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After pervading Western Europe for more than twenty years, early retirement trends reversed in the 
mid-1990's when activation policies re-converted existing incentives to extend working life (EWL). 
This study investigates the institutional conditions explaining the cross-national variation of activation 
policies' outcomes in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy between the mid-1990's and 2009.
Revoking  existing  benefits  for  diffused  and  uncertain  advantages,  these  policies  faced  harsh 
opposition from the coalitions (labour and capital organizations) interested in keeping the costs of 
early exit externalized for their members (older workers and their employers). In this study the central 
research question is: to what extent has the effectiveness of activation policies been affected by the 
organizational articulation of the externalization coalitions?
The  articulation  of  these  coalitions  is  framed  according  to  the  affinities  coupling  protection, 
production and partnership institutions. From an actor-centered perspective, the EWL re-conversion is  
depicted as a sequential game. Under irresistible environmental pressure, the state first interact with 
social partners to retrench welfare incentives and then to encourage HRM strategies to retain older 
workers. The higher is the organizational articulation of labour and capital, the more interactions tend  
to be framed in social governance modes that, discouraging opportunistic actions, convey the EWL re-
conversion from the strategy of the state into the companies' HRM. In these cooperative modes social 
partners are thus expected to not hinder but to support the adoption of retrenchment and retaining 
policies. Being the articulation the highest in the Netherlands, lower in Germany and the lowest in 
Italy, the effectiveness of activation policies is expected to follow the same pattern.
This hypothesis is tested using Event History Analysis on data drawn from the third wave of the  
SHARE in a two-stage research design estimating the effectiveness of retrenchment and retaining  
policies. The main findings show that social partners mediated the EWL re-conversion, promoting the 
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1  Introduction 3
1 Introduction
After pervading Western Europe for more than twenty years, early retirement trends reversed around 
the mid-1990's, when a series of welfare reforms, here defined as activation policies, set incentives to 
extend working life (EWL). Although reversing retirement trends, these policies did not cancel out,  
but  in some cases  even raised,  the cross-national  variation in the average age of exit  from work 
(OECD 2006; Gruber and Wise 1999; Phillipson et al. 2005).
 The  aim of  this  study  is  to  investigate  the  institutional  conditions  explaining  the cross-national 
variation of activation policies' outcomes. Activation policies for EWL by re-converting the incentives 
once used to  foster  early  exit  from work.  Those incentives  were first  institutionalized in  the  late  
1960's,  when  the  de-industrialization  process  brought  the  inclusion  of  special  arrangements  (or 
pathways of exit) in the pension system granting the inflow of workers before statutory retirement age. 
The incentives then drifted short after as they started being massively used by employers and social 
partners  to  cope  with  the  industrial  restructuring  induced  by  the  market  increased  competition  
(Ebbinghaus  2006).  Early  retirement  was  therefore  shaped by  a  mix  of  public-private  incentives. 
Public incentives (or pull factors) granted the Governments to adjust the workforce to the external  
forces in a climate of social peace and general consensus. This is because pathways of exit not only 
increased the welfare of older workers,  but also externalized the costs of the personnel's  turnover 
within  companies.  Therefore  pathways  of  exit  lead  to  institutionalization  of  human  resource 
management (HRM) practices (push factors) that aim at shedding older workers instead of promoting 
their work capacity. Those practices included private payments and other conditions penalizing work 
at later age, such as long and inflexible hours, high workload and stress, age discrimination, and the  
exclusion from training and career programs.  
Early retirement stopped being a win-win solution when the economic and demographic expansion 
that once had supported its widespread turned into a persistent contraction. The permanent economic  
austerity and the population ageing, shrinking the room for social spending and its financing, brought  
European Union to prioritize activation policies in the national Governments' political agenda (Arza 
and Kohli 2008). 
Since activation policies require a wide re-conversion of existing incentives,  Governments first 
retrenched  the  social  programs  offering  pathways  of  exit.  Although  re-conversion  did  not  call  
automatically for cuts, retrenchment was in this case necessary to de-legitimate the pathways' abuse  
and to push the re-conversion also in companies' HRM (Arza and Kohli 2008). 
Despite  the  decreasing  returns  of  early  retirement,  activation  policies  were  not  easy  to  push 
through. Revoking existing benefits for diffused and uncertain advantages, they faced opposing forces 
that, despite strong, did not prove to be immovable (Pierson 2000; Pierson 1998). Those forces were 
represented by the expectations of beneficiaries to the extent that they could form coalitions (here 
defined as externalization coalitions) able to hinder the outcome of activation policies (Manow 2001; 
Ebbinghaus 2006). 
The organization of these coalitions were shaped by the institutional setting that surrounded the 
actors  carrying  a  vested  interest  in  controlling  retirement  incentives.  These  actors  included  the 
Government  and  employers,  who  directly  produced  public  and  private  incentives,  and  interests' 
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organizations,  which mediated the effect  of  pull  and push incentives  (Ebbinghaus 2006).  In other 
words, involved in the social dialogue and in the collective bargaining, interests' organizations shaped  
the ways in which incentives were used and expectations were formed and aggregated. In short, this  
setting was the result of the affinities between the logics presiding at the social protection, production, 
and social partnership. It moreover shaped the conditions which lead the externalization coalitions to 
support or hinder the EWL re-conversion (Ebbinghaus 2006).  
  This research investigates the institutional conditions that, conveying of the EWL re-conversion top-
down, promote the effectiveness of activation policies and minimize the stratification of their effects 
both intra and inter-generationally.    
Since in literature already extensive knowledge is found about institutional conditions pertaining to 
the social protection system, this study focuses on the conditions pertaining to the system of interests'  
intermediation.  Therefore  the  three  cases  under  analysis  were  chosen  to  have  very  similar  social  
protection,  but  a  system  of  interests'  intermediation:  highly  coordinated  in  the  Netherlands,  less 
coordinated Germany,  and least  coordinated in  Italy.  Those  three countries  were characterized  by 
strong early retirement patterns that have been reversed in the mid-1990's, more successfully in the 
Netherlands, less successfully in Germany and least successfully in Italy.
From an actor-centered perspective, the coordination of the interests' intermediation is expected to 
affect the partnership settings where the Government attempts at re-converting retirement incentives  
and thus the coalitions' opportunities to hinder those attempts (Scharpf 1997; Arza and Kohli 2008). 
The success of the EWL re-conversion is not measured, as it is often the case in the welfare analysis,  
on  the  bases  of  political  outputs  but  on  outcomes.  Bridging  between  a  political  economy  and a 
sociology  streams,  this  research  aims at  examining  how institutional  legacies  affect  not  only  the 
effectiveness  of  activation  policies,  but  also  their  distributional  effects.  The  opposition  of  the 
externalization coalition in fact, preserving the expectations of their core members only, concentrates 
the effect of activation policies on social groups falling outside their membership and fosters both intra 
and inter-generational cleavages. This is because the costs of insiders' opportunism falls on outsiders  
and young generations, who have to double their sacrifices for keeping the system sustainable. This is  
the well known issue of the double payment: outsiders and young have to work longer before being 
able to retire and are entitled to lower benefits, which in turn lead them to work even longer (Ferrera 
and Jessoula 2007).      
In the following sections the empirical and institutional aspects leading to the formulation of the 
main research questions (Sections 1.1-1.2-1.3), the case selection rationale (Section 1.4) the theoretical 
aspects leading to the hypotheses (Section 1.5), the methodological aspects leading to the research  
design (Section 1.6), and the outline of the thesis are explained in detail. 
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The empirical premises of this  research is the evidence that,  despite reversing early retirement  
trends, activation policies appear to be the most effective in the Netherlands, less effective in Germany 
and least effective in Italy. As shown in Graph 1.1, plotting the employment rates of workers aged 50  
years or older between 1983-2009, early retirement trends reversed in the second half of the 1990's in 
all the three countries, but the older workers' activation is much less pronounced in Italy. While both in 
Germany and the Netherlands the employment  of  older  workers reaches  65% in 2009,  Italy lags 
behind with an employment rate of older workers below 50%.
Graph 1.1: Employment rate of older workers aged from 50 to 65 years in Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands between 1983 and 2009.
Source: Eurostat, 2013.
Looking at the employment trends of older workers by gender in Graphs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, it can be noticed 
that the mobilization was to a greater extent female. In Germany and the Netherlands the employment 
rate  of  women  aged  50+  (red  line)  grew since  the  early-1980's  as  a  result  of  the  increased  re-
integration of women after child-bearing (Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991c), rose steeper in the second 
half of the 1990's, and attained more than 50% in 2009. In Italy instead older women's employment  
grew only after the mid-1990's remained below 40%. The mid-1990's signed also the start of older 
men's mobilization (blue line), which turn out to follow the same pattern explained for women. It is 
again much more remarkable in the Netherlands and Germany (about 20%), than in Italy (less than  
10%). 
To show how long older workers remain in employment, the trends of the effective average age of  
retirement in the same period (for Germany available only since 1996) are shown in Graphs 1.5 and 
1.6. These graphs show that in the Netherlands, despite the share of older women in employment grew 
since the early-1980's, the effective age of exit kept on falling for both men and women until the mid-
1990's.  This  is  because  women,  who  increasingly  returned  to  work  in  their  mid-age,  were  also 
increasingly encouraged as well as men to access a pathway of exit. Once the exit age of men and  
women inverted their trends, they rose rather gradually. Men's age first grew from 60 to 61 years, then  
fluctuated between 1995-2005 and finally rose steeply by 2 years until  2009. By the same token, 
women's age first grew from 59 to 60 years, then fluctuated and only after 2000 grew again beyond 61.
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Graph 1.2- 1.3- 1.4: Employment trends of older men and older women (50-64 years) between 
1983 and 2009 in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. 
Source: Eurostat, 2013.
   
The average exit age grew more steadily in Germany and Italy. In Germany it rose from 60 to 62  
years for men and from 59 to 61 for women. The highest increments are unexpectedly obtained in 
Italy, not so much for men's age raising from 60 to 61 years, but for women's age rocketing in less than 
a decade from 57 to almost 62 years.
   
Graph 1.5 - 1.6: Average effective age of employment exit for men and women 
between 1980 and 2009 in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. 
Source: OECD, 2013 
Combining the information from the exit age and the employment rate trends, it can be argued that 
in  the  Netherlands,  Germany,  and  Italy  working  lives  are  extended  only  after  the  Government 
retrenched pathways of exit. While in Germany the employment growth is associated to a clear rise of 
the  retirement  age  after  the  mid-1990's,  trends  are  less  clear  in  the  other  two  countries.  In  the  
Netherlands the size of older workers' cohorts increases more than Germany and Italy, but the exit age 
rises more gradually. On the contrary in Italy only a very selective group seems to delay significantly  
their exit. 
Those outcomes can be interpreted as the result of different environmental pressures. More likely 
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they  can  derive  from  the  institutional  settings,  providing  externalization  coalitions  different 
opportunities  to  hinder  the  EWL re-conversion.  The  extent  to  which  outcomes  are  functional  or 
induced by the vested interests is discussed in the next section.  
1.2 Extending working life: institutional perspective
From a functionalist perspective, outcomes can be explained by different environmental pressures. 
As shown by BlossfeId, Buchholz, and Hofäcker (2006) and Kohli et al. (1991), the environment is a 
powerful  trigger  of  institutional  and  behavioural  change.  If  pressures  deriving  from  de-
industrialization and globalization pushed for the institutionalization of pathways of exit and early 
retirement  patterns,  the  EWL re-conversion  is  pushed by  pressures  exerted  by  the  ageing  of  the 
population. 
One way of estimating this pressure is to look at the old age dependency ratio in the Netherlands,  
Germany and Italy since the early 1990's. This is calculated as the proportion of individuals at an age  
when they are economically inactive (aged 65+) over the working age population (aged 15-64) and it 
gives a clue about the financial  strains pushing the re-conversion. Those strains are actually even 
stronger because, being the welfare based on PAYG system, early retirement increases the share of  
dependents in need for support, as shrinking the workforce able to finance it. 
 As shown by Graph 1.7, despite the demographic pressure triggered the change, it did not lead the  
countries under higher strain, as Italy, to achieve the highest outcomes. On the contrary, the wider 
mobilization  of  older  workers  occurred  where  the  pressure  was  lower,  in  the  Netherlands  and 
Germany.   
Graph 1.7: Old-age dependency ratios for Germany, Italy and the Netherlands between 1980 and 2012.
Source: World Bank, 2014
The functionalist thesis thus does not hold here, since the impact of the environmental pressure (in this 
case demographic) on retirement patterns is always filtered by the institutional setting  (Kohli et al. 
1991;  BlossfeId,  Buchholz,  and  Hofäcker  2006). The  setting  filters  the  environmental  forces  by 
limiting the possible trajectories of change that the interaction of the relevant actors  lead  to (Crouch 
2001). The Government, social partners and employers, depending on their power balance, set the 
prevailing strategical goals and set policy incentives accordingly.  
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If  the  globalization  pressure  gave  the  opportunity  to  the  beneficiaries  to  form  a  coalition  to  
externalize the costs of the increased international competition, the cuts induced by the demographic 
pressure  caused  the  coalition's  opposition.  The  institutional  legacies  shared  by  the  Netherlands,  
Germany,  and  Italy  give  the  externalization  coalitions  the  opportunity  to  hinder  the  EWL re-
conversion. This is because their involvement in the regulation of retirement incentives makes their 
involvement necessary also for their reform. The institutional specificities however might have caused 
the coalitions to affect the activation policies' outcomes in a different way.   
This argument seems to find support in the data. Looking at the employment trend of older workers 
with different skills' endowment, operationalised in Graphs 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10 as the educational level,  
it  can  be  noticed  that  activation  policies  created  different  distributional  effects.  In  Italy  the 
employment  trend  grew  mainly  among  highly  skilled  workers  (Graph  1.9),  who  are  usually 
underrepresented in the unions' membership and more productive than the rest of the workforce. On  
the contrary outcomes are equally distributed across older workforce, as it is the case in Germany 
(Graph 1.8) and the Netherlands (Graph 1.10). 
Graph 1.8 – 1.9 – 1.10: Employment trends of older workers (50-64 years) between 1992 and 2009 
by educational attainment in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. 
All in all, the institutional specificities led to a different outcomes in the EWL re-conversion, being  
the greatest in the Netherlands, lower in Germany, and the least in Italy. At first sight, this is because in 
Italy  the  externalization  coalitions  had  higher  opportunities  to  preserve  the  expectations  of  their 
members than in Germany and the Netherlands. 
1.3 Research questions  
This research contributes to the existing academic debate on the institutional conditions enhancing an 
active, healthy, and a sustainable ageing by means of a shared and integrated strategy. It does so by  
identifying the conditions that reduce the opportunities of the externalization coalition to hinder the  
effectiveness of activation policies.  In more general terms these conditions refer to the institutional 
affinities between protection, production, and partnership. The affinities refer to a typical coupling 
between the logic of institutions that, in  the sphere of protection, partnership, and production, regulate 
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retirement incentives. This is further explained in Section 1.4. 
    In European countries where the affinities (based on universalistic or residual welfare logic) limited 
the costs' externalization of early exit, the expectations tend to be either too small or disaggregated to  
form  a  coalition  threatening  the  EWL re-conversion.  More  interesting  are  the  cases  where  the 
affinities, based on a conservative welfare logic, fostered high expectations in vertically organized  
coalitions,  as in the Netherlands,  Germany,  and Italy.  Here expectations  were high and organized 
enough to impede unilateral action of the Government. Nevertheless, as shown in the previous section, 
their inclusion into the re-conversion process produced significantly different outcomes.
Central  research question  To what extent  has the effectiveness of activation policies in the 
Netherlands,  Germany,  and  Italy  between  the  mid-1990's  and  2009  been  affected  by  the 
organizational articulation of the externalization coalition? 
The expectations of the externalization coalitions are part of the interests represented the unions 
and  employers'  associations.  The  organizational  articulation  of  these  associations  depends  on  the 
extent to which those interests, aggregated according to democratic criteria, can be represented at more 
central levels. In all the three cases the interests are articulated enough to be represented at national  
level by Confederation boards. 
Governments  were  required  to  involve  those  boards  since  the  beginning  in  the  re-conversion 
process, when retrenchment policies were first formulated and then implemented. This involvement 
took place in different modes of social governance. The extent to which this involvement supported or 
hindered  the  effectiveness  of  retrenchment  policies  and in  turn  can  explain  the  difference  in  the 
outcomes is investigated in the first empirical part of this study (Chapters 5-6-7).      
RQ2: Under which institutional  conditions has the involvement of  unions and employers'  
Confederations  in  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  retrenchment  policies  promoted  their  
effectiveness in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy between the mid-1990's and 2009?
The organizational articulation of interests' associations does not only allow the expectations to affect  
bottom-up the policymaking. Unions and employers associations can also coordinate top-down the 
incentives provided by the HRM policies through the collective bargaining system. The collective 
bargaining  system  is  enough  vertically  coordinated  to  constrain  the  companies  strategies  to  the 
agreements  negotiated  at  sectoral-industry-workplace  levels  in  all  three  country.  Nevertheless 
collective agreements (CLAs) may convey two strategies, one opposite to the other. The first is to keep 
on shedding older workers with incentives able to compensate the retrenchment of the pathways of  
exit that the coalition could not hinder above. The second is to retain older employees with incentives 
able to support both their productivity and their work preferences (Trampusch 2006; 2007)  The extent 
to which the involvement of social partners in the collective bargaining supported or hindered the  
effectiveness of retaining policies and in turn can explain the difference in the outcomes is investigated 
in the second empirical part of this study (Chapters 8-9-10).      
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RQ3:  Under  which  institutional  conditions  have  unions  and  employers'  associations  
promoted the effectiveness of retaining policies in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy between the  
mid-1990's and 2009?
The vertical articulation of the interests' organizations do not only affect the outcome of activation 
policies,  but  also  their  distributional  effect.  Depending  on  how  encompassing  the  interests  they  
represent  (Olson  1982),  unions  and  employers'  associations  may  minimize  or  intensify  the 
distributional  effects of activation policies across social  groups, both intra and inter-generationally 
(Kohli 2006).    
 
RQ4:  Under which institutional conditions have unions and employers' associations affected the  
distributional effects of activation policies in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy between the mid-
1990's and 2009?
All together, the research questions investigate the extent to which the organizational articulation of 
the system of interests  representation explains different  mobilization outcomes in the Netherlands,  
Germany, and Italy. This is because their different coordination lead them to either support of hinder 
the effectiveness of retrenchment and retaining policies. The hypotheses about the association between 
institutional coordination of the interests' representation and policy effectiveness is based on a twofold 
theoretical framework of the actor-centered institutionalism and the institutional affinities. 
1.4 Theory and hypotheses
As described before, although institutionalized by public incentives, the international variation of 
retirement  patterns  can  not  be  explained  by  only  looking  at  the  generosity  of  pathways  of  exit.  
Employers  are  also  interested  to  manage  the  turnover  of  their  staff  and  set  private  incentives  
accordingly. Finally, social partners mediate the public and private incentives in the interest of their  
constituencies (Ebbinghaus 2006). 
From a historical institutionalist perspective, retirement patterns are therefore the outcome of the 
coupling  between  the  institutions  presiding  at  protection,  production  and  partnership  systems  by 
Ebbinghaus (2006). This coupling tend to occur between inherently similar institutions, or in other 
words  affinities.  This  is  because  their  interaction,  producing  complementarities  where  the 
arrangements  in  one  sphere  enhance  the  results  in  other,  grants  comparative  advantages.  The 
institutional logic pursued by the three spheres are classified respectively according to the “The three  
worlds of welfare capitalism” (Esping Andersen 1990), “The variety of capitalism” (VoC) (Hall and 
Soskice 2001), and the “The three modes of interests mediation” (Crouch 1993). 
The protection  logic  is  classified according to the level  of  de-commodification granted by the 
welfare  system.  Despite  providing  opposite  levels  of  de-commodification,  residual  and  the 
universalistic logic lead to the institutionalization of pathways of exit of moderate generosity. On the 
contrary the most generous incentives are produced in welfare systems led by a conservative logic as 
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in the three cases under analysis. Being institutions affines a residual welfare is associated to poorly 
coordinated markets, where companies's strategy responds only to a competitive logic. As opposed to 
this  liberal  market economy (LME),  in coordinated market economies (CME) companies have an  
interests to cooperate to the detriment of pure competitive motives and develop a system of interests 
representation.
The more coordinated is the system of interests' representation, the more the state can interfere with 
pure market mechanisms to coordinate companies' competitive strategies. The vertical coordination (or 
organizational articulation) is associated to a specific logic of interaction between unions, employers  
organizations,  and  the  state  (here  defined  as  partnership  system).  The  logic  is  pluralistic  where  
interactions are poorly institutionalized and outcomes are therefore based on contingent relative power 
between  actors.  If  interactions  are  instead  highly  institutionalized  among  coordinated  actors,  
interactions  are  frequently  iterated.  The  iteration  lead  to  reciprocation  and  thus  to  a  cooperative  
partnership, where actors prefer outcomes where mutual overcome selfish benefits. This is not the case  
when interactions, occurring among very fragmented interests' system, are rarer and thus contentious. 
Therefore the specific mechanism that couples the institutions governing the sphere of protection, 
partnership, and production together affects the regulation of retirement incentives. Those mechanisms 
allow  the  push  incentives,  produced  by  HRM practices,  to  be  strategically  steered  top-down  by 
collective agreements and social policies. At the same time however those mechanisms give to micro 
strategies of beneficiaries the opportunity to aggregate and affect the policymaking of pull incentives.
The main argument of this research is that, once the environment pushed the welfare state to EWL, 
the institutional affinities, influencing the partnership system, affect the top-down conveyance of the 
EWL re-conversion and its  outcome. Tthe outcomes are compared in three countries with similar  
affinities, but for this coordination, being high in the Netherlands, medium in Germany and poor in 
Italy (see for more information section 3.4). 
Since this comparison involves a limited part of the institutional structure in a relatively small  
range of time and space, the focus should deviate from institutions to actors. In the framework offered 
by actor-centered institutionalism the re-conversion can be depicted as a sequential game between the  
relevant actors, in this case: the state, employers and social partners. 
Employers  are  considered  here as  partially  separated  from their  interests'  associations.  This is  
because employers can defect from their collective actions, unless their organizations set incentive to 
punish opportunistic actions (Olson 1965). 
The institutional setting is relevant here because, as depicted in Graph 1.10, it affects the type of 
game that produces the outcomes. Around the mid-1990's the EWL re-conversion, triggered by the 
policy  environment, reaches the political agenda and started sequential game. The setting first affects  
the  actors'  orientations  and  capabilities.  In  this  case  the  organizational  articulation  of  interests  
representation affects the strategical motives leading the state, social partners, and employers to enter  
the interaction (this is further explained in Chapter 3). On the bases of their perceived preferences and 
reciprocal capabilities, bounded-rational actors order their possible courses of actions (or strategies) 
according to the advantages (or payoff)  they perceive they would gain from them (constellation). 
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Depending on whether payoffs award strategies involving mutual benefits or opportunistic actions, the 
partnership between actors (game) tend to be antagonistic (zero-sum) or cooperative (positive-sum). 
The  constellation  furthermore,  influencing  the  relative  power  among  actors,  define  the  modes  of 
interaction,  that  is  the  mechanisms  that,  solving  the  conflict  in  the  interaction  (majority  votes, 
unanimity, veto points etc.), lead to policy output and outcomes (Scharpf 1997).      
Graph 1.10: Feedback process in actor-centered institutionalist policy approach
 
source: Scharpf, 1999; author's elaboration
 
According to Ebbinghaus, the interactions between the state, social partners, and employers take 
place in four typical modes of social governance: consultation, concertation, self-administration, and 
self-regulation. Although depending on the circumstances in which these modes take place, in average 
consultation and self-administration make the top-down conveyance of the EWL re-conversion easier 
than the concertation and self-administration (see for more details Chapter 3). This is because being 
associated  to  cooperative  partnership  that  sanctions  opportunistic  strategies,  social  partners  are 
discouraged from hindering the policymaking and thus the outcomes of activation policies.  
 Since cooperative partnership is more likely to occur for higher  organizational  articulation of  
labour and capital interest, the general hypothesis tested in this research is the following. Activation 
policies are more likely to be effective the stronger is the organizational articulation of the system of  
labour and capital's intermediation system. 
Accordingly  activation policies  are  expected  to  be the most  effective in  countries  with strong 
articulation, such as in the Netherlands, less effective in countries with medium articulation, such as in 
Germany, and the least effective  in countries with a low articulation, such as in Italy.
Specific hypotheses  pertaining to the effect  of  organizational  articulation of  labour and capital 
interest are  derived for  each  instance  (macro  -meso-  micro)  in  which retrenchment  and retaining 
policies are formulated and implemented. These hypotheses are tested in two empirical sections, one 
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1.5 Research design 
The  data  on  which  the  hypothesis  is  tested  is  the  Survey  on  Health  and  Retirement  in  Europe  
(SHARE) because older workers represent the full sample of the respondents. The main dataset used is  
Sharelife,  the  third  wave,  because  it  provides  comparable  retrospective information  over  the 
retirement trajectories of different cohorts of older workers in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.  
This enables comparing the trajectories of older workers exposed to strong pull and push incentives 
and the trajectory of cohorts whose retirement incentives have been affected by activation policies.
This  cohort analysis is the core of the research design, which is  not aimed at evaluating these 
policies.  Instead  the goal  is  to  infer from the typical  patterns  of  these two different  cohorts,  the 
institutional  attempts that  protection,  production,  and  partnership  made  to  foster  the  extension of 
working  life.  This  cohort  analysis  assumes  different  characteristics  in  Germany,  Italy,  and  the 
Netherlands,  because  of  the  different  processes  by  which  the  extending  working  life  paradigm 
penetrates the institutional affinities in the three countries.
The effectiveness  of retrenchment and retaining policies are estimated separately in two different 
analyses, which require two different processes of operationalization. In the first part of the research 
design  that  estimates  the  effectiveness  of  retrenchment  policies,  work-retirement  trajectories are 
operationalized as the institutional arrangements (pathways of exit) that the individual experience to 
pass from employment until the statutory retirement at the age of 65. Retrenchment policies are instead 
operationalized  as  a  cohort  effect. In  the  second  part  of  the  research  design  that  estimates  the 
effectiveness of retaining policies, work retirement trajectories are operationalized as its starting point: 
the age of exit  from employment. This different operationalization is due to the different nature of 
retaining policies that affect mainly the permanence of older workers in the job and to a lesser extent  
the  sequence  of  institutional  arrangement  that  follows  the  exit  from  employment.  The  different  
dimensions of retaining policies finally are operationalized as a set of working conditions concerning 
health,  safety,  and  support  in  the  workplace  experienced  by  older  workers  in  their  last  job.  The 
subjective measurement of the quality of those working conditions are reduced, using Iterative Factor 
Analysis into  three  factors  that  represent  to  what  extent  the  dimensions  of  physical  health 
reconciliation, mental health reconciliation, and age equality are promoted. Other two variables are 
used  to  represent  the  extent  HRM  policies  foster  the  dimensions  of  time  reconciliation  and 
employability:  the performance of part-time work, and the extent skills are developed. Finally the 
average level of retaining measures will be interacted with the cohort effect, in order to refine the  
effectiveness of retaining policies from the effectiveness of retrenchment policies (main effect). 
The  methods  used  to  estimate  the  effectiveness  of  activation  policies  and  thus  the  top-down 
alignment of protection, partnership, and production to extend working life are Event History Analysis 
for two main reasons. First EHA is the appropriate method to investigate durations before an event, 
and thus the extension of the career before the exit due to retirement. Secondly, EHA can successfully 
deal with the right-censored observations that in the sample represent individuals that are exposed to  
activation policies but are still in employment.  
The effectiveness of retrenchment policies are investigated using Competing-Risk model  in order 
to  estimate  to  what  extent  older  workers  exposed to  the  retrenchment  policies  have  significantly  
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changed their  typical retirement trajectories. The  effectiveness of retaining policies  is investigated 
using Piecewise-constant exponential model  in order to estimate to what extent older workers exposed 
to retaining policies delay significantly their exit from employment. 
1.6 Outline
In Chapter 2 a review of the literature pertaining to the institutional incentives of retirement behaviour  
is  presented.  It  first  reviews  the  theories  and  the  contributions  concerning  the  pull  and  push 
institutional  incentives  and  the  social  stratification  of  their  behavioural  effect.  Subsequently  it 
continues with the theories that model institutional incentives as the result of the logic of different part  
of the institutional framework. At the end it describes the scientific contribution of this research.   
Chapter 3 is devoted to the description of the analytical framework. After defining the main concepts  
of the research (work-retirement transitions and activation policies), the main theoretical foundation is 
described: the theory on Institutional affinities and complementarity between protection, partnership, 
and production, as discussed by Ebbinghaus (2006) and actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf 1997). 
Based of this theoretical model, the main hypotheses guiding this investigation are formulated. 
Chapter 4  discusses the methodology for testing the hypotheses.  First  the operationalization of 
work-retirement  transitions  and  activation  policies  is  explained.  Then  detailed  information  over 
Sharelife and over the samples of the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy are provided. At the end the  
EHA techniques are discussed that are applied to test the hypotheses: the competing-risk model (CR)  
and the piecewise constant exponential model (PCE).
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 form Part 1 and contain the empirical section with the investigation of the  
extent to which  the partnership structure has affected the effectiveness of retrenchment policies to 
EWL. This part answers the research questions RQ 2 and 4. It considers at whether in the Netherlands 
and Germany cooperative social partners have contributed to implement retrenchment policies that 
lower significantly more the likelihood of entering  pathways of exit than the retrenchment policies 
implemented in Italy, where social partners are instead antagonistic.   
Chapters 8, 9, and 10 form Part 2 and contain the empirical section on investigating the extent to 
which the partnership structure has affected the effectiveness of retaining policies to EWL. This part 
answers the research questions RQ 3 and 4. It analyses whether in the Netherlands retaining policies 
conveyed by the very coordinated social partners lower the likelihood of exiting employment more 
than the retaining policies conveyed respectively by the less coordinated social partners in Germany  
and by the least coordinate social partners in Italy. 
Chapter  11  the  final  conclusions are  summarized  and  the  main  findings,  contributions  and 
limitations of this research are discussed.   
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2 Literature review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to the review of the literature on retirement determinants and to the innovative 
contribution of this research. The review is organized first according to the main incentives that are 
produced by the institutional framework, according to the widely used distinction between pull and 
push incentives.
Although institutions affect retirement, they do not determine a unique standardized behavior since 
their effect is both  mediated and moderated  by socio-demographic characteristics and occupational 
and household circumstances.  On the one  hand micro  and meso characteristics  shapes  individual  
preferences  (“agency”)  and  bring  individuals  to  react  differently  to  the  same  set  of  incentives 
(“structure”). On the other hand, incentives tend to be socially stratified because different outcomes is  
encouraged in different  social  groups.  Therefore,  we are  going to consider the literature over the  
individual and household characteristics that  mediate and interact with the effect of pull and push 
incentives on retirement behavior. At micro level the literature has focused on the following socio-
demographic characteristics: gender, health status, education. At meso level three main spheres are 
relevant  within  the  literature:  the  household,  the  occupational  and  social  network.  The  relevant 
dimension at household level is the gender-based division of care duties that affect the institutional 
trajectories of the couple, which not only are interrelated as a result of joint retirement norms and 
preferences, but are also affected by other additional circumstances: union disruption, fertility and 
additional care duties of frail household's members. Occupational and social network are relevant as  a  
sphere of socializations, where social norms are created and thus preferences are shaped, while the  
occupational status also stratifies both pull and push incentives.
Furthermore we are going to move to a wider perspective and we will review the theories that has 
tried to map retirement outcomes in Europe and beyond according to institutional logic leading the 
policy-making in the protection, production, and partnership spheres, which in our context are defined 
as institutional affinities. 
We will first review the typologies based on different  welfare regimes. We will then move to the 
concept of institutional complementarities and we will review the literature based on the VoC welfare  
regime  approach  that  have  investigated  retirement  outcomes  as  the  results  of  complementary 
incentives set by affines institutions within protection, production, and partnership. We will then pass 
from a static  to a  longitudinal  perspective and we will  review the contributions that  investigated  
tensions to institutional complementarities that govern retirement patterns caused by an external and  
an internal forces: namely globalization and population ageing. 
We will then move on to locate the main weaknesses of the literature body that this research will  
address and finally we will expose the innovative contribution and the social relevance of this work.
This  chapter  is  structured  as  follows.  First  the  literature  on  the  main  effect  of  institutional  
incentives  is  reviewed,  as  divided  in  pull  and push incentives  in  Sections  2.2  and 2.3.  Then the 
literature  about  how  preferences  mediate  and  moderated  the  effect  of  institutional  incentives  is 
investigated  by  looking  at  the  both  individual  socio-economic  characteristic  and  household 
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composition. The remaining of the chapter is devoted to explaining how those incentives are combined 
in  regimes  characterized  by  different  institutional  affinities  and  how  those  affinities  can  drive  
institutional change. Finally the innovative character of this research is presented.  
2.2 Institutional determinants of retirement behavior: pull and   
push incentives
As widely documented by the literature, retirement is created and lead by institutions, which provides 
the  main direct determinants of retirement behaviour. Since the industrial revolution, the exit from 
employment  in  old-age  is  a  very  common trait,  because  the decline  of  the  work  capacity  makes  
workers unemployable. Since the second half of XIXth centuries however, the state has protected 
elderly from the poverty that followed this transition with the introduction of old-age pension benefits 
that institutionalized retirement as a phase of life (Kohli 2007). Retirement thus has its origin in the 
public attempt of dumping the social spill-over effect caused by firm's strategy of shedding redundant 
elderly.
Afterwards, the economic boom after the second post-world war period made possible generous 
redistributive  policies  that  anticipated  the  entitlement  to  increasingly  higher  social  benefits  (pull 
incentives)  to  improve  the  political  consensus.  Employers  have  in  the  same  period  created 
complementary incentives (push incentives) that enable them to shed older workers when they become 
redundant. 
Different streams of literature investigated the effect of retirement incentives generated by social  
protection systems and employers. The economic literature has focused on retirement as a product of 
increasing pull incentives,  under the assumption that  older workers prefer  to substitute work with  
leisure, the more pension benefit replace their last wage (among others Gruber & Wise 1999; 2004). 
This approach is complemented by a second stream of literature, which focus on employers' attitudes  
toward  older  workers.  Under  the  assumption  that  ageing  disrupt  the  work  capacity,  this  stream 
investigates the extent to which working conditions (push incentives) are strategically set to shed older 
workers.
2.2.1 Pull incentives
The simplest retirement model is provided by the economic labour supply theory, which predicts that 
workers, because of aging, gradually substitute their work commitment for leisure until the full exit 
from employment (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004). However this model proves to be unrealistic because, 
unless savings are concerned, retirement is possible only when the wage is replaced by other sources.  
The preference for leisure is found instead among the motives that, among others, makes individual 
more or less sensitive to retire as soon as, in Esping-Andersen's words, he becomes de-commodified,  
i.e. relived from the necessity of gaining their living in the labour market . The necessary resources 
may be found in earlier savings, in the income earned by other household's members, but more often 
in welfare benefits (Esping Andersen 1990). 
Retirement  itself  is  explicitly  institutionalized  with  the  creation  of  pension  systems  to  de-
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commodify  elderly  that  are  not  anymore  employable  in  the  labour  market.  The  offer  of  this 
institutional  opportunity  of  de-commodified leisure  attracted older  workers,  who were pulled into 
inactivity. As shown by different life course studies, this institutionalization increased the timing of  
employment exit highly standardized around the age that entitled individuals to the pension benefits  
and opened a third phase of  leisure after education and work (Kohli 1986, 2007). 
During the post second world war economic expansion,  a series of redistributive policies have  
increased  pension  benefits  to  foster  the  political  consensus.  Moreover,  in  the  mid-1970's  when 
globalization's economic turmoil threatened the economic stability worldwide, retirement became an 
instrument to dampen the social costs of increasing the flexibility of the workforce. 
On this purpose, additional institutional arrangements were implemented to attract older workers  
earlier into inactivity (the so-called pull incentives). These incentives were implemented within the  
pension, the unemployment, and the disability schemes and institutionalized different pathways of exit  
that, according to the definition of Kohli and Rein, made the transition toward retirement a trajectory 
(1991). As a result of these reforms, patterns of employment exit became increasingly re-standardized 
around earlier age and a new leisure period was institutionalized until statutory retirement  (Han and 
Moen 1999).   
The attractiveness of pathways of exit did not rely only in the earlier entitlement to social benefit  
and their increased generosity. More relevant was the very low opportunity cost of retiring early. Since  
benefits were calculated according to strong non-actuarial formula that cuts substantially the financial  
advantages  to  remain  longer  in  the  workforce.   The  positive  causal  effect  of  pull  incentives  on  
retirement  timing has  been widely assessed by numerous  comparative and country-based studies 
(Blöndal and Scarpetta 1998; Gruber and Wise 1998;  1999; 2004).
This assessment required more complex econometric indicators, which model retirement as the 
comparison  between  the  benefit  streams  associated  to  the  different  pathways  of  exit  and  the 
opportunity costs of keep on working for some additional years.  Among these indicators the social 
security  wealth  (SSW) and the option value (OP)  are  the  benchmark.  The social  security  wealth 
measures “the expected discounted value of the future streams of” benefits coming from different sets  
of institutional incentives. The option value indicator allows to model the choice of older workers as a  
comparison between the SSW of retiring at present and the SSW of postponing retirement at some 
point in the future. In both cases the calculation of pull incentives is discounted on the life expectancy 
for each cohort of older workers.  (Brugiavini and Peracchi 2004; Gruber and Wise 2004).
These  studies  suffer,  among  others,  by  three  main  limitations.  First  they  assume  perfect  
information   among older workers, who actually have in average insufficient resources to both gain 
and elaborate the necessary information for such a long-term planning. Secondly they significantly 
ignore the subtle influence of social norms, which apply implicit rewards and sanctions to the conduct 
of their members. Finally these studies leave completely aside the complementary set of institutional 
incentives created by employers to manage their staff outflow. These incentives rely in the working 
conditions that older workers experience in their job and include both the financial gains they obtain 
by either working or dismissing and the quality of the working methods and of the job environment.  
The review of the literature that investigated the extent to which firm's incentives change the balance  
between work and retirement is provided in the next section. 
18 2  Literature review
2.2.2 Push incentives
Since the staff represents a key aspect of the firm's performance, employers have a vested interests in  
governing  the  outflow  of  older  workers  as  part  of  their  strategy  to  maximize  their  firm's 
competitiveness. 
As widely documented by the literature, employers tend to have in general a negative attitudes toward 
older workers and to encourage their dismissals as soon as possible using so-called push incentives.  
The motives of this negative attitude relies in stereotypes that depict the work capacity as inevitably 
decaying with ageing and that justify the statistical discrimination of older workers in firms (OECD 
2006; for the Netherlands Sonnet and OECD 2005; for Germany OECD 2005; for Italy OECD 2004).  
According to the implicit contract theory, this negative attitude is especially developed in productive 
system based complex firm-specific skills, which require a high initial investment when workers are 
just hired and are hardly transferable. This enhance employers to retain their staff over the life course  
to  maximize  their  returns,  with the  so-called  implicit  contract.  This  contract  requires  the  earning 
profile to starts lower than workers' productivity to compensate the initial investment made to develop 
firm-specific  skills,  grows  along  with  seniority  and  exceeds  it  in  late  career,  when  workers'  
productivity decreases. This upward career path is defined Internal Labour Market (ILM) and involve 
along time decreasing return and increasing costs.  The balance between the companies returns and 
costs is broken in the late career, when due to ageing seniors staff experience significant productivity  
losses. Since ILM's are often associated with a rigid employment regulation that impede unilateral 
dismissals of seniors, the most rational strategy for companies is to enhance their voluntary exit, by 
using push factors (Doeringer and Piore 1985; Lazear 1979).     
They can be both financial and non-financial and they complement the effect of pull incentives. 
Monetary push incentives support the finance of seniors after dismissals or top up social benefits when 
they prove to be insufficiently attractive. More in detail they can be provided by secondary or third-
private pillar pension programs or by ad-hoc lump-sum benefits, often referred as golden-handshakes. 
Since monetary push incentives promote early retirement, by further de-commodifying seniors, they 
are functional substitute (Kohli et al. 1991; Ebbinghaus 2006; Casey 1989).     
Non-monetary incentives instead discourage seniors to continue their career in a more subtle way. 
They concern the aspects of the workplace and the working conditions that can affect the performance 
of older workers and thus their self-esteem. While the needs, the preferences and the capacities change  
with ageing, those work aspects have to be adapted to support the performance of seniors. If this is not 
the case their productivity together with their self-esteem, encouraging them to leave the job, which 
they perceive they can not perform anymore (Reci and de Bruijn 2006; Ilmarinen 2005; Tuomi et al. 
2001; Schmid and Gazier 2002; Montizaan, de Grip, and Fouarge 2014).  
In a comparative perspective, it has been showed that  in countries where internal  and external 
rigidities are stronger, there is a higher likelihood of retiring around early age boundary as a result of  
heavy incentives set by HRM policies. From the perspective of seniors, whose bargaining positions is 
often  rather  weak,  retirement  becomes  in  many  cases  mandatory  because  from a  pure  economic 
perspective older workers would prefer to continue working in a context of upward wage-profile .  
(OECD 2006; Mortelmans and Denaeghel 2013; Blau and Shvydko 2011). 
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Not  only,  as  argued  by  Transitional  Labour  market  and  flexicurity  theory,  because  of  those 
rigidities, retirement becomes an abrupt transition, notwithstanding the interest of older workers of 
leaving gradually their  job, along with their increasing preference for leisure  (Schmid and Gazier 
2002). Only with a gradual withdrawal older workers can get accustomed stepwise to their new status,  
plan  new activities,  build  up  a  new identity  and avoid the typical  depression  symptoms that  are 
associated to the void of leaving their job abruptly.    
Therefore  employers'  shedding  strategy  can  make  retirement  not  only mandatory  but  also  as  
involuntary.  The possibility that retirement may hinder individual preferences has stimulated a new 
branch of literature on the effects and the determinants of a forced exit from employment. On one 
hand, different studies have found a negative effect of unmet retirement expectations on subsequent  
physical  and  mental  well-being,  measured  as:  life  satisfaction,  emotional  satisfaction  stability,  
usefulness, self-image,especially on men (Van Solinge and Henkens 2007; Schultz et al., 1998). 
Other studies have instead further investigated involuntary retirement determinants and identified 
the most hampering push factors in those organizational aspects that worsen older workers' health,  
such as heavy physical or mental workload, long working hours, and labour market rigidities that raise 
the  labour  costs  of  seniors  and  deteriorate  health  conditions (Van  Solinge  and  Henkens,  2005). 
Moreover involuntary retirement follow a cyclical trend. In fact during economic restructuring older 
workers are over-represented in collective dismissals, because their positions are often obsolete and  
the social costs of their dismissals is more easily compensated by public and private benefits (Van 
Solinge and Henkens  2007 ;  Siegrist et al. 2007).
The push strategy has its origins not only in the high labour costs of older workers due to strong 
ILM, but also in a statistical discrimination  due to pervasive age-stereotypes in the human resources 
management. These stereotypes depict an irreversible decline of the work capacity and productivity  
along aging, that cannot be compensated by programs of skills' updating and reconversion for two 
orders of reasons. On one hand the cognitive ability are thought to irreversibly decay with age, making  
problematic  for  older  workers  to  learn  new  working  methods.  On  the  other  hand,  the  training 
investment is judged not profitable, since the returns are limited to the short remaining working career 
(among others OECD, 2006;  (Bayl-Smith and Griffin 2014). The combination of these two reasons 
makes the statistical discrimination of older workers rationale in different aspects of the employment 
relations.  For  instance  their  exclusion  from  training  and  other  innovative  programs  foster  their 
productivity  gap  and  in  turns  justifies  their  discrimination  by  their  bosses  and  their  colleagues 
(Illmarinen, 2006; Loretto and White, 2006).
As shown by gerontologist studies, these age stereotype are for the vast part irrational, since the 
irreversible decay of work capacity is not based on scientific evidence. In fact the natural decline of 
productivity is found to be compensated by the experience and the expertise developed along the  
career, which enhance the problem-solving skills of older workers  (Illmarinen 2006). Moreover the 
irreversible decline of cognitive skills is denied by studies that show how learning performance can be 
improved by adapting learning methods to older workers'  background  (Schmid and Gazier 2002). 
Finally when health problems that compromise work capacity are concerned, evidence is found that an 
healthy, safe, and more comfortable job environment supports the well-being and the productivity of 
older workers. 
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In short, the general arguments of this literature is that working conditions that satisfies age-related 
needs extend working life, because they weaken the reasons why older workers and companies prefer  
early retirement. In fact these job aspects make older workers more competitive for the companies and 
increases their job satisfaction, their self-esteem and their will to continue working (Boockmann et al., 
2012).
This last arguments is based on a basic assumption developed in work psychology and occupational 
sociology, that work is not only instrumental to gather economic resources. It has an intrinsic value, 
since it provides individuals with social status, work identity and self-esteem (Doherty, 2009 in Radl, 
2010). These intrinsic rewards derives from the individual self-consciousness of mastering ones' job 
which as a parable  increases with experience, but tend to decrease with aging, especially if working  
conditions do not support  performance during aging (Illmarinen, 2006). 
At first intrinsic rewards depends on the interaction between older workers' health and their work  
environment. In fact the health, the needs, and the preferences of individuals changes after mid-life 
making older workers either less able or less favorable to work long hours, in physically or mentally 
demanding jobs. Moreover if not supported by training programs older workers may experience their  
skills' endowment to be  insufficient to perform their tasks, as modified by continuous technological 
innovation.
When the interaction  between ageing  and work  environment  erodes  the  performance  and thus 
intrinsic satisfaction that  older workers receive from work, their preference for early retirement is 
more likely to increase. Instead, if working conditions are manipulated to match older workers' health, 
needs, and wishes, intrinsic work reward and preference for work can be preserved also in the late  
career (Illmarinen, 2006).
The association between work characteristics  and retirement  timing is  indirectly shown by the 
evidence that retirement patterns differ by sectors and by occupations. Earlier exits are in fact over-
represented low-profile occupations within the industry and manufactory sector, where the working 
conditions are in general physically demanding and where there is a higher need to update and re-
converse skills (Blöndal & Scarpetta, 1999; De Preter et al., 2013b).  
A common theoretical framework within work psychology and occupational sociology is the effort-
reward imbalance theory. According to this theory work characteristics can be divided in two groups:  
job demands and job resources (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007), which affect early retirement intention 
through two different causal mechanisms. Job demands are expected to enforce an energetic process 
that  increase  the  perception  of  ill-health  and  strengthen  the  intention  of  retire  early  because  the  
individual perceive himself as non productive. Job resources enforce instead a motivational process 
that encourage the work engagement and the individual work enjoyment, which in turns encourage  
older workers to work longer (Scheurs et al., 2010). The major part of the investigations in this field 
adopts this approach in their theoretical framework (Blekesaune & Solem, 2005; Wahrendorf et al.,  
2012; Siegrist et al, 2007). Its main prediction is that early retirement is more likely when working  
conditions are imbalanced toward effort and the other way around and it is supported by different 
studies.   
A second common approach combines the effort-reward with the demand-control imbalance theory 
to measure the overall psychosocial stress at work. Demand-control imbalance theory instead focuses 
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to work aspects that measure to what extent older workers are able to autonomously control their work 
performance and predict that early retirement is less likely the more is the autonomy enjoyed by older 
workers  and  vice-versa.  Using  this  combined  approach  Wahrendorf  et  al.  (2012)  showed  that 
retirement timing is negatively associated to poor psychosocial stress due to low rewards and low 
autonomy.
The most innovative and complete work that quantified the effect of all work-related dimensions on 
retirement timing is  found in Boockman et  al.  (2012) for Germany. Using the LIAB data,  which  
longitudinally merge company HRM policies (IAB) and micro personnel careers, estimate  the effect 
of what is called  Specific measures for older employees (SMOE)  at company and individual level. 
These policies are age-specific and involves: part-time work, reduced work requirements, mixed-age 
work teams, standard and specific training, and equipment of workspace. Their effect on retirement  
transitions  are  estimated  on  employees  after  2002,  when  information  about  those  measures  are 
collected and the results are rather weak. Results report a rather consistent effectiveness of mixed-age 
work team and workspace equipment,  which is  instead weaker for the other measures,  since it  is  
concentrated in the first part of the late career for part-time work and it around certain age-boundaries 
for  the  remaining  measures.  These  weak  evidence  can  be  interpreted  as  a  consequence  of  the  
interaction between the effect of SMOE with the effect of welfare benefits, since they have specific 
age-specific  eligibility  conditions  or  as  a  result  of  an  measurement  mistake,  since  SMOE's 
implementation within companies does not necessarily correspond to older workers' intake of those 
measures.
The relevance of these work dimensions is expressed from qualitative interview as one of the main 
motives of their  decision to retire early.  The sample of Dutch employees insists  with a particular  
emphasis  on  these  work  aspects:  physical  and  psychological  strain  at  work,  lack  of  support  and 
discrimination from other colleagues and from the management, which does not use and invest in their  
skills  (Reeuwijk et al., 2013). 
Measures  that  support  work  capacity  after  mid-life  in  are  often  suggested  as  successful  good 
practices to encourage older workers to remain longer in employment between their health and work, 
especially if they are affected by some forms of disability (Fasang, 2008). The estimation of their  
effectiveness in doing so unfortunately does not provide unequivocal evidence. 
Training quality and availability is found to have a positive and significant effect in some studies  
on older workers job satisfaction and retirement timing (Schils & Fouarge, 2007; De Preter et al.,  
2013b). However this effect is not supported in other investigations (Montiziaan et al., 2013).  
Likewise  the  effectiveness  of  part-time  in  extending  working  life  is  ambiguous.  Different 
theoretical  approaches indicate this measures  as one of  the  most  effective to extend working life 
(Transitional Labour Market theory; Flexicurity; Economic Retirement model), because it is assumed 
that both from an economic and psychologic perspective older workers prefer to gradually withdraw 
from  employment  rather  than  experience  an  abrupt  transitions.  Schils  found  that  the  association 
number of hours worked and retirement is negative, but very little (Schils, 2008). A second stream of 
literature  provides  evidence  that  depict  part-time  work  actually  as  a  pathway  of  early  retirement  
(Boockman  et  al.,  2012).  This  is  found  particularly  the  case  when  part-time  is  part  of  phased 
retirement programs (Siegenthaler and Brenner 2000).
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As for the job environment, the support of colleagues, bosses and the implementation of age-mixed 
groups are found to be one of the most important aspects that motivate older workers to stay longer in 
employment together with measures that reduces the unhealthiness and the strain of work (Van Solinge 
& Henkens, 2007; Boockman et al., 2012; Illmarinen 2006; Jepsen et al., 2002). However it may be 
that supportive and healthy work environment are experienced especially by seniors that work high in 
the  occupational  structure.  In  this  case  this  effect  masks  the  occupational  stratification  of  push 
incentives that is in turn the effect of a HRM strategy regulating the personnels' composition.
The strategy of pushing older workers from employment is often operationalized in their effect on 
health status and on  job satisfaction of older workers or as context variables that measures labour 
market rigidities from a macro perspectives (OECD, 2006).
In conclusion a plausible interpretation of the ambiguity of working conditions to extend working 
life is that although these measures improve the individual preferences to work, the pursuing of these  
preference is bounded by the strategy pursued by employers. If their policy is to shed older workers,  
because perceived as redundant, they will pursue this goal using other sets of push incentives. Since, 
as mentioned earlier, older workers have a few power to bargain their dismissal timing, these measure 
can be effective only if HRM are willing to retain older workers and thus extending working life. 
2.2.3 Combination pull versus push incentives
Push factors  are  often not  set  alone,  but  in combination with generous monetary incentives,  both 
public  and  private.  The  strategy  of  pushing  older  workers  from  employment  is  legitimized  and 
supported by the pathways of exit provided by social protection system (OECD, 2001; Maltby et al., 
2004), which allow the transfer the costs of the pushing strategy from companies to the collectivity 
(De Vroom, 2004).  
The research that have tried to disentangle the effect of the two sets of incentives is rather limited.  
One example of these attempts is offered by Fasang. From a more explorative perspective, she uses 
Sequence Analysis  to  cluster  the  most  common institutional  arrangements  used  to  retire  early  in  
Germany and Britain. The novelty of this research relies on especially in combining both pull and push 
institutional  arrangements in comparing typical retirement patterns.  In the longitudinal analysis of  
work-retirement transitions are included not only the private and public schemes that de-commodify  
the  gap  between  the  exit  from  employment  and  the  entry  into  old-age  pension,  but  also  work 
characteristics in the late career (self-employment and part-time) which seems to be associated to the  
subsequent retirement transitions and often are mediated gender differences in late career (Fasang, 
2010). 
2.3 Moderator and Mediators of institutional incentives
Although  institutional  incentives  regulate  retirement  transitions,  individuals  within  the  same 
institutional context do not follows the same trajectories, but socially stratified patterns for two orders  
of reasons. 
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On the one hand, as pointed out by Mayer, the micro-effect of institutions (in his words “structure”) 
is never deterministic, since a margin of individual autonomy (in his words “agency”) makes always 
the behavioral outcome to a certain extent uncertain. In other words,  preferences thus  mediates the 
effect  of  institutions  (Mayer,  2001).  As  for  retirement,  the  role  of  individual  preferences  is  quite 
relevant because the role of institutions often takes the shape of incentives, often quite persuasive, but 
very rarely legal prescriptions.
Individual preferences, or agency, may depends both by individual circumstances, such as gender 
or taste for work and for leisure, education etc., and by circumstances that occur within the households 
and the workplace and their mediations, make older workers react differently to the same structure of 
incentives.
On the other hand, another source of de-standardization of retirement patterns within the same 
institutional context depends on the fact that the different social groups are exposed to different sets of 
incentives .  This  moderation effect is  found for example for women, that  often have more looser 
eligibility rule to pension benefits than men, or among different occupations, where different work-
related characteristic affect the likelihood to be pushed out from employment (Radl, 2010; 2013). 
The literature that investigated the mediating and moderating role of micro (individual) and meso 
(households and workplace/social class) characteristics of institutional incentives on retirement will be 
presented below in Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
2.3.1 Individual level
Four main individual characteristics mediate and moderate the outcomes of institutional incentives: 
gender, education, occupational status, health status, and preference for work. 
The gender  stratification of  retirement  behavior is  explained by the literature  according to the 
following mechanisms. Since women are more likely to bear the major part of caring duties within the  
household and to be discriminated in the labour market, they need to work longer than men to become 
eligible for pull incentives. In order to compensate this “gender disadvantage” the social protection 
schemes  prescribed  looser  the  entitlements  conditions1 for  women,  who  effectively  retire 
systematically earlier  than men. Moreover,  as pointed by different  studies, women tend to be less  
sensitive to monetary incentives. In more details, since women are more likely to be the second earner 
and the first care provider in the household, they are more likely to retire when frail members fall in  
need of care, even if this timing does not maximize her retirement incomes. On the contrary men in the 
same situation will  be more likely to continue working, since they perceive their  main task is  to 
compensate for the lost resources once provided by women. A further consequence of their lower 
sensitiveness to monetary incentives, women are more likely than men to coordinate their retirement 
behavior to the needs of the household (see below).
Similarly  to  gender,  the  relationship  between institutions  and retirement  is  both  mediated  and 
moderated by education. On the one hand more educated individuals are found to retire later because  
they enter the labour market at  higher age and reach to be less sensitive to monetary institutional  
1 Lower contribution period and figurative contributions that cover the gaps in the working career due to child 
bearing.
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incentives,  because  they  tend  to  have  a  higher  taste  for  work.  The  utility  that  more  educated 
individuals gain from work is less connected to the monetary outcomes and tend to rely more on the  
satisfaction that individuals gain in performing well their job (Duggan, 1994). 
Furthermore education mediates  the  relationship between institutions  and retirement  because it 
stratifies individuals along the occupational structure and thus social classes, where the balance of 
monetary  and  non-monetary  incentives  vary  (Duggan  1994).  In  fact,  as  shown  by  Radl  and 
Wahrendorf,  early exit  are especially concentrated within middle classes,  while careers tend to be 
longer within the low and high social classes and among self-employed workers. More in detail, low 
skilled  and  skilled  blue-collar  workers  tend  to  retire  involuntary,  since  pull  incentives  are  more 
moderated and firms tend to push them by using the disability pathway. The contrary is true within 
unskilled and skilled service jobs, intermediate occupations, high-degree manual job and high low 
salariat, where retirement tend to be voluntary because workers are pulled into generous pathways of 
exit (Radl, 2013; Wahrendorf, 2012).  
Furthermore socio-economic differences in retirement behavior are also found to depend on the 
variation  of  retirement  expectations  varies  across  social  groups  (Radl,  2010).  Those  retirement 
expectations are based on social norms on what is considered the proper retirement timing for different 
social groups, social classes etc. and have their origin in the embedment of institutional incentives. As  
different studies have shown, social norms help to explain the residual variance in retirement timing 
left after controlling for institutional incentives and delay the adoption of new behavior associated  
with the reform of institutional incentives (Van Solinge & Henkens, 2007). 
On the same line health status is also found to both moderate and mediate the relationship between 
institutional incentives and retirement. As shown by a consistent body of evidence, early retirement is 
strongly  associated  with  health-related  problems for  two orders  of  reasons.  Firstly  push  and pull 
incentives increases the more work capacity is hindered by illnesses or disabilities. In fact, companies 
are interests to shed ill or disabled workers because they are redundant and because of that special  
social protection system have been created to protect them from unemployment, especially in the late 
career.
2.3.2 Meso level: Household and workplace/occupational level
This  literature  branch  is  based  on  life  course  perspective  and  test  the  hypothesis  that  retirement 
behavior is affected by a inter-relationship of earlier events that occurs in all the spheres in which the  
life of the individual takes place, giving then a particular emphasis to the the social embedment of 
retirement behaviour ( Van Solinge & Henkens, 2007). 
Characteristics  that  mediate  the  effect  of  institutional  determinants  on  retirement  are  not  only 
individuals as predicted by economic theories based on rational choice (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2004), 
As  described  earlier  often  retirement  patterns  of  men  and  women  are  shaped  by  household 
circumstances (Blossfeld et al., 2006). While women, as primary care giver, are more likely to adapt  
their career to household circumstances than men that, as main  breadwinner,  will be more likely to 
maximize their work income and keep on working. As a result of that, Fasang points out that while 
men are more likely to undertake “state-institutionalized” trajectories, women' transitions are “driven  
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by the institutions of the family ((Fasang 2010) p. 256). In more detail, while men's employment tend 
to  maximize  their  retirement  income,  women can  decide  to  withdraw with  a  lower  or  without  a 
personal retirement income. As shown by Fasang for Germany and Britain in fact, the compliance of  
women work decision to the household needs is reflected by the female over representation in part-
time  late  careers  and in  non-decommodified  retirement  transitions  especially  in  case  a  consistent  
household income is granted by a dead or alive male breadwinner (Fagan, 2008; Fasang, 2010). A 
partial  exception  regards  grandchildren,  since  the  desire  of  spending  more  time  with  them  is  a 
retirement motive that seems to more equally shared by older men and women (Reeuwijk et al, 2013).
The necessity to care for frail relatives for women in the late career is a recent spillover effect of  
the gains in life expectation that is expected to push older women out of employment, unless these 
caring activities can be externalized or reconciled with work. Given the preference of women for part-
time,  flexible work schedules  are  often indicated as  an effective measure to extend older  women 
working life with caring responsibility. This last argument however does not find empirical support in 
the work carried out by De Preter et al. whose design, by pooling data for 11 European countries 
perhaps  fails  in  taking  account  that  part-time is  not  always  used  as  a  reconciliation  measures  in 
Europe, but as a pathway of exit (De Preter et al., 2013a; 2013b). 
Retirement decisions within the couple tend to be a “joint decision” even in absence of caring 
duties  with  the  development  of  common retirement  norms  (Gustman  & Steinmeier,  2000;  2004; 
Denaeghel et al., 2011; Reeuwijk et al., 2013). Coherently with the male breadwinner perspective, this 
coordination to a great extend due to women that, as secondary earners, synchronize their behavior to  
the retirement timing of their spouses (Moen et al., 2006). Evidence from an intercohort perspective 
shows that although the growth of dual-earner households, where bargaining power should be more 
equally distributed within the couple, woman are still following men career, especially when these  
latter have health problem. Instead men engage in work longer  if the wife does not work for illness or 
due  to  unemployment  (Denaeghel  et  al.,  2011).  Other  couple's  circumstances  that  foster  the 
coordination within the couple are the following. At first the level of educational attainment of the  
husband is shown to delay retirement of women (Denaeghel  et al.,  2011). Moreover from a male 
breadwinner  perspective,  a  wide  educational  gap  makes  the  partner  with  a  lower  educational  
attainment more likely to retire earlier since the high income of the spouse make it affordable (Fischer 
& Souza-Poza, 2006).  Secondly the age gap within the couple delay retirement of the couple, since 
probably the younger partner encourage the spouse to remain longer in employment.  From a more 
gender-neutral perspective, if partner supports the spouse in continue working significantly lower the 
likelihood of involuntary retirement  (Van Solinge & Henkens, 2007).
From  a  life-cycle  perspective,  other  household  circumstances  that  mediate  and  moderate 
institutional incentives rely in the disruption of family unions and fertility (Brugiavini et al. 2011).  
Coherently with the gender dynamics within the household, divorce and fertility delay the retirement  
of women and anticipate the employment exit from men, unless institutional arrangements reduce the 
disadvantage that women cumulate along the years they had to limit their labour market participation 
to care for the household and children. This long-life disadvantage developed by women due to child-
raising makes them less sensitive to monetary incentives, and thus more likely to receives a lower and 
more polarized retirement income (Fagan, 2008).  
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Within  the  socialization  of  the  individual  within  the  working  place  and  occupational  groups 
enhance the development of social norms, which in turn affect the preferences of older workers over 
how  their  retirement  should  take  place.  The  sense  of  belonging  to  the  social/occupational  class 
enhance individuals to conform to these norms to increase their social prestige within the social class.  
The effectiveness of these norms relies in the social sanctions that are applied by the other members in 
case of their violation. Social norms also are observable after reforms of institutional incentives, as a  
frictional force that resist to behavioural change. 
Finally colleagues and bosses do not only indirectly offer models and thus social norms to conform 
to, but they directly affect the involuntary exit of older workers, in case they do not provide them 
active support to remain working (Van Solinge & Henkens, 2007).
 
2.4 Retirement “regimes” as result of different protection logics
Cross-country systematic differences of retirement patterns in Western-Europe are investigated from a 
macro perspective as a consequence of a systematically different provision of pull incentives within  
the protection system.
The  most  renowned typology of  the  protection  logic  is  the  “Three  worlds  of  welfare  state  of 
welfare capitalism” by Esping Andersen  (Esping Andersen 1990).The protection logic is classified 
according to the level of de-commodification, which measures to what extent the citizens are entitled 
to receive economic resources as a result of a social right and to what extent those social rights are  
universally  granted.  As of retirement, the level  of  de-commodification measures the generosity  of 
factors  that  pull  older  workers  toward  public  pathways  of  early  exit  and  their  level  of  social  
stratification. Three dominant regimes are identified: liberal, conservative, and universalist. The liberal  
logic grants a low level of de-commodification and tend to minimize early retirement trends because a 
residual conception of welfare limits the generosity of pull incentives. The same retirement outcome is  
obtained by the Universalist logic, which by combining high level of universal de-commodification a 
strong  full-employment  culture,  limits  the  attractiveness  of  generous  pathways  of  exit.  In  the  
conservatory  logic  instead  the  generosity  of  social  rights  is  highly  stratified  and  increases  with 
seniority. In this system older workers have a privileged  and highly protected position within labour 
market  (internal  labour  market)  that  implies  high  labour  costs  for  employers,  which  are  then 
encouraged  to  substitute  them  early  with  younger  workers  with  much  lower  earning.  This  early 
intergenerational transmission of work opportunities and rights was particularly enhanced in the mid 
1970's onward, when early retirement had been highly encouraged as socially accepted instrument to 
deal with labour market redundancies in times of economic turbulence (Maltby et al., 2004). 
Criticism to this typology has proposed substantive and methodological variations to the Welfare 
capitalism model, which very often do not substantially change how the typology maps logic and 
countries. One of the few criticism that introduced a variation in the way the protection logics are 
classified is proposed by Ferrera with the introduction of the familistic logic that distinguishes the 
Mediterranean regime in Southern Europe from the Continental regime (Ferrera, 1996). The familistic 
logic  encourages  early  exit  even  more  than  that  the  conservative  logic  because  the  clientelistic 
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relationship  between  the  government  and  core  workers  (adult  and  older  workers)  makes  early  
retirement  the  only way to boost  the  political  consensus,  to  grant  companies  a  certain degree  of  
flexibility  in  an  otherwise  very  rigid  labour  market,  and  to  ensure  younger  people  with  enough 
resources in the family redistribution (Ferrera, 1996; Jessoula & Ferrera, 2007).  Another criticism is  
related to the uncertain and to some extent arbitrary classification of the so-called “hybrid cases”,  
whose protection logic tend to vary between different  areas of the social security system. Typical 
“hybrid cases” in Europe are Finland and The Netherlands, where a prevalent universalistic logic is  
compensated by a strong Conservative logic that characterizes social protection and labour market 
institutions that govern work-retirement transitions. 
One implicit aspect of all the welfare typologies that explain “hybrid” cases, is that the protection 
logic in different sectors of the welfare state is the product of the interaction between the strategy  
pursued by the state and by other institutional spheres. 
2.5 Institutional affinities and complementarity 
The interaction between different spheres of the institutional framework have been deeply investigated 
by the literature (Amable, 2000). First attempts are carried out by the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
literature that investigates how the dominant strategy followed by the productive system affect the 
characteristics of the financial, protection and educational system and thus different workforce patterns 
( Hall and Soskice 2001). 
The production logic is classified according to the level of coordination of the productive system 
which affect the characteristics and the stratification of push factors across firms. The typology based 
on this approach classifies the Western-European economies according to four production logics: the 
Anglophone  liberal  market  economies  (LME),  the  nordic  centrally-coordinated  market  economies 
(CCME),  the  sector-coordinated  market  economies  (SCME),  and  the  state-coordinated  market 
economies  (StCME).  The  Anglophone  liberal  market  economies  follows  a  short-term  economic 
strategy that pursues immediate returns of investments, minimize the investments for infrastructures,  
research, and inter-company coordination, that produce low-quality products by flexibly employing 
low-skilled workers. In this context push incentives are highly stratified and follows the economic 
trends,  because they strictly  depend on the company'  strategy and opportunities.  On the contrary,  
nordic centrally-coordinated market economies follow long-terms strategies aimed at the production of 
innovative high-quality products for export thanks to the employment of highly skilled workers. The 
state  has  a strong power of coordinating employers  production and human resources policies and 
because of that push factors is rather low and quite consistent among employees. The role of the state 
is lower in the sector-coordinated market economies, where instead more relevant is the coordination 
of interests,   strategies, and thus push incentives that occur at sectoral/industry level.  Much lower  
sectoral  coordination  is  finally  found in the  state-coordinated market  economies,  where  firms  are  
smaller,  interests  and strategies are organized at  a decentralized level and when necessary a more  
central coordination is obtained ad-hoc thanks to a state intervention. The lower is the coordination of 
the productive system, the more fragmented is the implementation of push factors because companies'  
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interests are not bounded together by central or sectoral organizations.
The most famous example is that the coordination of the productive system enhance an educational  
system that  form highly skilled and specialized workforce,  while more general  skills  characterize  
workers are preferred where the productive system is less coordinated. The production of specialized 
skills is then at the bases of the development of ILMs, whose strength maps the logic by which the 
production system contribute to the management of retirement trajectories.
According to the VoC literature the production logic enhances the formation of affines structures in 
other institutional spheres, which in turn are complementary in persecuting the competitiveness of the 
system. For instance,  as shown by Schroder LME system enhances the development of an  affine 
residual welfare, while CMEs system enhances  affine  generous welfare systems. As for retirement 
strong ILMs in CMEs enhance the generous protection schemes on which companies can externalize 
the social costs of early retirement, which are instead not necessary in LME's where ILM are very  
weak and early retirement is not a common strategy among firms. From the opposite perspective, 
Esping-Andersen provide arguments on how the protection logic affect the rigidity of labour market, 
which in turn affect the strategies of companies and their HRM. Here the residual character of social  
protection favors a deregulated labour market, where companies find no obstacle in employing older 
workers. Instead a generous welfare may enhance companies to shed older workers, the more rigidly it  
regulates labour markets. 
From  this  perspective  while  affinities refer  to  the  structure  of  the  institutional  system,  while 
complementaries concern  the  policies  that  the  affinities  implement  to  enhance  certain  behavioral 
patterns.  Institutional complementarities are functionally maximize the competitive advantages of the 
institutional  affinities,  which  in  turn  justify  their  self-reproduction  (Hall  &  Soskice,  2001). 
Nonetheless,  as  argued  by  Hall  and  Thelens  complementaries  may  fail  to  contribute  to  the 
competitiveness and the sustainability of the system. In this case affinities shape the process of change, 
making it path-dependent (Hall & Thelen, 2009).   
Different  attempts  have  tried  to  integrate  the  logics  of  the  different  institutional  affinities  to 
improve our understanding of the complexity of capitalistic systems (Amable, 2003;  Boyer, 2004; 
Schröder, 2009). In one of the most recent and most explicit effort Schröder integrates the productive 
and the welfare logic, while Amable' s classification offer the most detailed mapping that take into 
account not  only the the productions and welfare sphere,  but  also the more or less  indirectly the 
structure of the partnership (Schröder, 2009; Amable, 2003). 
The retirement institutions affinities' and complementarity have been investigated, theorized, and 
modeled recently, although a prevalent tendency of the literature has been to consider social protection  
sphere as the main driver of retirement (Ebbinghaus, 2006; Petrovici & Muffels, 2009). 
2.6 Institutional complementarity as driver of institutional change
As pointed out by Hall & Thelen, the institutional complementarity theory do not only help explaining 
the reproduction of those configurations that bring a competitive advantage to the system. It is also  
useful  to  investigate  the  path  of  institutional  change  if  those  complementaries  proof  to  be  dis-
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functional (Hall & Thelen, 2009). 
In  more  details,  the  competitive  advantage  granted  by  the  self-reproduction  of  institutional  
complementarities  may  vanish  when  internal  and  external  forces  turn  this  advantage  into  a 
disadvantage. This will enhance complementarities to change. This change may be abrupt or more 
gradual,  but  as  argued by different  scholars,  it  tend  to be path-depend,  since  it  is  shaped by the 
institutional affinities that originated the previous complementarities.
In this section we will look at the academic debate over the re-configuration of the institutions 
governing  retirement,  when  respectively  an  external  and  an  internal  force  has  put  the  previous 
complementarities under tension. Those forces are: globalization and population aging. 
 
2.6.1 Globalization and early retirement
Globalization  is  the  external  force  that  since  the  1970's  has  triggered  the  reform of  institutional  
complementarity that regulated retirement trajectories in Western Europe. Globalization by increasing  
the  volatility  of  product  markets  and  the  need  of  technological  innovation,  and  labour  market 
flexibility, became an obstacle for older workers' employment, especially in countries where labour 
market are rigidly regulated and ILMs strong. In these countries older workers have a over-protected 
positions that imply an unsustainable labour cost for companies for both dismissing or retaining them.  
Furthermore the continuous technological development makes the skills endowment of older workers 
more and more inadequate to remain competitive. The deterioration of older workers' productivity is 
particularly accentuated because investing in late career is not profitable for companies (OECD, 2004). 
As a solution, they sponsored then the adoption of welfare programs that allow them to shift the costs 
of  their  shedding  strategy  on  the  collectivity  (pull  incentives  provided  by  pathways  of  exit)  
(Ebbinghaus,  2006).  Moreover  in  order  to  maximize  this  strategy,  working  conditions  are  set  to 
provide strong push incentives, both monetary and non.
Since institutional affinities filter the impact of globalization, early retirement trends have been  
much more intense in Continental and Southern European countries, and much more moderated in 
Scandinavia and in Anglo-Saxon countries.   
Despite its pervasiveness, the effect of globalization on older workers' careers is found to follows a 
common sectoral patterns in Europe and OECD's countries. In fact as shown by Blöndal & Scarpetta 
first and by De Preter et al. subsequently, early retirement trends are comparatively more spread in 
slow-growing and declining sectors (namely manufacturing), whose higher exposure to competitive 
pressure, make older workers' skills more likely to become redundant (De Preter, 2013; & Blöndal & 
Scarpetta, 2009). As pointed out earlier, these redundancies have been solved by the development of 
pre-existing or new social security programs that protected disability, sickness, unemployment or and 
old-age but  eligibility  conditions were loosened institutionalize early exit  from the labour market.  
However  when  “institutional  affinities”  are  tightly  coupled  changes  that  over  time  occur  in  the 
protection sphere are expected to cause change in other spheres (Hemerijck & Manow, 2001). 
Different studies have traced and mapped the implementation of pull and push incentives in Europe 
and beyond. From an holistic perspective, Mayer analyses how institutional complementaries have 
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shaped the main transitions of the life course in the post-industrial political economies in Europe. Four  
different life-course regimes are found, according to the Esping-Ansersen's three worlds of Welfare 
capitalisms as modified by Ferrera. Similarly to the Welfare Capitalism, early exit from employment is 
strongly encouraged in the Conservative regime, where exits tend to be again standardized around 
earlier ages boundaries . Early exit are also encouraged in the familistic regime, where exit patterns 
tend to be more de-standardized, because early retirement award only to “core” workers in a strongly  
segmented labour market. On the contrary when welfare is generous but labour market inclusive, as in  
the  Social-Democratic  regime,  early  exits  are  minimized  and  retirement  trajectories  remain 
standardized  around  high  age  boundaries.  Finally  a  marginal  welfare  and  flexible  (“segmented”) 
labour  market  of  the  Liberal  regime  shape  late,  but  more  de-standardized  retirement  transitions 
(Mayer, 2001; 2004).
In the comprehensive study carried out by Blossfeld et al., institutional affinities of the protection 
and the production system are used to model  the  filters of  the globalization impact  on retirement 
patterns in Europe. The novelty os this model rely in the combined attention given to the logic of both  
social protection and companies as separate intervening variables. Systematic differences have been 
found among three clusters of countries. In Anglo-Saxon countries, given the original high flexibility 
of labour market and the residual of social protection, late exits have been employers-led. In the Social 
Democratic  countries  late  exit  have  been  publicly-led,  because  welfare  have  only  moderately  
sponsored pathways of exit. Early exits have been strongly enhanced in Continental and Southern 
European countries early by a joint effort of both the welfare state and companies (Blossfeld et al., 
2006). 
A similar mapping has been carried out by Ebbinghaus, with a theoretical model that take more 
explicitly in consideration the role of social partners as an autonomous actors with a peculiar strategy  
and  capacity  of  influence  retirement  patterns.  In  shorts  his  conclusions  are  that  early  retirement 
programs have been then expanded thanks to the more or less direct support of the vested interests of  
employers and unions, which “colluded” with the state to respectively shed the less competitive strata  
of the workforce and preserve the stability of late careers' members (Blossfeld et al., 2006; Ebbinghaus 
2006). 
As Ebbinghaus and Blossfeld have separately argued, the affinities' nexuses have a strong power in 
explaining  to  what  extent  early  retirement  was  spread  after  globalization  forces  made  those 
institutional equilibria under strain after the mid-1970's (Ebbinghaus, 2006 Blossfeld et al.,  2006).  
While  globalization  made  product  markets  more  volatile,  a  higher  flexibility  both  numerical  and 
functional was needed from the labor force (Blossfeld et al. 2006). Older workers experienced then 
more difficulties in adapting to this flexibility, especially in Central and Latin affinities, where rigid 
internal  labour  markets  (ILM)  were  highly  institutionalized.  ILMs  define  a  rigid  labour  market 
structure  that  is  typical  of  coordinated  productive  systems,  where companies  retain  workers  in  a 
seniority-based upward career in order to maximize the revenue of the initial investment made on their  
skills. When globalization made the flexibility of the workforce a competitive resource, economies 
based on strong ILM struggled in imposing more flexible working conditions to older workers (Blau 
&  Shvydko,  2007).  Therefore,  while  Anglo-Saxon  and  Nordic  could  redistribute  the  costs  of 
globalization on the overall workforce, the Central and Latin countries decided to provide “golden” 
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exits to older workers, while concentrating the flexibility on the cohorts of workers newly entered the 
labour market.  As a consequence of that, while Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries provided older 
workers with a few pull and push incentives and experienced a moderate trend of early retirement, 
Central and Latin countries strongly encouraged early exit outcomes by developing a powerful pull 
and  push  incentives,  whose  configuration  depended  on  the  specific  nexus  connecting  protection, 
production  and partnership  (Blossfeld et  al.,  2006).  One of  the main  contribution  of  Ebbinghaus' 
model  is  the  argument  that  although  the  main  discriminant  of  cross-country  divergence  in  early 
retirement trends is the social protection logic, important differences can be found between countries  
that have generous pull incentives. It is in fact found that the higher is the coordination within the 
production and the social partnership spheres, the more limited early retirement trends are. More in  
detail  the  more  economies  are  based  on  small  and  uncoordinated  firms,  like  in  Italy,  the  more 
organizations of employers and employees tend to be weak, to protect particularistic interests, and to  
entertain conflictual relations. Because of that interests organizations are not able to bargain a joint  
long-term strategy with firms and thus when older workers becomes redundant, HRM policies rely on  
the state to dampen the social effects of their individual adjustment strategy (Maltby et al. 2004). The 
production of early exit incentives result then polarized between social protection and the firms that  
tend to follow their particularistic and often opportunistic strategy. Instead the more the economy is  
dominated by large companies, as in the Netherlands and in Germany, the more encompassing are the 
representation of employers' and employees' interests and the more cooperative are industrial relations.  
As  a  consequence  of  that  the  implementation  of  pull  and  push  incentives  results  to  be  more  
coordinated  because  the structure  of  collective  bargaining  bound the interests  of  individual  firms 
within  a  long-term strategy centrally  defined and then vertically  spread downward.  The extent  to 
which the production can opportunistically relies on protection to dampen the social effect of their 
adjustment strategies is more limited, because it is moderated by social partnership that coordinate the 
overall system of institutional complementarities.
2.6.2 Ageing population: depart from historical legacy?
Institutional equilibria have been often referred as “immovable object” that tend to reproduce itself, 
especially in the case of retirement institutions, since they grant economic advantages for both workers 
and companies (Pierson 1998).
However this is not the case, as shown by the reforms that have taken place in the last 20 years that 
have consistently reformed the social protection and labour market institutions that affect retirement 
patterns and have reversed early retirement trends in all Europe (OECD 2006). Despite a certain path 
dependency has been found also in the shift of early retirement culture, meaning that the most efficient  
reforms have been implemented where push and pull incentives were more moderated, some countries, 
among which The Netherlands, Finland and (to some extent) Germany have proved to move away 
from their original early retirement culture and to drastically promote an extension of late careers (De 
Vroom et al., 2004).
Mortelmans & Denaegel  (2013) and Ebbinghaus and Hofäcker (2013) have mapped European 
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countries according to the reforms of early retirement pathways within the social security and labour 
market institutions. Taking a longitudinal perspective, first countries are clustered according to the mix 
of pull and push incentives that set to encourage early retirement in the mid-1990's, according to both 
the welfare-state typologies carried out by Esping-Andersen, as modified by Leibfried, Ferrera, and 
Bonoli (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Leibfried, 1992; Ferrera, 1994; Bonoli, 1997) and to the Blossfeld's 
typology that integrates welfare and labour market logic. These typologies, based on macro indicators  
measuring the pension system generosity, labour market constrains on late careers, and retirement 
patterns,  map  Western  European  countries  in  the  four  usual  clusters  (Liberal,  Social-Democratic, 
Conservative,  and  Southern-European  regimes),  together  with  a  separate  post-socialist  countries,  
where institutional incentives are more country-specific. This mapping is then repeated over time in 
1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008. The evolution of this mapping over time shows two main findings: a 
relatively  persistence  of  the  clustering  in  four  regimes,  and  the  displacement  of  some  countries,  
namely the Netherlands and Finland, that especially from 2005 onwards pass from a Continental logic 
of encouraging early exit to a Social-Democratic logic of extending working life. Despite its novelty,  
this  research  suffers  from  methodological  weaknesses  that  hplemented  policies  to  retain  older 
employees, by preventing their over-fatigue, improving their work-leisure trade-off, and by fostering 
the update and the re-conversion of  their skills. However retaining policies are implemented in times 
of  economic  growth,  especially  when labour  shortages  are  experienced and as  a  response  to  the  
incentives  and  reforms  that  are  set  within  welfare  programs(Conen  2013a). From  a  European 
perspective the tendency of employers to retain older workers but not to hire them is confirmed, while 
country-specific HRM policy trends are shown. Company in Germany, France, Poland and UK are  
more likely to implement training plans for older workers. Programs that combine retirement and work 
are more instead commonly used by companies in the Netherlands and Poland. Demotion is more  
common among Danish and Polish companies. inder the measurement of pull and push incentives cuts 
over  time:  the  welfare  generosity  measures  dimensions  that  are  not  directly  related  to  early  exit 
pathways  (expenditure  on  elderly  care,  social  protection,  and  labour  market  policies);  while  the 
operationalization  of  push  incentives  does  not  isolate  them  completely  from  pull  incentives 
(Mortelmans & Denaegel, 2013).
Recent efforts have been made to investigate changes in employers' attitudes toward older workers, 
considered as the main drivers of HRM policies focused on regulate the late careers of their older  
employees in different European countries. Among others, studies within the framework of the ASPA 
research  project  (Activating  Seniority  Potential  in  Aging  Europe)  offer  a  useful  insight  of  how 
companies' strategies have changed after the retrenchment of welfare early retirement benefits between 
2000 and 2009. In the Netherlands employers have increasingly implemented policies to retain older 
employees, by preventing their over-fatigue, improving their work-leisure trade-off, and by fostering 
the update and the re-conversion of  their skills. However retaining policies are implemented in times 
of  economic  growth,  especially  when labour  shortages  are  experienced and as  a  response  to  the  
incentives  and  reforms  that  are  set  within  welfare  programs  (Conen  2013a). From  a  European 
perspective the tendency of employers to retain older workers but not to hire them is confirmed, while 
country-specific HRM policy trends are shown. Company in Germany, France, Poland and UK are  
more likely to implement training plans for older workers. Programs that combine retirement and work 
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are more instead commonly used by companies in the Netherlands and Poland. Demotion is more  
common among Danish and Polish companies. inder the measurement of pull and push incentives cuts 
over  time:  the  welfare  generosity  measures  dimensions  that  are  not  directly  related  to  early  exit 
pathways  (expenditure  on  elderly  care,  social  protection,  and  labour  market  policies);  while  the 
operationalization  of  push  incentives  does  not  isolate  them  completely  from  pull  incentives 
(Mortelmans & Denaegel, 2013).
Finally HRM policies that reduce the workload are more common in Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Although companies  aim more at  retaining  older  workers,  their  age-stereotypes  seems to be  still  
strong,  and thus retaining policies seems to depend more on the business cycle and complementary to 
changes that occur in other institutional spheres and not to a genuine change of perception toward  
older workers.  Finally HRM policies that reduce the workload are more common in Denmark and the 
Netherlands (Conen 2013a).  Although companies  aim more at  retaining  older  workers,  their  age-
stereotypes seems to be still strong,  and thus retaining policies seems to depend more on the business  
cycle and complementary to changes that occur in other institutional spheres and not to a genuine 
change of perception toward older workers.  
2.7 Contributions and innovative character
The institutional  affinities  that  shape retirement  patterns have been studied both comparatively in 
situation of equilibrium and when they are challenged by external forces (Ebbinghaus 2006; BlossfeId, 
Buchholz, and Hofäcker 2006; (Blossfeld, Buchholz, and Kutz 2011). These attempts have especially 
investigated the de-stabilizing effect of globalization forces and the path-dependent establishment of a 
new institutional and behavioural equilibria. Understudied are instead the more recent turbulence to 
those equilibria caused by the ageing of the population. 
More in detail, while the changes within the protection system have been extensively described and 
investigated,  insufficient is the understanding of how the population ageing pressure have affected the 
strategy of the actors two spheres  that  shape retirement  patterns:  the production (companies)  and 
partnership (social partners). Some attempts have been made from a macro perspective to re-map the 
new equilibria  to test to what extent previous typologies still hold, but a more precise investigation of 
the processes that lead to the new equilibria is still missing.
The aim of this research is to contribute to fill this gap in the literature. This research investigates  
the  extent  to  which  institutional  affinities  affect  the  configuration  of  the  new  equilibria,  both 
institutional  and  behavioural.  In  particular  it  focuses  on  how the institutional  affinities  affect  the 
capacity of social partners to mediate the output and the outcomes of policies aimed at responding to 
the challenge of the ageing populations. 
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3 Theory and hypotheses
3.1 Introduction
Given the deep embedment of early retirement patterns, the goal of extending working life called for a  
radical  discontinuity  in  Germany,  Italy,  and  the  Netherlands.  According  to  Streek'  and  Thelen's 
classification of institutional change, it can be argue that EWL required a re-conversion of the social  
and labour market institutions that previously fostered early retirement  (Streeck and Thelen 2004). 
This  re-conversion,  involving  the  retrenchment  of  the  welfare  provisions  financing  the  so-called 
pathways  of  exit  and  the  shift  of  employment  practices  shedding  older  workers,  is  attained 
respectively by retrenchment and retaining policies. Although pushed by both internal and external  
pressures, Governments do not have an easy time implementing them due to the opposition of the so-
called vested interests. These are represented by the two main beneficiaries of early retirement: older 
workers  and their  employers,  aggregated  in  their  interests'  organizations. As shown by numerous 
studies, this opposition is not only organized in the political arena, but also in other settings provided 
that,  in  Crouch's  words,  the  Government  share  public  space  (Crouch  1986).  According  to  the 
institutionalist  approach,  those  settings  are  defined  by  the  interaction  of  the  institutional  logics 
governing  the  spheres  where  retirement  incentives  are  regulated:  the  social  protection,  social 
partnership, and production (Ebbinghaus 2006). 
Moving to an actor-centered perspective,  the interaction of the institutional  logics provides  the 
“rules of the game”,  or  in other words the governance modes, where relevant strategy-led actors,  
interacting,  define  the  magnitude  of  the  change  (Scharpf  1997).  The  relevant  actors  in  the  three 
institutional spheres governing the retirement incentives are: the Government, the social partners, and 
employers (Ebbinghaus 2002). While the Government include the EWL target in the agenda, the other 
two represent the main viscous forces trying to opportunistically hinder its achievement. They can do 
that  by  blocking  or  watering  down Government's  attempts  to  re-convert  existing  incentives  both 
publicly and privately. Their success is inversely related to the opportunity costs that each setting set to 
the pursue of opportunistic behaviours. 
Having the country cases under investigation a similar social protection and production logic, this 
study tests the extent to which the social partnership logic matters in EWL. This logic is here mainly 
defined  by  the  system  of  interests  representation,  being  very  coordinated  in  the  Netherlands, 
moderately coordinated in Germany, and fragmented in Italy.
As  already discussed by Ebbinghaus (2002),  four main  governance modes that  presides  at  the 
interaction between the Government and social partners:  regular consultation, ad-hoc concertation, 
self-regulation, and self-administration. Retrenchment policies are assumed to be more effective the 
more they privatize the pathways of exit's costs. Their formulation takes place in one of the first two  
modes, while the last two modes regulate their implementation. Retaining policies are assumed to be 
effective if they improve five main aspects of older workers' job quality: time reconciliation, physical  
and mental health reconciliation, age equality,  and employability. Their implementation take place 
ultimately within companies, but their formulation can be effectively coordinated by the collective 
negotiations between unions and employers' association, which represent a self-regulation mode.     
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 As it will be explained in more detail in the remaining of this chapter, the main hypothesis is that  
the  achievement  of  the  EWL target  depends  relies  on  the  its  top-down  conveyance  through  a  
coordinated  system  of  interests'  representation.  This  is  because,  according  to  a  actor-cented 
institutionalist approach, the higher the coordination the more likely social partners and companies are 
included in governance modes that  set high costs and thus discourage the pursue of opportunistic  
behaviours.  
Because of that I expect the most effective activation policies are implemented in countries with a 
strong  cooperative  partnership,  such  as  in  the  Netherlands,  less  effective  activation  policies  are 
implemented in countries with medium cooperative partnership, such as in Germany, and the least 
effective activation policies are implemented in countries with a contentious partnership, such as Italy.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 the main concepts are defined. The theory is 
outlined in Section 3.3. From this theory the main hypotheses about the effectiveness of activation 
policies and its stratification are derived in Section 3.4.   
3.2 Definition of main concepts
3.2.1 Retirement: work-retirement trajectory
Retirement is a complex concept that takes different specifications according to both the institutional 
context we observe and the perspective we assume. From an economic perspective it can be described 
as  the  exchange  of  work  with  leisure,  due  to  a  change  of  preferences  in  older  age  (Cahuc  and 
Zylberberg 2004). From a behavioural perspective, according to Feldman (1994, p. 287), retirement is 
a transition out of a career path of considerable duration. From a life course perspective is as a third 
phase of life, after education and work, characterized by leisure and an higher commitment to family, 
social network and other social activity (Kohli 1986; 2007; Mayer 2004).       
Besides all the different perspective from which retirement can be described, it remains eventually 
a social practice originated and shaped by institutional factors. Depending on the  goals pursued by the 
institutional, retirement has assumed different social functions. Along the years from an anti-poverty 
instrument in late old-age, retirement became first an instrument that granted a higher rewards to older  
workers to  boost  their  political  consensus and a  socially  accepted  instrument to  deal  with labour 
market tensions (Kohli et al. 1991; Mayer 2004; Kohli 2007;  Ebbinghaus 2006).  
Depending on these functions, retirement takes over different conceptualization, depending on the 
way institutions govern the behavioral patterns. From a behavioral perspective, retirement is often 
defined as the transition from work into old-age pension system. However this concept exhausted its 
capacity to represent retirement in the 1970's after the institutionalization of pathways of exit, which 
allow to exit  employment before the entitlement to an old-age pension benefit  because they offer 
income support alternative to work (Kohli and Rein 1991).    
These  institutional  arrangements  may  be  both  public  (pull  factors)  or  private  (push  factors), 
because they can be regulated by social security programs (early retirement, sickness, disability, and 
unemployment)  or  by  programs  that  are  collectively  negotiated  or  implemented  unilaterally  by 
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employers that provide financial benefit associated to older workers' premature dismissals (Kohli and 
Rein  1991). After  the  institutionalization  of  these  pathways  of  exit  work-retirement  transitions 
changed into  trajectories, defined as the specific combination of institutional arrangements that the 
individual experiences to pass from work to retirement. As pointed out by Fasang, when common 
patterns arises between individual work-retirement trajectories, then typical trajectories arises (Fasang 
2010).
This definition may be then distinct between a the  objective and  subjective specification, which 
depends  by  the  way  retirement  is  measured.  While  the  objective  specification  is  based  on  the  
identification of the moment when the income source of the individuals shift from work wage to one 
of  the  social  benefits  provided  by  pathways  of  exit  (Fasang  2010),  the  second  is  based  on  the 
perceived status reported by the individual  . Although less reliable, this analysis adopts a subjective 
definition of retirement trajectory, because this is the way it has been measured by the data is used  
(among others, some examples making the same choice are: BlossfeId, Buchholz, and Hofäcker 2006; 
Blossfeld, Buchholz, and Kutz 2011).   
The  concept  of  work-retirement  trajectory  enable  us  to  investigate  retirement  along  two 
fundamental  dimensions.  The  first  is  quantitative  and  refers  to  the  length  of  the  trajectory,  by 
measuring to what extent individuals exit employment before the statutory retirement age of 65 years.  
The  second  is  qualitative  and  describe  work-retirement  trajectories  in  terms  of  their  institutional 
composition. Work-retirement trajectories indicate the programs effectively chosen by older workers 
to retire (Fasang 2010).
The advantage of this conceptualization relies in the possibility of investigating more closely the  
association between activation policies and their outcomes. More in detail, while the effectiveness of 
retaining policies are investigated on the age of employment exit, the effectiveness of retrenchment 
policies are analysed along both the qualitative and quantitative  dimension to understand whether 
these  reforms  only  delay  employment  exit  or  are  associated  to  a  significant  change  of  typical 
retirement trajectories.
3.2.2 Activation policies
The adoption of the EWL paradigm implies the re-conversion pull and push incentives  (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005),  which is carried out  with the implementation of what  is defined here as activation 
policies.  Pull  factors  are  monetary  incentives  that  define  the  financial  attractiveness  of  public 
pathways of exit. Instead push factors may be both monetary and non-monetary and are regulated by 
collective agreements and by personnel policies that encourage older workers' dismissals  (Feldman 
1994; (Shultz, Morton, and Weckerle 1998; De Preter, Van Looy, and Mortelmans 2013; Negrini et al. 
2013).     
Pull incentives are generally provided by social security programs that replaced the work income of 
older  workers,  namely  the  early  retirement,  unemployment  and  sickness  and  disability.  Their 
retrenchment has been part of a quite visible reform process that involved the progressive tightening  
up of the eligibility conditions and the generosity of the programs. In our framework the policies  
implemented to cut pull  incentives will  be defined as retrenchment policies (OECD 2006;  OECD 
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2004; OECD 2005; Sonnet and OECD 2005).      
Conversely push incentives are much less visible. Since their ultimate regulation is within firms 
also  their  re-conversion  is  hardly  observable.  Nonetheless  they  are  of  great  importance  because,  
complementing  pull  incentives,  they  can  water  down  or  even  cancel  out  the  the  effect  of  their  
retrenchment . On the one hand they can provide private benefits to directly compensate the cut of pull  
incentives and encourage the early dismissals of older workers (monetary- i.e. known in the literature 
as a golden handshake) (Ebbinghaus 2006). On the other hand they can strategically set the working 
conditions to encourage early exit, by boosting the decay of the older workers' ability to perform their  
job  (non-monetary).  For  example  HRM  practices  that  prescribe  heavy  workload  can  harm  the 
occupational health of older workers, who become then more likely to fall into a disability pathway.  
Furthermore  these  practices  can  potentially  compensate  the  effect  of  retrenchment  policies  that 
narrowed the eligibility to disability if they cause older workers such a damage that they keep the  
entitlement to the disability benefit. Alternatively these practices can compensate the retrenchment of 
the  generosity  of  disability  benefit,  if  they  make  work  so  painstaking  that  older  workers  remain  
sensitive to the disability benefit (Shultz, Morton, and Weckerle 1998; Wahrendorf and Siegrist 2011; 
Beehr et al. 2000; Kim and Feldman 1998;  Henkens and Tazelaar 1997).         
Therefore  fundamental  is  to  investigate  to  what  extent  push  factors  were  also  re-converted  in 
incentives to EWL. Being difficult to observe directly, this re-conversion is indirectly observed in the 
way they affect the working conditions experienced by older workers. 
Some key aspects of working conditions can retain older workers in employment because they 
compensate the disadvantages that make older workers less self-confident in performing their job and 
less competitive for the companies  (Walker, Taylor, and Eurofound 1998). The first aspect is time 
reconciliation and deals with a flexible working schedule, which is beneficial to reconcile work with  
health  problems  or  caring  obligations,  especially  for  women.  The  second  dimension  is  health 
reconciliation and indicates all those aspects of the working methods and environment reducing the 
physical and mental strains (Kim and Feldman 1998;  Henkens and Tazelaar 1997). The third aspect is 
age equality,  which defines  a working atmosphere  where older workers  do not  feel  discriminated 
because of their age, but they feel supported by their bosses and colleagues (Bayl-Smith and Griffin 
2014).  Finally  employability  deals  with  training  and lifelong learning  programs that  enable  older  
workers  to  update  their  work  capacity  to  the  technological  innovation  and  thus  preserve  their  
competitiveness within the company  (Fouarge and Schils  2007;  Montizaan,  de Grip,  and Fouarge 
2014).  In  this  framework  the  policies  implemented  to  re-convert  push  incentives  in  these  work 
dimensions are defined as retaining policies. 
Table 3.1: Examples of  retrenchment and retaining policies.
RETRENCHMENT 
POLICIES
Their aim is to privatize the costs of using pathways of exit for both older  
workers and their employers. 
• Narrow down the eligibility conditions to access pathways of exit
• Reduce the generosity of the benefits financing pathways of exit
• Raising the contribution rate for the use of pathways of exit.
RETAINING 
POLICIES
Their aim is to improve one of the following aspects of job quality that are 
effective in encouraging older workers to keep on working:
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TIME RECONCILIATION 
• flexible  working  arrangements:  such  as  part-time,  tele-working, 
flexitime, job-sharing.
• Long or short care leaves
 HEALTH RECONCILIATION (physical and mental)
• greater  internal  flexibility  and  mobility:  such  as  redeployment  or 
outsourcing in case of reorganization or restructuring, shifting or downshifting;
• redesigning the working environment to reduce physical stresses and 
strains,
• ergonomics and increasing use of robotic technologies
• adapting  working  hours  in  order  to  avoid  physically  demanding 
working schedules; (overtime, working weekends, shift work, etc); 
• pre-retirement leave, extra non-working days/holidays;
• shorter working hours in combination or not with partial retirement 
benefits, avoiding in principle the option of early retirement   
   
AGE EQUALITY
• anti-ageism policies
• career development for older workers
• reduce  the  impact  of  seniority  rules  on  wage  and  employment 
protection (EPL)
EMPLOYABILITY
• training, long life learning programs; extra training leave.
• greater  internal  flexibility  and  mobility:  such  as  redeployment  or 
outsourcing  in  case  of  reorganization  or  restructuring  needs,  shifting  or 
downshifting;
• knowledge transfer projects,  adopting two approaches:  parallel  duty 
and role takeover. Parallel duty means that the mentor and trainee work side by 
side;  important  knowledge and  skills  are  thereby transferred.  Role  takeover 
means that, under supervision, the trainee steps into the role of the mentor
Source: (OECD 2006; Walker, Taylor, and Eurofound 1998)  
3.3 EWL and actor-centered institutionalism
As argued by Hall & Thelen, institutional affinities is a useful analytical instrument not only to model  
stable institutional configuration, but also to model divergent patterns of institutional change, when 
they exhaust their capacity to provide comparative advantages  (Hall and Thelen 2008). In a path-
dependent perspective, “history matters” and institutional affinities drive the trends of institutional 
reform (Ebbinghaus 2006; Ebbinghaus and Hofäcker 2013). 
Extending working life  (EWL) is policy strategy aimed at lengthening the economic activity of 
older workers and require a radical institutional change (OECD 2006; Ilmarinen 2005; Phillipson et al. 
2005). In Streek and Thelen's words, this change implies a re-conversion, because the same institutions 
used to foster early retirement pattern have to be redeployed to achieve the opposite outcome (Streeck 
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and Thelen 2005). Being early retirement beneficial for many constituencies and being these latter  
involved in its regulation, it is important to study the outcome of this re-conversion from an actor-
centered  institutionalist  perspective.  This  perspective  allows  to  identify  whether  the  partnership 
institutions embedded in the three cases under investigation let the constituencies opposition hinder 
the achievement of the EWL target or not (Ebbinghaus 2006; Scharpf 1997). 
As part  of  the more general  active ageing strategy,  the EWL target was endorsed by different 
international organizations. They formed an epistemic community spreading their concern about the 
unintended diffusion of early retirement patterns since the late 1970's2. (OECD 2006; Ilmarinen 2005; 
Haas 1992) In the early 1990's projections showed that due the progressive ageing of the population, 
the welfare and economic systems were under threat, unless a larger mobilization of older workers 
replaced shrinking new cohorts. Since then it became part of a policy-making process in 2001 and 
2002 when the European Council in Stockholm and in Barcelona established two main targets to be  
achieved by 2010: raise the employment rate of the 55-65 years group to 50% and delay the effective 
retirement  age  by  5  years.  These  two  targets  became  institutionalized  within  both  the  European 
Employment and Pension strategies based on the Open Method of Coordinations (OMC). Despite 
promoting the inclusion of the EWL target into the policy agenda and political debate, OMC's soft  
approach  left  opposition  forces  plenty  of  room  to  hinder  its  achievement (Zeitlin,  Pochet,  and 
Magnusson 2005; Jepsen, Foden, and Hutsebaut 2002). 
As  pointed  out  by  Ebbinghaus  (2006),  the  state,  social  partners  and  employers  colluded  in 
supporting  early  retirement  for  different  reasons  (see  Figure  3.1).  The  state  first  institutionalized 
pathways of exit in the early 1970's to reduce the social costs of the deindustrialization, that is the 
crisis  of  the  sectors  employing  comparatively  the  highest  share  of  older  workers.  Employers 
complemented pull incentives with HRM practices pushing out employees as soon as ILM's rules 
make their labour costs overcome their declining productivity. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
these practices involved both private payments and working conditions that contribute to the decline of 
the work capacity. 
Since pathways of exit extended the social rights of older workers and externalized the costs of  
pushing HRM practices they were strongly supported by social  partners.  In the three cases under 
investigation social partners are collective actors hierarchically organized to represent the interests of 
their members (workers and companies). Workplace representatives and employers encouraged older 
workers to claim for pathways of exit, while unions and employers' associations formed coalitions to  
foster their generosity and the externalization of their costs. This “collusion” caused the unintended 
expansion  of  pathways  of  exit  in  the  late  1970's,  when  the  increased  international  competition 
2 Concerns over the causes of early retirement, namely health, work, and living conditions of older workers 
have been expressed since the first half of the 1980's. Especially the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and the World Health Organization (WHO- Helsinki meeting 1991) expressed their concern over age 
discrimination and to the deterioration of their occupational health that push older workers out of 
employment, unless actions are taken to prevent the decline of their work capacity. Their recommendations 
suggest then to increase the support of older workers within their working environment with public and 
private measures fostering: equal opportunities, safer and healthier work environment, skills training, a better 
mach between job conditions and age-related needs and research over work and aging. Other 
recommendations are expressed by OECD and European Union over the harmful generosity of the 
widespread pathways of exit provided by public and private schemes that attract older workers out of 
employment.
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extended restructuring processes to the rest of the economies. Also in this case the expansion was  
mediated  by  social  partners  that  at  workplace  and  central  level  shaped  state's  and  companies' 
incentives for early exit (Ebbinghaus 2006). 
Figure 3.1: Path-dependent feedback processes in early retirement and obstacles for re-conversion. 
source: (Ebbinghaus 2006), adapted by the author.
     Although pushed by both internal and external pressures, Governments do not have an easy time 
implementing them. Borrowing the path-dependent feedback mechanism theory from Pierson (Pierson 
2000), Ebbinghaus identifies the main obstacle to the EWL re-conversion in the social expectations 
that workers and employers developed with regard to early retirement. The most obvious arena where 
these expectations find support is the political one, where opposition endorse them in the hope for later 
electoral punishment of the Government (Schludi 2005). However if these expectations aggregate as 
the core members' interest of corporate organizations that “share public space”, those organizations 
will form coalitions to defend them also in other settings  (Ebbinghaus 2006;  Crouch 1993;  Crouch 
2001).  
The  main  argument  of  this  research  is  that,  after  mediating  the  diffusion  of  early  retirement 
incentives,  social  partners  mediated  also  their  re-conversion.  This  argument  holds  under  the 
assumption that, independently from its political colour, the Government has the same commitment to 
EWL in the Netherlands,  Germany,  and Italy.  From a theoretical  perspective,  in  the constellation 
regulating retirement pattern it pursues public interests and is committed to general long-term goals. 
Given pathways of exit exerted a similar strong pressure on public finances and caused similar labour 
market distortions – welfare without work  (Esping-Andersen 1996), employment dilemma  (Scharpf 
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forces to reform them (Eichhorst and Hemerijck 2008).   
Notwithstanding those irresistible  forces  (Pierson 1998) and the declining strength of  interests' 
organizations, no reform could be enforced without the involvement of social partners (Crouch 2001). 
This  is  because  their  institutionalized  role  in  social  insurance  gave  them a  veto  power  to  block 
unilateral actions either by mobilizing social consensus against their formulation or by hindering their 
implementation. The involvement of social partners was thus a necessary conditions for the EWL re-
conversion to start in all three cases under investigation.  (Schludi 2005;  Ebbinghaus 2006;  Crouch 
2001).  
When dealing with social partners, the Government pursue a strategy of blame avoidance, trying to 
reduce the political  costs of  unpopular policies  (Pierson 1996). It  is  guided by mainly two goals: 
convince them to give up their veto power to solve a substantial problem (policy interests), or to ask 
their cooperation to legitimate the institutional re-conversion (politics interests). By the same token, 
also social partners had similar motives for entering the “public space”: preserve the interests of their  
members (policy interests) or defend their institutional role within corporative institutions (politics 
interests) (Hassel 2009).  
Despite their opposition social partners were not  immovable objects (Pierson 1998). These three 
cases  showed  that,  as  pointed  out  by  Crouch  (2001),  under  intolerable  pressure  social  partners 
supported the depart from path-dependency by reversing early retirement patterns. Therefore if the 
configuration of the institutional affinities do not deterministically predict path-dependent paths, they 
nevertheless  indicate  a range of  possible  alternatives,  among which the contingent  power balance  
among actors expresses the final outcome.   
In line with actors-centered institutionalism (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995;  Scharpf 1997), it can be 
argued  that  institutional  affinities  explain  also  why  the  actors'  constellation  produce,  among  the 
alternatives,  a  certain  outcome  and  not  others.  Outcomes  are  assumed  to  be  achieved  by  the  
interdependent strategies (or games) pursued by all  the actors within the constellation.  Actors are  
assumed to be capable of evaluating ex-ante the payoffs (or the proximity to their preferences) of the  
outcomes generated by the possible courses of actions within the constellation and of selecting the 
strategy leading to the achievement of their most desirable outcome.  capacity. 
The institutional context is here relevant (see figure 1.1) because, influencing actors' “perceptions, 
preferences, and capabilities”  (Scharpf 1997, pg. 38), define  the ordinal ranking of the payoffs and 
thus the type of strategic interaction within the constellation. The context is furthermore relevant since 
it influences the  interaction modes,  that is the method solving the strategic conflict among actors. 
Defining the mode of interaction the balance of power among actors, it  helps predicting the final  
outcomes of a certain constellation.   
This  theoretical  perspective  is  useful  to  predict  how  social  partners  mediated  the  EWL re-
conversion in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. This is because the different institutional affinities, 
explained  in  the  next  section,  channelled  the  oppositions  of  vested  interests  into  different  policy 
interactions leading to different outcomes. Those interactions are formed whenever the Government  
act to formulate or implement activation policies. In other words the coalition of unions and employers 
(associations)  hindered  the  effectiveness  of  activation  policies  only  in  constellations  and  modes 
awarding opportunistic strategies with respectively the highest payoff and a veto power. 
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3.4 Case selection: most similar systems design
The Netherlands, Germany, and Italy are selected according to a most similar systems design (MSSD) 
(Przeworski  and  Teune  1970).  The  similarity  of  these  three  cases  is  evaluated  according  to  the 
“Institutional  affinities  and  complementarities  between  protection,  production,  and  partnership  in 
Europe” by  Ebbinghaus (2006- see Graph 3.3).
Building on the institutional complementarities' theory based on the Variety of Capitalism approach,  
this typology models retirement incentives (complementarities) as shaped by the interaction between 
the  institutional  affinities presiding  at  three  main  institutional  spheres:  the  social  protection,  the 
production and the partnership. As mentioned in  the previous section,  the  role  of  the  partnership 
sphere is in this model particularly re-evaluated with respect to the earlier literatures. In this context in  
fact the retirement patterns are not modelled simply as the “automatic consequences of the institutional 
affinities between the production and welfare  regime”,  but  as  social  practices mediated by social 
partners at central and workplace level,  according to their opportunity and constrains  (Ebbinghaus 
2006, p. 270). 
The institutional logic pursued by the three spheres are classified respectively according to the 
“The three worlds of welfare capitalism” (Esping Andersen 1990), “The variety of capitalism” (Hall 
and Soskice 2001), and the “The three modes of interests mediation” (Crouch 1993). 
The protection logic is classified according to the level of de-commodification granted by welfare 
system. As of retirement, the level of de-commodification measures the generosity of pathways of exit 
(pull incentives). Of the three logic identified, the generosity of pathways of exit is limited in welfare 
systems dominated by a liberal and a social-democratic logics, and drifted in welfare systems that, as 
the three cases under investigation, are led by a conservatory logic. This is because being payroll taxes 
the main financing source, they are expected to protect the main contributors: older workers and their 
employers,  especially  if  their  welfare  is  threatened  by  external  forces  (as  in  the  case  of  de-
industrialization first and the labour market turmoils after) (Esping Andersen 1990; Esping Andersen 
1999; Ebbinghaus 2006). 
The production logic is classified according to the level of coordination of the economic system 
and affect the characteristics of push factors and the stratification across firms. The coordination is  
minimum  in  the  Anglophone  liberal  market  economies  and  maximum  in  the  nordic  centrally-
coordinated market economies. An intermediate level is found in the Netherlands and Germany, where 
high coordination is found at sectoral level (sector-coordinated market economies) and one degree  
lower in Italy where the higher fragmentation of the economic system, composed by few big and many 
small companies, is compensated  ad-hoc by state interventions (state-coordinated market economy) 
(Hall  and Soskice 2001;  Ebbinghaus 2010).  A common trait  of  CME is the institutionalization of 
strong ILM (see Chapter 2), where seniority rules rise the labour costs until it overcome productivity 
in the late career. In Germany, Italy and the Netherlands push incentives are thus structural conditions 
to maintain ILM and not merely a cyclical measure to overcome economic downturn  (Ebbinghaus 
2006).
The partnership logic is classified according to three ideal-typical  modes of exchange between 
organized labour and capital. This logic varies depending on how the actors perceive each other as  
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separated and on how explicitly regulated interactions are. In the most primitive contestation  logic 
antagonist labour and capital engage sporadically in conflicts, which imposed costs inversely related to 
their power resources. Pluralist bargaining implies the mutual recognition of capital and labour and 
thus the development of contractual procedures to avoid conflicts (and their costs), when the density of 
interactions increases. Finally in bargained corporatism capital and labour engage positive-sum game, 
thanks to procedures that discourage short-term conflicts to foster the achievements of long-term joint 
interests (Crouch 1993). 
According to Crouch, the bargained corporatist logic requires capital and labour to have a high 
organizational articulation, where central levels are able to commit memberships to a strategical and  
long-term  course  of  action  (Crouch  1993).  The  achievement  of  this  pre-condition  for  bargained 
corporatism  is  the  main  difference  concerning  the  affinities'  configurations  of  the  Netherlands, 
Germany, and Italy. 
As a result of diverse historical legacies capital and especially labour organizations have followed 
diversified development tracks, which in turn institutionalized different forms of policy interactions 
between  unions,  employers  and  governments,  here  defined  as  social  partnership  (Crouch  1993; 
Ebbinghaus 2006; Hassel 2009).     
The articulation of both organizations is the highest in the Netherlands, but not monopolistic as in  
Scandinavian countries. Here the state since the early phase of nation building “shared public space”  
to build a common national identity in a context of deep religious cleavages. For that it supported 
central corporate structures that encouraged a co-operative inclusion of the Catholic, Protestant, and 
social-democratic confederations into the policymaking (Crouch 1993) and along time consolidated a 
logic  of  cooperative  social  partnership.  As  a  result,  the  Government  shares  with  social  partners 
different  tasks not only the formulation retirement incentives but,  thanks to the development of a  
highly coordinated system of collective bargaining, also their implementation (Ebbinghaus 2006).   
The  social  partnership  logic  is  slightly  less  cooperative  in  Germany.  Here  during  the  nation- 
building process only one part of labour movement was recognized into the “public sphere” and in  
turn weakened the consolidation of a formal social dialogue structure. As a result the main level of 
organizational articulation was slowly established at the industry level, where the collective bargaining 
in leading branches (chemical and steel) coordinated standards in the rest of the productive system. As 
a result social partners are not explicitly involved to regulate retirement incentives, but they take part, 
together with a constellation of other stakeholders, the Commissions consulted by the Government 
(Ebbinghaus 2006; Crouch 1993).         
The organizational  articulation is  comparatively  the lowest  in Italy.  Here the poorer  economic 
coordination across small-sized companies undermined the the aggregation of employers'  interests. 
Furthermore  the Catholic  domination  intertwined  with  a  weaker  state  politically  isolated  and de-
legitimated the more progressive currents of the labour movement, which then assumed a contentious 
behaviour. Both organized labour and capitalism grew as ideologically fragmented and thus unable to 
be included in a stable social partnership as in the other two countries. Because of the high costs of the 
contentiousness  pervading  this  partnership  constellation,  the  interactions  tend  to  be  poorly 
institutionalized  and  occurring  ad  hoc  whenever  strictly  necessary.  This  means  that  retirement  
incentives  tend  to  be  regulated  primarily  by  the  Government  and  the  HRM practices  unless  the  
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opposition of  interests'  organizations  opens a conflict  that  is  solved  by the actors'  relative  power 
(Ebbinghaus 2006; Crouch 2001).       
In short the different partnership logic makes the involvement of social partners in positive-sum 
games the most likely in the Netherlands, less likely in Germany, and least likely in Italy. This is  
because the steadier corporative structure supports the pursue of common long-term outcome, while 
the ad-hoc interactions in Italy lead to the pursue of the strongest opponent's short-term interests.  
Table 3.2: Institutional affinities between protection, production, and partnership in Western Europe.
Institutional affinities Protection Production Partnership
Center:
Germany, the Netherlands





As already explained by Ebbinghaus (2002; 2010), the actors constellation regulating retirement 
incentives  gives  origin  to  five  alternative  modes  of  interactions:  unilateral  action,  consultation,  
concertation,  self-regulation,  and  self-administration.  Being  the  modes  in  which  the  Government 
“share public space” with social partners and employers, they are defined as social governance modes  
and are described in the next section.
3.5 Modes of social governance
As pointed out by Ebbinghaus ( 2002; 2011), the institutional setting, more specifically the affinities 
between the logics of the protection, production, and partnership systems affect the governance modes 
of  retirement  incentives.  Due  to  the  high  political  and  social  consensus  surrounding  the 
institutionalization and the costs' externalization of early retirement incentives (Ebbinghaus 2006), the 
Government  hardly  faced  institutionalized  “veto  opposition”.  The  opposite  is  true  when  those 
incentives had to be cutback and a “new politics”, based on blame avoidance, was undertaken by the 
Government (Ebbinghaus 2011).  
According to this “new politics”, Government had the choice to share the blame within the political  
or the corporative arena. If the political consensus was sufficient in countries where a weak organized 
interests could not block unilateral actions, in The Netherlands, Germany, and Italy the Government  
had to search also for consensus in the corporative arena. 
According to Ebbinghaus (Ebbinghaus 2002; 2011), the Government can share public space in four 
modes of social governance. They are graphically represented as the yellow and orange sections in 
Figure 3.2 and their main characteristics are summarized in Table 3.3.      
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Figure 3.2: Modes of interaction for the regulation of retirement incentives: unilateral 
intervention and social governance modes.
Source: (Ebbinghaus 2002)   
source: (Ebbinghaus 2002; 2011)
This  triangle  represents  the  constellation  of  actors  involved  in  the  regulation  of  retirement 
incentives. The three blue space surrounding the vertices stand for the actors' unilateral governance 
space. For unions and employers' organizations this space represents the internal coordination between 
associational levels and members, ranging from the bottom-up strategical aggregation of interests to 
the  top-down  compliance  rules.  For  single  employers  it  also  represents  incentives  set  by  HRM 
practices before being coordinated by collective negotiations and public policies (Ebbinghaus 2006). 
The actors' prerogatives become more shared the more our attention is moved from the vertices to 
the centre of the triangle. Moving from Government's unilateral vertex toward the centre there are two 
modes of social governance in which social partners interfere to a different extent with the policy-
making. 
Consultation is the nearest mode to unilateral action and takes place when the Government ask 
social  partners'  view  over  legislative  proposals.  Governments  can  be  legally  obliged  to  consult  
institutionalized advisory boards or just willing to confer with social partners in less formal settings. In 
any case, social partners' view, expressed as opinions or recommendations, is usually not sufficient to  
block the policymaking. In some cases however the Government can have a moral obligation to take 
back  a  proposal,  often  when  it  is  unanimously  rejected  by  boards  including  Governments'  or 
independent  experts.  The inclusion of  independent  experts  prevents  social  partners  from fostering 
particular interests. This is because social partners can de-legitimize Government's unilateral actions  
only when they foster the long-term societal welfare. 
A further  element  that  usually  drives  social  partners  toward  a  long-time strategy is  the strong 
institutionalization of this practices. Interacting regularly, social partners, experts,  and Government 
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maximizing common and not particular interests. In short the consultation settings raises the cost of  
opportunistic behaviours of social partners (Ebbinghaus 2010a).
Concertation is at the centre of the constellation and requires all relevant actors to explicitly  agree 
on a proposal that is later enacted by the Government or the Parliament. This agreements is often the  
result of a political exchange  (Pizzorno 1978). In other words, social partners decide to endorse a 
Government's reform in exchange for an amendment of the original proposal or a side payments, that  
are  concessions outside the range of  issues  under  negotiation  (Scharpf  1997).  The entity  and the 
distribution of the “political exchange” depends on three circumstances: the initial power endowment 
of actors, the opportunity costs that the negotiation setting associates to opportunistic behaviours and 
to the non-agreements option. All circumstances are affected by the institutionalization level of the 
concertation practices. First the more regular are interaction the more the power balance tend to be  
equal  or  in  favour  of  the  Government.  Second  regular  interactions  discourage  opportunistic 
behaviours, because the iteration allow to sanction them. Third regular interactions tends to lower the 
cost of non agreement for both the Governments and social partners, since the iteration allow to solve 
the stalemate at a later stage (Axelrod 1984; Scharpf 1997).
Specularly, concertation organized ad hoc is highly treacherous, but only for the Government. Since 
unilateral action is always preferred unless blocked, the Government's call for concertation is itself a  
weakness sign that set the balance power totally in favour of social partners. Moreover the lack of 
regular iteration limits notably the Government's chance of sanctioning opportunistic actions. Finally 
ad-hoc interactions make the non-agreement option very costly for the Government and is then limits  
it  capacity  of negotiating before  accepting it  (to  the limit  the lack of iteration produce a on-spot 
contract setting (Scharpf 1997).   
In short the less institutionalized the concertation setting is the higher is the political exchange  
required to reach an agreement. Moreover the lower institutionalization tend to polarize the costs and 
the benefits of this exchange on respectively the Government and social partners. 
While  the  consultation  and concertation  are  the  modes  in  which  social  partners  influence  the 
policymaking, self-administration and self-regulation modes characterize the social partners' role in 
the  policy-implementation  (Ebbinghaus  2011).  Policy-implementation  is  a  critical  phase  because 
social partners can opportunistically alter the intended outcome of policies, especially if they were 
implemented against their interests. 
Self-administration stands in between the consultation and the concertation mode, meaning that the 
Government retains to a great extent the right of decide unilaterally the criteria regulating policy-
implementation . In this mode the Government delegate to social partners the management of social 
insurance in the three cases under investigation. This is because social partners have a vested interest  
in managing schemes directly financed by their members. Besides managing the pay-roll taxes, they  
are also responsible for assessing the eligibility of claims within executive boards according to criteria  
defined previously by the Government (Ebbinghaus 2011). 
This setting minimizes the opportunity costs of opportunistic behaviour under two circumstances. 
The first is when eligibility criteria requires a subjective assessments of the executive board. Among 
the  welfare  scheme  financing  pathways  of  exit,  the  management  of  disability  is  often  the  most  
problematic. This is because in many cases the eligibility assessment is based on the executive board's 
view on the claimants' employment perspectives. The least problematic implementation is often the 
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pension system, because the entitlement is usually based on objective criteria,  as the age and the  
contribution history (Ebbinghaus 2011). 
The second circumstance lowering the cost of opportunistic behaviour is the lack of independent  
supervision.  This  is  often the case  when the executive and supervising  boards  are  both bipartite, 
meaning that controllers and controlled are both nominated by unions and employers association. To a 
lesser extent, this is also the case when the composition of executive boards is tripartite but decisions 
are based on majority rules. Although experts do not have a veto power, their inclusion provide the  
system with more transparency because they can report administrative distortions.
In  short  subjective  eligibility  criteria  and  the  lack  of  independent  supervision  make  self-
administration  the  implementation  mode  encouraging  the  most  opportunistic  behaviour.  This  is 
because the distortion of the assessment process goes unnoticed and the costs are fully externalized.
Finally  the  furthest  modes  from unilateral  action  is  the  self-regulation.  Here,  according  to  the 
subsidiarity principle, the Government supports unions and employers' associations bargaining over 
employment and welfare issues in full autonomy (Trampusch 2007).  The Government however can 
encroach into collective bargaining by regulating its legal framework and the taxation policies. The 
Government  can  for  example  declare  collective  agreements  valid  erga  omnes  within  sectors  and 
elevate  them  to  a  almost  legal  status  or  introduce  a  monetary  incentives  to  encourage  certain  
outcomes.   
Despite  the  autonomy  provide  social  partners  with  the  full  right  of  neglecting  Government's 
pressure, it does not automatically encourages opportunistic behaviours. This is because at the net of 
Government's incentives their costs are internalized or, in other words, are born by their members:  
employers and workers. Opportunistic behaviours are instead encouraged the more public incentives 
externalize their costs.   
As in the consultation and concertation, also here the level of institutionalization plays a key role in 
encouraging or hindering opportunistic behaviours. Moving from a central to a more decentralized 
perspective, the collective bargaining discourages the opportunism of single companies, as employers 
with regard to their employees and as competitors. The level of institutionalization defines in fact the 
extent to which HRM policies are vertically coordinated through the system of collective bargaining.  
This vertical coordination is effective when agreements have a compelling status for members and 
cover a wide range of issues pertaining to the employment relations, both monetary and non-monetary. 
The  more  coordinated  is  the  bargaining  system  the  more  companies'  retirement  incentives  are  
standardized according to a long-term strategy conveyed by the Confederal peaks to pursue general  
interests.  
As described above and summarized in Table 3.3 the four modes of social governance associate a 
different  cost  to  opportunistic  behaviour,  that  is  here  defined  as  hindering  the  formulation  and 
implementation of activation policies. This cost is in general higher in consultation setting with respect 
to concertation and in self-administration setting with respect to self-regulation, but a closer look has 
to be given to the specific  circumstances in which those modes take place.  Those circumstances,  
deriving from the dominant  partnership logic,  shape social  partners'  preferences toward activation  
policies and thus their interests in hindering or supporting their effectiveness.  
Hypotheses about the extent to which the partnership logic affect the outcome of the EWL re-
conversion are derived from the actor-centered institutionalist theory in the next section. In short social 
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partners are expected to support the effectiveness of activation policies only when their organizational 
articulation  include  them  in  social  governance  modes  that  minimize  the  payoff  of  opportunistic  
behaviour.   
Table 3.3: Four modes of social governance where the involvement of social partners can affect the policymaking and 
implementation of activation policies.  
Mode Consultation Concertation Self-administration Self-regulation
Function Deliberation of social 
partners' view on legislative 
proposals  
Negotiation between 
Government and social 
partners 
Delegation of partial 
authority to social interests 
groups for pathways of exit 
management
Collective negotiation 




Consideration of vested 
interests
Discuss political exchange, 
threat unilateral action 
(shadow of hierarchy)
Partial delegation of 
authority after setting 
criteria- parameters
Subsidiary: define legal 
framework and support 
legitimacy (erga omnes 
extension); shadow of 
hierarchy in case of no 
agreement
Partners' role Opinions, recommendations Discuss political exchange, 
enforce compliance of 
members 
Implementation, in some 
cases also supervision
Bipartite formulation and 
implementation
Decision mode Unanimity, majority rules Voluntary agreements: 
majority/unanimity rules, 
possible veto points
Majority decisions Voluntary agreements
Potential threat  Voice, exit Exit Voice, exit Exit





private actors' coordination, 
ensure correct 
implementation of the pact
Deliberation, 
implementation legitimacy
Internalization of costs, delf-
determination
Problems Status quo defence, no 




term interests of “insiders”, 
obstacle re-conversion for 
incremental change 
Threat of collusion for 
distorted implementation of 
unpopular policies, 
externalization of costs, 
bureaucratic, lack of 
competence
State exclusion, threat of 
collusion to favour narrow 
interests
Source: (Ebbinghaus 2002)  and elaborated by the author     
3.6    Working hypotheses
As mentioned earlier  no  hypotheses  about  institutional  changes  can  be derived  from institutional 
legacies  unless  contingent  circumstances,  and  especially  the  power  balance  among  actors,  are  
considered. Estimating the power balance in a constellation is complex, because requires to compare at 
once a large number of variables related to actors' resources, legitimacy, prerogatives etc. In spite of  
that, it can be easily inferred by the motives moving the actors to interact: policy and power interests,  
which resemble the distinction between membership and influence logic (Streeck 1987; Hassel 2009; 
Baccaro and Simoni 2008). 
In general the Government and the vested interests motives for interaction can be depicted as a  
cooperative strategic game (Scharpf 1997; Ebbinghaus 2006). The vested interests are referred here as 
externalization coalitions because preserving the externalization of pathways of exit's costs is the the 
most effective strategy for companies, older workers and their interests' organizations to block the 
EWL re-conversion at once. In fact the deadlock of this first Government's strategy undermines all its  
further movements.  
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Despite the two interests are never mutually exclusives, actors form their strategies according to the 
relative importance of policy and power in the specific interaction they deal with. Actors playing 
power-maintaining strategies tend to prefer preserving their institutional role more than achieving their 
policy goal. As such they reveal a weaker influence capacity, which leaves space to the counterpart to 
impose their policy priorities. On the contrary actors playing policy-oriented strategy are in a stronger  
position, since their focus on a policy target is harder to negotiate with side payments.  
As  argued  by  Hassel  (2009),  the  strategical  priorities  in  social  partnership  are  shaped  by  the 
organizational  capacity  of  interests'  associations  and  the  type  of  Government.  They  are  relevant 
because  produce  configurations  (ranking  pay-off  of  the  alternative  strategies)  leading  to  different  
outcomes  (see  figure  3.3).  The  organizational  articulation  of  social  partners  and  the  type  of  re-
conversion  under  investigation  makes  symmetric  combinations  unlikely.  The  policy-policy 
combination is typical of pluralistic settings where interests' articulation is so low as to discourage the 
Government  to  delegate  institutional  power  and social  partners  to  defend  it.  The  politics-politics 
combination  is  compatible  to  settings  where  systemic  transitions  (as  the  economic  transition  in 
Central-Eastern  Europe)  is  combined  with  a  high  fragmentation  of  the  organized  interests. 
Governments here tries to ensure social peace and social partners compete to build their institutional 
role (Hassel 2009).   
Ranging from medium to high level, the organizational articulation of labour and capital interests 
dealing  with  EWL re-conversion  in  the  Netherlands,  Germany,  and  Italy  tends  to  give  origin  to 
asymmetrical  strategy  combinations.  Depending  on  whether  the  first  strategic  movement  of  the 
Government places it in a strong or weak influence position, the external coalitions associate a low or 
high payoff to policy-oriented strategy, as shown in Figure 3.3. Since their policy priorities are driven  
by their membership logic (Streeck 1987), which is shaped on particularistic interests, policy-oriented 
strategies  are opportunistic and undermine the EWL reconversion by hindering the effectiveness of  
activation policies.
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All in all, externalization coalitions are encouraged to play opportunistic strategies only if they are  
involved in interactions where the Government plays power-maintaining strategies and discouraged 
elsewhere. Under the assumption that the perception of relative power induces the actors to value the 
payoff according to the expected success of the alternative strategies (Avdagic 2011), it may be argued 
that policy interactions encouraging opportunistic strategies produce less effective activation policies 
and vice versa. 
The  organizational  articulation  (or  vertical  coordination)  of  labour  and capital's  interests  is  of  
extreme relevance for the outcome of EWL re-conversion because, influencing the constellation and 
the interaction modes of social governance, reward or punish its opportunistic obstruction. In short the  
organizational capacity of interests' is argued here to be the main institutional condition determining 
whether vested interests will hinder or support the effectiveness of activation policies.
As  mentioned at  the  end  of  the  previous  section,  social  governance  modes  give  in  general  a 
different  payoff  to  opportunism.  Further  specification  is  nonetheless  necessary  to  examine  how 
vertical coordination of the externalization coalitions influences actors'  motives for interaction and 
thus their strategy. In Figure 3.4 the power-policy motive of actors are represented as a continuum and 
drawn as two perpendicular lines. The vertical line represents top-down the motives of Government, 
while the horizontal line depicts left-right the coalitions' motives. Social governance modes find place 
in the upper-right quadrant if they tend to hinder opportunism or in the lower-left quadrant if they tend 
to discourage it. Outsides the quadrant on the left a vertical line depicts bottom-up the organizational  
articulation of interests' coalitions leading to more cooperative form of social partnership.
    Figure 3.4: Relationship between social partnership, actor's power balance, and the payoff of opportunism behaviour.
In  interactions  with  high  interests'  organizational  articulation  the  constellation  is  typically 
characterized by positive-sum game. This constellation is shaped by a virtuous circle: the interests'  
articulation is developed through the iteration of social dialogue, which in turns constrains actors to  
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permeated by mutual trust and reciprocity, the Government perceives as low the risk of de-legitimation 
and involve the coalitions to solve a problem at stake (policy-oriented strategy). The coalitions instead 
needs to avoid opportunism since, as a break of reciprocity, will prevent them to play future influence 
(power-maintaining  strategy).  As  shown  in  the  upper  part  of  Figure  3.4  strong  organizational 
articulation of interests' coalitions is associated to a more cooperative partnership, which tends to take  
place in consultation or self-regulation modes. Because of this power balance, consultation and self-
regulations tend to solve  the actors' conflict with modes of interaction preserving the Government's 
shadow of hierarchy (Scharpf 1997). In other words the Government can threaten credible sanctions if 
the coalitions hinder the EWL re-conversion.
On  the  contrary  the  lower  interests'  organizational  articulations  is  the  more  the  constellation 
resemble zero-sum games (prisoner’s dilemma). Being contentious and thus costly, social partnership 
is  poorly  institutionalized  and  tends  to  occur  only  when  the  Government  lacks  the  necessary 
legitimacy  to  act  unilaterally  (power-maintaining  strategy).  Those  circumstances  shift  the  power 
balance  in  favour  of  the  coalitions  which  makes  their  support  conditional  to  the  pursuit  of  their  
members'  interests  (policy-oriented  strategy).  The  poor  iteration  of  social  partnership  moreover 
encourages opportunism, because no credible sanctions can prevent it. Thus the lower the coalition's  
vertical coordination is, the more interactions move towards the lower-right area in figure 3.4, where 
the  likelyhood  of  opportunism  is  higher.  In  concertation  and  self-administration  the  unilateral 
dependence of the Government makes mode of interaction sensitive to veto power and as such favour 
particular over general interests.           
   All things considered, the leading hypothesis of  this  research argues that  one the affinities,  the  
partnership,  has a  significant  impact  in enhancing the the top-down diffusion of  the paradigm of  
extending working life in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.
Hypothesis 3.1: 
Activation policies more likely to be effective the stronger is the organizational articulation of the  
system of labour and capital's intermediation system.
Because of that  activation policies are expected to be the most effective in countries with strong 
articulation, such as in the Netherlands, less effective in countries with medium articulation, such as in 
Germany, and the least effective  in countries with a low articulation, such as Italy.
This main hypothesis needs to be further articulated in the three main levels of partnership where 
the externalization coalition mediates the EWL conversion and thus the effectiveness of activation 
policies.  These  levels  are:  macro-central,  where  social  partners  affect  the  policymaking  and  the 
implementation of retrenchment policies,  meso-sectoral,  where unions and employers'  associations  
bargain  retaining  policies,  and  micro-company,  where  retaining  policies  are  finally  implemented 
(Ebbinghaus 2006).
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3.6.1 Macro level
The first instance where the externalization coalition can hinder EWL re-conversion is the formulation 
of retrenchment policies. Being part of “austerity” measures imposing concentrated costs and diffused 
benefits, the Government needed the support of social partners to converge the social consensus on 
them and legitimate the EWL re-conversion (Pierson 1996; Ebbinghaus 2006). 
This consensus is obtained with the social dialogue, that is the interaction between the Government 
and  peak  of  unions  and  employers'  confederations.  The  organizational  articulation  of  interests 
association  refers  here  to  the  bottom-up  aggregation  of  member's  interests  which  leads  to  the 
institutionalization of different peak structures involved in the social dialogue (Brugiavini et al. 2001; 
Pulignano  2010).  A  highly  integrated  interests'  aggregation  tends  to  institutionalize  permanent 
structures  capable  to  bargain  a  unitary  strategy  before  interacting  with  the  Government.  In  the  
Netherlands this structure is the Sociaal Economische Raad (SER- Social and economic council) and 
its consultation is legally required for the policymaking. 
Conversely structures are more fragmented and transitory the lower is the vertical coordination of  
interests. In Germany since the 1990's different advisory boards were set up for consultation purposes: 
commission, and the Bündnis für Arbeit (Alliance for work). Finally in Italy, despite the advisory role 
is  officially  played  by  the  Consiglio  Nazionale  Economia  Lavoro  (CNEL-National  council  for 
economics  and  work),  the  social  dialogue  occur  by  ad-hoc  tripartite  commissions,  where  each 
participate separately to the bargaining. The institutionalization of the social dialogue is of importance 
here because, making more complex the regulation of the interaction (independent experts are added, 
the  decision-making  rules  prevent  veto-points  etc.),  changes  the  constellation  and  the  mode  of  
interaction.     
In both advisory and concertative boards outcomes are achieved through negotiations. Imagining 
the negotiating space as the area formed by two perpendicular axes, representing vertically the payoff 
of social partners and horizontally the payoff of the Government (see Figure 3.5), outcomes can be 
depicted as the result of the perceived payoff of non-agreements (NA). Status quo (SQ) is placed at the 
origin of the axes and the optimal strategy of Government and social partners is represented by A 
(retrenchment)  and B (hinder retrenchment). 
The constellation and the modes of interaction in consultation setting reduce the payoff of NA 
below SQ for social partners. This is because NA would de-legitimate social partners and put at risk  
their future involvement in policymaking. Since consultation setting requires wide consensus to be 
effective, in the Netherlands unanimous, a strategy seeking to hinder retrenchment would lead to NA,  
because it would not be backed by the experts. The negative payoff of NA lead social partners to  
increase the relative pay-off of A and to support it in order to avoid NA (see Figure 3.5)     
The opposite is true in the concertation setting, where the payoff of NA goes under SQ for the  
Government. This is because it would be prevented from retrenching and, wanting social support,  
would risk to fall. Being poorly regulated, social partners have a veto power against proposals below 
B and the Government is compelled to moved towards A and support the formulation of less effective 
retrenchment policies.         
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      Figure 3.5:  Process of retrenchment policies' formulation in the Consultation and Concertation modes.
                                                     
                                                                                   
                                                                                
Hypothesis 3.2:
Retrenchment policies are likely to be more effective the more similar to consultation the setting in  
which  they are formulated is.     
Because of that  retrenchment policies are expected to be  most effective  in the  Netherlands, less 
effective in  Germany, while the least effective in Italy.
 Once enacted, retrenchment policies can produce unintended effects if their implementation takes 
place in settings promoting hindering strategies. This occurs when social partners' role in the managing 
boards of the unemployment, disability and retirement schemes gives social partners the opportunity 
of compensating the retrenchment they could not hinder in the policymaking. As explained earlier 
these boards can administrate or regulate the benefits depending on whether the financing is public or 
private. Ideally the more private is the financing the wider are the discretional power of social partners 
and vice versa. 
Despite  the  higher  discretion,  the  self-regulation  mode  discourages  the  compensation  of 
retrenchment policies because the internalization of costs would lead to payroll taxes to unsustainable 
levels. In the administration mode instead the generosity and the eligibility of the benefits are defined 
by  the Government  leaving  no  opportunities  for  compensation.  This  opportunity  grows the more 
hybrid the modes become, combining the costs externalization with social partners' discretional power. 
Being in The Netherlands, Germany, and Italy mainly the financing mode of welfare system based 
on payroll taxes, the administrative function is traditionally given to social partners as a guarantee 
legitimizing  their  redistribution.  As  explained  earlier,  the  risk  of  compensation  is  higher  in  the 
management disability and unemployment since the eligibility assessment requires a certain discretion 
over the health status and the employability of claimants. Given that pathways are interchangeable, 
social partners may compensate the retrenchment formulated in any scheme causing the unintended 
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In the Netherlands social partners lost the opportunity for compensating since their exclusion from 
administrative boards between 1994-1997. In Germany this opportunity is associated to a low payoff  
because Government experts in both executive and supervision boards can punish it. This is not the 
case  in  Italy  where  retrenchment  compensation  has  high  payoff  especially  in  the  unemployment  
scheme.   
If administration is the function legitimizing social insurance, the self-regulation requires social  
partners to produce a cooperative partnership able to cover the workforce and coordinate the scheme's 
conditions across the economy. This is because early retirement schemes are regulated by the sectoral 
collective bargaining only in the Netherlands and Germany. According to the subsidiarity principle the 
involvement of social partners has a problem-solving function, which can be only indirectly guided by 
the Government. This can be done through subsidies, clauses extending the validity of agreements to 
all employees (erga omnes), and agreements over future bargaining rounds. 
The retrenchment's compensation is encouraged by subsidies that, as in Germany, externalizing the 
funding of early retirement schemes, moves the mode toward self-administration. On the contrary, the 
retrenchment is encouraged by social pacts, committing social partners' member to its implementation. 
This requires a very high vertical coordination for both unions and employers' associations, which it is 
only found in the Netherlands. It is associated with the institutionalization of a second  peak bipartite 
board:  the  Stichting  van  de  Arbeid  (STvdA-  Labour  Foundation),  providing  common 
recommendations to the members associations engaged in the collective bargaining. STvdA gives the 
Government the opportunity to boost the retrenchment of early retirement scheme by negotiating a 
political exchange in a concertation setting. Unlike Italy, these negotiations are more institutionalized 
and thus discourage STvdA from the stalemate. This is because the Government does not negotiate for  
a want of legitimation and thus can punish the stalemate by reducing their institutional role (shadow of  
hierarchy).  Political  exchange  therefore  tend  to  not  hinder  the  retrenchment  but  to  involve  side 
payments.   
Hypothesis 3.3:
Retrenchment policies are likely to be more effective the more similar to self-regulation or to self-
administration the setting in which they are implemented is. 
Because of that retrenchment policies implemented in disability and unemployment schemes are 
expected to be most effective in the Netherlands and  Germany, and less effective in Italy.
Hypothesis 3.4:
Retrenchment policies are likely to be more effective the more their implementation in self-regulation  
mode is vertically coordinated. 
Because of that retrenchment policies implemented in early retirement schemes are expected to be 
most effective in the Netherlands, less effective in Germany.
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3.6.2 Meso level
As mentioned earlier,  the EWL re-conversion can be depicted as  a  top-down sequential  game 
between the Government and the externalization coalition. After the central game played between the  
Government  and  the  Confederation,  the  interaction  moves  at  sectoral  level  where  interests' 
organizations coordinate working conditions across companies. This coordination is obtained through 
a self-regulatory setting, where unions and employers'  (associations) take part to a policy network 
motivated by policy interests (Scharpf 1997; Ebbinghaus 2006).
Working conditions provide relevant retirement incentives and, as such, are strategically used by 
the companies' HRM to maximize their personnel's productivity. In the Netherlands, Germany, and 
Italy, HRM policies comply with ILM and working conditions encourage early exit after the age when 
productivity is assumed to fall under their labour costs. Since their early 1970's those shedding policies 
were  supported  by  social  partners  and  in  turn  publicly  legitimated  by  the  institutionalization  of 
pathways of  exit.  This  means that  unless pathways are  considerably retrenched,  no incentives for  
strategical  change  are  faced  by  the  beneficiaries  of  early  retirement  (older  workers  and  their 
employers) and, following a membership logic, by their interests' organization.
The situation of low retrenchment is depicted in the lower part of the sequential game in figure 3.3,  
where the optimal strategical response of the sectoral bargaining is to keep on promoting shedding 
policies. Thus in Italy, where retrenchment is expected to be severely hindered by the inclusion of  
social partners in the concertative setting, collective labour agreements (CLAs) are not expected to  
include retaining policies.  
Figure 3.6: Tripartite governance- externalization coalition sequential game to convey EWL re-conversion.
On the contrary, the higher is retrenchment the more the costs of pathways of exit  need to be  
internalized  by  companies  and older  workers.  Although collective  bargaining  can  be  a  source  of  
additional benefits for early exit (Trampusch 2007; Trampusch 2009), the higher the retrenchment the 
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As shown in the upper half of Figure 3.3, unions and employers' associations are encouraged to  
switch toward a retaining strategy. Being limited the margin of payroll tax increase, they have a high  
interest  in  negotiating  the arrangements  making  EWL beneficial  for  their  members.  This  interest 
motives  unions  to  reduce  the  workers'  burden  and  employers  ('associations)  to  boost  workers' 
productivity.  This  what  is  expected  to  happen  in  the  Netherlands  and  Germany,  CLAs  are  thus  
expected to include arrangements over working conditions that extend working life.  
Hypothesis 3.5:
Retaining policies are likely to be more effective the more retrenchment policies internalized the costs  
of pathways of exit.
Because  of  that retaining  policies are  expected  to  be  most  effective in  the  Netherlands and 
Germany, and less effective in Italy. 
3.6.3 Micro level
The last instance where the externalizing coalition can affect the EWL re-conversion is at company  
level,  where working conditions are ultimately set by HRM policies. This strategic choice can be 
depicted as a the final step of the sequential game between the coalition and the Government. While 
companies in the countries  under investigation normally shed older workers,  they may shift  their  
strategy under circumstances changing their payoffs. External circumstances, such as a shortage of the 
workforce during economic expansion, can lead employers to ignore their ageism and retain their older 
employees  to  replace  this  gap.  A  part  from  voluntaristic  actions,  a  strategical  shift  can  be 
systematically required by institutional circumstances, or in other words, as a product of binding CLAs 
between unions and employers' associations.   
The  extent  to  which  CLA's  bind  companies'  strategies  depends  on  the  coordination  of  the 
bargaining system and thus again on the interests' organizational articulation. In all three cases under 
investigation the industry is  the  pivotal  level,  which  legally  compel  companies  to  implement  the 
standards negotiated in CLAs. As explained in the previous section, in spite of its coordination, the  
bargaining structure in Italy is expected to not bind companies to retaining strategies, because the 
Government fails to provide the incentives to do so. 
On the contrary in the Netherlands and Germany those incentives are conveyed through a similarly 
but not equally coordinated bargaining structure. The higher articulation of interests in the Netherlands 
lead  the  bargaining  structure  to  be  vertically  bounded  to  a  joint  long-term  strategy  defined  at  a 
confederal level. The comparatively lower articulation in Germany makes instead this coordination 
flatter, because the strategies negotiated in few industries set the tend for the rest of the economy.  
What  is  lacking in  Germany is  a  central  structure that,  as  STvdA in the Netherlands,  allows the 
Government  to  convey retaining  policies  directly  in  the  bargaining  strategies  of  both  unions and 
employers' organizations at industry level. 
In the Netherlands this conveyance is launched by the regular interactions between the Government  
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and STvdA, channelled through STvdA recommendations first and legal bounding CLAs after, finally 
reaches companies. This conveyance brings the HRM from a unilateral into a game setting, where the 
legal value of CLA imposes companies negative payoffs for shedding policies . As shown in figure 
3.7,  those  payoff  lead  companies  to  implement  retrenchment  policies  and  thus  foster  their  
effectiveness.   
 In  Germany  this  conveyance  is  supported  by  employers'  organizations.  This  is  because  only 
employers  are  organized  in  structures  so  articulated  as  to  adopt  the  EWL re-conversion  in  their  
strategy.  Conversely  due to  their  higher  fragmentation,  unions still  face higher  incentives  to  take 
advantage  of  their  role  in  the  management  of  early  retirement  schemes  to  hinder  the  EWL re-
conversion. Since they are still able to foster early retirement, unions have no interests in making  
retaining policies binding for companies by including them in CLAs, as shown in the lower half of  
figure  3.7.  In  absence of  sanctions penalizing  shedding policies,  in  Germany companies  perceive  
lower payoff for retaining strategy than in the Netherlands. 
Figure 3.7: Industry self-regulation - companies sequential game to convey EWL re-conversion.
Hypothesis 3.6:
Retaining policies are likely to be more effective the higher is the vertical coordination of the system of 
collective bargaining.
Because of that retaining policies are expected to be  most effective in the  Netherlands and less 
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3.6.4 Effectiveness' stratification
As  mentioned  earlier,  when  interacting  with  the  Government  in  a  constellation  encouraging 
opportunistic strategies, the externalization coalitions act according to a membership logic. This logic 
leads the coalitions to prefer strategies maximizing the interests of core members over the rest of the  
society. The more inclusive the membership is the more they pursue public-oriented interests, which 
lead to a fair redistribution of the costs of retrenchment policies. 
In  Continental  Europe  the  representativeness  of  labour  and  capital  organizations  tends  to  be 
narrower and cover exclusively the interests of workers and companies at the core of the economy:  
adult and older workers, and large companies in private manufacturing sector. Due to this dichotomy 
between insiders and outsiders3,  the strategy of unions and employers'  confederations affecting the 
policymaking  and  the  implementation  of  retrenchment  policies  is  not  to  hinder  their  general 
effectiveness. On the contrary the more they can follow their membership (as opposed to influence) 
logic, the more they are motivated to preserve insiders' rights and concentrate the retrenchment on the 
“outsiders”.   
Hypothesis 3.7:
The more retrenchment policies are hindered, the more their effectiveness is expected to be lower for  
core members and and higher for non-members of the externalization coalitions. 
Because of that  the  effectiveness of  activation policies is expected to be:  least stratified in the 
Netherlands, more stratified in Germany and the most stratified in Italy. 
As for retaining policies, if their implementation is mutually conveyed by the interests' organization 
to  their  members,  as  in  the  Netherlands,  it  becomes  legally  compelling  for  companies.  In  this  
coordinated bargaining system central agreements, by limiting progressively the strategic options at  
decentralized  ultimately  at  company  level,  are  expected  to  produce  also  horizontal  outcome 
coordination across the economy. Because of that the effectiveness of retaining policies is expected to 
follow no significant industry pattern. 
Hypothesis 3.8:
If mutually conveyed, retaining policies are likely to the highly effective across the economy.
If retaining policies are hindered other two sets of competing hypotheses can be derived about the 
stratification of  their  effectiveness.  The first  set  concerns  the case  where retaining policies  is  not 
conveyed by CLA's, as in Germany and Italy.
Under  the  assumption  that  the  structural  role  played by early exit  in  high ILM lead  HRM to 
develop negative age-based stereotypes, it can be argued that companies do not retain older workers  
unless constrained. This is because, the stereotypes makes older workers' skills redundant. According 
to this argument companies value shedding strategies always preferable to retaining strategies even 
3 Insiders and outsiders are here exclusively defined according to whether workers are part of the core 
membership of interests' organizations or not. Therefore, according to this distinction, public employees, 
normally defined as the welfare literature as insiders, belong here to the outsider group. 
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under external circumstances generating a workforce shortage. Since stereotypes are generalized in  
HRM, the voluntaristic implementation is expected to lead to a very poor effectiveness of retaining 
policies across the economy.
Hypothesis 3.9a:
If implemented on a voluntaristic bases, retaining policies are likely to be poorly effective across the  
economy. 
Conversely it can be also argued that this argument holds only in industries exposed to international 
competition and thus to high pressure for technological progress. This is because only where skills are 
required to be flexible age stereotypes makes older workers unfit to replace a skills shortage. On the  
contrary, stereotypes are weaker in sheltered industries, where skills do not need to be continuously 
updated. Because of that in case of skills shortage HRM are expected to prefer to retain older workers  
than to shed them. According to this argument, the voluntaristic implementation lead to a different  
industry  pattern  of  retaining  policies'  effectiveness.  The  effectiveness  is  expected  to  be  poor  in 
declining industries  and in  industries  exposed to  international  competition  and higher  in  growing 
protected industries.   
Hypothesis 3.9b:
If implemented on a voluntaristic bases, retaining policies are likely to be more effective in industries  
enduring skills' shortage that older workers are fit to replace, than in the rest of the economy. 
The second set of competing hypotheses refers to the case where, even if not conveyed by CLA's, 
retaining policies are unilaterally conveyed top-down to the membership of one interests' association. 
This is the case of Germany, where the employers' confederation  Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen  
Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA-  Confederation  of  German  employers)  made  a  coordinated  efforts  to 
foster the implementation of retaining policies among its members. However lacking this conveyance 
any legal constrain, it can be argued on the one hand that companies are expected to anyway retain  
older workers only on a voluntary bases, as in Italy (HP 3.9a-HP 3.9b). 
Hypothesis 3.10a:
If unilaterally conveyed, retaining policies are likely to be poorly effective across the economy. 
Hypothesis 3.10b:
If unilaterally conveyed, retaining policies are likely to be more effective in industries enduring skills'  
shortage that older workers are fit to replace, than in the rest of the economy.  
On the other hand it can be argued that the conveyance, although unilateral, promote a top-down 
learning process  among the membership of  BDA. In other  words,  spreading  awareness about  the 
future challenges and, more importantly, about the methods to improve productivity in older age works 
as a disincentives to opportunistic behaviour or shedding policies. By weakening age stereotypes the 
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unilateral conveyance encourage the implementation of retaining policies across the economy, as in  
the Netherlands.
Hypothesis 3.10c:
 If unilaterally conveyed, retaining policies are likely to be effective across the economy.
3.7 Summary of hypotheses
Table 3.4: Summary of main hypotheses about how the organizational articulation of interests' intermediation mediate the  
effectiveness of activation policies in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy.
Institutional affinity and sequential game Hypotheses Expectations
ACTIVATION POLICIES
Organizational  articulation  of  interests 
intermediation:
         + Cooperative partnership
        
         - Contentious  partnership
HP 3.1: 
The  EWL  re-conversion  is  more  likely  to  be 
effective  the  stronger  is  the  organizational 
articulation of  the system of labour and capital's 
intermediation system.
Activation policies delay employment exit:
+++  in the Netherlands
++    in Germany
+       in Italy
RETRENCHMENT POLICIES
Retrenchment formulation:
        + articulation  → consultation
        - articulation  → concertation
HP 3.2:
Retrenchment  policies  are  likely  to  be  more 
effective  the  more  similar  to  consultation  the 
setting in which they are formulated is.     
Retrenchment policies reduce entry into pathways 
of exit:
+++  in the Netherlands
++    in Germany
+       in Italy
Retrenchment implementation:
        + articulation  → regulation
        - articulation  → administration
HP 3.3:
Retrenchment  policies  are  likely  to  be  more 
effective the more similar to self-regulation or to 
self-administration  the  setting  in  which  they are 
implemented is. 
Retrenchment  policies  reduce  entry  into  in 
disability and unemployment pathways 
++  in the Netherlands and  Germany
+    in Italy.
Retrenchment regulation:
     + articulation→ + vertical coordination
     - articulation  → - vertical coordination
HP 3.4:
Retrenchment  policies  are  likely  to  be  more 
effective  the  more  their  implementation  in  self-
regulation mode is vertically coordinated. 
Retrenchment policies reduce entry into in early 
retirement pathway
++  in the Netherlands
+    in Germany
RETAINING POLICIES
Social partners convey retaining policies:
       +  retrenchment → + retaining conveyance
        -retrenchment → - retaining  conveyance
HP 3.5:
Retaining policies are likely to be more effective 
the  more  retrenchment  policies  internalized  the 
costs of pathways of exit.
Retaining policies delay employment exit
++ in the Netherlands and  Germany
 + in Italy. 
Retainment regulation:
       + articulation→ + collective bargaining 
       - articulation  → voluntary
HP 3.6:
Retaining policies are likely to be more effective 
the  higher  is  the  vertical  coordination  of  the 
system of collective bargaining.
Retaining policies delay employment exit
++ in the Netherlands
 + in Germany
EFFECTIVENESS STRATIFICATION
Retrenchment policies:
       + articulation  → fair redistribution costs
        - articulation  → costs concentrated on non- 
          members
HP 3.7:
The more retrenchment policies are hindered, the 
more their  effectiveness is  expected to  be lower 
for  core  members  and  and  higher  for  non-
members of the externalization coalitions. 
Effectiveness  of  retrenchment  policies  :  ---least 
stratified in the Netherlands,
– more stratified in Germany and 
- the most stratified in Italy. 
Social partners convey retaining policies:
        +articulation→ mutual conveyance
      
HP 3.8:  
The effectiveness of retaining policies is likely to 
be not stratified if it is mutually conveyed
In  the  Netherlands  retaining  policies  delay 
retirement in all industries
Social partners convey retaining policies:
    
        --articulation→  voluntaristic conveyance
HP 3.9:  
If implemented on a voluntaristic bases, retaining 
policies:
a: are  likely  to  be  poorly  effective  across  the 
economy. 
b:  are  likely  to  be  more  effective  in  industries 
In Italy retaining policies :
a: do not delay retirement in any industries
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enduring skills' shortage that older workers are fit 
to replace, than in the rest of the economy. 
Social partners convey retaining policies:
    
       +  articulation→   unilateral conveyance
HP 3.10: 
If  unilaterally  conveyed,  retaining  policies  are 
likely to be:
a: poorly effective across the economy
b:more  effective  in  industries  enduring  skills' 
shortage that older workers are fit to replace, than 
in the rest of the economy. 
c: effective across the economy  
In Germany retaining policies :
a: do not delay retirement in any industry
b: delay retirement only in growing and protected 
industries. 
c:  delay retirement in all industries
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4 Research design and methodology
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology used to test the main hypothesis that the coordination of the  
interests' representation significantly increases the effectiveness of activation policies. As explained in 
the analytical  framework,  this  research focuses on three countries characterised by a conservative  
welfare logic, a coordinated market economy, but a decreasing coordination of the partnership system. 
Because of that, I expect the effectiveness of activation policies to be the highest in the Netherlands, 
lower in Germany, and the lowest in Italy.
In these three countries the EWL re-conversion is first promoted by the government that tries to  
retrench the financial attractiveness of the pathways of exit provided by the social protection system.  
These policies are opposed by social partners to preserve the benefits that pathways of exit provide to  
their membership (older workers and employers) (Schludi 2005c). Their success depends on the extent 
to which the interaction mode with the government allow them to hinder the formulation and the 
implementation  of  retrenchment  policies.  Since  more  cooperative  social  partners  are  included  in 
interaction modes that make less likely for social partners to hinder retrenchment policies, I expect 
these  latter  to  be  the  most  effective in  the  Netherlands,  less  effective in  Germany,  and  the  least  
effective in Italy.  
Employers are not only a part of the social partners' membership, but they represent a separate actor 
in the constellation that regulates the institutional incentives of retirement behaviour. Employers are 
responsible of the ultimate definition of the so-called push incentives, as part of their human resources'  
management  (HRM).  Employers  are  interested  in  fostering  early  retirement  trends  as  a  way  to 
opportunistically shed the personnel's redundancies that limit the competitiveness of their companies.  
Their opportunistic behaviour can be constrained to retain older workers only if two conditions are 
met. The first is that social partners, as a result of the interaction with the government, adopt the EWL 
target. The second is that the interaction mode between social partners and employers allow the first to  
convey retaining policies into the latter throughout the collective bargaining structure. Since social 
partners  with  more  coordinated  organizations  are  more  likely  to  systematically  convey  retaining 
policies, I expect these latter to be the most effective in the Netherlands, less effective in Germany, and 
the least effective in Italy.  
Since social partners affect separately the effectiveness of retrenchment and retaining policies, this 
investigation is organized in two empirical part. For both of them the data is drawn by Sharelife, the 
third  wave  of  the  Survey  on  Health  and  Retirement  in  Europe  (SHARE).  Sharelife  provides 
comparable retrospective information over the work-retirement trajectories of older workers cohorts 
that are exposed to the activation policies and earlier cohorts that are exposed to strong pull and push  
incentives.
The  first  empirical  part  the  analysis  consists  of  a  cohort  analysis,  where  the  cohorts  of  older 
workers  are  compared  that  enter  their  late  career  before  and  after  the  mid-1990's,  when  the 
implementation of activation policies begins in the social protection system. This cohort analysis is not 
aimed  at  evaluating  the  outcome  of  the  activation  policies.  Conversely  by  comparing  the  work-
retirement patterns of the two cohorts, it is inferred which institutional attempts the protection, the 
64 4  Research design and methodology
production and the partnership systems have made to foster the extension of working life.
The effectiveness of retrenchment and retaining policies are investigated separately, using different 
operationalization  of  work-retirement  trajectories.  In  the  investigation  of  the  effectiveness  of 
retrenchment policies work-retirement trajectories is operationalised as the institutional arrangements 
(pathways of exit) used by the respondents to pass from employment until the statutory retirement at  
the age of 65. Retrenchment policies are operationalised as a cohort effect. 
In the second part of the research design work retirement trajectories are operationalized as the age  
of exit from employment. The different dimensions of retaining policies finally are operationalized as 
the aspects of the job quality that they improve. The subjective measurement of different aspects of the 
working conditions in the last job are reduced, using Iterative Factor Analysis into three factors that  
represent to what extent the dimensions of physical health reconciliation, mental health reconciliation,  
and age equality are promoted by HRM policies. Other two variables are used to represent the extent 
HRM policies foster the dimensions of time reconciliation and employability. In order to approach as 
much as possible the unit of analysis of retaining policies  the  job quality aspects are interacted with  
the industry where respondents work. 
The methods used to estimate the effectiveness of activation policies is Event History Analysis for 
two main reasons. First EHA is the appropriate methods to investigate durations before an event, and 
thus the extension of the career before the exit due to retirement. Secondly, EHA can successfully  
deals  with  the  right-censored  observations  that  in  the  sample  are  individuals  that  are  still  in 
employment. The effectiveness of retrenchment policies will be investigated using Competing-Risk 
model.  The  effectiveness  of  retaining  policies  will  be  estimated  using  a  Piecewise-constant 
exponential model. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First Sharelife and the samples' characteristics are described 
in Section 4.2. The operationalisation of the main variables and the controls is discussed  in Section  
4.3. Section 4.4 is devoted to the description of the methods. At the end the main limitations of this 
research design is discussed in Section 4.5.
4.2 Data
The data used to test the hypotheses are drawn from the third wave of the Survey on Health, Ageing  
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) conducted between 2008 and 2009. In short, the SHARE survey 
is a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel database of micro data on health, socio-economic status 
and social and family networks of more than 85,000 individuals (approximately 150,000 interviews) 
from 20 European countries and Israel aged 50 or over between 2004 and 2008-9.  
SHARE survey represents the best available source of the secondary data analysis because it is  
focused  on  how the elderly  experience  ageing  in  different  life  domains,  among  which  work  and 
retirement in Europe. Because of that, SHARE allows a valid operationalization of the key concepts of 
the analytical framework. Moreover it provides me a sample that is larger with respect to surveys  
addressed to the overall population. Finally it grants me comparable information for the Netherlands, 
Germany, and Italy. 
In more detail, this investigation is based on the third wave of SHARE (Sharelife) which offers a  
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retrospective overview over the lifecycle of the respondents. These retrospective information concern 
a broad range of domains, such as partnership, parenthood, health, employment and work quality. 
Especially  these  last  two  modules  are  of  interest,  because  they  provide  information  about  the 
economic positions of the respondents between the age of 50 and 65 years. The items of the remaining 
domains are considered for the operationalization of the controls. 
Sharelife questionnaire is based on Life History Calendars (LHC), a grid that graphically represents 
the life course in different domains as separate horizontal lines. Respondents are then asked to indicate 
the events  of their  life course  in each domain as the timing in which they experience transitions 
between two different statuses. For example, the retrospective employment history is represented as a  
series of qualitative transitions. It starts with the entry in labour market after education, continues with 
transitions between different jobs spells and job interruptions (such as unemployment, maternity leave,  
training leave etc.), and ends with the a last transition out of the labour market. Since then a new set of  
transitions  are  recorded  between  different  inactive  statuses  (unemployment,  disability,  retirement, 
household care etc.). For each step of the respondents' working career information are gathered over: 
the industry, the position of the job along the occupational structure, the employment relationship 
(self-employed, employee in the public sector, and employee in the private sector) and the working 
time etc. The same procedure is used in all the other life domains, except from work quality. Work 
quality is measured only in the last job if the respondents already left employment at the time of the  
interview or  in  the  current  job  if  the  respondents  were  still  working.  The  interviews  took  place 
between 2008 and 2009. Because of recalling issues retrospective information are not be measured in 
greater detail than at the yearly level. 
The main advantages of choosing Sharelife among the SHARE waves are three. First it provides  
information about the work-retirement trajectories of a wide range of birth cohorts from the late-1910's 
and the late 1950's. This allows for a fairly balanced comparison between the group of older workers 
exposed to activation policies and the group that did not experience them. The first group includes the 
cohorts that in the mid-1990's did not enter their late career. The second group includes the cohorts  
that in the same periods are already in their late career and thus are already exposed to early retirement  
incentives.  
Secondly, the retrospective information of Sharelife allow a longitudinal analysis of how the events 
in  the  late  career  affect  work-retirement  transitions.  This  allows  to  control  the  extent  to  which 
differences between the two cohorts of older workers are due to compositional effects. Thirdly, since 
the period of observation stops in 2009, the analysis can disentangle the effect of activation policies 
from the turmoil caused by the recent financial crisis.   
The national samples include individuals aged 50 years or older between 2008-2009, who report to 
stop working between the age of 49 and 65 years. Respondents that leave employment outsides those  
thresholds  are  considered  outliers  and  thus  excluded  from  the  analysis.  Tables  4.1  provides  a 
descriptive overview of the distribution of the variables included in the analysis in the general sample 
for the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. A more specific overview of the distribution of the variables 
is shown in the country-chapters. The data are organized at person-spell level.
The full sample is used only to investigate the effectiveness of retrenchment policies. The case  
number  is  2617  for  The  Netherlands,  2695  for  Germany,  and  2292  for  Italy  and  correspond  
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respectively to 1227, 1401, 1283 respondents. The total number of transitions out of employment are 
766 for the Netherlands and 833 for Germany, and 853 for Italy. 
The effectiveness of retaining policies is estimated on the sub-sample of respondents born after 
1944. This is to disentangle the effect of retaining policies from the effect of retrenchment policies.  
The case number is 1505 for The Netherlands, 1149 for Germany, and 1008 for Italy and correspond to 
692, 615 and 559 individuals. The total number of employment exit is 215 for the Netherlands, 151 for 
Germany, and 282 for Italy.
Despite the strength of these samples, three main weak points can be detected. First the distribution 
of the pathways of exit variable is quite unbalanced. The majority of the cases are divided between 
still working or in the pension pathway, while the frequency of unemployment and disability is rather 
marginal.  This  may  reduce  the  power  of  the  test  and  underestimate  the  real  effectiveness  of 
retrenchment policies. The distribution is also unbalanced in the industry variable. As shown in Table  
4.1  the  sectors  of:  financial  intermediation  and  real  estate,  renting  and  business  activity  are  
significantly underrepresented. This can strongly affect the estimations in these sectors, especially if  
retrenchment and retaining policies are interacted by industry.  
Secondly, a relevant number of cases in the sample are in the other pathway. As it is explained later 
in more detail, it is an exit route that is not directly associated to any institutional arrangements but  
supported by personal savings or by the household's income. Such an high frequency however may be  
a hint of a measurement error, which may consistently biases the estimation (see 4.3.1 for more details  
details).
Thirdly, the birth cohorts of the full sample start from 1910. This means that a small part of the 
respondents  in  the  cohort  <1944  group  is  an  outlier.  Since  an  extremely  long  survival  is  often 
associated to other extreme behaviour, among which exceptionally long careers, these outliers may 
bias the analysis and underestimate the effectiveness of retrenchment policies.     
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       Table 4.1: Sample's descriptive for The Netherlands, Germany, and Italy.
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4.3 Operationalization
The  discussion  over  the  variables'  operationalization  starts  with  the  dependent  variable.  Work 
retirement trajectories has two operationalizations because it is affected by activation policies in two 
dimensions.  Retaining  policies  affect  the  timining  of  exit  from  employment,  while  retrenchment  
policies affect the institutional arrangements chosen to exit from employment.    
Retrenchment policies are operationalized as a cohort effect, since they reduce the attractiveness of 
pathways of exit only for cohorts that in the mid-1990's reached a limited seniority (both biological  
and occupational) (Han and Moen 1999). Retaining policies instead are operationalized as the extent 
to which the job quality of older workers is improved by HRM policies. In order to approach the 
measurement unit of retaining policies, the job quality is interacted with the industry in which the 
individual is working. The operationalization of the controls concludes this section. 
4.3.1 Dependent variable: work-retirement trajectory
Work-retirement trajectory can be operationalised both in qualitative and quantitative terms. From a 
qualitative  perspective  work-retirement  trajectory  can  be  operationalised  as  the  institutional 
arrangements that is used to “bridge” the exit from employment and the entry into retirement (Fasang 
2010),  according  to  the  definition  of  pathway  of  exit.  From a  quantitative  perspective  it  can  be 
operationalised as  the  timing of  exit  from employment  (Lancee and Radl  2012;  Radl  2013;  Radl 
2010).  As  it  will  be  explained  below,  these  two operationalisations  will  be  used  to  estimate  the 
effectiveness of retrenchment and retaining policies.   
Retrenchment  policies  enhance  a  change  both  in  the  timing  of  exit  and  in  the  choice  of  the 
pathways used to carry out the trajectory between work to statutory retirement. Because of that in the  
first part of this investigation work-retirement trajectory is operationalized with two variables. One 
variables is a discrete variable and is a subjective measure of the age when career transition occur. The  
other  gives  subjective  measurement  about  the  qualitative  ending  point  of  the  transition.  It  is  a 
categorical variable equal to: 0 if the respondent remains into employment, 1 if the respondent enters  
into an unemployment pathway, 2 if the respondent enter a disability pathway, 3 if the respondent enter 
a  retirement pathway,  and 4 if the respondent enters an other pathway.  This latter includes all cases 
where the employment exit is not directly associated to the inflow into a pathway financed by the  
social protection system. Respondents are included in this pathway if they claim they left their job to 
take care of their household or to enjoy more leisure or to take care of their assets etc. Such a different  
range of answers raises the suspicion that this variable may have some validity problem. It is not clear 
whether  the variable  measures  the  institutional  arrangement  (and thus  the  source of  income) that 
respondents  used  to  exit  employment  or  their  personal  motivation  for  exiting  employment.  This 
validity problem can affect the operationalization, since respondents may be in the “other pathway” 
because of a measurement error.   
The  combination  between  timing  and  the  pathway  chosen  to  exit  employment  enables  me  to 
investigate whether behavioural trends are coherent with the policies implemented or whether these 
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latter are affected by  unintended effects. These effects occur for instance if  the retrenchment of one 
pathway  of  exit  does  not  correspond  to  a  lower  inflow  of  older  workers  in  that  pathway  or  is 
associated to an increased entry into an alternative one's. This unintended effects may be a hint that  
social partners and employers compensate retrenchment policies with private benefits.    
Retaining policies improve the working conditions to encourage an extension of the late career and 
thus delay the exit from employment. Because of that in the second part of this investigation, work-
retirement trajectories are  operationalized with two variables measuring the  timing of employment  
outflow. The first is a discrete variable and measures the age associated to a change in the career of the  
respondent. The second is a dichotomous variable equal to 0 if the respondent remains in employment 
and 1 if the respondent leaves employment into one of the previously described pathway. 
4.3.2 Main predictors: activation policies
The range of activation policies is extensive and include a wide varieties of measures both public 
and private. However they have two main levels of observation.  
Ideally retrenchment policies change is common to all individuals that are still in employment after  
their implementation. Because of that it is reasonable to assume that all individuals that are not eligible 
for a pathways of exit at the moment of the implementation of retrenchment policies (mid-1990's) are  
affected by them. Thus retrenchment policies are operationalized as a cohort effect. 
The unity of observation of retaining policies is more decentralized. In fact working conditions, 
although centrally regulated by the law and CLAs, are mainly strategically defined by HRM policies.  
This strategical regulation is aimed at encouraging some behavioural outcomes in the workforce. In 
the case of retaining policies, the aim is to encourage the older employees to delay their outflow from 
the company. The critical aspect that affects their effectiveness is however the way in which they are 
subjectively experienced by the employees. Their will of delaying their exit depends on the extent to 
which they perceive their job quality increased by retaining policies. Because of that retaining policies 
are operationalized as the quality of some key aspects of the working conditions that is perceived by  
respondents in their last of current job.   
 
4.3.3 Retrenchment policies
Birth cohort is often used to operationalize complex institutional, economic, and cultural changes,  
especially when the change is complex and does not have a precise temporal collocation (BlossfedI, 
Buchholz,  and  Hofäcker  2006;  BlossfedI,  Buchholz,  and  Kutz  2011;  Han  and  Moen  1999). 
Retrenchment policies include a series of measures implemented in different social protection schemes  
along few years. Because of this complexity, this research is not aimed at evaluating the causal effect 
of  retrenchment  policies  on  retirement  behaviour,  because  it  is  not  possible  to  set  the  necessary 
rigorous  quasi-experimental  research  design  (Khandker,  B.  Koolwal,  and  Samad  2009).  The 
behavioural effect of the retrenchment of pathways of exit is part of the assumptions and will not be  
tested. 
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The goal is to infer from the typical patterns of these two different cohorts the effectiveness of the 
Government's attempts to lower the financial attractiveness of the pathways of exit. In other words, the 
extent to which social partners hindered the retrenchment policies by affecting their formulation and 
implementation is investigated. 
The use of birth cohorts assumes that retrenchment policies affect only individuals that in the mid-
1990's are younger than a certain threshold  (Han and Moen 1999).  In pathways where the benefit 
depends on the contribution history, such as the pension and unemployment pathways, the use of birth  
cohorts  can lead  to  validity  problems.  In fact  among the young cohort,  individuals  may ripe  the 
necessary contribution history and enter the pension pathway before the mid-1990's.  By the same 
token, among the older cohorts, individuals may be actually exposed to retrenchment policies if they 
are  still  working after  their  implementation.  These validity  problems are  strongly reduced by the  
transitional  rules  that  are  often  set  for  the  implementation  of  retrenchment  policies.  These  rules 
preserve the short-term plans that older workers and their employers made on the bases of the previous 
incentives (or “acquired rights”) and normally exclude the whole older cohort from the exposition to 
retrenchment policies.  
Stronger validity problems arises because retrenchment policies follow a different temporal pattern  
in each pathway of exit. These different patterns make difficult to exactly separate the exposed from 
the non-exposed group.  
Despite  these  validity  problems,  the  birth  cohort  remains  the  best  available  instrument  to 
operationalize retrenchment policies.  The cohort  effect  is measured in all  the three countries as a  
dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the respondents are born in 1945 or after and 0 if they are born  
earlier.  According to this definition the individuals that in 1995 are aged 50 years or younger are  
considered  exposed  to  retrenchment  policies.  This  operationalisation  improves  the  validity  of  the 
measurement  if retrenchment policies set a transitional implementation or take place from the end of 
the 1990's onwards. It provides however less valid measurements if retrenchment policies have an 
immediate effect, especially if they are implemented in the years immediately following 1995. The  
choice of this operationalization also takes into account the timing with which the main retrenchment  
policies are enacted in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.
In summary, retrenchment policies are measured as a cohort effect. Although this operationalization 
has some validity issues, it fits the best with the empirical cases. 
4.3.4 Retaining policies
In literature three main approaches can be found to measure the extent to which retaining policies is 
part of the HRM goals. Firstly, surveys that are directly conducted on employers and HMR managers 
to investigate their attitudes towards older workers  (Conen 2013). Secondly, company surveys that 
analyse  the  characteristics  and  the  dissemination  of  HRM  policies  targeted  at  older  workers 
(Bredgaard and Tros 2006;  Tros 2005;  Van Dalen,  Henkens,  and Schippers  2009).  Thirdly,  micro 
survey that indirectly measured HRM policies targeted at older workers by looking at the extent to 
which they affect the self-perceived job quality of older workers (Ilmarinen 2005). 
The  operationalization  of  retaining policies  is  based  on this  last  approach.  Measuring  policies 
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indirectly  with  their  outcomes,  presents  some  critical  aspects  because  job  quality  presents  other 
potential sources of heterogeneity. Job quality depends on observed structural aspects of the work 
organization which can be controlled for including the occupational scale into the model. More critical 
is the fact that job quality, being a subjective rating, is also endogenous, since it is both dependent on 
unobserved  heterogeneity  (such  as  individual  preferences  especially  in  connection  with  health 
conditions) and affected by measurement errors. Those errors arise first because the information are  
retrospective and a time-constant within the age-range even if the individual changed job.       
In spite of its limitations, this operationalisation represents at the moment of writing one of the few 
way if not the only way of compare the effect HRM policies on retirement patterns in Germany, Italy  
and the Netherlands with a secondary data analysis. Databases combining information about HRM 
policies addressed to seniors with employees' careers are available only for Germany and only for a 
limited time span.  
Moreover, despite the errors, a unique measurement in the last job is likely to recollect the most 
recent.  This  means  that  information  are  provided  about  the  working  conditions  that  respondents 
experience just before their employment exit or before the interview while still working. In this sense 
effects, whenever significant, refer to working conditions that encourage either the decision to retire or 
keep on working. 
  The subjective rating of employees, despite discretional, has to main advantages. First by drawing 
information to employees and not to HRM managers, it is less sensitive to socially desirable answers 
that can overestimate the extent to which older workers are retained. Second by looking at how HRM 
policies affect the job quality, they give a closer insight on the extent to which their implementation 
actually improve the working conditions of the older employees  (Siegrist et al. 2007). For instance 
HRM policies may require to lower the workload after a certain age but their effectiveness depends on  
how substantial this reduction is, their coverage etc. This information can be drawn only by directly  
measuring the job quality of the respondents. 
  One may argue that this measurement excludes a relevant set working conditions, namely the 
monetary ones (De Preter, Van Looy, and Mortelmans 2013). This is a limitation of the analysis, since 
Sharelife does not provide information about the private benefits that employers offer to encourage 
their older employees' dismissal. Nevertheless if private benefits are still systematically used to foster  
early dismissals, then they should undermine the positive correlation between job quality and the exit 
timing. This was observed for instance in the case of partial retirement. Partial retirement is a measure 
that encourage older workers to EWL because it leaves them more time for their private life with  
minor or no cuts of their actual and future income. Its behavioural effect depends nevertheless on the 
extent to which partial retirement is profitable for employers. If it provides no savings for employers,  
then private benefits will be used to counteract the effect of partial retirement and the data will show  
that this latter has no effect or even negative effect on the exit age. All in all, if employers do not aim 
at retaining older workers, at the net of other effects, job quality will not show any positive effect on  
retirement timing, since its effect is watered down by other private benefits. 
    Retaining policies is operationalized as the level of job quality perceived by respondents in the 
set of working conditions that, according to their definition (see section 3.2), EWL. The job quality of 
these work dimensions is measured as follows. 
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Time Reconciliation policies are operationalized as a time-varying dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if respondents worked part-time at least for a period during each job-spell after the age of 49 years and 
0 otherwise. It measures the extent to which HRM policies give respondents the opportunity to reduce 
their working schedule. 
Health reconciliation, age equality, and employability policies are operationalized from 11 items 
containing a statement about  the job quality respondents experienced in their late career.  The late  
career is defined as the current job if they are working at the time of the interview, or the last job if  
they exited employment earlier. Respondents rate their subjective agreement to these statements using 
a Likert scale (1- strongly agree, 2- agree; 3- disagree; 4- strongly disagree). Since the statements  
depict  both  situations  of  high  and  poor  job  quality,  the  items'  scale  are  recoded  to  solve  those 
inconsistencies. The statements always depict a situation of poor job quality. The strong agreement to  
the statements represents the worst job quality and is set to 0, while an agreement (1), a disagreements 
(2) and a strong disagreement (3) represent growing improvement of the job quality (see table 4.2).   
Employability policies are operationalized as an time-constant ordinal variable, which measure the 
level of agreement of the respondents to the following statement (item H table 4.2): “Would you say 
that in your last/current job you had/have no opportunity to develop your skills?”. In other words it 
measure the extent to which HRM policies update and reconvert their skills of the respondents.
Table 4.2: List of the 11 items measuring the work quality of older workers in their last/current job
Items: Would you say (in) your last/current job...  (range 0-3)
A-… was/is physically demanding?
B- … was/is uncomfortable?
C- … you had/have heavy time pressure?
D- … involve/involved high conflict?
E- … was/is emotionally demanding?
F- … you had/has a little freedom to decide?
G-… did not/ does not give recognition?
H-… I had/have inadequate support?
I- … there was/is bad work atmosphere?
J- … employees were/are treated unfairly?
H-... you had/have no opportunity to develop your skills?
source: Sharelife, 2008-2009
The remaining 10 items are reduced into three factors using Factor Analysis (FA). FA reduces into  
one  factor  all  the  items  that  measure  the  same  underlying  construct  by  means  of  the  linear 
relationships between the items. The correlation between each pair of the items (represented in the 
correlation matrix) is used to constructs fewer factors representing the work dimensions improved by 
health reconciliation and age equality policies. 
Since the process of data reduction is theoretically guided, the correlation matrix is analysed using 
Iterative Principal Factor (IPF). IPF is run on a combined full sample for the Netherlands, Germany,  
and Italy. Factors are identified graphically using a scree plot, which represents the amount of items' 
variance explained by each factors (eigenvalues). IPF is re-run limiting the factors at 3 and the factor  
loadings, which represent the correlation between the items and the work dimensions, are rotated for a  
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better interpretation of the factors. The rotation is carried out using an orthogonal oblimax method4. 
From the rotated loadings predictions are calculated and linearly combined to operationalize health 
reconciliation and age equality policies. The scale of these variables is discrete, according to the Likert 
scale of the items explained above. They range  from 0 to 3, with 0 representing the lowest job quality  
and 3 the highest. 
Health reconciliation policies are operationalized with two variables. The first is highly related  to 
items A-B in table 4.2. They the extent to which HRM policies reduce the physical workload of the 
respondents and is defined as physical health reconciliation. The second variable is strongly related to 
items C-F in table 4.2. They measure the extent to which HRM policies reduce emotional burden and 
high level of stress due to deadlines and conflicts. It is defined as mental health reconciliation. 
Finally the variable operationalizing age equality is mainly associated with items G-J in table 4.2. 
They measure  the extent to which HRM policies enhance the quality of the social interactions that 
respondents  experience  at  work.  The  social  interactions  range  from the  informal  atmosphere  and 
support to more formal behaviours, such as work recognition, or conversely, age discrimination on 
work practices. 
Since  the  job  quality  dimensions  improved  by  retaining  policies  are  measured  as  a  linear  
combination of the predictions calculated for all items, the issue of multicollinearity may a concern. 
This is the case if a significant number of items were highly correlated to more than one construct. 
Predictions showed that only two 2 item: D and F were not predominantly correlated to only one of the 
three constructs. Moreover the correlation between the three factors proved to be under the threshold  
of problematic collinearity both for the overall and the country samples.
The main descriptive information of the variables operationalizing retaining policies are provided 
in table 4.3. Since the effectiveness of retaining policies is estimated the birth cohort born after 1944, 
the descriptive are shown only for this subsample by country. 
4 It  is admitted that the underlying assumption of the oblimax method - the stochastic independence between 
the factors - is rather unrealistic, especially between physical and mental reconciliation. Because of that first 
oblique rotation was opted for. However, this method proved to not give meaningful results since the 
correlation between the factors was too high (above 0.99). 
This is the reason why an orthogonal method was applied. The rotation enhances a clearer association between 
items and factors due to the oblimax method, which maximizes the number of high and low loadings. 
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Table  4.3:  Descriptives  of  variables  operationalizing  retaining  policies  for  the  Netherlands,  Germany  and  Italy.  
Subsample: cohort> 1944. 
source: Sharelife 2008-2009
In order to approach as far as possible the level of observation of retaining policies the job quality  
variables  are  interacted  with  the  industry.  The  industry-level  leaves  a  consistent  amount  of 
unexplained variance in terms of business culture, conditions of the local labour and financial market 
and so on. At the same time however, industry captures context forces on which the strategical HRM 
approach  toward  older  workers  crucially  depend.  By  capturing  forces  as  the  business  cycle,  the 
competitive  pressure,  and the technological  development,  the  interaction  between job quality  and 
industry enables to investigate whether HRM policies retain older workers on a voluntaristic or on a  
systematic bases. The retaining is voluntaristic if it follows an industry-pattern that is explained by the  
external forces. The retaining is systematic if it follows an industry-pattern that is explained by the  
institutional mechanisms by which social partners convey top-down EWL target. 
Industry is measured as far as possible according to the NACE 10-class classification. Due to the 
limitation  of  the  coding of  industry in  Sharelife,  industry is  operationalized as  a  8-class  nominal 
variable.  The correspondence between NACE, Sharelife  codification,  and the operationalization is 
shown in Table 4.4. Industry is included in the model as a set of eight time-varying dichotomous  
variables.
   
4.3.4  Retaining policies 75
     Table 4.4: Correspondences between the 10-class NACE, the Sharelife classification, and the operationalization.
NACE Sharelife  codification-  industry 
(re0141)
The operationalization
1-Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing
2. Manufacturing, mining & quarrying, and 
other industries
2. Mining and quarrying
3. Manufacturing
4. Electricity, gas, and water supply
2. Manufacturing, mining & quarrying, and 
other industries
3. Construction 5. Construction 3. Construction
4. Wholesale and retail trade, transportation 
and  storage,  accommodation  and  food 
services activities
6. Wholesale and retail trade
7. Hotels and retail trade
8. Transport, storage, and communication
4. Wholesale and retail trade, transportation 
and  storage,  accommodation  and  food 
services activities
5. Information and communication Missing Missing
6. Financial and insurance activity 9. Financial intermediation 5. Financial and insurance activity
7. Real estate activities 10. Real estate, renting, and business activity. 6. Real estate activities
8.  Professional,  scientific,  technical, 
administration and support service activities
Missing Missing
9.  Public  administration  and  defence, 
education, health and social work
11. Public administration and defence.
12. Education
13. Health and social work.
7.  Public  administration  and  defence, 
education, health and social work
10. Other services 14. Other community 8. Other community
Source: Share, 2010; European Commission, 2008
After discussing the measurement of of work-retirement trajectories and activation policies, I will 
conclude the operationalization of the relevant variables with the controls. Controls include micro and 
meso  characteristics  that  proved  to  mediate  and  moderate  institutional  incentives  of  retirement 
behaviour. 
4.3.5 Controls
An additional set of variables will be included in the models as controls. Their main effect takes into  
account  the  compositional  effects.  These  effects  show  how  the  correlation  between  institutional 
incentives and retirement behaviour is either mediated or moderated by other variables (for a detailed 
description  of  the  pertaining  literature,  see  chapter  2).  Their  interaction  with  retrenchment  and 
retaining  policies  provide  information  about  the  social  stratification  of  their  effectiveness.  The 
operationalization of the controls is the following. 
A first set of variables controls for the following individual socio-economic characteristics: gender 
and health status.  Gender is a dichotomous time-constant variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a 
women and 0 if is a men.  
The health status is a multivariate concept and it is measured with three different variables in order  
to capture the three main dimensions of its deterioration. Illness captures the health deterioration that 
is due to an acute and objective event. It is a time-varying dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent experience a serious illness (such as cancer, asthma etc.) in the person-period spell. Poor 
health is a subjective measurement of a more progressive health deterioration compatible with the  
ageing  process.  It  is  operationalized  as  a  time-varying  dichotomous  variable  equal  to  1  if  the 
respondent perceive their health conditions as poor in the person-period spell. Since responses about 
health  status  may  be  biased  toward  the  physical  conditions,  last  variable  captures  specifically  a 
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subjective  measurement  of  the  psychological  health  deterioration.  Stress is  a  time-varying 
dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious situation of high stress in the  
person-period spell5.   
A second set of variables controls for meso socio-economic characteristics: the family situation and 
the social class. Following the evidence that spouses make joint retirement plans (Moen, Sweet, and 
Swisher 2005), the operationalization of family situation takes into account not only the marital status  
of the respondents but also the economic status of the partner (Lancee and Radl 2012)  (Radl 2013) . 
Family situation is measured as a time-varying nominal variable that equals: 1- if the repondent does 
not cohabit with a partner, 2- if the respondent cohabits with a partner that has never worked, 3- if the  
respondent cohabits with a partners that still works, 4- if the respondent cohabits with a partner that  
already retired, and 5- if information about the partners' respondent are missing. 
Finally the analysis controls for social class. Social class captures the skills' endowment (or human 
capital), which affects the competitive value that individuals have for their employers. At the net of 
other effect, skills affect the HRM strategy toward older workers. The more scarce and firm-specific 
the skills are the more employers will retain them and vicerversa. Because of that social class controls 
for HRM policies that retain older workers only because they are is highly competitive. 
Social class controls also for the individual “taste for work”, that is the individual preference for 
work and leisure. Often the skills' endowment and the taste for work are operationalized as the attained 
educational level, but it can be considered to provide a less valid measurement than social class for 
two reasons. Firstly, the educational level is measured at the beginning of the career and does not take  
into account the skills acquired thereafter thanks to the training and the work experience. Furthermore 
the taste of work is not only innate but is mediated by other dimensions captured by social class, such 
as  the  job  description.  By  capturing  the  job  description,  social  class  controls  moreover  for  the 
stratification  in  the  income  distribution  and  in  the  job  quality  that  is  imputable  to  occupational 
differences. Secondly, social class controls for social norms, which are informal rules that standardize 
the retirement behaviour of individuals belonging to the same socio-occupational groups.  
Social class is measured as far as possible to the European Socio-Economic Classification (ESEC)  
(see  Table  4.3).  The  original  10-class  codification  can  not  be  implemented  because  the  relevant 
information  are  coded  in  Sharelife  according  to  the  International  Socio-Occupational  status  
classification (Harrison & Rose, 2006). In the final operationalization, social class is 6-class nominal 
time-variant  variable  whose  measurement  is  described  in  table  4.3.  Like  industry,  social  class  is 
included in the models as a set of 6 dichotomous variables. 
5 Sharelife ask respondents about their health status is repeated only between 4 and 6 times. It records therefore 
only the major health problems the respondents experienced during their lifecourse. 
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    Table 4.3: Correspondences between the ESEC, the Sharelife classification and the operationalization..
ESEC Sharelife  codification  –  job 
description (re013)
The operationalization
1.  Large employers,  higher grade professional, 
administrative and managerial occupations
1-legislator senior officials and manager
2-Professionals
1-Higher salariat
2-Lower grade professional, administrative and 
managerial  occupations  and  higher  grade 
technician and supervisory occupations
3-technicians and associated professional 2-Lower salariat
3-Intermediate occupations 4-clerks 3-Higher grade white-collar workers
4.  Small  employer  and  self  employed 
occupations (exc agriculture etc)
5. Self-employed occupations (agriculture etc)
Self-employed:
5-service workers and shop and market sale 
workers
6-skilled agricultural and fishery workers
7-craft and related trade workers
4-Petit  bourgeoisie  and  self-employed  in 
agriculture
6.  Lower  supervisory  and  lower  technician 
occupations
7.Lower services, sales and clerical occupations
8. Lower technical occupations
Private and public employees:
5-service workers and shop and market sale 
workers
6-skilled agricultural and fishery workers
7-craft and related trade workers
10-armed forces
5-Lower grade service and manual workers
9- Routine occupations 8-plant  machine  and  operators  and 
assemblers
9-elementary occupations
6-Semi- and non-skilled workers
10. Never worked and long-term unemployed Excluded Excluded
Source: Share, 2010; Harrison & Rose, 2006
The descriptives of controls are provided in table 4.1. The discussion of the methodology used to 
investigate the effectiveness of activation policies is concluded with the statistical methods employed. 
These methods are described in the following section.
4.4 Methods: Event History Analysis
The effectiveness of activation policies in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands between the early-
1990's and 2008-9 is estimated using Event History Analysis (EHA)  (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002). 
EHA indicates a set of statistical methods that investigates the  duration before the occurrence of a 
certain qualitative event (Bernardi 2006). 
As shown by the recent  literature,  it  is  the methodological tool  that  fits  the best  research that  
investigates  the  determinants  of  retirement  behaviour  (among  others  see  (Radl  2010;  Radl  2013; 
Lancee and Radl 2012; BlossfedI, Buchholz, and Hofäcker 2006; BlossfedI, Buchholz, and Kutz 2011; 
Siegrist et al. 2007). In the research design the event is the work-retirement trajectory and the duration 
is measured as the number of years respondents remain in employment between the age of 50 and 65 
years. This 15 years-window is defined as the time span where respondents are at risk of enter a work-
retirement trajectory.  
The key concept of EHA is  hazard rate h(t),  that is the probability that the  event (f) occur at a 
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The  function that  represent  the  distribution of  the  hazard  rate  over  time is  defined  as  hazard 
function, while the cumulation of the hazard rate over time is defined as cumulative hazard function. 
EHA allows to estimate the extent the hazard function of experiencing a work-retirement trajectory is 
affected by retrenchment and retaining policies. The descriptives, which compare hazard functions by 
cohort and by job quality, are presented in each country chapter. They are estimated using  Kaplan-
Meier (KM) estimators (Mills 2011). 
Work-retirement trajectory is defined as  non-recurring event and thus respondents drop out from 
the  sample  once  they  exit  employment  (Mills  2011).  The  operationalization  of  work-retirement 
trajectory as a pathway of exit and as a timing of exit entails different events that require separate  
modelling strategies.  
A further advantage of EHA is that, unlike other methods, it includes right-censored observations in 
the coefficients' estimation. In this research, right-censored observations are respondents that did not 
exit employment before the interview took place in 2008-2009. They represent a consistent part of the 
sub-sample born after 1944, which is assumed to be exposed to activation policies. Other methods risk 
therefore  to  underestimate  their  effectiveness  because  they  exclude  individuals  that  did  not  exit 
employment because they extended their working life.  Furthermore the inclusion of right-censored 
observations increases the sample size and thus the power of the estimations (Bernardi 2006).
A last advantage of EHA is that they allow the covariates to vary over time, which will further  
reduce  the  bias  of  the  estimations  (Bernardi  2006).  The  next  section  provides  a  more  detailed 
description of the two models chose in the two part of the research: a competing-risk model and a  
piecewise-constant exponential model.
4.4.1 EHA (1): Competing-Risk model
In the first empirical part, the effectiveness of retrenchment policies is estimated with a competing-risk 
model (CRM). The choice of this model is due to the operationalization of work-retirement trajectory 
as a pathways of exit. Since pathways of exit are multiple and competing events,  the model has to 
estimate the cohort effect separately on the sub-hazard function of each pathway of exit.
Between the two main available approaches, the  Cumulative Incidence Curve  (CIC) approach is 
preferred  to  the  latent  one6,  because  it  provides  more  accurate  and unbiased  estimations.  This  is 
because, unlike the latent approach, the estimations based on the CIC approach does not assume the 
stochastic independency of the  competing events.  In general this is a quite problematic assumption, 
because it is difficult to verify. In the case under investigation it is rather unrealistic because pathways  
of exit  are  to some extent  functional  alternatives.  Therefore if one pathway of exit  is  closed, the  
likelihood of entering the competing ones tends to increase. 
Unlike the latent approach, when calculating the hazard rate of one event, the CIC approach does 
not assume the competing ones to be right-censored. The CIC first estimates the hazard at ordered time 
6  The latent approach is based on KM estimates is performed separately for each competing event while the 
others are treated as right-censored, that is still waiting to experience that event. Treating competing events as 
right-censored implicitly assumes that competing events are stochastically independent, meaning that if we 
set to zero the likelihood of one event, the risk of experiencing the others will not change.
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j where the subjects are at risk of experiencing a failure  c, in this case entering a work-retirement 
trajectory. As shown in the equation 4.2 this is done by dividing the number of events m, or pathways 




As shown in the equation 4.3, the cumulative hazard function of the CIC approach is obtained by 
cumulating the hazard rate after they are discounted by the probability of surviving until time t-1.  
 
CIC ( t j)=Σ j '=1 Ŝ (t j−1) ĥ c( t j)  
Since the likelihood of the competing events are included in the calculation of the CIC, the sub-
hazard function of each event is conditional to and not independent from the competing ones (Mills 
2011). Because of that, the CIC provides a more appropriate method to study the correlation between 
the cohort effect on pathways of exit.
4.4.2 EHA (2): Piecewise-constant exponential model (PCE)
In the second part of the investigation the effectiveness of retaining policies is estimated using a 
piecewise-constant  exponential  model  (PCE).  This  is  the  standard  models  used  by  the  recent  
retirement literature at individual level, when the event  is a single occurrence, or in other words the 
exit from employment (Radl 2010; Radl 2013).    
Different models are available to investigate the duration of our single and non-recurring events. 
However they fail to model correctly the hazard function of retiring, that is the likelihood of exiting 
employment over time before including the covariates  (Mills 2011).             
Since the hazard of exiting employment is concentrated around the ages in which pull and push  
incentives are stronger, no realistic assumptions over the shape of the hazard rate can be made (Radl 
2010;  2013) PCE model  is  derivation  of  the  exponential  model,  which  assume the hazard  to  be 
constant in time, and is flexible enough to model this situation. It divides the survival time in different 
intervals α  and assumes the hazard to be constant within each interval but no restrictions are made on 
how hazard varies between intervals (Mills 2011a). It calculates the hazard as:
hi(t)=Λ e
Β xi                      for    α j−1≤t<α
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4.5 Summary: methodological limitations and anticipations
This chapter was devoted to the description of the two separate methodologies used estimate the 
effectiveness of retrenchment and retaining policies policies in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. 
The main methodological limitations of this study are the following.
Although Sharelife survey represents one of the best data source for this research, the distribution 
of the birth cohorts can raise two issues. First the sample size of the cohort born after 1944 is rather 
limited in all three countries and reduces the power of the estimations pertaining to retaining policies'  
effectiveness. Second respondents of very early cohorts are a selected group whose survival deviate 
extremely from the sample's and the population's mean. To the extent that their working career also far 
exceed the sample's mean then they will bias downward the effectiveness of retrenchment policies.  
This risk is however minimized in the sample because of the preventative exclusion of outliers that  
retired outside the 50-65 age range. Moreover the exclusion of the cohorts group at the highest risk of  
selection  did not lead to significant changes in the estimation of the cohort effect.
Other  methodological  limitations  concerns  the  operationalization  of  the  main  variables.  The 
measurement of work-retirement trajectories as pathways of exit suffers of internal validity problems 
because the survey's item does not  ask for an unique piece of information.  The range of possible 
answers contains both the institutional arrangements that supported the income of respondents and the 
social activities they undertook after they left employment, such as holidays, voluntary work, family 
care and housework etc.. This flaws in the measurement of the pathway required the inclusion of the 
respondents that provided information about their social activities after retirement into the “other” 
pathway and to a reduction of the statistical power. Since those social activities tend to require a 
certain level of health to be performed, the other pathway is likely to include very early exits and also  
to to underestimate in both cohorts early retirement patterns.
Furthermore the measurement of work-retirement trajectories as timing of employment outflow at 
yearly level is likely to underestimate the estimation of the cohort effect. This is because in the short  
period of observation (mid-1990's-2009) retirement changes are likely to be gradual and need a more 
refined measurement to be correctly captured. .     
Although  the  operationalization  of  retrenchment  policies  as  a  cohort  effect  is  backed  by  the 
literature, its measurement as birth cohorts born after 1944 may rise some objections about its validity. 
Those objections concern mainly the extent to which it discriminate correctly between groups exposed 
to different institutional incentives.  
This measurement is thus valid enough since the purpose of this research is to investigate the extent 
to which the Government succeeded in delaying the exit of workers aged between 50-65 years since 
the mid-1990s.  
As for retaining policies, a first limitations concern lack of information about monetary company 
incentives excludes from the analysis an important set of push incentives. Moreover the analysis is  
restrained  to  the  cohort>1944.  This  restrain  does  not  allow to  compare  the  extent  to  which  the 
correlation between job quality and retirement  timing,  and thus the HRM strategies  toward  older 
workers, changes after the mid-1990's. Nevertheless it is useful to disentangle the effectiveness of  
retaining policies from the effectiveness of retaining policies. 
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A further set of limitation concerns the lack of two main controls. The first is the company size, on  
which the HRM policies towards older workers critically depends. The second is a regional variable 
that can control for consistent economic disparities, as they exist especially in Germany and in Italy.   
Finally although this analysis controls for social class, self-employed are not excluded from the 
sample. This may bias the analysis of retrenchment policies to the extent that those self-employed 
define by themselves their working conditions.    
In  the  following  chapters  the  two  empirical  parts  are  shown.  The  first  will  investigate  the 
institutional conditions under which social partners hinder the effectiveness of retrenchment policies.
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Part 2 
Institutional affinities and effectiveness of retrenchment 
policies in The Netherlands, Germany, and Italy
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5 The effectiveness of retrenchment policies in The 
Netherlands
5.1 Introduction
It was shown in Chapter 1 that the Netherlands have been the most effective in EWL with respect to 
Germany and Italy. The goal of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which this outcome is due to  
the high cooperativeness of social partnership, which prevented social partners from hindering the 
retrenchment of pathways of exit. The leading question of this chapter is thus:  To what extent have  
social  partners  affected  the effectiveness  of  retrenchment  policies  in Italy  from the mid-1990's  to  
2009?
Chapter 3 showed that, although retrenchment policies were developed mainly by the Government, 
social partners could greatly hinder their effectiveness to preserve their members' expectations. Their  
success depended on the extent to which the social governance mode where retrenchment policies are 
formulated and implemented award or punish their opportunistic actions.
In  the  Netherlands  social  partners  participate  to  the  policymaking  using  a  channel  of  regular 
consultation, institutionalized in the tripartite Sociaal Economische Raad (SER - Social and Economic  
Council). Being typical of iterated interactions, this SER tends to generate constellations and modes of 
interaction punishing opportunistic defence of particular interests. This is because recommendations 
are morally constraining for the government only if supported by the independent experts. Failures in 
delivering recommendations are considered as a sign of social  partners'  irresponsibility  which de-
legitimize their future participation in the policymaking. This is what occurred in 1992, when SER,  
failing to advice the Lubber III cabinet about the proposed retrenchment of the disability pathways,  
was not anymore addressed for the following decade. Since then social partners were encouraged to 
moderate their opposition and support the retrenchment of pathways of exit  in order to regain the  
power of advising the government (power-recovering strategy- see Section 3.5).  
Also limited is their power of hindering the implementation of retrenchment policies. Due to the 
de-legitimation endured in the early 1990's, social partners were excluded from the only board that  
would enable them to hinder the implementation of retrenchment of the disability pathway. Since this  
administrative board had given social partners the task of assessing the eligibility of claims on the  
bases  of  broad  and  subjective  criteria  in  absence  of  external  supervision,  it  fostered  an  unduly 
expansion of the disability pathway. This prerogative was however taken away in 1994 when the 
administration  of  social  insurance  was privatized.  The  other  implementation body,  based  on  self-
regulation mode, discourage unions and employers associations from hindering the retrenchment of 
the  early  retirement  pathway provided by  the  VUT schemes.  This  is  because  the  strong  vertical  
coordination of  the  collective bargaining system allowed the government to  punish defections  by 
privatizing their costs and by acting in the shadow of hierarchy. Costs of VUT schemes were fully 
privatized in 1999, four years after the STvdA (Stichting van de Arbeit- Foundation of Labour) was 
forced to foster their retrenchment under the threat of removing the legal extension of CLAs' validity  
(power-maintaining strategy - see section 3.5).        
Being formulated and implemented in social  governance modes that  discourage social  partners 
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opportunistic actions,  retrenchment policies are expected to highly effective. The government started 
retrenching pathways of exit in 1993, when the TBA “act on reducing disability claims” reduces the 
financial attractiveness of the most popular pathway of exit. It continues in 1997, when it triggers the 
retrenchment of the second most  attractive pathway of exit  based on early retirement schemes. It 
finishes in 2004 when also the third pathway based on the unemployment benefit is retrenched, but 
only slightly. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The pathways of exit provided by the Dutch protection system 
at the early 1990's are described in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3 the reasons why the institutional  social  
partners  cooperate  to  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  retrenchment  policies.  How  the 
retrenchment policies in the Netherlands lower the financial attractiveness of the previously described 
pathways of exit are further discussed and, on the bases of this the hypotheses over their effectiveness 
are  formulated  in  Section  5.4.  These  hypotheses  are  tested  with  a  competing  risk  model,  whose  
estimation is interpreted in Section 5.5. Conclusions are discussed at the end.
5.2 Pathways of exit: an overview
Until 2009 the statutory retirement age is set at 65 years in the Netherlands (OECD 2014). After that 
the  pension  system  provides  three  different  sources  of  income  protection,  as  regulated  by  the 
Algemene Ouderdomswet (AOW - General Old-age Act in 1957 and later modification). First, the 
public pension system allocates a safety-net  benefit, which equals 70% of the minimum wage if the  
recipient  resided  in  the  Netherlands from the age of  15 years  onward7.  Second,  the occupational 
pension  schemes  preserve  the  past  income  of  recipients  by  providing  a  fully-funded benefit  that  
generally replace about the 70% of the final wage after 40 years of contribution. They are regulated by  
social partners in industry-wide agreements  (CLAs) under a strict public and private supervision. The 
public supervision enhances the coverage of the occupational schemes. Thanks to tax deductions and  
the mandatory extension of CLA to all workers in the same industry, their coverage is almost total. The 
private supervision, entrusted to the Insurance Board, grants the economic viability of the schemes.  
Third, private pension plans can provide an additional benefit on a voluntary bases, but their diffusion 
is hardly supported by a tax-friendly regime8 (Van Riel, Hemerijck, and Visser 2002).
Until  the  mid-1990's  however  few  social  protection  schemes  subsidized  a  series  of  inactive 
episodes prior to retirement. As shown in Graph 5.1 the episodes were subsidized by four schemes: the  
occupational  sickness  and disability  scheme,  the  occupational  pension system,  the  unemployment 
insurance  scheme,  and  social  assistance  scheme.  The  combination  between  the  inactive  episodes 
subsidized by these schemes institutionalized three main pathways of exit: disability, early retirement, 
and unemployment (for an extensive discussion see among others:  (De Vroom and Blomsma 1991; 
7 The entitlement for the AWO benefit increases at a rate of 2% for every year of residence between the age of 
15 and 65 years. The level of AWO benefit of two recipients living together is adjusted to 100% of the 
minimum wage and, with the exception of the 1992-1996 period, is indexed to the contractual wage twice a 
year (Van Riel, Hemerijck, and Visser 2002).    
8 Tax deductions for the contributions to private pension plans only apply if they do not result in a total 
pension exceeding 70% of the last wage at the age of 65 years and after 40 years of work. Since this is the 
aim of most occupational schemes, tax deductions are generally not available for private schemes (Van Riel, 
Hemerijck, and Visser 2002). 
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Van Dalen and Henkens 2002; Sonnet and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2005; van Oorschot and Jensen 2009).  The episodes provided the occupational disability and sickness 
schemes are represented in orange, the episode provided by the pension system is represented in light 
blue, and the episodes provided by the unemployment scheme are represented in red. 
Graph 5.1: Pathways of exit  institutionalized by social protection system in The Netherlands until the mid-1990's.
Source: (De Vroom and Blomsma 1991)
All the relevant legislation concerning the regulation of the three pathways of exit are listed in 
Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: List of the main relevant legislation that regulated the disability, the early retirement and the unemployment 
pathway of exit in the Netherlands. 
Public pension system- 1st pilllar
1957-Algemene Ouderdomswet (AOW) 1957- General Old-age Act
Unemployment pathway
1952- Werkloosheidswet I (WW)  1952- Unemployment Benefit Act I
1963- Algemene Bijstandwet (ABW) 1963- Social Assistence Act
1963- Wet Werkloosheidsvoorziening, WWV 1963- Unemployment Provision Act
1981- Wet Wijzinging van het Aantal Dagen Werken, Vereist voor  
het Recht op Uitkering
1981-  Act on Changing the Conditions of Worked Days Required to 
Access the Benefit. 
1984- Wet verlaging van Uitkeringpercentages 1984- Act on Lowering the Benefit Percentage
1984-  Wet Verlenging van de Uitkeuringsduur Ingevolge de Wet  
Werkloosheidvoorziening voor Werknemers van 50 jaar en Ouder
1984-  Law  lengthening  the  benefit  of  pursuant  to  the  Act 
Unemployment Provision that are employees aged 50 and Older
1986- Werkloosheidswet II, (WW) 1986- Unemployment Insurance Act II
1991- Wet Herziening Arbeidsverledeneis (WHA) 1991-  Act on Revising Work History Requirements
1991- Wet Koppeling met Afwijkingsmogelijkheid (WKA) 1991- Conditional Linking Act.
1993- Wijzinging Enkele bepalingen inzake het recht op uitkerin 1993- Changing some determinations of the Right to a benefit
1994- Wet aanscherping referent-eisen WW 1994- Act on tightening the conditions of the WW. 
1997-  Wet Overheidpersoneel onder de Werknemerverzekeringen  
(OOW)
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2003- Wet Afschaffing van de Vervolguitkering 2003- Act on abolition of the follow-up benefit
2003- Regeling vrijstelling Verplichtingen (WW) 2003- Regulation on Exemption from obligation under the WW 
2004-  Wijziging  van  de  Werkloosheidswet  en de  Wet  Structuur  
Uitvoeringorganisatie  Werk  en  Inkome  in  Verband  met  de  
Vervanging  van  Fictief  Arbeidsverleden  door  Feitelijk  
Arbeidsverleden en de Beperking van het Verzorgingsforfait,
2004-  Act  on  Changing  work  history  requirements  to  actual  work 
history
  
2004-  Wijzing  van  Enkele  Socialeverzekeringwetten  en  Enige  
Andere  Wetten  in  Verband  met  het  Aanbrengen  van  Enige  
Verenvoudingen,
2004- Act on Changing Certain Social Security Act to Simplify
2006-  Wijzinging onder meer WW in Verband met Aanscherping  
Wekneis,
2006-  Act on Tightening the Work record condition of the WW.
 Disability pathway
1913- Ziektewet (ZW) 1913- Sickness Act
1967- Wet Arbeidsonbekwaamheid (WAO) 1967- Occupational Disability Act.
1986- Wet op de verdere wijziging van de algemene invaliditeit en  
de Wet op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering
1986- Act on further amendment of the general disability act and the 
act on disability insurance.
1986- Wet Arbeid Gehandicapte Werknemers (WAGW) 1986- - Act on Work for Disabled Workers
1992- Wet Terugdringing  Arbeidsongeschiktsheidsvolume (TAV) 1992- Act on reducing the Disability Volume
1993-  Wet  Terugdringing  Beroep  de 
Arbeidsongeschiktsheidsregelingen (TBA)
1993-  Act on Reducing Disability Claims
1993- Wet Terugdringing Ziekteverzuim (TZ) 1993- Act on Reducing Sickness Absence 
1993- Arbowet (ARBO) 1993- Act on Working Circumstances
1995-  Invoeringswet  Organisatiewet  Sociale  Verzekeringen  
-IOSV-
1995-  Act over the new organization of social insurance
1995-  Wet  Aschaffing  Malus  en  Bevordering  Reïntegratie,  
(AMBER)
1995- Act Abolition of “Malus” and Improvement of Reintegration.
1996-  Wet  Uitbreiding  Loondoorbelingsverplichting  bij  Ziekte,  
(WULBZ)
1996- Continued Payment of Salary (Sickness) Act
1997-  Wet  Arbeidsongeschiktheidverzekering  Zelfstandigen,  
(WAZ)
1997- Act on Incapacity Insurance for the self-employed persons
1997-  Wet Overheidpersoneel onder de Werknemerverzekeringen  
(OOW)
1997- Act on Public Servants under the Employees Insurance Scheme.
1997- Wet op de Medische Keuringen (WMK) 1997- Act on medical examination
1997-  Wet  Premiedifferentiatie  en  Marktwerking  bij  
Arbeidsongeschiktheidverzekeringen (PEMBA)
1997- Act on Premium Differentiation and Market Regulation.
1997- Organisatiewet Sociale Verzekeringen (OSV) 1997-  Act over the new organization of social insurance
1998- Wet op de (Re)Integratie Arbeidsgehandicapten (REA) 1998- Disability Reintegration Act
2001- Wet Verbetering Poortwachter (WVP) 2001-  Act on Improving the Gatekeeper
2001- Besluit Aanstellingskeuringen 2001- Decision on Reassessment 
2002- Invoeringswet  wet  structuur  uitvoeringsorganizatie 
(ISUWI) 
2002- Implementation structure act
2003-  Wet Verlenging Loondoorbetalingsverplichting bij  Ziekte,  
(VLZ)
2003- Act extending the wage payment obligation 
2004- Wet Einde Toegang Verzekering (WAZ) 2004- Act abolition of the WAZ
2004- Schattingsbesluit 2004-  Tribunal decree. New re-assessment  of WAO's recipients with 
tighter conditions. 
2006- Werk en Inkomen naar Arbeidsvermogen (WIA) 2006- Work and Income according to the capability of working 
Early retirement pathway
Late 1970's- Vervroegde uittredingsregelingen (VUT) Late 1970's- Early retirement schemes
1997- Pensioen covenant 1997- Pension covenant 
1999- Wet fiscale behandeling van pensioenen (FBP) 1999- Act on the fiscal regulation of pensions.
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2004- Sociale afspraken over vervroegde-uittredingsregelingen en  
spaarregelingen levensloopregeling
2004-  Social agreements on early-retirement schemes and life-course 
saving schemes
Sources: (De Vroom and Blomsma 1991); (OECD 2005); van Oorschot 2007;  Van Gerven 2008 
The financial attractiveness of the three pathways increased the more their costs could be externalized 
and not endured by their main beneficiaries: older workers and their employers. The costs are to a 
great extent externalized for both of them when inactivity episodes are financed by public social policy 
schemes, as in the case of the unemployment and occupational disability pathways  (De Vroom and 
Blomsma 1991). The use of these two pathways in fact imposed no additional costs to employers and 
limited cuts to older workers that did not nevertheless affect their future pension income. 
The first pathway was provided by the insurance-based unemployment scheme (WW as regulated 
in 1952  by Werkloosheidswet, WW Unemployment Benefit Act and in 1981 by the et Wijzinging van 
het Aantal Dagen Werken, Vereist voor het Recht op Uitkering, Act on Changing the Conditions of 
Worked Days  Required  to  Access  the  Benefit)  in  combination  with the  tax-based  unemployment  
scheme (WWV as regulated in 1963 and modified in the 1976 by the Wet Werkloosheidsvoorziening, 
WWV, Unemployment Provision Act and in 1984 by the Wet verlaging van Uitkeringpercentages, Act 
on Lowering the Benefit Percentage, and by the Wet Verlenging van de Uitkeuringsduur Ingevolge de  
Wet Werkloosheidvoorziening voor Werknemers van 50 jaar en Ouder;  Law lengthening the benefit of 
pursuant to the Act Unemployment Provision that are employees aged 50 and Older) and the general 
social  assistance  (Algemene  Bijstandwet,  ABW Social  Assistence  Act  as  regulated  in  1963)  (Van 
Gerven 2008).   
In the mid-1980's this pathway consisted of an insurance-based benefit (WW) for the first 130 days, 
which  replaces  80%  of  their  last  wage,  and  by  a  tax-financed  unemployment  benefit  (WWV),  
replacing 75% of the last wage. Although the normal maximum duration of the WWV benefit was two 
years, recipients above 60 years at the end of the WW benefit could withdraw the WWV benefit until 
pensionable age. Once the regular duration of WWV expired, recipients could postpone it for a period 
proportional  to their  age at  the rate of 70% of  the statutory minimum wage.  If a  person became  
recipient at the age of 57,5 years or later, they were able to reach the pensionable age at the WWV  
level with no obligation to further search for a new job. Younger recipients after the age of 50 years 
had to pay an higher cost to use this pathway. In the last years before the pensionable age the WWV  
benefit was substituted by the general social assistance (ABW)9 (Van Gerven 2008). The cost for these 
recipients  is  even  higher  because,  being  the  ABW means-tested,  it  does  not  allow for  additional  
compensations normally given by employers.  
In 1986 the WWV scheme was abolished and the WW benefits was lowered to contain social 
expenditure (Werkloosheidswet II, WW Unemployment Benefit Act II). The pathway of exit based on 
unemployment becomes less generous but much of its  costs still  remained externalized.  The WW 
scheme was structured in two episodes: the first provides 70% of the last earning, while the second  
benefits stood in between the latter  and the social assistance. The duration of the insurance-based  
benefit remains proportional to the workers' age up to 4,5 years10. After that a lower follow-up WW 
9 After WWV expired, other segments of the workforce had to resort to a means-tested social assistance benefit (RWW or  
ABW)
10 In fact the reform of 1986 made the duration of the unemployment insurance based on the contribution history. However 
this latter was  inferred from the age of the recipients and included periods of notional contribution (van Gerven, 2008)
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benefit lasted, proportionally to the age of the recipients, up to 3.5 years. Like in the previous regime, 
a person that entered at the age of 57.5 years or later could reach the pensionable age without resorting 
to social  assistance  (De Vroom and Blomsma 1991;  van Oorschot  2007).  The costs  for younger 
recipients  are however  lower  than in the previous regime because the newly implemented IOAW 
benefit allowed for lump-sum compensations of employers. Unlike ABW, IOAW benefit is means-
tested only on income and not on capital. 
All in all, although the unemployment pathway imposed some costs to its recipients, it was still  
attractive for older workers that had a more unstable careers and a low wage profile (Gruber & Wise, 
1999). Despite in the 1990's different attempts were made to re-integrate unemployment recipients  
with  activation  programs  and  further  restrictions,  the  unemployment  pathway  described  above 
remained unchanged until 2003 (Van Gerven 2008).  
The second pathway was financed by the occupational sickness and disability scheme. It offered 
such a financially attractive option for both older workers and employers that spread endemically until 
the mid-1990's  (Kurzer 2013;  van Oorschot and Boos 2000).   Along the first part of the 1980's the 
occupational disability pathway consisted of two episodes. The first one was the temporary sickness 
episode (regulated by the Ziektewet (ZW)- Sickness Act in 1913) that lasted about 1 year. The second 
episode is permanent disability (Wet Arbeidsonbekwaamheid (WAO)- Occupational Disability Act., as 
regulated in 1967 and reformed in 1972) and lasted until pensionable age. Its attractiveness for older  
workers relied in its generosity, since in both episodes the benefit replaced 80% of the last wage. For 
employers it relied in the high inclusivity of the permanent disability episode. On the one hand no age 
limits  were  set.  On the  other  hand the  WAO requirements  were  very  loose,  since  disability  was 
expressed in terms of lost “earning capacity” in a suitable11 job. The para-public medical commissions 
in charge of assessing claimants'  earning capacity (see section 5.3) could therefore interpret  these 
requirements very inclusively and declare fully eligible also cases of partial disability (Kurzer 2013). 
Moreover the commission could also declare fully disabled also workers, whose ageing was impairing 
their labour market prospects. These loose requirements gave employers the opportunity of shedding 
their employees as soon as they became redundant especially in time of industrial  restructuring. Due  
to the convenience of this pathway, employers were also willing to make it more appealing by topping-
up both ZW and WAO benefits to 100% of the last wage with private provisions (Van Gerven 2008; 
van Oorschot and Boos 2000).    
In  1987  the  Government  reduced  the  attractiveness  of  the  disability  pathway  by  lowering  its 
generosity. The benefit  was reduced by 10% and was strictly linked to the degree of the assessed 
disability. This measure affected not only claimants but also their employers, who needed to privately  
compensate these cuts to use this pathway (Van Gerven 2008 12). Employers' costs were however much 
lower if they shed older employees. For them partial WAO benefit could be combined with WW and 
WWV, provided that  eligibility conditions were met,  or alternatively with the IOWA benefit.  This 
costs' externalization eased the private topping-up of both the ZW and WAO benefits carried out by 
11 “Suitable job” means here a job that is compatible with both the past professional experience and the past 
earning profile of the claimants.
12 since this reduction was inversely related to the claimants' age and the eligibility conditions the disability episode still  
preserved much of its financial attractiveness Taking the same example used before, the follow-up benefit for 35 years old 
employee would drop to 55% of their previous wage, while the same benefit would drop up to 65% for a 55 years old  
employee. 
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CLAs and HRM policies  (De Vroom and Blomsma 1991). Thanks to the combination of public and 
private benefits the disability pathway usually replaced 100% of the last wage in the first year, 90% in 
the second year, 75% in the third, and 70% until the statutory retirement age (van Oorschot and Boos 
2000; Sonnet and OECD 2005; Van Gerven 2008).
The third pathway was financed by early retirement scheme (Vervroegde uittredingsregelingen- 
VUT) introduced in the late-1970's to facilitate the integration of younger workers. VUT schemes 
were established as a separate fund in the occupational pension plans and thus were regulated by 
collective  labour  agreements  (CLAs),  mainly at  industry level.  They were financed by  additional  
contributions paid by both employers and employees, who share respectively 2/3 and 1/3 of the total  
amount. Although regulated by CLAs, also the early retirement schemes were strongly supported by 
public legal and financial measures. The legal measure consisted in extending to all employees the 
VUT schemes included in industry-wide agreements (erga omnes extension). The financial measure 
consisted in externalizing the costs of the beneficiaries with relevant tax exemptions, the so-called 
“reversal rule” used also for occupational pension schemes. Taxing the benefit and not the contribution 
base, this rule allowed a double savings because both the tax levels and the tax rates were reduced 
(Bovenberg and Gradus 2014; Sonnet and OECD 2005; De Vroom and Blomsma 1991).  On the one 
hand the contributions are deduced on the gross wage, that is higher than the benefit from which taxes 
are computed. On the other benefits are taxed as is they were regular source of income. This rule in a  
progressive tax system as the Dutch one produces a consistent externalization of VUT costs (Euwals et 
al. 2006). 
Besides  this  costs'  externalization,  employers  profit  from the  use  of  early  retirement  pathway 
because it was the easiest way to shed their employees for two reasons. First, early retirement was the 
most accepted pathways of exit since, unlike unemployment and occupational disability, it was not 
associated to any social stigma. Second, it was the most financially attractive pathway, after the reform 
of the unemployment and the occupational schemes in 1987 (De Vroom and Blomsma 1991). Thanks 
to this attractiveness no additional private benefit have to be set by employers to push older employees  
to enter this pathway. 
The benefit was financed by a PAYGO system and paid to employees that reached the minimum 
age and a minimum contribution period to the fund. Replacing 80% of the last monthly wage until  
pensionable age independently from the age and contributing history, it provides the highest benefits. 
Being the minimum age and contribution period set at respectively 55 and 10 years, it is the most  
inclusive pathway, at least for workers with a rather stable and full-time career13. As the other two 
pathways, also the entry into the early retirement pathway does not affect future pension income, since  
social security contributions are paid until the age of 65 years (Euwals et al. 2006; Lindeboom 1998).
Despite employers have to pay to use it, the tax-benefirs and its extreme generosity made the early  
retirement the most diffused pathway among older male workers until 1997, when it is retrenched for 
the first time (Lindeboom 1998; De Vroom 2004). The other two pathways were instead more popular 
among older  workers  with a  more unstable  and precarious career,  such as  women and low-skills 
workers (De Vroom and Blomsma 1991).     
13 Part-time workers are normally excluded from VUT schemes. This explains the reason why woman are 
underrepresented among the recipients of this pathway (De Vroom and Blomsma 1991)
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Since the mid-1990's the Dutch Government undertakes systematic attempts to extend working life 
by narrowing the attractiveness of these three pathways using retrenchment policies (De Vroom 2004; 
van Oorschot 2007).  According to the analytical framework, their effectiveness depends on the role  
played by social partners in the process of formulation and implementation of these policies. The  
mechanisms by which the shared regulation of  pathways of exit  in  the Netherlands enhanced the 
effectiveness of retrenchment policies (the interaction mode between protection and partnership) is  
further discussed in the next section.
5.3 Institutional affinities between protection and partnership
In  the  Netherlands  the  institutional  affinities  between  the  protection  and  the  partnership  systems 
associate  a  Conservative  welfare  logic  with  a  cooperative  logic  of  interests'  representation 
(Ebbinghaus 2006).  Because of  their  cooperativeness social  partners  are  regularly involved in the 
formulation and implementation of policies regulating the three pathways of exit. Their role is then not 
only limited to reduce the political and popular oppositions against retrenchment policies  (Schludi 
2005),  because  it  is  constantly  intertwined with  the  Government's  regulation  of  social  protection 
schemes (Ebbinghaus and Manow 2001).
These regular intertwined responsibility reduces social partners' interest of hindering retrenchment 
policies. This is because, due to this regular intertwined responsibility, social partners join interaction 
modes that lower their benefit/cost mix of opposing the retrenchment of pathways of exit. 
Corporative practices are highly institutionalized in the Netherlands, where the social partners have 
a prominent role in regulating social policies since the second post-war. These corporative practices 
temporarily  weakened  during  the  1970's,  when  the  first  post-war  economic  shock  forced  the 
Government to implement unilaterally austerity measures, such as the freezing of wages and benefits.  
They re-flourished again after the Wassenaar Agreements in 1982, when the social partners commit to 
pursue economic recovery by fostering in the next bargaining rounds wage moderation and labour 
market flexibility. In exchange of that they obtained the public support of pathways for older workers 
ejected during the economic recovery  (Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Visser 1998). 
The corporative practices take place in a consultation setting when the policies are formulated and  
in a self-administration and self-regulatory setting when they are implemented (Visser and Hemerijck 
1997; Trampusch 2007). The consultation setting is firmly established in a tripartite board: the Sociaal 
Economische  Raad  (SER-  Socio-economic  council).  Instituted  by  law  in  1950,  it  is  the  main 
corporative advisory body of the Government and, as such, it is financed by the social partners. Two 
third14 of  its  members  were  nominated  by  the  national  union  and  employers'  confederations 
(respectively the Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging- FNV15 and  and VNO-NCW- Confederation of 
14 The composition of SER slightly changes in 1995. Before that the members nominated by social partners are 
at least 2/3 and after 2/3. This show that after 1995 the power of social partners weakens (see later for more 
details (Woldendorp 2005).
15 Founded in 1976 as a result of fusion of two of the three main associations that reflected the religious-
political currents of the Dutch pillared society (Verzuiling): the catholic Nederlandse Katholiek Vakbeweging 
(NKV), and the social-democratic Nederlands Verbond van Vakvereningen NVV). The protestant Christelijk 
Nationaal Vakbond (Cristian National Union) joined the FNV in 1982 ( Visser 1998a). 
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the  Netherlands  Industry  and  Employers16)  and  the  remaining  members  were  independent  expert 
appointed  by  the  Government,  the  so-called  kroonleden17 (crown  representatives)  (Visser  and 
Hemerijck 1997;  Woldendorp 2005).  As a part  of  the corporative practices,  also the Consultation 
process was slowed down during the 1970's and revitalized after 1983.   
SER's  statutory  task is  to  provide  the Government  recommendations  over  its  policy  proposals 
(puzzling  role-Eichhorst  and  Wintermann  2005).  Its  advising  role  is  so  significant  that  whenever 
relevant  reforms  are  discussed  in  the  political  arena  the  Government  is  obliged  to  ask  SER's  
recommendations  (Woldendorp  2005).  Although  not  legally  binding,  SER's  recommendations  are 
taken in high consideration by the Government because its support can smoothen the policy process.  
This holds especially when they raise a wide oppositional front, as in the case of retrenchment policies 
(powering  (Eichhorst and Wintermann 2005) . The powering force of SER is however limited only 
when recommendations are adopted unanimously.  The kroonleden hold in fact a veto power, which 
protect the policy-making from for corporative interests that harm the long-term sustainability of the  
system (Eichhorst and Wintermann 2005).  Therefore despite their overrepresentation, social partners 
do not benefit from maintaining intransigent positions because they will be hold responsible for SER's 
inefficiencies and loose their credibility. 
This is what social partners learnt in the early and in the late 1980's when, accused of purposely  
slowing  down  the  economic  recovery  to  defend  the  particular  interests  of  their  members,  the  
Government acted in the shadow of hierarchy (i.e. threatened to act unilaterally). If in the early 1980's 
they could preserve their legitimacy by signing the Wassenaar agreements, their positions in the late  
1980's were too intransigent to reach another compromise. This is because in 1982 social partners 
modernized the labour market on condition that the costs of redundancies, the most of them older,  
were externalized (Visser 1998; Rhodes 2001). When in the late 1980's the Lubbers III Government 
(based on the coalition between Christian and social democrats) asked them to cut this externalization 
with retrenchment measures, they failed to give up their previous compromise. Because of this social  
partners lost their legitimacy and after 1995 also the prerogative of advising the Government, which 
does not anymore address to SER when relevant reforms are discussed (Visser and Hemerijck 1997; 
Hemerijck and Marx 2006)        
All together, the consultation setting gives social partners very few incentives to hinder tout-court 
retrenchment  policies.  This  is  because  the intransigent  defence  of  pathways  of  exit  further  de-
legitimize social partners and trigger more stricter unilateral measures of the government . Its shadow 
of hierarchy makes more beneficial for social partners to endorse retrenchment policies in order to 
avoid further  retrenchment  and re-gain  the necessary legitimacy to play  the puzzling role  (Visser 
16 VNO-NCW was founded in 1996 after the merging  : Nederlands Christelijk Werkgeversverbond (NCW- 
Dutch Cristian employers' confederation) instituted from the previous fusion between the Protestant PCW 
and the Catholic NKW) and the liberal Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (VNO- Federation of the 
Dutch Businesses) (Visser 1998).
17 Independent experts are chosen among university professors in economics, political science and law and, by 
virtue of their offices, the directors of the Dutch Central Bank and the Centraal Planbureau (CPB- 
Netherlands bureau for economic policy analysis- the main independent research institute responsible for 
macro-economic model of the Dutch economy and for the forecasting of potential effect of the political 
reform). With the exception of these two last members, the experts are expression to some extent of the main 
political parties ((Eichhorst and Wintermann 2005; Woldendorp 2005) .
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1998). 
Retrenchment policies are in second place implemented by a  self-regulatory setting in the early 
retirement pathway and by a self-administration setting in the disability and unemployment pathway. 
In both bodies social partners play a predominant role, but different is their accountability and thus 
their incentives of hindering the retrenchment policies (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). 
The self-regulatory mode, where VUT schemes are implemented, is the collective bargaining level 
where  the  occupational  pension  funds  are  managed.  The  collective  negotiations  are  centrally 
coordinated by the Stichting van de Arbeid (STvdA- Foundation of Labour). Established in 1947, this 
board is a national private institution where the peaks of unions and employers' organizations provides 
members with common recommendations about the priorities that need to be addressed (Woldendorp 
2005; Pulignano 2010).   
Although no interference is played by the Government, in this setting social partners have normally 
little interest of hindering retrenchment policies because this opportunistic behaviour would increase 
the payroll taxes . This is not the case in the Netherlands because the VUT schemes are consistently  
subsidized  by  tax  incentives.  This  tax  incentives  lower  significantly  the  social  partners'  costs  of 
expanding VUT schemes and thus increases  their  interests  of  hindering the retrenchment of early 
retirement pathway(Euwals et al. 2006). 
The Government enacted three measures to enhance unions and employers' association to retrench 
VUT schemes. At first, as an employer, it bargained the retrenchment of VUT schemes in the public  
sector  (Sonnet and OECD 2005). Second in 1996 it spent its  shadow of hierarchy to conclude with 
STvdA  the  so-called  Pension  Covenant.  In  this  agreement  STvdA  recommended  its  member 
organizations to retrench VUT schemes according to the model offered in the public sector  (Visser 
1998; Woldendorp 2005). Yet, due to their soft nature, these recommendations did not compel them to 
reach precise targets concerning the magnitude or timing of the retrenchment. Therefore, in 2001-4 the  
third and decisive measure removed the tax incentives that had externalized the costs of VUT schemes  
on the public finances. This increased the accountability of social partners for the heavier contributory 
pressure  on  employers  and  employees  and  enhanced  the  correct  implementation  of  retrenchment 
policies in the VUT schemes. All in all making social partners directly accountable for the costs of  
their  opportunistic  behaviour,  in  the  Netherlands  the  self-regulation  setting  enhance  the 
implementation of  retrenchment policies and thus their effectiveness (see Section 5.4.3).
The  administration  setting,  responsible  for  the  premium  collection,  claims'  assessment,  and 
benefits'  payment,  is  mainly  organized  in  the  Bedrijfsverenigingen (IIA-  Industrial  Insurance 
Association) and is supervised by the  Sociaal Verzekeringen Raad  (SVR- Social Security Council) 
(Borghi and Van Berkel 2007). The main critical aspect of this setting is that social partners have no 
legal or financial accountability for the administration of the unemployment and disability pathway for  
two  reasons.  First  since  IIA's  and  SVR's  members  are  nominated  by  unions  and  employers'  
organizations,  the  supervision  of  the  administration  process  is  distorted  because  controllers  and 
controlled  are  driven  by  the  same  corporative  interests.  Second,  since  the  financing  of  the 
unemployment  and  disability  are  totally  externalized  the  opportunistic  expansion  of  their 
attractiveness does not cause any direct costs on social partners' members (Stigter 1997). Because of 
this, social partners have a high interests of hindering the implementation of retrenchment policies.     
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Yet, the Government neutralized this threat with a deep reorganization of the administrative setting 
in occasion of the report of the Commission Buurmeijer (or All-Party Commission's inquiry)  in 1993. 
This  report  imputed  to  the  implementation  distortions  the  main  responsibility  for  the  massive 
expansion of disability and unemployment as a pathway of exit  (Visser and Hemerijck 1997)  This 
distortions proved to be stronger in the disability scheme, where social partners have a much higher  
discretional role in manipulating the eligibility assessment and the benefit generosity. The evidence of 
this  opportunistic  behaviour  publicly  de-legitimized  corporate  associations  as  reliable  partners  of 
social policy administration. The distortions of this administrative setting were therefore removed by 
progressively  excluding  social  partners  from  the  responsible  boards.  In  1994  (Invoeringswet  
Organisatiewet Sociale Verzekeringen -IOSV- Act over the new organization of social insurance) the 
SVR supervising board is substituted by an independent institution: the College van Toezicht Sociale  
Verzekeringen (CTSV- Board  of  Social  Insurance Supervisory).  The  IIA had to  externalized their  
administrative  tasks  and has  to share  their  managerial  tasks  with the regional  public employment 
service agencies (PES). The national  coordination of the IIA boards is taken by the Tijdelik Instituut  
voor coördinatie en afstemming (TICA-Temporary Institution for the coordination and tuning), which 
is still composed by social partners' representatives but are lead by an independent chair (van der Veen 
and Trommel 1999; Stigter 1997).   
As  of  1997 social  partners  are  further  deprived from their  prerogatives  by the  Organisatiewet 
Sociale Verzekeringen (OSV- Act over the new organization of social insurance). The IIA boards were 
in fact substituted by private organizations and the administration of social insurance became a “quasi-
market”  setting.  In  the  same  year  the  coordination  role  of  the  TICA is  taken  over  by  another 
independent board: the  Landelijk Instituut Sociale Verzekeringen (LISV-National Institute for Social 
Insurance).  Finally  in  2002  the  Invoeringswet  wet  structuur  uitvoeringsorganizatie  (ISUWI-  
Implementation  structure  act)  merged  the  LISV  into  the  Uitvoeringsinstituut 
Werknemersverzekeringen (UWV- Institute  for  Employee  Insurance)  (Visser  and  Hemerijck  1997; 
Hemerijck and Marx 2006; Johnston, Kornelakis, and d’ Acri 2011).      
All  in  all  social  partners  can  not  hinder  the  retrenchment  policies  implemented  in  the 
unemployment and disability schemes. This is because after 1994 they do not play anymore a role in 
their administration.  
According to the hypothesis HP 3.2-3.3 in the Netherlands social partners have a low interest to  
hinder both the formulation and implementation of retrenchment policies. The hypotheses about how 
this low interest enhanced the policies' effectiveness in lowering the attractiveness of the pathways of 
exit are derived in the next section.  
5.4 Retrenchment policies: working hypotheses
A list of the policies that retrenched the pathways of exit until 2008 in the Netherlands is presented in  
Table 5.1. The weak interference of social partners allowed the Government to substantially lower the 
attractiveness of using the pathways of exit for both older workers and their employers. Retrenchment 
policies in the Netherlands did not affect substantially the eligibility conditions, which still allow the 
uses  of  the  three  main  schemes  as  pathways  of  exit.  Nonetheless  the  financial  attractiveness  of 
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pathways of exit  is retrenched by lowering the pathways' capacity of replacing the previous work  
income. Benefits either follow a principle of actuarial parity, meaning that the benefit stream obtained  
along the pathway of exit is the same independently from the exit timing, or drop in the last part of the 
pathway. What is common in all the pathways is that recipients are more impoverished the earlier they 
stop working and thus face less incentives to do so. Therefore if employers wanted to replicate the 
same exit patterns, they had to provide their employees with additional resources to compensate these  
cuts. Since social partners are both excluded from the administrative boards and can not make use of  
public fundings when they bargain social benefits, these resources can not anymore be externalized in 
the implementation phase. These resources had to be privately provided either by employers or by  
contributive funds (De Vroom 2004).   
All together, since the weak interference of social partners made the costs of preserving pathways 
of exit fully private, both employers and older workers had a lower incentives to make use of them. 
Because of that the overall hypothesis is that in the Netherlands the effectiveness of retrenchment  
policies is expected to be high and only slightly stratified. This is because social partners could not  
preserve the pathways of exit for their core members. 
Hypotheses concerning the effectiveness of retrenchment policies are expressed as the extent to 
which they are expected to lower the likelihood of entering a pathway of exit in a cohort that newly 
enter their late career (or in other words get 50 years old) in the mid-1990's with respect to the older  
cohort. Once these hypotheses are tested, it is possible to estimate the effectiveness of retrenchment  
policies in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2009. 
5.4.1 Unemployment pathway
Despite different public interventions reformed the unemployment scheme to activate the recipients 
between 1987 and the early-2000, they hardly affected its attractiveness as a pathway of exit. The 
unemployment pathway was not the first target of the Government, because it represented a residual 
pathway for  a  marginal  group  of  older  workers,  who  could  not  access  more  generous  public  
provisions. Its popularity nevertheless increased after the retrenchment policies notably increased the 
costs of using the disability pathway (see next section), although private benefits (severance payment) 
had to compensate unemployment's lower generosity (Van Gerven 2008).   
Along the 1990's  social partners regained progressively enough credibility to affect  the policy-
making  by  severely  moderating  their  positions  in  SER.  This  allowed  them  to  preserve  the 
unemployment pathway as a redundancy absorber in return for legitimizing the retrenchment of the 
other  two  pathways.  In  2003  however  in  the  midst  of  a  severe  recession,  the  newly-established 
conservative-liberal Government (Balkanende II) decided to retrench also the unemployment pathway. 
Its proposal is aimed at reducing severely the externalization of its costs by subtracting from the public 
benefit the amount of the severance payment. Despite the retrenchment could not be fully rejected,  
social partners exceptionally managed to discuss it in the setting where STvdA and the Government 
coordinate the collective bargaining rounds in 2004. This setting gave STvdA the power to weaken the 
Government's proposal in exchange for supporting wage moderation and the further retrenchment of 
the other pathways, as signed in the so-called Museum square pact. Being unanimously approved by 
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SER, this pact is the only measure that allows social partners to partially hinder the formulation of  
retrenchment policies in the Netherlands  (Hemerijck and Marx 2006).  
Despite weakened by the interference of social partners, the retrenchment of the unemployment 
pathway substantially limited the externalization of its costs. In 2004 the maximum duration of first  
more generous WW episode is connected to the actual contribution history and not anymore to the age 
(Wijziging van de Werkloosheidswet en de Wet Structuur Uitvoeringorganisatie Werk en Inkomen in  
Verband  met  de  Vervanging  van  Fictief  Arbeidsverleden  door  Feitelijk  Arbeidsverleden  en  de  
Beperking van het  Verzorgingsforfait,  Act  on Changing work history requirements  to  actual  work 
history). In the same year the Wet Afschaffing van de Vervolguitkering (Act on abolition of the follow-
up benefit)  abolished the follow-up WW episode,  meaning only at  the age of 60.5 years  or later  
recipients with full requirements did not fall into the social assistance (IOAW). In 2006 this minimum 
age was further delayed to 61 years and 2 months when Wijziging onder meer WW in Verband met  
Aanscherping  Werkeis (Act  on  Tightening  the Work record  conditions  of  the  WW) restricted  the 
maximum duration of the WW episode from 54 to 38 months (Van Gerven 2008; OECD 2014).
Finally the re-integration of older recipients was stimulated in 2004 when the Regeling vrijstelling 
Verplichtingen WW  (Regulation on Exemption from obligation under the WW) re-introduced their 
legal duty to search for a job. Three exemptions were however reserved for: recipients older than 64 
years, recipients that fell out of the disability pathway after the age of 57,5 years, and recipients with  
very poor chance for re-integration (Sonnet and OECD 2005; van Oorschot 2007).
If  social  partners  could  slightly hinder  the formulation of  retrenchment policies,  they have no 
power to hinder their implementation. Their complete exclusion from the self-administration boards 
make them  in fact unable to interfere with the claims' assessment or with the recipients' re-integration. 
This  is  especially  important  because  it  prevents  them from opportunistically  exploiting  the  third 
criterion  that exempt from the job search duty to foster the use of unemployment as a pathway of exit.
In summary, despite the limited role of social partners, retrenchment policies have only marginally  
affected  the  attractiveness  of  the  unemployment  pathway  between  1995  and  2009.  They  are 
implemented rather late with respect to the other two pathways and this delay increased the relative 
attractiveness  of  unemployment.  Retrenchment  policies  made  its  used  more  costly,  but  did  not  
undermine its function of residual exit route for redundancies excluded by the retrenchment of the  
disability pathway.  Because of that the hypothesis is that the cohort born in 1945 or after will not have 
a significantly lower hazard of entering a pension pathway than the older cohort (HP 5.1). 
5.4.2 Disability pathway
The retrenchment of the disability pathway was the first and main target of the Dutch Government to 
EWL. As explained in section 5.3 in 1991 the Government decided to boost the work participation by  
sharply cutting the inflow into disability.  Due to their intransigent position, social partners failed to 
channel  their  criticism from SER to the Government,  which felt  legitimized to act  unilaterally  in  
1992  .  Being  discredited  in  the  formal  consultation  setting,  social  partners  tried  to  hinder  the  
retrenchment of the disability pathway by mobilizing in may the public opinion in one of the largest 
post-war protest. In spite of this success, also their credit among the public opinion soon plunged when 
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the  Commission  Buurmeijer  reported  that  their  opportunistic  administration  had  expanded  social 
expenses to externalize the social costs of industrial restructuring. Being this report focused especially 
on  the  misuse  of  the  disability  scheme  as  a  pathway  of  exit,  social  partners  failed  to  hinder  its 
retrenchment by mobilizing the public against it (Yerkes 2011; Visser and Hemerijck 1997). 
The Government in 1992 and 1993 unilaterally enforced two acts: the Wet Terugdringing Beroep  
op  de  Arbeidsongeschiktheidsregelingen  (TBA -  act  on  reducing  disability  claims)  and the  Wet 
Terugdringing  Arbeidsongeschiktheids  Volume  (TAV  -  Reducing  disability  Volume  act), which 
increased substantially  the  costs  of  disability for both recipients and their  employers  (Kautto and 
Bach-Othman 2010).   
TBA increased recipients'  costs for three main reasons. First  from permanent  the WAO benefit 
(loondervingsuitkering-  wage loss benefit equal to the 70% of the previous wage) was limited to a 
maximum period of 6 years for claimants aged 58 years or older, to 3 years at the age of 53 years and  
to 2 years at the age of 43 years. After that  the benefit (vervolguitkering- follow-up benefit) plunged 
between the statutory minimum and the previous wage  (Van Gerven 2008).  Due to this temporal 
limitation, TBA strongly discouraged disability as a pathway of exit before the age of 59 years, when 
claimants can not anymore transit into statutory retirement age with the full WAO benefit. Second the 
follow-up benefit was actuarially adjusted, meaning that it approached more the minimum wage the 
lower is the age when recipients got entitled to it. Third a new more stringent eligibility criteria made 
more  selective  the assessment.  Disability was defined as  a  reduction of  the earning capacity  due 
exclusively  to  a  medically-assessed  physical  or  mental  impairment.  The  earning  capacity  was 
determined as  a  residual  capacity  of  performing  a  socially  accepted  job,  independently  from the 
previous individual professional experience  (Van Gerven 2008;  De Vroom 2004;  van Oorschot and 
Boos 2000).
TAV increased employers' costs increased by introducing a bonus-malus system in the calculation 
of disability contributions, hitherto based on a single national percentage of the gross wage. While 
providing  incentives  to  hire  disabled  workers  (see  section  8.2),  it  sanctioned  employers  if  their 
employees were laid  off  as  a  result  of  disability.  Since the oppositions of employers  against  this  
sanction could hinder the implementation of this system in the administrative body (still dominated by 
social  partners),  it  was  abolished  in  1995  with  the Wet   Afschaffing   Malus   En   Bevordering  
Reïntegratie (AMBER- Act Abolition of “Malus” and Improvement of Reintegration) (van Oorschot 
and Boos 2000). 
However,  to repair  the sharp discredit  they suffered from the  Commission Buurmeijer's  report, 
social  partners  drafted  a  STvdA's  bilateral  agreement  in  December  1993,  where  they  showed  a 
cooperative  attitude  toward  the  retrenchment  of  disability.  Their  further  exclusion  from  the 
administration bodies in 1994 fully prevented them to hinder also its future implementation (J. Visser 
and Hemerijck 1997; Hemerijck and Marx 2006; van der Veen and Trommel 1999; Yerkes 2011).    
As a result of the marginalization of social partners, following acts managed to increase employers'  
costs by progressively privatizing the costs of sickness and disability insurance. They are implemented 
by two main coalitions dominated by the social-democratic party and led by Wim Kok. Former head of 
the FVN at the time of the Wassenaar agreement, Kok promoted, as a part of the well-known strategy 
“job, job, job”, retrenchment policies that increased the employers' costs, without further cutting the 
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benefit's generosity.    
The Wet Terugdringing Ziekteverzuim (TZ - Act on reducing sickness absence) in 1994 limited this 
privatization in the first 6 weeks18, obliging employers either to pay directly to their sick employees at 
least 70% of their last wage or to reinsure this risk in the private market. In 1996 the Wet Uitbreiding 
Loondoorbetaling bij Ziekte (WULBZ- Act on Extension of Wage Pay in Case of Sickness) extended 
this obligation to 1 year, privatizing  de facto  the whole sickness episode  (van Oorschot and Boos 
2000;  Kautto  and  Bach-Othman  2010),  which  is  finally  extended  in  2004  with  the  Verlenging 
Loondoorbetalingsverplichting bij  Ziekte (VLZ-  Act  extending  the  wage  payment  obligation) 
extended. The disability risk was privatized also, but only partially. In 1996 the Premie-differentiatie 
en Marktwerking bij Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekeringen (PEMBA- act on premium differentiation 
and market regulation) differentiated the employers' contribution to the WAO scheme according to the 
risk,  calculated  as  the  number  of  claims  filed  in  each  firms  and  industry.  In  order  to  dampen 
employers' opposition, the Government included an opt-out option that for 5 years let them insure their 
risk with a private insurance company (Kautto and Bach-Othman 2010).      
These  policies,  sanctioning  employers  abusing  of  disability  to  lay  off  their  older  employees,  
included also measures that promote the re-integration of the recipients. In fact the ARBO act required  
employers to hire a certified private company specialized in occupational health and safety service 
(arbo-dienst) to implement anti-absenteism policies and policies that prevent the risk of sickness and 
disability by improving the working conditions (see Section 7.2 for more information). ARBO is then 
renewed in 1998 to strengthen employers' private responsibility for prevention measures, by imposing  
a fine to employers that does not fulfil the rule prescribed by the ARBO act (van Oorschot and Boos 
2000).    
Employers  and  employees'  responsibility  was  also  strengthened  for  the  effectiveness  of 
reintegration  from  sickness  and  disability  by  the  Wet  verbetering  poortwachter (WVP -  Act  on 
Improving the Gatekeeper) in 2001. This act compel them to a series of timetabled activity in the first  
two  years  of  sickness,  when  the  risk  is  employers'  responsibility.  Among  others,  these  activities 
include the implementation of a personalized reintegration plan  after  8  weeks of  sickness,  whose  
progress had to be regularly reported to the public authority. The non-compliance to these rules led to 
sanctions for both employers and employees . The will of reactivating older workers is further shown 
in 2004 when recipients aged between 50 and 55 years had to endure a re-assessment of their current  
eligibility  (Schattingsbesluit,  Tribunal decree.  New re-assessment of WAO's recipients  with tighter  
conditions) (Yerkes 2011; Kautto and Bach-Othman 2010). 
In  all,  retrenchment  policies  enacted  hitherto selected  the inflow from the ZW into the WAO 
episode so that the costs' externalization can not be opportunistically used by employers, and to a 
minor extent, employees. This is obtained not only by increasing the private costs of disability, but  
also by compel their active support.  
 Having remarked the cooperative attitudes shown by social partners after 1993 (and especially in 
2003 with the  Museum square  pact-  see Section 5.4.3),  the Kok II  Government  in 2002 and the 
Balkanende I Government in 2004 integrated SER recommendations in the final and most radical  
18 This period was limited to 2 weeks for companies with less than 15 employees (van Oorschot and Boos 
2000) 
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retrenchment of the disability pathway in 2006, when WAO are substituted by WIA schemes (Werk en 
Inkomen naar Arbeidsvermogen- WIA, Work and Income according to the capability of working). The 
retrenchment in this case affected manly employees with partial impairments. 
The minimum disability threshold is increased by 15 to 35% and two different schemes applies to 
full  and  partial  disabled  recipients:  IVA  (Inkomensverzekering  voor  volledig  en  duurzaam  
arbeidsongeschikten-  Income  insurance  for  fully  and  permanently  disabled) and  WGA 
(Werkhervatting gedeeltelijk arbeidsongeschikten-  Employment reintegration of partially disabled)  . 
Recipients are defined as fully disabled if their lost at least 89% of their working capacity, are awarded 
with a benefit equal to 75% of their last wage, and their disability is re-assessed every 5 years. For  
partial recipients this benefit expires after only 38 months, and is replaced with flat-rate benefit about 
20-25% lower.  They are furthermore obliged to seek and accept any socially acceptable job, whose  
wage can top-up the flat-rate benefit (Van Gerven 2008; Kautto and Bach-Othman 2010; Yerkes 2011).
Summing up the consultation setting gave the Government the power to discredit and marginalize 
the radical  opposition of social  partners.  This  marginalization increased social  partners'  benefit  of 
endorsing rather than hindering the retrenchment of disability. The same consultation process then 
allowed the Government to re-integrate social partners again in the policy-making after their attitude 
became cooperative. Furthermore the early exclusion of social partners from the self-administration 
setting prevented them from opportunistically hinder the implementation of the policies formulated to 
retrench  the  disability  pathway.  As  a  result  of  the  successful  neutralization  of  social  partners'  
opposition,  the  retrenchment  policies  in  the  Netherlands  have  strongly  reduced  the  financial 
attractiveness of the disability pathway of exit  for both employers and employees. Therefore it  is  
hypothesized  that  the  cohort  born  in  1945 or  after  will  have  a  significantly  lower  likelihood  of  
entering a pension pathway than the older cohort (HP 5.2). 
5.4.3 Early retirement pathway
Apparently early retirement is, among the three pathways, the most hard to retrench for the Dutch  
Government for mainly two reasons. First since it is the most main route among “core workers”, its  
retrenchment is the most unpopular because employees get to deserve it as a result of their long work 
commitment. Second the regulation of VUT schemes  are under the authority of the main defender of 
those acquired rights, social partners, and the Government has no legal right to interfere with it (see  
Section 5.2). 
In spite of its lack of legal authority, as mentioned in Section 5.2, the Government managed to 
force the retrenchment policies in the so-called “shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf 1997). In other words, 
bargaining  with  STvdA the guidelines  for  the  next collective  bargaining  rounds,  it  threatened to 
abolished with a unilateral action the tax incentives that partially externalized the costs of the overall  
occupational schemes, of which VUT were part. Facing the threat of a large increase of the payroll  
taxes, in the so-called Pension Covenant in 1997 STvdA recommended their members to follow the 
guidelines  provided  by  the  CLA in  the  public  sector,  in  which  the  Government  bargained  the 
substitution of the VUT with the less generous pre-pension schemes (van der Meer and Visser 2010; 
Sonnet and OECD 2005; De Vroom 2004; Wilthagen 2003).  
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Graphs 10 and 11 compare the generosity of pre-pension schemes negotiated in the public sector in 
the transitional and in the fully implemented regime with the generosity of VUT schemes. As opposed  
to VUT schemes, pre-pension schemes does not set a minimum age to draw a full pre-pension benefit.  
The benefit  follows nevertheless the principle  of actuarial  parity and its  level is thus reduced the  
earlier older workers make use of this pathway. The overall idea is that the total benefit stream that  
recipients withdraw along this pathway is the same independently from the the age of employment 
exit . While the VUT benefit replaced 80% of the previous earnings from the age of 60 years onward,  
the pre-pension benefit fall under 30% of the last wage at the age of 55 years and approaches the  
generosity of the VUT only the age of 61. In order to preserve acquired rights, the retrenchment of the  
early retirement pathway in the public sector is limited in the short-term by a transitional regime  
between 1997 and 2002. Moreover both transitional and pre-pension regimes provide cohorts of older  
workers born in 1947 or earlier  for more favourable conditions (see Graph 5.2).  The goal of  this  
transitional regime is thus to delay by at least 1 year the entry in this pathway  (Sonnet and OECD 
2005). 
The  pre-pension  benefit  can  be  furthermore  cumulated  with  work  earnings  to  enhance  partial 
retirement in the last years before statutory retirement. In this period recipients that work part-time can 
compensate  the lost  wage withdrawing a pre-pension benefit  with no repercussions for the future 
pension streams This option is particularly favourable within the last ten years before the statutory 
retirement age (65), because it fully-cover the contribution and does not affect future pension streams  
(Feldstein and Siebert 2002; Henkens and Schippers 2008; De Vroom 2004).
Table 5.2: Replacement rates of VUT, transitional and pre-pension schemes in the public sector by age and cohorts.
Source: Euwals, 2004 in (Sonnet and OECD 2005)
As shown in Table 5.2 also the new pre-pension regime implemented in 2003 provides for a more 
generous actuarial adjustment rules for cohorts that were born in 1947 or earlier. For those cohorts the 
pre-pension scheme approximates the generosity of the VUT schemes at the age of 61. Nonetheless it  
sets a further incentives of postponing the entry into this pathway until the age of 62 years, when the  
benefit almost equals the last wage. A similar progression but translated one year after, concerns the 
pre-pension benefit of younger cohorts, who are thus encouraged to delay their entry into this pathway 
accordingly.  
As  for  the  private  sector  the  substitution  of  VUT  scheme  was  delegated  to  the  collective 
negotiations of the social partners. This self-regulation gave them a great deal of power to disregard 
the implementation of the Pension Covenant, which did not legally compel the bargaining members of 
Age VUT Transition scheme 1997-2002 Pre-pension scheme after 2003
cohort < April 1942 April 1942- March 1947 < April 1942 April 1942- March 1947 >March 1947
55 0 27 25 27 25 18
56 0 30 28 30 28 21
57 0 35 32 35 32 24
58 0 40 38 40 38 28
59 0 48 45 48 45 33
60 80 59 55 59 55 40
61 80 75 70 75 70 51
62 80 75 70 100 93 70
63 80 75 70 100 100 100
64 80 75 70 100 100 100
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the  signing  Confederations.  Nevertheless  since  1999  the  Government  managed  to  encourage  the 
retrenchment of the early retirement pathway by gradually transferring the costs' externalization from 
VUT to pre-pension schemes. Fiscal facilities for older workers that opt for pre-pension schemes were  
introduced in 1999 by the Wet fiscale behandeling van pensioenen (FBP - Act on the fiscal regulation 
of pensions) (De Vroom 2004; Sonnet and OECD 2005). The abolishment of VUT fiscal facilities is 
included in 2004 in a new Museum square pact between STvdA and the Balkenende II government  
(see also Section 5.4.1). During the negotiations the Governance acted in a strong shadow of hierarchy  
and threatened to introduce tax penalties on early retirement benefits and to limit the authority of  
social  partners  on  pre-pension  schemes  with  opt-out  clauses19.  Facing  also  additional  threats 
concerning  the Government's  plan  of  retrenching  also  the other  pathways  of  exit,  social  partners 
decided to satisfy some of its counterpart requests to preserve their authority over pre-pension funds  
and to hinder the retrenchment of the unemployment pathway (see Section 5.4.1)  (van der Meer and 
Visser 2010).
The early retirement pathway is phased out in 2015, when pre-pension schemes are substituted by 
life-course saving scheme. Since 2005 pre-pension schemes remained available only to older workers 
aged 55 or more. Younger cohorts are able to retire early only at the age of 63 years after 40 years of 
work history20, according to the rules that regulates the occupational pension schemes  (Sonnet and 
OECD 2005).      
By  increasing  their  financial  accountability,  the  abolition  of  tax  incentives  strongly  promoted 
sectoral  representative organizations  to  adopt  pre-pension  schemes already in the  next  bargaining 
rounds. As a result of that, the actual substitution of VUT with pre-pension schemes in the private  
sector has been gradual but extensive. In the end of the 1990's VUT schemes were still included in 
almost the majority of the sectoral collective agreements, but they become marginal in 2005 (2%) 
(OECD, 2005). The specific conditions of transitional and pre-pension schemes in the private sectors 
varied across industry (Trampusch 2009), but they all provide for a similar actuarial adjustment to the 
rule I have shown for the public sector in Table 5.2. 
In  all  the  retrenchment  of  the  early  retirement  pathway  was  triggered  in  1997,  when  the 
Government obtained in the shadow of hierarchy the commitment of social partners and gave them a  
benchmark by implementing pre-pension schemes in the public sector. The retrenchment was further  
promoted in the private sector by the fiscal incentives that, increasing the private costs VUT schemes,  
discouraged social partners from preserving them. Since social partnership did not hinder both the 
formulation  and  the  implementation  of  policies  retrenching  its  financial  attractiveness,  it  is 
hypothesized  that  the  cohort  born  in  1945 or  after  will  have  a  significantly  lower  likelihood  of  
entering a pension pathway than the older cohort (HP 5.3). 
Table 5.3 gives an indication over the retrenchment of early retirement pathway. by showing the 
percentage of workers covered by VUT, transitional,  and pre-pension schemes in 2001, 2006. At first  
glance the implementation  of  pre-pension  schemes seems to be rather  fast.  In  fact  in 2001 VUT 
schemes are significantly replaced in all the industries with the exception of trade and catering and 
19 This opt-out clauses were meant to give employees the opportunities of exiting collective pre-pension 
schemes and to join private funds (Pochet et al. 2010).
20 Alternatively 3 years earlier in case they will use all their disposable time of the life-course saving schemes at 
the end of their working life (OECD, 2005).
5.4.3  Early retirement pathway 103
corporate service. In 2006 VUT schemes become even more marginal, but remain still significant in  
the service sector.  The retrenchment of early retirement pathway was thus more consistent  in the 
primary and secondary sectors than in the tertiary.
Table 5.3: Diffusion of VUT transitional and pre-pension schemes in 2001 and 2005 across industry, expressed as percentage 
of workers covered by these collective negotiated schemes.
Source: (Spijkerman and Klaassen 2002; Beeksma, Junger, and De la Croix 2007)
  
Note: The industry classification in 2001 and 2006 differ. In 2001 information are available for: 
Industry, that in the Table  is represented by manufacturing and construction, 
Trade , that in the Table  is represented by trade and catering
Service,  that in the Table  is represented by corporate service and other services
Public sector: information are available only for 2001.
According  to  the  pace  of  retrenchment  across  industries,  it  is  hypothesized  that  among 
cohort>=1945 the likelihood of entering a pension pathway is significantly higher in the industries  
where the dissemination of pre-pension schemes is slower: trade and catering and corporate services 
(HP 5.4). 
A summary of the hypotheses about the effectiveness of retrenchment policies for the Netherlands 
between mid-1990's and 2009 is provided in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Summary of how retrenchment policies lower the financial attractiveness of the three pathways of exit in the 
Netherlands and their hypothesized effectiveness in extending working life.
Pathways of exit Retrenchment policies (RP) Hypotheses
Unemployment 
pathway
Social  partners  hinder  the  formulation  of 
retrenchment  policies,  they  do  not significantly 
reduce its  financial  attractiveness.  It  remains  a 
sort of “last resort” pathway.
HP 5.1: since the financial attractiveness of unemployment is 
not considerably reduced, the hypothesis is that the cohort 
born in 1945 or after  will  NOT have a significantly lower  
hazard of entering a pension pathway than the older cohort.
Disability pathway Since  social  partners  can  NOT  hinder the 
formulation of retrenchment policies, these latter 
successfully lower its financial attractiveness:
- benefit is significantly reduced for early entrants
- eligibility is narrower with the introduction of a 
stricter disability definition.
Social  partners  can  NOT  hinder  the 
implementation of the retrenchment policies. 
HP  5.2:  Since  social  partnership  can  NOT  hinder  the 
formulation and the implementation of policies retrenching 
its financial attractiveness, it is hypothesized that the cohort 
born  in  1945  or  after  will  have  a  significantly  lower  
likelihood  of  entering  a  pension  pathway  than  the  older  
cohort.
Early  retirement 
pathway
Thanks  to  its  shadow  of  hierarchy  the 
Government  formulates  with  social  partners 
retrenchment policies that  do significantly reduce 
its financial attractiveness:
-  VUT  is  substituted  by  pre-pension  scheme, 
HP  5.3:  Since  social  partnership  can  NOT  hinder  the 
formulation and the implementation of policies retrenching 
its financial attractiveness, it is hypothesized that the cohort 
born  in  1945  or  after  will  have  a  significantly  lower  
likelihood  of  entering  a  pension  pathway  than  the  older  
Sector VUT schemes Transitional schemes Pre-pension schemes 
2001 2006 2001 2006 2006
Agriculture and fishery n.a 0 n.a. 100 100
Manufacturing 20 10 77 33 52
Construction 20 0 77 25 75
Trade and catering 43 24 45 31 31
Transport and communication n.a 19 n.a 44 69
Corporate services 14 17 69 28 50
Other services 14 7 69 36 50
Public sector 0 n.a. 100 n.a. n.a.
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whose benefit is based on actuarial parity.
Social  partners  can  NOT  hinder the 
implementation  of  the  retrenchment  policies, 
because their financial accountability is increased 
by the Government. 
BUT:
-Dissemination of pre-pension scheme is  limited 





HP 5.4:  It  is  hypothesized that  among cohort>=1945 the  
likelihood  of  entering  a  pension  pathway  is  significantly  
higher  in  the  industries  where  the  dissemination  of  pre-
pension  schemes  is  slower  the  following  industries (as 
classified in the sample): 
-Wholesale and retail  trade,  transportation and storage & 
catering. 
- Financial intermediation 
-real estate, renting and business activity
 -other community
5.5 Findings
The hypotheses outlined in the previous sections are tested using a Competing-Risk model (CRM). 
Estimations are expressed in hazard ratios in Table 10.3. The descriptive of the Sharelife sample that  
were used in this analysis are presented in Section 4.2. 
The work-retirement trajectories are compared between the cohort of older workers born in 1944 or 
earlier and the cohort born after 1944. It is estimated the extent to which these two cohorts have a 
different  likelihood  of  undertaking  four  types  of  trajectories:  unemployment  pathway,  disability 
pathway, early retirement pathway, and “other” pathway. The fourth (other) pathway represent the exit 
from employment without a income support,  because an alternative support is found either in the 
household resources or in savings. Since this typical work-retirement trajectory is not associated to  
any of the three pathways of exit investigated here, the estimations pertaining to this  other pathway 
will not be interpreted and therefore are not presented in Table 5.4. These estimation will instead be 
presented, together   with the estimations of the controls, in Appendix 2.
Model 1.1, model 2.1 and model 3.1 include the cohort>1944 variable and the controls (whose 
estimations are presented in the appendix ) for the three pathways of exit (unemployment, disability, 
and early retirement) and they respectively test HP 5.1, HP 5.2, and HP 5.3.  Model 3.2 include also  
the interaction between the cohort>1944 variable and industries in order to test HP 5.4.  
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Table 5.4: Competing risk models (CRM) estimating the effectiveness of retrenchment policies on the hazard of undertaking 
one of the four pathways of exit (1. unemployment; 2. disability; 3. early-retirement). Estimates are expressed in hazard 
ratios. 
Source: Sharelife 2008-2009 release 3.1, 2010. 
Note: Short variables' description:
Dependent variable:
Work-retirement trajectory: time-varying categorical variable equal to: 0 if the respondent is working at the end of the person-
period spell or exit employment at the statutory retirement age of 65 years, 1 if the respondent entered a unemployment pathway 
at the end of the person-period spell, 2 if the respondent entered a disability pathway  at the end of the person- period  spell,  3  if  
the respondent entered an early retirement pathway  at the end of the person-period spell, and 4 if the respondent entered other 
pathways  at the end of the person-period spell.
Independent variables:
Cohort>1944: time-constant dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is born after 1944  
Industry:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the industry where the respondent is working in the person-period spell.  
For a more detailed description see Chapter 4. The full model is shown in Appendix A.
The cohort effects in models 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1 in Table 5.4 show that, since social partner have a  
limited  power  of  hindering  retrenchment  policies  in  the  Netherlands  these  latter  have  been  very 
effective. Starting from model 2.1, the cohort effect shows that, according to HP 5.2, older workers  
born after 1944 are significantly less likely to enter the disability pathway than older workers that are 
born earlier. This result supports the argument that their inclusion in a consultation setting prevented 
social partners from hindering the government's formulation of retrenchment policies. Because of that 
the government managed to strongly privatize the costs of the disability pathway for both employers 
and older workers. This result supports moreover the argument that the exclusion of social partners  
from  the  social  security  administration  prevented  them  from  opportunistically  compensating  the 
disability's retrenchment in its implementation. All in all, since social partners could hinder neither the 
formulation or the implementation of retrenchment policies, the latter are effective in lowering the  
(1.1) (2.1) (3.1) (3.2)
Unemployment Disability Early Retirement Early Retirement
Cohort >1944 1.486 0.596** 0.480*** 0.305***
Interaction: Cohort>1994*Industry ( Ref: Construction* Cohort >1944)
Cohort >1944* Agriculture forestry and fishing 2.650
Cohort >1944* Manifacturing mining & quarrying 1.263
Cohort >1944* Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 1.006
Cohort >1944*Financial intermediation 3.021*
Cohort >1944*real estate, renting and business activity 2.330
Cohort >1944*Public administration and defense, education, health and social work 1.754
Cohort >1944* other community 2.550*
Failures 45 106 463 463
Subjects 1408 1408 1408 1408
Total Observations 2,399 2,399 2,399 2,399
BIC
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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attractiveness of the disability pathway after 1995.  
Moving to the cohort effect estimated in model 3.1, according to HP 5.3, older workers born after 
1944 are significantly less likely to enter the early retirement pathway than earlier cohorts.  This result 
supports the argument  that social  partners,  initially forced to include retrenchment  policies  in  the 
Pension Covenant in 1997, did not hinder their further implementation in the industry negotiations. 
Their compliance was not only the result of their commitment, but was enhanced by a tax regime that 
fully  privatize  the  costs  of  VUT  schemes.  Since  this  regime  made  social  partners  financially 
accountable for the regulation of the early retirement pathway, they promote its retrenchment to cuts  
the costs of their members.    
With regards to the effectiveness of retrenchment policies by industry the HP 5.4, predicting a  
significantly  higher  likelihood  to  enter  the  early  retirement  pathway  in  industries  where  the 
dissemination of pre-retirement schemes is slower, is only partially confirmed by model 3.2. Here the 
interactions between the cohort effect and industries are included and  the construction industry, where 
the  pre-retirement  schemes  diffused  faster  than  in  the  other  industries,  is  used  as  reference.  The 
cohort*industry interactions show that, against HP 5.3, the likelihood of entering the early retirement 
pathways is not significantly higher in the wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & 
catering, and in the renting and business activity industry.  Instead according to HP 5.4,  the older  
workers are significantly more likely to enter the early retirement in the other two industries financial  
intermediation and other community industries. Furthermore the fact that the likelihood of entering 
early retirement pathway does not significantly vary in the remaining industries mirrors the fact that in 
those industries the dissemination of transitional and pre-pension schemes occurs to a similar pace, as  
shown in Table  5.3. 
The  final  hypothesis  HP 5.1  predicting  the  low effectiveness  of  the  unemployment  pathway's 
retrenchment is supported by model 1.1, showing that the likelihood of entering this pathway does not  
statistically differ between the cohorts born before and after 1944. This result supports the argument 
that the retrenchment of the unemployment pathway occurs in the only setting where social partners  
could weaken the government's plan: the social dialogue over the collective bargaining. In exchange 
for its commitment to support the retrenchment of the other pathways, STvdA preserved the function 
of unemployment as the safety net for older workers shed by restructuring processes and excluded 
from the disability pathway.
At  the same time the risk of  unemployment  does  not  significantly increase,  meaning that  this 
scheme  did  not  massively  sheltered  older  workers  excluded  from  disability.  This  can  have  two 
explanations. First its low attractiveness, further retrenched in 2004, limits its function of alternative 
pathway.  Second,  the  exclusion  of  social  partners  from the  administration  of  the  unemployment 
insurance, limited their capacity of expanding its generosity in the implementation phase.
In  conclusion  retrenchment  policies  proved  to  be  effective  in  extend  working  life  in  the 
Netherlands.  The limited  interference  of  social  partners  makes the Government  more  effective  in 
reducing the attractiveness of the disability pathway. Moreover the implementation of retrenchment 
policies  is  supported,  rather  than  hindered  by  social  partners,  who  further  contributed  to  their  
effectiveness.   
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5.6 Conclusion
This  chapter  investigated  the effectiveness  of  retrenchment  policies  between 1995 and 2009.  The 
estimations of the CRM show that retrenchment policies were highly effective. This is because social  
partners, interacting in modes of social governance punishing opportunistic actions, were discouraged 
from hindering the retrenchment of pathways of exit for their core membership. 
The  consultation  mode  and  the  privatization  of  social  insurance  administration  supported  the 
retrenchment of the disability pathway. As shown by the estimates, not affected by the opposition of 
social partners in the phases of formulation or implementation, those policies significantly reduced the 
inflow into disability trajectories.  
The self-regulation mode supported the retrenchment of early retirement pathway. Since social  
partners  have  to  bear  the  costs  of  VUT scheme,  they  were  encouraged  to  substitute  them  with 
transitional  and  pre-pension scheme,  which preserve the right  to  exit  early  and at  the  same time 
contain the costs. Nevertheless since these transitional and pre-pension schemes are less financially 
attractive, they strongly discourage early retirement trajectories.  
As shown by the estimation, the effectiveness of retrenchment policies follows to some extent the 
industry dissemination of transitional and pre-pension scheme, but not for the wholesale and retail  
trade, transportation and storage & horeca (hotel, restaurant, and catering) industries. Maybe a more  
precise estimation would have benefit  from separating the effect in the transportation and storage,  
where diffusion of transitional and pre-pension scheme was much faster than in the rest of the industry.
The only ineffective retrenchment concerned the unemployment pathway. This can be interpreted 
as the side payment that the government had to pay in exchange for social partners' support of other  
pathways'  retrenchment.  In  the  unions and employers'  associations  perspective,  it  represented  the 
safety pathways for older workers and companies facing strong international competition.   
An interesting matter for discussion are the reasons behind this industry pattern. One can claim that  
sheltered industries are more likely to retrench the early retirement pathway than the industries that are  
more exposed to globalization forces. This argument however does not find empirical support, since 
the effectiveness of retrenchment policies in exposed industries  (such as manufacturing mining & 
quarrying and wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & catering), is not significantly 
different  with respect  to protected industries,  as construction. Alternatively one can claim that  the  
retrenchment is less effective in the industries characterized by the lowest coverage of the collective 
bargaining  (Traxler  and  Behrens  2002).  The  effectiveness  of  the  early  retirement's  retrenchment 
followed  a  pattern  opposite  to  the  distributional  effects  expected  for  social  partners'  hindering  
strategies. It is higher in industries where the social partners' power of coordinating HRM practices is 
stronger  and  lower  elsewhere.  In  all,  social  partners  in  the  Netherlands  from  immovable  object 
(Pierson 1998) became actively involved in promoting the effectiveness of retrenchment policies.
 Therefore can be a hint that companies and collective bargaining at some point in the mid-1990's  
started to intentionally retain older workers. This argument is also supported the failed expansion of  
unemployment as an “alternative” pathway of exit. Companies could have offered additional private  
benefit to encouraged older workers to dismiss and enter unemployment, but this is not shown by the 
data.  The extent  to which companies have effectively retained older workers from the mid-1990's  
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onwards is the topic of the second part of the investigation in Chapter 8.
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6 The effectiveness of retrenchment policies in Germany
6.1 Introduction
As shown in Section 1.2 the outcome of activation policies in Germany laid in between the outcomes 
in the Netherlands and Italy. This chapter investigates the extent to which this intermediate outcome 
was the result of the moderate cooperativeness of the partnership, which let social partners hinder the 
effectiveness of retrenchment policies. The main research question is:  To what extent  have social  
parters hindered the effectiveness of retrenchment policies in Germany between the mid-1990's and  
2009?
Because of their moderately strong articulation, labour and capital interests are vertically integrated 
into two confederations: the BDA (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände) and the 
DGB (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund),  organize respectively the employers 'associations and union. 
Those confederations take part in the policymaking in settings that are more institutionalized than in  
Italy, but less than in the Netherlands. Although a tripartite advisory board monitors the viability of the 
statutory  pension  system yearly,  social  partners  affected  the  formulation  of  retrenchment  policies 
through a series of temporary ministerial commissions. Those commissions displayed a mode laying in 
between consultation and concertation,  depending on the force balance between actors.  As  in  the 
Netherlands,  the  Government  could  overcome  the  social  partners'  deadlock  in  the  shadow of  its  
hierarchy, but only if it could mobilize a vast political consensus against their opportunism. As in Italy,  
if the government lacked a strong base of political legitimation, social partners had the chance of 
hindering the formulation of retrenchment policies.  
According to the constitutional principle of selbsterwaltung, social partners dominated the boards 
administrating their members' contributions. Their incentive of hindering the implementation of the 
pension retrenchment is severely limited by eligibility and benefits' criteria giving them no discretional 
power (Lehmbruch 2003) This is not true in the disability and unemployment pathway, where social 
partners have a high discretional role in assessing the health conditions and the residual employability 
of claimants. These prerogatives were nevertheless removed by the Harz Commission in the early 
2000's (Eichhorst and Wintermann 2005). 
The Kohl government started retrenching the pension and the unemployment pathways of exit in 
1989. Nevertheless the implementation of these policies was delayed by the turmoil aroused in the 
aftermath of the German economic unification first to 1992 and then to 1997. This turmoil caused also 
the adoption of emergency measures that partially contradicted the previous retrenchment. Between 
1990 and 1995 a temporary unemployment scheme was opened for older workers massively expelled 
in the Easter regions.
Finally  the  economic turmoil  created  a  favourable  conditions  for  social  partners  to  distort  the  
finality  of  the  old-age  part-time scheme,  originally  adopted  to  delay  the exit  from work.  This is 
because, although managed in self-regulatory modes, those schemes are supported by public subsidies 
that greatly externalized their costs. These subsidies encouraged social partners to negotiate schemes 
on vertical part-time that, instead of reducing the working schedule, shortened the working life.  
Because  of  this  interference  played  by  social  partners  both  in  the  formulation  and  the 
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implementation of retrenchment policies, the effectiveness of the retrenchment policies in Germany is  
expected to be lower than in the Netherlands, where social partners can not hinder any phase of the 
retrenchment policies' development. Conversely it is expected to be higher than in Italy, where social  
partners  could  hinder  not  only  the  implementation  but  to  a  greater  extent  the  formulation  of  
retrenchment policies.
This chapter is organized as follows. First the pathways of exit are described that used to be offered 
by the German protection system in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3 the institutional channels are discussed 
by which social partners cooperate to the formulation and implementation of retrenchment policies 
maximize their opportunity of hinder both the last phase. Further discussion on how the retrenchment 
policies in Germany lower the financial attractiveness of the previously described pathways of exit is  
presented  in  Section  6.4  where,  on  the  bases  of  this,  the  hypotheses  over  their  effectiveness  are  
formulated. The hypotheses are tested with a competing risk model, whose estimation is interpreted in 
Section 6.5. Conclusion about the effectiveness of retrenchment policies are presented at the end. 
6.2 Pathways of exit: an overview
In Germany the social protection system managed three main pathways of exit at the beginning of 
the 1990's. The “statutory pension insurance” system, as regulated by the pension system reforms in 
1957 and in 1972 (Rentenreform I-II- Pension reform I- II), covers about 9/10 of the workforce21 and 
fix at 65 years the statutory retirement age. In spite of that, it granted four episodes that led to the  
withdrawal of a full pension benefit by the age of 60 years or earlier. Other pathways, namely the 
unemployment  and  disability  schemes,  as  regulated  between  1972  and  1996,  provided  episodes 
anticipating the exit from work by three years or more (Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991a).
An overview of the pathways of exit available in Germany at the beginning of the 1990's is shown 
in Graph 6.1. Here the episodes provided by the occupational disability schemes are represented in 
orange, the episodes provided by the public pension system are represented in read, and the episodes  
provided by the unemployment scheme are light blue. Episodes are drawn according to the earliest age 
when they became available.
21 only a particular category of public employees (Beamte- about 7% of the workforce) have a separate “pension regime”.
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 Graph 6.1: Pathways of exit and episodes available in Germany at the beginning of the 1990's.
Source: Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991a; Schmähl 2003   
A list of the relevant legislation regulation of pathways of exit that will be mentioned in this and in  
the following sections is provided in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: List of the main relevant legislation and social agreements that regulated the disability, the early retirement and the 
unemployment pathway of exit in Germany. 
Unemployment pathway
1983 -Arbeitslosengeld I SGB III- Erweiterung (1) 1983 Insurance-based unemployment benefit SGB III- 
-the maximum duration of the insurance-based unemployment benefit is 
extended to 12 months for older workers (54 years and more).
1985-  Gesetz  zur  Reform  der  Job-Förderung  und  
Rentenversicherung
1985-  Act  on  the  Reform  of  Job  Promotion  and  Statutory  Pension 
Insurance
-the maximum duration of the insurance-based unemployment benefit is 
extended to 18 months for older workers (49 years and more).
1986 Gesetz zur Reform der Job-Förderungsgesetz 1986- Law on the Reform of the Job Promotion Act- 
-the maximum duration of the insurance-based unemployment benefit is 
extended to 24 months for older workers (54 years and more).
1987 -Gesetz über die Erweiterung des Versicherungsschutzes  
in Arbeitslosigkeit und Kurzarbeit
1987 Act on the Extension of Insurance Coverage in Unemployment and 
Short-time work- 
-the maximum duration of the insurance-based unemployment benefit is 
extended to 32 months for older workers (54 years and more).
1986- Gesetz zur Reform der Job-Förderungsgesetz § 428 of  
SGB III
1986- Law on the Reform of the Job Promotion Act § 428 of Social Law 
Book III
- workers aged 58 years or older are exempted from searching for a new 
job.
-1989 Altersteilzeit (1) 1989- Introduction of  old-age part-time work
1990-1995 Altersübergangsgeld 1990-1995 Early  retirement  benefit  on  the  bases  of  long-term 
unemployment.  Provisions  offered  to  older  unemployed  in  the  Eastern 
regions that up to 5 years before the entry into a pension pathway (55 
years) 
1994- Altersteilzeit (2) 1994- Relaxed conditions for old-age part-time work 
1996- Gezets  sur Förderung eines  gleitended Übergangs in  
den Ruhestand (3)
1996-  Reform  of  old-age  part-time  work  to  encourage  progressive 
retirement 
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1999- Zweites Gesetz zur Fortentzwicklung der Altersteilzeit  
(5)
1999.  Second  Law  for  the  further  development  of  old-age  part-time 
scheme.
-  Abolish  the  regulation  §  428  of  Social  Law  Book  III  that  exempts 
workers aged 58 years or older from searching for a new job.
2005 -  Hartz IV- Vierte Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen  
am Arbeitsmarkt
2005 - Hartz IV Fourth Act for Modern Services on the Labour Market
-  Maximum  duration  of  insurance  based  unemployment  benefit 
(arbeidlosengeld I) is shortened.
Disability pathway
1999-  "Gesetz  zur  Reform  der  gesetzlichen  
Rentenversicherung" (Rentenreformgesetz 1999 - RRG 1999)  
ist am 22.12.1997  SGB VI 
1999-  "Act  to  reform the public pension system" (Pension Reform Act 
1999 - RRG 1999) on 22.12.1997  SGB VI 
- eligibility to disability pension scheme are narrowed-down.
-years  before  the  age  of  60  years  are  fully  taken  into  account  for  the 
actuarial adjustment of the benefit. 
2001 "Gesetz  zur  Reform  der  Rehabilitation  und  Teilhabe  
behinderter Menschen
2001- Act to reform Rehabilitation and Participation of Disabled People
Early retirement pathway
1957- Rentenreform I 1957- Pension reform
- introduces the pension unemployment scheme at the age of 60 years
- introduces the pension female at the age of 60 years and after 15 years of  
contribution.
1972- Rentenreform II 1972 Pension reform
-introduces the pension long-term insured scheme at the age of 63 years
- introduces the pension disability scheme at the age of 60 years
1992 Gesetz zur Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung  
(Rentenreformgesetz 1992 –RRG 1992 –) 18.12.1989 11/4124 
SGB VI 
1992- Act to reform the public pension system (Pension Reform Act 1992 
-RRG 1992 -) 18.12.1989- 11/4124    SGB VI 
-It is legislated in 1989, but its implementation is delayed to 1992.
-All  pathways  that  allow  to  exit  before  the  age  of  65  are  set  to  be 
progressively phased out by 2012.
-the actuarial parity of the benefit is strengthened (-0.3% for each month 
before the age of 65 years).
1996-  Gesetz  zur  Umsetzung  des  Programms  für  mehr  
Wachstum  und  Beschäftigung  in  den  Bereichen  der  
Rentenversicherung und Arbeitsförderung
1996-Act on the Implementation of the Program for improved growth and 
employment in the areas of pension and employment promotion.
-  The  phasing  out  of  pathways  of  exit  without  actuarial  adjustment  of 
pension benefit is accelerated from 2012 to 2004. 
1999-  "Gesetz  zur  Reform  der  gesetzlichen  
Rentenversicherung" (Rentenreformgesetz 1999 - RRG 1999)  
ist am 22.12.1997  SGB VI 
1999-  "Act  to  reform the public pension system" (Pension Reform Act 
1999 - RRG 1999) on 22.12.1997  SGB VI 
- disability pension scheme: eligibility is delayed by 3 years (60 → 63 
years) or is maintained at the age of 60 years and the benefit is actuarially 
adjusted (-0.3% a month).
- -the actuarial parity of the benefit is further strengthened with the so-
called “demographic factor”
- eligibility to disability pension scheme are narrowed-down.
Source:OECD 2005; Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991a;  Schmähl 2003; Hinrich 2003        
The  unemployment  pathway  was  institutionalized  in  1983,  when  the  insurance-based 
unemployment  benefit  was  extended  to  12  months  for  unemployed  older  than  54  years 
(Arbeitslosengeld I SGB III- Erweiterung (1)). Insurance-based unemployment benefit replaced 67% 
of the last wage if the unemployed had dependent children or 60% otherwise. After that recipients got  
entitled to the means-tested unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosenhilfe I). Its replacement rate was in 
average 10% lower (57% of the last wage with dependent children and 53% otherwise) but it could be 
withdrawn without any general maximum period of receipt22. The maximum duration of the insurance 
22In 2006 this scheme was abolished and it was substituted by a “unemployment benefit II” providing flat rate  
benefit for the most basic need under a stricter means-tested conditions and only in case they actively search for  
a new jobs (Radl, 2010).
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benefit was extended to 18 months in 1985 with the Act on the Reform of Job Promotion and Statutory 
Pension Insurance (Gesetz zur Reform der Job-Förderung und Rentenversicherung), to 24 month in 
1986 with the Act on the Reform of Job Promotion and Statutory Pension Insurance (Gesetz zur  
Reform der Job-Förderungsgesetz), and finally to 32 months in 1987 with the Act on the Extension of 
Insurance  Coverage  in  Unemployment  and  Short-time  work  (Gesetz  über  die  Erweiterung  des  
Versicherungsschutzes in Arbeitslosigkeit und Kurzarbeit) (Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991a). 
This extension created high incentives for older workers and companies to make extensive use of  
this  pathway and progressively anticipate the exit  from employment at  the age of 57 years and 4  
month. These incentives were further reinforced by the introduction of the Law on the Reform of the 
Job Promotion Act § 428 of Social Law Book III (Gesetz zur Reform der Job-Förderungsgesetz § 428  
of SGB III) in 1986, because it exempted unemployment benefit's recipients aged 58 years or older 
from the obligation of searching for job. The unemployment pathway was so beneficial for companies 
during  the economic restructuring  of  the  1980's  and 1990's  that  they provide older  workers  with 
generous severance pay or other private transfer to compensate the difference between the previous  
wage and the unemployment benefit23 . The use that companies make of this unemployment pathways 
is so systematic that the exit at the exit from employment at the age of 57 years (the so-called 57th rule) 
becomee institutionalized both as a social norm and a HRM practice (Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991a) ; 
Schmähl 2003) . 
The disability pathway was provided by the occupational disability scheme since the mid-1970's. If 
individuals with a contribution history of at least 5 years and worked at least 3 out of the last 5 years  
lost 50% of their working capacity, they could receive 2/3 of the full old age benefit for one year. In  
case after that  year they were unable to find a full  or  part-time job, they are entitled for general  
disability pathway, where full-old age benefit is granted24 (Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991a).
Finally, as mentioned at the beginning of this section the old-age pension pathway provided four  
different episodes between the age of 60 and 63 years, namely long-term unemployment, women, and 
seniority. The  financial  attractiveness  of  these  episodes  strictly  depends  on  the  length  of  the 
contribution history,  since  the pension formula for the  calculation of  the benefit  on the so-called 
“earning points” cumulated along each year of effective or figurative contribution. This earning points 
represent at least 75% of the annual salary and lead to a net replacement rate of about 70% after 45  
years of work25.   
The  unemployment  episode was  created  as  early  as  in  1957,  when  the  Adenauer's  reform 
(Rentenreform),  restructured  the pension system in the  second post-war  period.  This  episode  was 
23The extent to which and the period in which older workers were compensated depended upon the “social plan”  
employers stipulated with older workers before the dismissals. This practice became institutionalized as 58 ot 59 
rule.
24General disability is given to people that were not healthy enough to perform any regular employment on a 
regular bases (80% of the pensions delivered). The intake rate was very high. It has been calculated that 32% of 
male  blue-collar  workers  in  1987  were  entering  disability  retirement.  Applications  were  not  automatically 
approved, but they were subjected to the approval of the retirement insurance. The rate of approval was about 2/3  
and  appeals  were  rarely  successful.  Rejected  applicants  could  either  return  to  the  labour  market,  or  enter 
unemployment episode (12 months at 63% of last net income). After that means-tested unemployment assistance 
and welfare benefits are available. 
25 According to OECD (2005) the standard net replacement rate represents the replacement rate with average 45 earning 
point, cumulated over 45 years of contributions based on the average net earning of all current workers. 
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opened from the age of 60 years for seniors with a work history of 15 years or longer that had lost  
their job at least 1 year earlier. With the minimal requirements these episodes provide low benefits.  
Nonetheless their attractiveness increased for women if other more generous pathways were open to  
other  members  of  the  household,  typically  the  partner,  according  to  a  male  breadwinner  logic 
(BlossfeId  and  Drobnic  2001).  For  men  their  attractiveness  increased  also  if  these  benefits  were 
supported with  lump-sum by employers.  This  was the case  of  the  unemployment  scheme,  which 
undertake a big diffusion in the mid 1970's and 1980's as a socially legitimated way to adjust the 
workforce  to  the  market  pressure  induced  by  the  globalization  (Jacobs,  Kohli,  and  Rein  1991a; 
Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2006).
Other two much more generous episodes are available for “core” male older workers, where open  
in 1972, when the second expansive reform of the pension system (Rentenreform (2) ) took place. The 
first is the flexible retirement episode and includes the long-term insured and made individuals that 
worked at least 35 years eligible for a old-age pension at 63 years. The second episode was opened for  
older workers that at the age of 60 years old and after a contribution history of 35 years were declared  
affected  by  a  severe  disability  that  impair  at  least  50  % of  their  earning  capacity.  The  financial  
attractiveness of this episode relies in two elements. The first is the generosity of the benefit, which is  
near to the average replacement rate discussed above. The second is the ambiguity of the eligibility  
conditions, which mixed both health and labour market criteria. These conditions entitle on the one 
hand older workers that experience an an objective reduction of the working capacity by 50% or a  
reduction  of  earning  capability  below  a  minimum  threshold  for  any  reasonable  occupation 
(“erwerbsunfähig”,  EU) or a lack of  vacancies that  can enable  him to earn at  least  50% of their  
previous wage (“berufsunfähig”, BU) (Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991a ; Schmähl 2003).
Recipients of episodes belonging to the pension pathway had a status of retirees, as if they retired at 
the statutory age of 65 years. As a consequence of that they received full old-age pension benefit,  
whose amount depends almost entirely by the contributions they had paid throughout their overall  
working career. The pension pathway reduces the final pension benefit only indirectly by interrupting 
their contribution records, since no actuarial adjustments are applied (Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991a) 
(Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2006). 
The cumulation of the necessary contribution period does not means that effective work had to be 
performed until the entry into one of the pension pathway's episodes. In fact the benefit could also be 
accrued  by  the  so-called  figurative  contribution  periods,  that  are  period  in  which  the  career  is 
temporarily interrupted for socially legitimated reasons, such as maternity, education, unemployment, 
disability  etc.  In  particular  unemployment  and  disability  provide  older  workers  with  preliminary 
pathways that anticipate their employment exit before the eligibility to the pension pathways (Jacobs,  
Kohli, and Rein 1991a; (OECD 2005).  
After describing the main pathways of exit available in the social protection system in Germany the 
institutional affinities that enable social partners to participate to their regulation are presented in the 
next section. 
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6.3 Institutional affinities between protection and partnership
In Germany the social governance modes where social partners participate to the regulation of the 
three main schemes that build pathways of exit (disability, early retirement, and unemployment)  limit  
their capacity of hindering the formulation of retrenchment policies  (Schludi  2005a). but not their 
implementation (OECD 2005;  Trampusch 2004).  
Because of their moderately strong articulation, labour and capital interests are vertically integrated 
into two confederations: the BDA  and the DGB, organize respectively the employers 'associations and 
union. Those confederations take part in the policymaking in settings that are more institutionalized 
than in Italy, but less than in the Netherlands. 
A tripartite  advisory  board,  the  Sozialbeirat  (Social  Advisory  Council)  monitors  the  financial 
evolution of the statutory pension system yearly and the repercussions of law changes.  As in the  
Netherlands, their opinion is compelling for the government only if they are unanimous. Although 
their  monitoring had an influence on the formulation of retrenchment policies,  this  influence was  
difficult to observe since it was overwhelmed by other interaction setting, the ministerial commissions 
(Steinmeyer 2000). 
Since  these  commission  appointed  temporary  and  their  membership  could  vary,  they  did  not 
develop a constellation as cooperative as in the Netherlands. As a result they displayed a mode laying 
in between consultation and concertation, depending on the force balance between actors. As in the  
Netherlands,  the  Government  could  overcome  the  social  partners'  deadlock  in  the  shadow of  its  
hierarchy,  but  only  if  it  could  mobilize  a  vast  political  consensus  and push  them toward  power-
maintaining strategies.  As in Italy,  if  the government  lacked a  strong political  legitimation,  social 
partners  had  the  chance  of  playing  policy-oriented  strategies  and  hindering  the  formulation  of  
retrenchment policies (see section 3.5) (Schludi 2005a).  
The  first  commission  was  appointed  by  labour  minister  Blüm of  the  Kohl  christian-democrat 
cabinet three years before the the first pension reform was legislated in 1989. Since the proposal was 
delivered after a lengthy discussion and obtained a general consensus among all political forces, it was  
also backed by the social partners. More problematic was to obtain such a wide political consensus  
after  the  German  economic  unification  (Hinrichs  2003). Given  the  unification  turmoil  the 
implementation of this pension retrenchment had to be postponed. At the same time unions (IG metall) 
asked for the appointment of a second commission: the bündnis für arbeit (alliance for job) to promote 
the economic recovery and the creation of new jobs. This commission failed in 1996, when the Kohl 
cabinet refused to moderate their proposal concerning the implementation of the 1992 reform. The  
withdrawal of the unions led the government to implement their policy unilaterally and generated 
massive protests which obliged the government to postpone again their proposal by three years. Not 
backed up by a wide political consensus, this unilateral action turned against the government at the  
elections in 1998. The new Schröder cabinet appointed a new alliance for job, where he successfully  
re-plan the enactment of the 1992 reform in 2001 (Riester commission) and the retrenchment of the 
unemployment  pathway  in  2005  (Hartz  commission).  This  was  because  the  design  of  these 
commissions  allowed the chairmen to avoid social partners' veto by searching wide consensus among 
the political forces within the majority and the opposition (Lehmbruch 2003(Schludi 2005a) Schludi 
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2005a).
According to the constitutional principle of selbsterwaltung, social partners dominated the boards 
administrating their members' contributions. Their incentive of hindering the implementation of the 
pension retrenchment is severely limited by eligibility and benefits' criteria giving them no discretional 
power (Lehmbruch 2003) This is not true in the disability and unemployment pathway, where social  
partners have a high discretional role in assessing the health conditions and the residual employability 
of claimants. These prerogatives were nevertheless removed by the Harz Commission in the early 
2000's (Eichhorst and Wintermann 2005). 
Finally social partners take part in the implementation of  the old-age part-time schemes, originally 
adopted to delay the exit from work. However the economic turmoil created favourable conditions for 
social partners to distort its function. This is because, although managed in self-regulatory modes,  
those schemes are supported by public subsidies that greatly externalized their costs. These subsidies  
encouraged social partners to negotiate schemes on vertical part-time that, instead of reducing the 
working schedule, shortened the working life (Trampusch 2004).  
All in all, the limited cooperativeness of the partnership system encourage social partners to hinder 
not  much  the  formulation  but  rather  the  implementation  of  retrenchment  of  the  pension  and  
unemployment  pathway.  The  next  section  discusses  the  expected  empirical  implication  of  this 
interference.   
6.4 Retrenchment policies' effectiveness: working hypotheses
During the 1990's different sets of policies to extend work life have reformed the existing pathways 
of exit (Teipen and Kohli 2004). A first set of passive policies to extend work life is introduced with 
the  goal  of  retrenching  the institutional  opportunities  to  use  the  pathways  of  exit  (especially  the 
pension pathway) already in 1989. The implementation of the new regime however was interrupted in 
the aftermath of the German Reunification in 1990 (Schludi 2005a).  
The reunification posed a great challenge for the entire German economy. In fact if companies in  
the  Eastern  regions  were  suddenly  exposed  to  the  economic  turmoil  induced  by  globalizations, 
companies in the Western regions had to support the former by massively increasing their non-wage 
labour cost, both in terms of tax and contributory rates. As a result of this, German economy had to  
incur a massive process of industrial restructuring in which a large mass of workers were expelled  
from  the  productive  system  (Teipen  and  Kohli  2004).  Because  of  that  the  government  applied 
emergency  measures  that  partially  contradict  the  EWL target.  The  retrenchment  pathway  if  first  
postponed  to  1992  and  then  to  1997  and  at  the  same  time  a  new  temporarys  scheme  in  the 
unemployment pathway between 1990 and 1995 is targeted to older workers massively expelled by the 
productive system in the Easter regions (OECD 2005). Because of that the top-down conveyance of 
the EWL re-conversion is partially interrupted until 1996. After that no significant attempts are made 
by the government and the Confederations to enhance this conveyance downward to the organizations 
implementing incentives in the disability and unemployment pathway (OECD, 2005). 
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6.4.1 Unemployment pathway
The government was also in Germany very cautious in retrenching the unemployment pathway, 
since it represented a safety-net for older workers not eligible for other more generous pathways. The 
retrenchment of the unemployment pathway was legislated until 2005, when the so -called Hartz IV 
reform (Hartz IV- Vierte Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt-Hartz IV Fourth Act 
for Modern Services on the Labour Market), reduces the maximum duration of the insurance-based  
unemployment benefit (Arbeidslosengeld I). 
Nonetheless other attempts were made since 1989 to reduce the abuse that companies made of this 
pathway (57th rule  explained above), by introducing an alternative pathway the “old age part-time 
work scheme” (Altersteilzeit)26.  Under the assumption that  lighter  working conditions would have 
encouraged a longer working life, workers older than 55 years could half their working time for 6  
years or until they turned 60. During this 6 years they were receiving 70% of their previous earnings 
and social security contributions were topped up 90% of their former value and was subsidized by the 
unemployment  insurance,  which  refunded  20%  of  the  companies'  costs  for  six  year27.  The 
implementation of these schemes was demanded to the collective negotiations, which provided also 
additional  benefits  for  older  workers  such  as  lump-sump payments  and  compensation  for  future 
reduction on pension benefits,  (Jacobs et  al.,  1991;  (Radl  2010); OECD, 2005,  Frerichs Naegele, 
2008). 
Despite  the public subsidies,  the old-age part-time scheme did not  overrule  for companies the 
opportunity cost of shedding older redundant workers full-time as soon as they become eligible to the  
unemployment pathway at the age of 57 years and 4 months (57th rule). Because of that this scheme is 
only marginally disseminated until 1996. In 1996 the social protection system introduced the Act on 
the  Promotion  of  a  gradual  transition  into  retirement  (Gesetz  zur  Förderung  eines  gleitenden  
Übergangs in den Ruhestand). It reduces the minimum age of entry into an old-age part-time scheme 
from 58 to 55 years and give social partners the role of implementing those scheme into companies  
throughout the collective negotiations.  
In 1996, the EWL re-conversion was not yet conveyed the strategy of the organizations responsible 
for the collective bargaining. On the one hand the target was not centrally conveyed by central social  
agreements as in the Netherlands. On the other hand the government itself until the previous year,  
financed additional pathways of exit to boost the economic recovery in the East  (Trampusch 2004). 
Because  of  that  they  attempts  at  hindering  the  implementation  of  old-age  part-time  scheme,  by 
applying a  concept  of  vertical  rather than  horizontal  part-time.  Thanks to  this  concept  instead of 
shortening the working schedule and lengthening the working life (progressive time model), social  
partners can bargain a model where the working time remain unaltered and the working life is halved  
26 The  old-age  part  time  retirement  scheme  substitute  the  so-called  pre-retirement  schemes  (May  1984- 
December 1988) people could exit labour market at the age of 58 years old. They could officially retire at 60 
year with early retirement pathway and in the mean time was supported by the employer and the unemployment  
office (OECD (a), 2006). 
27 These subsidies were provided if employer progressively replaced older workers with a younger unemployed 
or trainee. However afterwards a non-funded version of this program was introduced and in this case the 
intergenerational replacement was not taking place (Frerichs Naegele, 2008). Since only the participants to 
the funded early retirement are registered, the total uptake of this program is underestimated.
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(Aleksandrowicz 2014). 
Social  partners  were  encouraged  to  hinder  the  implementation  of  old-age  part-time  scheme, 
because  they  are  not  financially  accountable  for  that.  In  fact  the  unemployment  insurance  fund 
allocates  to  companies  that  adopted  the old-age  part-time  scheme  vertically,  with  the  so-called 
Blockmodell the same subsidies provided for the progressive time scheme and no additional costs have 
to be bear by social partners or their members (Schmähl 2003). 
The public subsidies is finally abolished in 2000, but because of the long transitional period, only 
in 2009 they will become financially accountable for the implementation of old-age part-time scheme. 
Because  of  that  along  the  overall  observation  period  social  partners  can  successfully  hinder  the 
retrenchment of the unemployment pathway.  
As mentioned earlier, a measure to discourage the use of a insurance-based unemployment episode 
before a pathway of exit  was implemented only in 2006 as part of a major labour market reform 
(“Hartz  reform  IV”).  As  shown  in  graph  1.7  it  first  reduced  the  maximum  duration  of  the  
unemployment episode. Until 2006 previous rules granted a higher maximum duration of the benefit 
from the age of 45 onward and it granted up to 32 months at the age of 58. Under the 2006 regime, the 
maximum duration of the benefit increased only from the age of 55 from 12 to 18 months. This reform 
is partially reversed in 2008, when the maximum duration of the benefit increased at the age to 15 
months from the age of 50 and rise up to 24 months at the age of 58 (Aleksandrowicz 2014; Radl,  
2010).
Furthermore the “Hartz reform” further reduces the profitability of unemployment episodes that 
exceed  the  maximum  duration  of  the  regular  benefit  because  it  substituted  the  generous 
Arbeitslosenhilfe with a means-tested and tax-funded social assistence transfer (Arbeitslosengeld II – 
unemployment benefit II)28 whose amount covers only the most basic needs (Frerichs Naegele, 2008 ; 
Radl 2010).
28 Unemployment benefit I was providing a benefit equal to about 50% of the last net income to a single person 
and 53% of the last net income to a married person.
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Graph 6.7: Maximum duration of the unemployment episode by age groups between 1987 and 2006, from 2006 and 2007 
and after 2008.
Source: Radl, 2010.
Since social partners can hinder the implementation of retrenchment policies, the hypothesis is that 
the  cohort  born  in  1945  or  after  will  NOT  have  a  significantly  lower  hazard  of  entering  a 
unemployment pathway than the older cohort (HP 6.4).
Since social partners can hinder the implementation of retrenchment policies especially in the old-
age part-time schems, the hypothesis is that  among the cohort born in 1945 part-time workers will  
have a significantly higher likelihood of entering a unemployment pathway than full-time workers  (HP 
6.1).
Since the public sector had higher eligibility conditions, it is expected that among the cohort born  
in 1945 older workers in public Administration and defence, and in the education, health and social  
work have significantly lower likelyhood of entering a pension pathway than the older cohort working  
for the private sector (HP 6.2).
Since social partners hindered the implementation of retrenchment policies significantly more in 
industries exposed by the globalization, it is hypothesized that among the cohort born in 1945 older  
workers will be more likely to undertake this pathway if they work in: wholesale and retail trade,  
transportation  and  storage  &  catering;  real  estate  renting  and  business  activity,  and  financial  
intermediation; manufacturing , mining & quarrying (HP 6.3).
6.4.2 Disability pathway
The occupational disability episode was radically modified in 1999 by the Act to reform the public 
pension system" (Pension Reform Act 1999 -  RRG 1999) on 22.12.1997  SGB VI  ("Gesetz zur  
Reform  der  gesetzlichen  Rentenversicherung"  (Rentenreformgesetz  1999  -  RRG  1999)  ist  am  
22.12.1997  SGB VI- "-  also known as Riester reform). As much as in the pension pathway, social 
partners play no direct role also in the formulation of retrenchment of the disability pathway. The 
social protection system could therefore reform drastically the eligibility conditions that regulated the  
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due  only  to  a  deterioration  of  physical  or  psychological  conditions.  After  1999  the  occupational 
disability due to a disadvantage in the labour market is abolished (Börsch-Supan & Wilke,  2006; 
OECD, 2005). 
The retrenchment of the entitlement conditions that regulate the access to the disability pathway is  
however undermined in the implementation phase by the active role played by social partners in the  
self-administration bodies (PES) that are responsible of assessing the eligibility of claimant. Moreover 
social  partners  have a discretional power in defining whether the claimants and recipients have a  
reasonable perspective to re-integrated into labour market or not. In the first case recipients can be 
included  into  rehabilitation  programs,  as  considerably  improved  in  2001  by  the  act  to  reform 
Rehabilitation and Participation of Disabled People, and re-integrated into labour market (Gesetz zur  
Reform der Rehabilitation und Teilhabe behinderter Menschen). In the second they are just included in 
a disability pathway.  
Because of the role they play in PES for the implementation of disability benefits, social partners  
can manipulate the allocation procedures to assess older workers eligible to enter disability pathway 
(and not a rehabilitation program) with more “inclusive” criteria without being hold accountable for  
that.  As  a  result,  social  partners  are  given  the  opportunity  of  watering  down  the  retrenchment 
formulated in 1999.  
 Since social partnership can hinder the implementation of retrenchment policies, it is hypothesized 
that  the cohort born in 1945 or after will NOT have a significantly lower likelihood of entering a  
pension pathway than the older cohort (HP 6.4).
6.4.3 Pension pathway
The retrenchment of the pension pathway starts in 1989, when the Act to reform the public pension 
system  (Gesetz  zur  Reform  der  gesetzlichen  Rentenversicherung-  Rentenreformgesetz  RRG  1992  
-11/4124 SGB VI) ( Schmähl 1993). This reform provides for the progressive increase of the minimum 
eligibility conditions to enter the different episodes of the pension pathway: the women's, seniority,  
occupational disability, and unemployment episode. Moreover it improves the actuarial parity of the 
pension benefit, which, besides the working history, is also  adjusted to the effective age of exit from 
employment. The implementation of the reform is set to take place as of 1992, but the economic 
emergency raised by the reunification process bring the social protection system to delay this process 
(Rürup, 2002; OECD, 2005). The implementation process is then accelerated in 1996 with the Act on 
the Implementation of the Program for improved growth and employment in the areas of pension and 
employment  promotion  (Gesetz  zur  Umsetzung  des  Programms  für  mehr  Wachstum  und  
Beschäftigung in den Bereichen der Rentenversicherung und Arbeitsförderung). This act anticipate the 
phasing-out of the pension pathways of exit from 2012, as originally established in 1992, to 2004. The 
transitional rules are graphically represented in Graph 5.2 for the seniority episode, Graph 5.3 for the  
women's episode, Graph 1.4  for the disability episode and Graph 1.5 for the unemployment episode.
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Graph 6.3: Transitional change in the eligibility conditions for the female pathway as defined by reforms  in 1992 and 1999.
Source: Berkel & Börsch-Supan, 2004
The implementation of these policies is gradual to preserve the the acquired rights of older workers 
that built up expectations based on the previous rules. The transitional rules showed that the aim of 
these reforms is not to close the institutional opportunities to use these pathways of exit but to make 
them a  less  profitable  option.  In  more  details  the  implementation  process  provides  two  different 
transitional rules. In the first set of rules, where the recipient receive a full old-age pension benefit  
without  actuarial  adjustment,  the  minimum age  to  become eligible  to  enter  the  pension  pathway 
increases by 6 months every years. The starting time of the implementation of this transitional rules 
varies according to the episodes. The earliest implementation takes place in the unemployment episode 
in 1997. It is then followed by the implementation in the seniority and female episodes in 2000, and in  
the disability episode in 2001 (Berkel and Börsch-Supan 2004).
From a comparative perspective, the women' episode was the pension scheme that undertook the 
greatest  retrenchment.  In  fact  while  the  minimum  age  of  the  other  “male”  episodes  increases 
progressively, the entitlement for women rise abruptly  from 40 to 60 years in 1997 at the beginning of 
the transitional period. 
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Graph 6.4: Transitional change in the minimum age for the disability pathway as defined by reforms introduced in 1992 and 
1999.
Source: Berkel & Börsch-Supan, 2004
Graph 6.5: Tansitional change in the minimum age for the unemployment and old-age part-time  pathwayd as defined by 
reforms introduced in 1992 and 1999
Source: Berkel & Börsch-Supan, 2004
The second set of transitional rules required instead an actuarial adjustment of the benefit to the 
actual retirement age but leave unaltered the eligibility conditions for at least 15 years, as in the case of 
the unemployment scheme. In other cases the benefit's actuarial adjustment is not accompanied by any 
increase of the minimum age, as the disability pathway and of the long-term insurance pathway (where 
the minimum age actually decrease by one year to 62 years in 2013) .
Also  in  the  second  set  of  transitional  rules  the  women's  episode  is  exposed  to  the  greatest 
retrenchment, since  also in this case the minimum age jumps from 40 to 60 years in 1997, but further 
increases are delayed as of 2011. 
As for the actuarial adjustment of the pension benefit, Figure 1.6 compares the retirement-age-
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specific adjustments on the bases of the pre- and post- 1992 reforms rules 29. According to the post-
1992 regime, the full old-age pension benefit, calculated according to the earning points cumulated in 
the working life, is delivered entirely only at the age of 65 (100%). The benefit is reduced by 0.3% for  
each months the retirement is anticipated from the pivotal age of 65. The total actuarial reductions 
cannot  exceed  10.8%.  Simmetrically,  the  old-age  pension  benefit  is  increased  by  0.5% for  each 
additional month the individual retire after the statutory retirement age of 6530 (Radl, 2010;  OECD, 
2005)31. 
The actuarial parity of the pension benefit is further increased in 1999, when a new demographic 
factor  is  added  to  the  calculation  of  the  pension  benefit  ("Gesetz  zur  Reform  der  gesetzlichen  
Rentenversicherung" (Rentenreformgesetz 1999 - RRG 1999) ist  am 22.12.1997  SGB VI-  "Act to 
reform the public pension system" (Pension Reform Act 1999 - RRG 1999) on 22.12.1997  SGB VI  ). 
This demographic factor connects further reduces the benefit generosity in case of early exit, because 
it connects the benefit to the  projections concerning the population ageing.     
Graph 6.6: old-age pension benefit adjusted on the actual retirement age, calculated as the  percentage of the full old-age 
benefit that the individual would receive at the statutory retirement age of 65. 
Source: Berkel & Börsch-Supan, 2004
All  in  all,  retrenchment  policies,  although  delayed  by  the  consequences  of  the  economic 
reunification, have significantly lowered the financial attractiveness of the pension pathway. Because 
of that, it is hypothesized that the cohort born in 1945 or after have a significantly lower likelihood of  
entering a pension pathway than the older cohort (HP 6.5).
In addition, since the retrenchment of eligibility conditions is higher for women than for men, it is 
29 The calculation of the retirement-age-specific adjustments assumes that previous earnings are constant after 60 years old 
and that the 1992 reform is fully phased in. 
30 Although relevant, this reform decreases but do not eliminate the monetary incentives to retire early. In fact the German 
old-age pension system should impose a penalization of 8-9% by year in order to be actuarially fair and eliminate early 
exit incentives (Börsch-Supan & Schnabel, 1997;  Börsch-Supan & Wilke, 2006). 
31 Also in this case these measures are also implemented gradually in order to distribute the burden over different cohorts,  
reducing the effective impact of the reforms that are implemented until 2005 (Radl, 2010 (c)).
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hypothesized that  among the cohort born after 1944 women are less likely than men to undertake a  
pension pathway (HP 6.6). 
Table 6.2: Summary of how retrenchment policies lower the financial attractiveness of the three pathways of exit in 
Germany and their hypothesized effectiveness in extending working life.
Pathway of exit Retrenchment policies Working hypotheses
Unemployment 
pathway
Social partners can NOT hinder the formulation of 
retrenchment policies in the consultation process. 
The  social  protection  system  tries  it  formulating 
old-age  part-time  schemes  to  substitute  the 
unemployment  pathway.  This  latter  is  only 
marginally  reformed.  It remains  a  sort  of “last  
resort”  pathway  for  older  workers  expelled from 
the productive system.
Social partners can hinder retrenchment policies by 
manipulating  the  implementation  of  old-age  part-
time schemes.  More in detail they can implement 
these  scheme  in  the  block  model  instead  of  the 
progressive time model without being accountable 
for that 
HP 6.1: Since social partners can hinder the implementation of 
retrenchment policies, the hypothesis is that the cohort born in 
1945 or after will NOT have a significantly lower likelihood 
of entering a pension pathway than the older cohort.
HP  6.2:  Since  the  public  sector  has  higher  eligibility 
conditions, I expect that among  the cohort born in 1945 older 
workers in the 
-Public Administration and defence, 
-education, health and social work
have  significantly  lower  likelihood  of  entering  a  pension 
pathway than the older cohort working for the private sector.
HP 6.3:  Since  social  partners  hinder  the implementation  of 
retrenchment policies significantly more in industries exposed 
by the globalization, I expect that  among the cohort born in 
1945  older  workers  will  be  significantly  more  likely  to 
undertake this pathway if they work in: wholesale and retail 
trade, transportation and storage & catering; real estate renting 
and  business  activity,  and  financial  intermediation; 
manufacturing , mining & quarrying.
Disability pathway Social partners can NOT hinder the formulation of 
retrenchment  policies  in  the  consultation  process. 
The social protection system manage to unilaterally 
the eligibility conditions.
On  the  contrary  social  partners  can  hinder  the 
implementation of  retrenchment policies,  since  in 
the  Public  Employment  Service  (PES)  they 
discretional power in  allocating the benefit  to the 
claimants. 
 
HP  6.4:  Since  social  partnership  can  hinder  the 
implementation  and  the  of  retrenchment  policies,  I 
hypothesize that the cohort born in 1945 or after  will  NOT 
have a  significantly  lower  likelihood  of  entering  a  pension 
pathway than the older cohort
Pension pathway Social partners can NOT hinder the formulation of  
retrenchment  policies in  the  consultation  process. 
The social protection system manage to unilaterally 
reduce its financial attractiveness because increases 
the eligibility conditions and the actuarial fairness 
of the benefit.  
However:
Because of the economic emergency induced by the 
German reunification,  these retrenchment  policies  
are  progressively  implemented  between  the  late 
1990 and the 2010'sù
Comparatively the retrenchment of the eligibility is 
higher for women than for men.
   
HP  6.5:  Since  social  partnership  can  NOT  hinder  the 
formulation and the implementation of policies retrenching its 
financial attractiveness, I hypothesize that the cohort born in 
1945  or  after  will  have  a  significantly  lower  likelihood  of 
entering a pension pathway than the older cohort
HP 6.6:  Since  the  retrenchment  of  eligibility  conditions  is 
higher for women than for men, I hypothesize that among the 
cohort born after 1944 women will be significantly less likely 
than men to undertake a pension pathway.
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6.5 Findings
The hypotheses outlined in the previous sections are tested using a Competing-Risk model (CRM).  
Estimations are expressed in hazard ratios in Table 9.3. The descriptive of the sample that I have used  
in this analysis were presented in Chapter 4. 
The work-retirement transition of the cohort of older workers born in 1944 or earlier and the cohort  
born  after  1944  are  compared.  In  particular  it  is  estimated  to  what  extent  they  have  a  different 
likelihood of undertaking four types of work-retirement trajectories based on: unemployment pathway, 
disability  pathway,  early  retirement  pathway,  and  “other”  pathway.  The  fourth  (other)  pathway 
represent the exit from employment without a income support, because an alternative support is found 
either in the household resources or in savings. Since this typical work-retirement trajectory is not 
directly affected by the retrenchment policies explained here, the results concerning this other pathway 
are not interpreted. The estimation is instead presented, together with the full model in Appendix B. 
Model 1.1, model 2.1 and model 3.1 include the cohort>1944 variable and the controls (whose 
estimations are presented in the appendix ) for the three pathways of exit (unemployment, disability, 
and early retirement) and they respectively test HP 6.1, HP 6.3, and HP 6.4.  Model 1.2 includes also 
the interaction between the cohort>1944 variable and industries in order to test HP 6.5 HP 6.6.  
At first glance, retrenchment policies in Germany are effective only in the pension pathway. The 
cohort effect estimated for the pension pathway in model 3.1, it shows that, according to the HP 6.5,  
older workers born after 1944 are significantly less likely to enter the early retirement pathway than  
older  workers  that  are  born  earlier.  This  result  offer  empirical  support  to  the  argument  that  the 
effectiveness of retrenchment of the pension pathway is boosted by the impossibility of social partners 
to hinder both their formulation. This argument is also supported by the fact that no significant pattern 
exist between core members and outsiders (model 3.2) 
Furthermore,  according  to  the  HP 6.6,  since  the  retrenchment  of  the  eligibility  conditions  is 
comparatively greater in the women' episode than in other pension episodes, model 3.2 show that the  
interaction between the cohort effect and gender is significant and higher than zero. This means that  
among the cohort born after 1944 women are significantly less likely than men to undertake a pension  
pathway.
Moving to the disability pathway, model 2.1 supports the HP 6.4, showing that the cohort born in 
1945 or after does not have a significantly lower likelihood of entering a pension pathway than the  
older  cohort.  This  supports  the  argument  that  the  effectiveness  of  retrenchment  policies  in  the 
disability pathway is hindered by the social partners in the implementation phase. Social partners take  
part in the PES, where can successfully manipulate the assessment of older claimants to systematically 
include them into disability pathway and not in rehabilitation programs also after the reform set in 
2001.  
As for the unemployment pathway, the cohort effect in model 1.1 show that, according to the HP 
6.1 the cohort>= 1945 does NOT have a significantly lower likelihood of entering a pension pathway 
than the older cohort. Following the argument this result is due to the massive dissemination of old-
age part-time schemes based on the block models that distort the finality of these schemes from EWL 
into fostering early exit. This massive dissemination was enhanced by social partners in the collective 
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negotiations, especially because the can opt for a block model without loosing the public support. 
Table  6.3:  Competing  risk  models  (CRM)  estimating  the  effectiveness  of  retrenchment  policies  on  the  hazard  of  
undertaking one of the four pathways of exit  in Germany (1. unemployment; 2. disability; 3. early-retirement). Estimates are  
expressed in hazard rates (Full model shown in Appendix B).
Note: Short variables' description:
Dependent variable:
Work-retirement trajectory: time-varying categorical variable equal to: 0 if the respondent is working at the end of the person-
period spell or exit employment at the statutory retirement age of 65 years, 1 if the respondent entered a unemployment pathway  
at the end of the person-period spell, 2 if the respondent entered a disability pathway  at the end of the person-period spell, 3 if the 
respondent entered a early retirement  pathway  at the end of the person-period spell,  and 4 if the respondent entered other  
pathways  at the end of the person-period spell.
Independent variables:
Cohort>1944: time-constant dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is born after 1944  
Industry:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the industry where the respondent is working in the person-period spell.  
For a more detailed description see Chapter 4. For the full model see Appendix B.
Source: Sharelife 2008-2009 release 3.1, 2010. 
Since  they  can  hinder  the  implementation  of  a  scheme  originally  set  to  delay  the  entry  into 
unemployment without being accountable for that, the effectiveness of retrenchment policies in the 
unemployment pathway is low. The validity of this argument is furthermore increased, by including 
the interaction between the cohort effect and the part-time. As it is shown in model 1.2, the cohort  
main  effect  remains  non-significant.  This  shows that  older  workers  working  full-time in  the  two 
cohorts have no significantly different likelihood to enter an insurance-based unemployment episode, 
that actually is reformed only in 2006. More interesting is the estimations of the interaction, indicating 
1,1 1,2 1,3 2,1 3,1 3,2 4
unemployment unemployment unemployment disability pension pension other
Cohort>=1945 0.950 0.772 0.921 0.631 0.398*** 0.281** 0.703
Interaction: Industry*Cohort>=1945 3.520 2.000
Cohort >1944* Agriculture forestry and fishing 0.704 2.042
Cohort >1944* Manifacturing mining & quarrying ref ref
Cohort >1944* Construction 0.951 1.421
Cohort >1944* Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 1.758 0.857
Cohort >1944*Financial intermediation 0.371 3.408
Cohort >1944*real estate, renting and business activity 0.295 2.705
Cohort >1944*Public administration and defense, education, health and social work 1.872 0.314
Cohort >1944* other community 0.278 1.040
Interaction: Cohort>=1945 *women 0.545* 0.610
Interaction:Cohort>=1945*part-time 3.552*** 3.528**
BIC 2560,33 2560,79 2611,34 996,1 6406,59 6456,28 1345,55
177 177 177 66 331 331 88
Number of events 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380
Observations 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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that among the cohort born in 1944 and after part-time32 workers have a much higher likelihood to 
enter unemployment than full-time workers (HP 6.2). This is a strong indication of the widespread 
diffusion of these scheme and of the extent to which social partners could implement it to foster rather  
than retrench the entry in unemployment pathway.
Finally, HP 6.3 is rejected by the interaction between the cohort effect and industries in model 1.3,  
since  no  interaction  results  to  be  significant.  Against  the  expectations,  social  partners  hinder 
retrenching policies  not  only for exposed industries  but  for the overall  economy.  Because of that  
among the cohort  born in  1945 older  workers  are  not significantly more likely to undertake this 
pathway if they work in industries exposed by the globalization forces than in protected industries.  
This may be interpreted on one hand as a result of similar eligibility conditions set across industry to  
access  the  old-age  part-time  schemes  and  the  other  episodes  based  on  the  insurance-based 
unemployment benefit. On the other hand this offer empirical support to the argument that the bock 
model is the highly preferred sets of old-age part-time scheme implemented by social partners in the 
collective bargaining across the whole economy. First they expand in the two main “pace” industries 
(chemistry and metal- here manufactory industry) and institutionalize a new standards of social rights 
and norms about early exit that further spread to other industries.
6.6 Conclusions
In this  chapter  it  was investigated  to  what  extent  the  moderate  achievements  in  EWL can be 
partially explained as the outcome of a hindering strategy played by social partnership system that 
successfully undermined the effectiveness of retrenchment policies. 
First the financial attractiveness of the main pathways of exit provided by the social protection 
system in Germany were described. Subsequently the institutional channel by which social partners 
can hinder the implementation was discussed, but not the formulation of retrenchment policies. Since 
they are involved in the implementation of episodes in the disability and the unemployment pathway, 
it  was  hypothesized  that  they  hindered  the  effectiveness  of  retrenchment  policies  in  those  two 
pathways of exit. The results of the PCE models carried out on Sharelife data significantly support the 
hypotheses,  showing  that  retrenchment  policies  have  been  effective  in  the  only  pathway,  whose 
retrenchment social partners had no power to hinder: the pension pathway. From this results it can be  
concluded that the moderate cooperativeness of social partners in Germany have moderately reduced  
the effectiveness of retrenchment policies.  
The consultation channel by which social partners participate to the policymaking process enhance 
the effectiveness of retrenchment policies, because it does not allow them to significantly affect the 
content of the policies. Because of that the social protection system manages to significantly retrench 
unilaterally  the  financial  attractiveness  of  the  most  main  pathway  of  exit  Germany:  the  pension 
pathway.
On the contrary he institutional channels by which social partners participate to the implementation 
of retrenchment policies also hinder the effectiveness of retrenchment policies. Since social partners  
32 Since in the data it is not specified whether the part-time is intended as horizontal or vertical, it is assumed that part-time 
is intended in both senses.
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are  not financially  accountable  for  their  administration,  they  water  down  the  restriction  of  the 
eligibility conditions, as in the case of the disability pathway's retrenchment. Not only social partners 
are also encouraged to hinder the effectiveness of retrenchment policies also in self-regulatory bodies,  
as  in  the  case  of  unemployment  pathway.  Since  social  partners do  have to  bear  the  costs  of  the 
diffusion  old-age  part-time scheme and no  restrictions  is  made over  the  characteristics  that  these 
scheme must have, social partners are free to distort the  the finality of this scheme from EWL to foster 
early  retirement.  Because  of  that  old-age  part-time  schemes  produce  the  unintended  effect  of  
significantly enhancing rather than discouraging exits toward the unemployment pathway.
Finally  the hypotheses  concerning the social  stratification  of  the  effectiveness  of retrenchment  
policies is only partially supported by the results. According to the hypothesis retrenchment policies 
have a higher effectiveness on women, because the reform of the incentives included in the women's 
episode is greater than in the other pension episode. Against the hypothesis, social partners do not  
hinder  retrenchment  policies  in  the  industries  exposed  to  globalization  forces  but  in  the  overall  
economy.
In  summary,  this  chapter  provided  empirical  evidence  that,  because  of  their  moderate  
cooperativeness,  social  partnership  have  hindered  the  effectiveness  of  retrenchment  policies  in 
Germany. The extent to which social partners have hindered rather than enhanced the effectiveness of 
retaining policies are investigated in Chapter 9.
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7 The effectiveness of retrenchment policies in Italy
7.1 Introduction 
In comparison to Germany and the Netherlands, in Italy the outcome of the EWL re-conversion was 
the most modest. The goal of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which this outcome is due to 
the  high  contentiousness  of  the  social  partnership,  which  allowed  social  partners  to  hinder  the 
retrenchment of pathways of exit. The leading question of this chapter is thus: to what extent  have  
social partners affect the effectiveness of retrenchment policies effectively EWL in Italy from the mid-
1990's to 2009?
 According to the hypotheses (HP 3.2 and 3.3) in Chapter 3,  the effectiveness of retrenchment 
policies  is  expected  to  be greatly  hindered  by  social  partners.  This is  because,  due to  their  poor 
organizational articulation, social partners interact in social governance modes encouraging them to 
hinder both the formulation and the implementation of retrenchment policies. 
The institutionalization of the pathways of exit  started in the mid-1960's in the public pension 
system under a strong clientelistic pressure. This pressure created the main pathway consisting of 
different episodes for insider and outsider groups: older men and older women, older workers in a  
private and public sector, and older workers with a stable rather then unstable career. The disability  
pathway was institutionalized in the 1970's when the pension system proved to be insufficient to shed 
the redundancies of the economic restructuring. After the access to disability was strictly limited in 
1984, a further pathway was institutionalized in the unemployment scheme but only for the “core” 
sectors of the economy. 
Their  retrenchment  was  proposed  first  by  the  Amato's  Government  in  1992  and  then  by  the  
following five Governments until  2004  (Ferrera and Jessoula 2007). Due to their contentiousness, 
social  partners  are  not  steadily  involved  in  the  policy-making  in  consultation  boards,  as  in  the 
Netherlands and Germany, but only in situation of economic and political emergency in an ad-hoc  
concertation modes. Playing a power-maintaining strategy the Government could not spend its shadow 
of hierarchy to force the retrenchment but is subjected to the social partners' policy-oriented strategy, 
aimed at preserving the expectations of their members. Their inclusion is thus expected to hinder the 
effectiveness of retrenchment policies among older employees in the core industries of the private 
sector (see section 3.5).      
If social partners are normally excluded from the policy-making, they used to dominate the boards 
administrating the social security schemes. Again under a strong clientelistic pressure, social partners  
faced  great  incentives  to  compensate  the  retrenchment  policies,  because  it  does  not  imply  any 
additional costs. Those incentives used to be particularly high in the administration of the disability  
scheme, where social partners have a great discretion in assessing the eligibility of the claimants. After 
they were excluded by the administration boards  in 1994,  incentives  to  compensate  retrenchment  
policies remains only in management of the unemployment pathway. This is because employers and 
unions define jointly the redundancies and can therefore concentrate them on older workers with no 
additional costs. 
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 This chapter is organized as follows.  The pathways of exit  provided by the Italian protection  
system are described in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 provides the reasons why the institutional settings 
including social partners the formulation and the implementation of retrenchment policies let them 
hinder both the phases. Section 6.4 describes how these settings affected the retrenchment of each 
pathways  of  exit  and  from this  information  hypotheses  over  its  effectiveness  are  derived.  These 
hypotheses  are  tested  with  a  competing  risk  model  (CRM),  whose  estimations  are  interpreted  in 
Section 6.5. Conclusion about the effectiveness of retrenchment policies are finally discussed. 
7.2 Pathways of exit: an overview
In Italy the old age insurance (called  cassa nazionale di assistenza sociale (CNAS) - National fund for 
the social assistance) was first introduced at the end of the 19 th century in the public sector and then 
extended to private blue-collar employees as a voluntary and fully-funded scheme with the  D.M. n.  
350/1898   (Castellino 1976). Between 1945 and 1959 (D.lgs.lgt. 177/1945, Legge 218/1952, Legge  
104/1957, Legge 1047/1959) the old age insurance was organized as a public system of mandatory 
occupational schemes for both employees and self-employed. The statutory retirement age was set at  
65  years  and  the  contribution-based  benefit  was  integrated  to  a  minimum thanks  to  the  gradual  
implementation  of  a  PAYGO  financing  method  (Ferrera  and  Jessoula  2007;  Brugiavini  1999; 
Castellino 1976). Despite all changes that occurred since then, 65 remained the age at which old-age is 
protected independently from the contribution history. 
Like in Germany and in the Netherlands pathways of exit were institutionalized first to award the 
generations that contributed to the post-war reconstruction (pension pathway) and then to absorb the  
redundancies of economic adjustments (disability and unemployment pathways). In Italy nevertheless 
their  expansion  drifted  under  the  pressure  of  a  strong  political  clientelism.  Clientelism  led  the 
expansion within each of the three pathways of extremely generous episode to ensure the political  
loyalty of the so called insiders and less generous episodes to increase the political dependence of the 
so-called outsiders (Ferrera 1996; Mirabile 2004).    
An overview of the pathways of exit that were available in Italy at the beginning of the 1990's is  
shown in Graph 7.1. Here the episodes provided the occupational disability schemes are represented in 
orange, the episodes provided by the public pension system are represented in read, and the episodes  
provided by the unemployment scheme are represented in light blue.  
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Graph 7.1: Pathways of exit and episodes that were available in Italy at the beginning of the 1990's.
Source: OECD, 2004; Mirabile, 2005; Jessoula & Ferrera 2006
The list of of the main relevant legislation and social agreements that regulated the disability, the early 
retirement and the unemployment pathway of exit Italy is presented in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: List of the main relevant legislation and social agreements that regulated the disability, the early retirement and the 
unemployment pathway of exit Italy. 
Unemployment pathway
Legge  869/1947-  Regolamentazione  della  Cassa  Integrazione  
Guadagni Ordinaria -
Act 869/1947- Introduction of temporary earning support funds
Legge 164/1975- Intervento straordinario della Cassa Integrazione  
Guadagni- 
Act  164/1975-  Extraordinary  intervention  of  the  earning  support 
funds
Legge 155/1981- Regomentazione del Prepensionamento  Act 155/1981- Introduction of the preretirement benefit
Legge  223/1991- Revisione  delle  norme  in  materia  di  Cassa  
Integrazione  Guagagni  (CIG).  Introduzione  dell'  indennità  di  
mobilità
Act 223/1991- Revision of the norms concerning the CIG scheme 
and introduction of mobility scheme
Disability pathway
Legge  118/1971  -Nuove norme  in  favore  dei  mutilati  ed invalidi  
civili
Act 118/1971- New norms in favour of the disabled and the invalid
Legge 222/1984- Revisione dell' invalidita'  pensionabile Act 222/1984-  Reform of the  eligibility  criteria for the disability 
scheme.
Early retirement pathway
D.lgs.lgt. 177/1945- Introduzione di una componente a ripartizione Act 177/1945 Introduction of a PAYGO component
Legge  218/1952- Riforma  della  componente  a  ripartizione.  
Introduzione dell' integrazione al minimo
Act 218/1952- Reform of the PAYGO component. Introduction to 
an integration to the minimum.
Legge 104/1957- Estensione della copertura ai lavoratori autonomi  
agricoli
Act 104/1952- Coverage extension to agricultural workers
Legge 1047/1959- Estesione della coperatura agli artigiani Act 1047/1959- Coverage extension to craft workers
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Legge 613/1966 -Estensione della copertura ai commercianti Act 613/1966- Coverage extension to the self-employed salesmen 
(petty bourgeoisie?)
Legge 238/1968- Passaggio al sistema retributivo per I lavoratori  
dipendenti-
Act 153/1968- Passage to the retributive system for employees. 
Legge 153/1969- Riforma del sistema retributivo con prestazioni più  
generose.  Eliminazione  della  componente  a  capitalizzazione:  
Introduzione della pensione sociale
Act 153/1969- Reform of the retributive system with more generous 
benefits. Abolishment of the fully-funded component. Introduction 
of the social- minimum benefit.
Legge 177/1976-  Riforma del  sistema retributivo per I  dipendenti 
pubblici. Prestazioni più generose. 
Act 177/1976- Reform of the retributive system of the employees in 
the public sector. 
Legge 233/1990- Introduzione del sistema retributivo per I lavoratori 
autonomi
Act 223/1990- Extension of the retributive system also for the self 
employed.
Legge 503/1993-  riforma del sistema pensionistico pubblico- Act  503/1992- concerning  the  reform  of  the  pension  system- 
informally  called  Amato's  reform from the  prime minister  of  the 
Government that implements it.
Legge 335/1995- Riforma del sistema pensionistico obbligatorio e  
complementare-
Act  335/1995- concerning  the  reform  of  the  mandatory  and 
complementary  pension  system-  informally  called  Dini's  reform 
from the prime minister of the Government that implements it.
Legge 449/1997- Riforma Prodi Act  449/1997- Prodi's  reform  from  the  prime  minister  of  the 
Government that implements it.
Legge  243/2004-  Riforma  Maroni.  Riforma  del  sistema  
pensionistico pubblico Riforma Maroni-Tremonti: disegno di legge  
delega
 Act  243/2004- Reform of  the  public  pension  system informally 
called Maroni's reform from the Welfare minister of the Government 
that implements it.
Source:(Mirabile 2004) Ferrera and Jessoula 2007
Unlike  the  Netherlands  and  Germany,  pathways  of  exit  in  Italy  are  entirely  financed  by  public  
insurance schemes. The pension system offered exit routes to all workers, while unemployment and 
disability schemes were used to absorb workers laid off before these routes. Given the prohibitive 
private  costs  of  individual  dismissals  for  economic reasons,  as  regulated  by  the Legge  604/1966 
(Norme sui  licenziamenti  individuali-  Act  604/1966-  Regulations  about  the individual  dismissals), 
separate schemes were introduced to finance the unemployment pathway. These schemes offered three 
episodes of different generosity according to the economic position of the   claimants, that in this case 
are the companies themselves (Mirabile 2004) (Tursi and Varesi 2013).
The  Cassa  Integrazione  Guagagni (CIG-  Earning  support  funds  Legge  869/1947- 
Regolamentazione  della  Cassa  Integrazione  Guadagni  Ordinaria  -Act  869/1947-  Introduction  of 
temporary earning support funds-) had been originally established to partially externalize companies's  
costs up to 1 year for restructuring processes due to a limited numbers of “ordinary” objective events  
(such  as  seasonal  market  fluctuations,  weather  events  etc.).  Subsequent  ad-hoc  acts  enlarged  its 
coverage,  originally  very  limited,  to  the  whole  industrial,  construction,  and  agricultural  sector  to 
temporary to support  companies during the first  restructuring processes induced by Globalization.  
Once those processes became more complex and less predictable the CIG was extended to the so-
called  extraordinary  events  (  Legge  164/1975-  Intervento  straordinario  della  Cassa  Integrazione  
Guadagni or CIGS- Act 164/1975- Extraordinary intervention of the earning support funds) (Tursi and 
Varesi 2013).
Although not targeted at older workers, these CIG schemes tended to overrepresent them because 
seniority was one of the most important criteria used to select the employees, who had to suspend their  
work. This allowed to first suspend from the work of older workers that could directly inflow into a  
pension pathways afterwards. Since this group at the same time represented the highest part of the  
labour cost, their working time is reduced to the utmost possible, that is zero hours, to maximize the 
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companies' saving. As for older workers, this episode was very attractive because it replaced the 80% 
of  the  forgone  gross  earnings  (roughly  equal  to  the  pension  benefit  received  after  40  years  of 
contributive history) and did not affect their future pension income. Social contributions were in fact 
totally covered by CIG (Brugiavini and Peracchi 2012).  
The maximum duration of the two CIG episodes varied according to the nature of the events that  
caused the company's redundancy. The longest episode was provided by CIGS until 4 years in cases  
where  market's  circumstances  imposed  a  permanent  re-structuring,  a  re-conversion,  or  a  re-
organization of the company's production process. Initially the CIGS was available for companies that 
were  already  covered  by  the  CIGO  or  with  15  employees  or  more.  However  its  coverage  was 
progressively enlarged  ad hoc  to support systematic process of re-conversion and re-structuring in 
sectors originally not covered by CIGO, such as the service sector, and the craft sector 33 (Vesan and 
Ferrera 2006).   
A common trait of CIG schemes is that, when their maximum duration expired, they required the 
reintegration  of  recipients  that  were  not  eligible  for  another  pathway.  The  high  private  costs  of 
updating and re-converting older workers' expertise previously undermined by a prolonged suspension 
from work pushed to the institutionalization of a further episode to fill  this  gap between the CIG  
episode and the pension pathway.    
The mobility episode (regulated by the  Legge 223/1991 (Disciplina dei licenziamenti collettivi-  
Regulation of the collective dismissals) is, as the CIGS episodes, only open for employees working in 
medium or large companies (more than 15 employees) or in core private industries that are involved in 
a plan aimed at dismissing at least 5 employees. The dismissed workers receive a benefit (indennità di  
mobilità-  mobility benefit)  normally for a period of 12 months and the duration increases with age, 
because the chance to gain new employment is supposed to lower progressively34. For older workers 
the duration was increased up to 36 months in the hope that they reach the entitlement for one of the  
pension pathways. If this did not occur, the benefit was further extended up to 5 years (the so-called 
long-mobility scheme) (Mirabile 2004)35. During this period they withdraw a very generous benefit. It 
replaces 100% CIGS benefit in the first year, which in turn replaces 80% of the last wage and about  
100% of the same PAYGO benefit ones' would withdraw after 40 years of contribution history. This 
amount is reduced to 80% of the CIGS benefit  the following years, but no penalty for the future 
benefit they eventually get in the seniority or old-age pathway (OECD 2004; Vesan and Ferrera 2006). 
All in all thanks to the sequence of the CIG and the mobility pathway the unemployment pathways 
supported the exit from employment up to 9 years before the entry into a pension pathway. Despite its 
attractiveness  it was reserved to stable male workers and to companies in a “core” sector: industrial,  
construction. Others recipients have to endure a far poorer exit  route, based on the very marginal  
generosity  of  the  ordinary  unemployment  benefit.  This  disparity  had  its  rationale  in  the  Italian  
familistic system, where the presence of a “core” worker at the head of the household compensated the 
33 In this sector firms are either big or under the influence/control of other big firms
34 The maximum period of receipt in fact increased to 24 months if the worker was older than 40.
35 The disability pathway was existing until 1984, when older workers could retire permanently from the labour 
market because the disability concept included cases of competitive disadvantage in the labour market. Since  
then the concept of disability include only a reduction by at least 60% of the work ability due to physical and  
psychological reasons that have to be repeatidly verified every three years (OECD (b), 2006). 
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lower treatments reserved to the other members (Brugiavini 2009). 
A final ad-hoc scheme was introduced when restructuring processes risked to become too hard for 
companies that fell out the unemployment pathway. They financed a pre-retirement episode aimed at 
protecting older workers laid off as a result of this economic turbulence. Nevertheless it was officially  
classified as a pension pathway, because it just anticipated by 5 years the entry into the old-age or the 
seniority pathway with no solution of continuity  (Brugiavini 1999; Mirabile 2004; Brugiavini and 
Peracchi 2004) .    
A second pathway used to externalize the costs of the economic restructuring for companies that  
did not benefit from the “privileged” unemployment episodes is the occupational disability pathway. 
Despite  not  originally designed with that  function, the disability  scheme institutionalized the first  
episode in 1971 when the Legge 118/1971 (Nuove norme in favore dei mutilati ed invalidi civili- New 
norms in favour of the disabled and the invalid) loosened significantly the requirements. It lowered the 
minimum loss of earning capacity from 75 to 50%. This earning capacity's loss could be measured on 
the bases  of either health-related or socio-economic criteria.  Older unemployed could inflow into 
“civil” disability if their prospects to gain new employment compatible with their professional history 
were judged by a para-medic commission (see section 7.2) to be less than 50%. These criteria is  
officially  withdrawn  in  1984,  when  a  reform  (Legge  222/1984  Legge  222/1984  Revisione  dell'  
invalidita'  pensionabile-  Act  222/1984 Reform of  the eligibility  criteria for the disability scheme) 
limited the definition of disability to psycho-physical health impairments, according to the notion of 
residual  working capability  (OECD 2003;  Mirabile  2004).  This  reform included other  three main 
changes. It discouraged the jump from unemployment to disability pathway by including two new 
requirements: recipients have to be insured for at least 5 years and have worked in the last 3. Moreover 
it made the episode temporary, because the recipients had to be reassessed two times every three years  
before it was extended until the earliest pension episode. Finally the full disability was only granted if  
the working capacity was reduced by more than 2/3 with reference to not a suitable but to a socially  
acceptable job. If these threshold was not met, or met only with reference to a suitable job, then the 
disability was assessed as partial. Partial disability gave access to a lower benefit, calculated on the  
level of disability, and did not granted the payment of notional contributions, which then affected the 
future  pension  benefit  (Brugiavini  1999; Brugiavini  and  Peracchi  2014;  Brugiavini  and  Peracchi 
2012). In case of full disability benefit's generosity increased with the work history. For stable older  
workers it was very generous since it amounted to 80% of the pensionable income (it is calculated 
using the same formula for the pension benefit and amount roughly at 2% of last wage per year of  
contribution- see later) and granted the payment of the notional contributions necessary to accrue their  
future pension benefit (Jessoula and Ferrera 2006). 
Finally disability scheme institutionalized a second episode for workers that became disabled as a 
direct consequence of performing their job (professional diseases and work injury). They obtain a 
“privileged” benefit, since it is granted also when claimants do not met the contribution requirements 
explained above (Ales 2002).   
All  in  all  disability  episode  offers  different  treatment  that  “award”  core  workers  and  “save” 
marginal workers. The attractiveness of this pathway was officially retrenched for older workers in  
1984 but it is important to investigate whether social partners could hinder in the next section its 
implementation and  cause unintended effects  (De Zorzi, Fallani, and Belloni 2001).     
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The third and most attractive pathway of exit in Italy was financed by the public pension system 
itself, as regulated by a series of legislative acts between 1945 and 1990 (see Table 7.1). Two episodes  
in the pension pathway were initially introduced in 1969 for the men and women employed in the 
private  sector  (Legge  238/1968  Passaggio  al  sistema  retributivo  per  I  lavoratori  dipendenti-  Act 
153/1968  Passage  to  the  retributive  system  for  employees),  with  the  purpose  of  facilitating  the 
industrial restructuring and the intergenerational transmission of work. Other episodes were further 
introduced for civil servants in 1976 (Legge 177/1976 Riforma del sistema retributivo per I dipendenti  
pubblici. Prestazioni più generose- Act 177/1976 Reform of the retributive system of the employees in 
the public sector) and to self-employed in 1990 (Legge 233/1990 Introduzione del sistema retributivo 
per  I  lavoratori  autonomi-  Act  223/1990  Extension  of  the  retributive  system  also  for  the  self 
employed). The financial attractiveness of the different episodes in the pension pathway was enhanced 
by  a  common  retributive  formula  that  did  not  take  into  account  the  age  of  exit,  but  solely  the 
contribution history, either effective or notional. The pension benefit  was in fact calculated as the  
product  of  a reference wage and the years of contribution.  The reference wage was based on the 
earnings gained in a reference period, the last 5 years of work for private employees and the last month 
for public employees. Since earnings increase with seniority, the benefit formula was very generous  
since it took as a reference the highest part of the earnings' profile  The benefit consisted of 2% of the 
reference wage for each year of contribution history36 (Jessoula and Ferrera 2006; Brugiavini 1999) .
Despite the common retributive formula, the financial attractiveness of the pension pathway varied 
across episodes, since the eligibility conditions differed by gender and occupational status. The old-
age episode and is open at the age of 60 years, provided that claimants has a contribution history of at  
least 15 years in the private sector and is male. The second is the women's old-age episode and grants 
women the opportunity of withdrawing an old-age pension benefits at the age of 55 years with the  
option of counting the period of childbearing as notional contribution history. For public servants and 
self-employed  the  same  old-age  pathway  is  available  only  for  women  5  years  later  at  60  years  
(Jessoula and Ferrera 2006).  
These two first episodes did not provide particularly generous benefits (the so-called pensione di  
vecchiaia- old-age pension benefit), since the minimum eligibility conditions replaced only 30% of the 
last year's wage. These two episodes were targeted at older workers with an unstable career, who could 
not access more attractive pathways. In spite of the low benefit, this episode could be attractive if  
other more generous pathways are open to other members of the household (typically to the partner).  
This logic explains the looser criteria set for women, who have a more marginal career than men and 
have more difficulty to become entitled to a pension benefit. Thanks to this pathway women could  
follow their partners once they access a pathway of exit. Additional incentives provided to withdraw 
from employment with this pathway is provided by the so-called Trattamento di Fine Rapporto (TFR; 
severance pay). It is a severance pay, which amounts to one monthly wage per year in the same job 
and is withdrawn whenever the employment contract is resolved . The short-term availability of such a 
lump-sum benefit together with additional private employers' payments could reduce older workers' 
concern for the long-term losses in pension income due to their premature exit (Brugiavini 1999).
Other  more  generous  pathways  of  exit  are  available  for  “core”  male  older  workers,  whose 
generosity further increases if they worked in “core” industries: the public and the industrial sector.  
36 The pension benefit is first indexed first to the wages and afterwards to the prices.
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The seniority episode was introduced in 1965 (Legge 903/1965 Pensioni di anzianità per I dipendenti  
privati- Act 903/1965 Introduction of seniority pension for employees in the private sector) only for 
employees in the private sector that worked at least for 35 years. The initial purpose of this scheme is 
to provide a relief for workers who since their early life contributed to the economic growth after the 
post-war period. Once the pathway is extended to the rest of the workforce, it is clear enough that the 
purpose  becomes  political  and  aimed  at  claiming  credits  in  the  next  elections.  The  financial  
attractiveness of this pathway for private employees and self-employed is very high: the minimum 
eligibility conditions grants a benefit (the so-called- pensione di anzianità- seniority pension benefit)  
that replaces at least 70% of the last year's wage and is not connected to any kind of actual parity.  
Because of that for workers that start working early this episode was attractive from the age of 50-55 
years  (Ferrera and Gualmini  2004; Brugiavini 1999). The seniority episode provided much looser 
requirements for civil servants. After 1976 they could obtain a so-called baby pension (pensione baby- 
baby pension, as regulated by the Legge 177/1976 Riforma del sistema retributivo per I dipendenti  
pubblici. Prestazioni più generose. - Act 177/1976 Reform of the retributive system of the employees 
in the public sector) after 20 years of contribution if men and after 15 years of contribution if women 
and mothers (Jessoula and Ferrera 2006; Franco and Marè 2002).    
In the early 1980's, once globalization shook the economy, an third episode was introduced to ease 
the  companies'  task  of  shedding  older  redundancies  in  the  private  sector:  the  schema  di pre-
pensionamento (pre-retirement  scheme) as  regulated  by the  Legge 155/1981  (see  table  7.1).   The 
access into the seniority and old-age pathway was forwarded by 5 years and the benefit is calculated 
according  to  the  retributive  formula  explained  earlier  with  no  actuarial  adjustment.  The  lower 
generosity of this pathway, especially for older workers that developed a short contribution history, is 
often compensated in their eyes by the short-term availability of the TFR and of a golden-hand shake  
(that is a monetary lump-sum) that the company provides to encourage their early exit. Besides that,  
older  workers  might  opt  for  less  generous  but  ready-to  pay  episodes  because  of  their  limited 
computational  skills,  which  prevent  them  from  comparing  correctly  different  streams  of  income 
(Brugiavini 1999). Alternatively they may forced to accept them in order to avoid their dismissals due  
to  the  so-called  “giustificato  motivo  oggettivo”  (justified  objective  reason,  or  in  other  words  for 
economic reasons- as regulated by the Legge 604/1966). The individual dismissal scheme is much less 
generous since, beside the TFR, the severance pay covers only up to 6 monthly wages and the residual  
unemployment benefits is very low (about 30% of the last wage) (Tursi and Varesi 2013).  
After describing the main pathways of exit available in the social protection system in Italy, I will  
present the institutional affinities that enable social partners to participate to their regulation. As it will  
be discussed in the next section, these institutional affinities are the same mechanisms that allow social 
partners to hinder both the formulation and the implementation of retrenchment policies.
7.3 Institutional affinities between protection and partnership
In  Italy  the  institutional  affinities  between  the  protection  and  the  partnership  system  combine  a  
conservative welfare logic and a contentious logic of interests' representation. The contentiousness of 
social partners discourages the Government from explicitly involve them into the policy-making on a 
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regular  base.  The  highly  fragmented  social  partners'  structure  makes  difficult  to  reach  general 
consensus  between  the  different  ideological  positions  at  the  Confederal  level,  where  the  social  
dialogue takes place (see section 3.5) (Baccaro 1999). Because of this contentiousness in Italy there 
are  no  steady  unitary  bodies  expressing  to  the  Government  the  social  partners'  view,  neither 
unilaterally  (as  the  BDA  and  the  DBG  in  Germany37)  nor  bilaterally  (as  the  StvdA  in  the 
Netherlands38). 
Social partners interact with the Government in two modes, which represent the most subtle and the 
most explicit interference to the policy-making. The first is the political lobby. Until the 1970's unions 
and employers' associations could be directly represented by their members in the Parliament. After  
the direct representation was abolished in the mid-1970's, their interests were represented by the lobby 
of their referent party39. 
The  second  is  the  social  concertation  (the  so-called  concertazione  sociale).  Usually  social 
concertation is defined as a stable negotiation between social partners and the Government to reach 
shared economic and social. This kind of “shared Government” does not have deep-rooted traditions in 
Italy. Due to their contentiousness, social partners lack here the necessary cooperativeness that makes 
a steady concertation possible in other “corporatist” countries in Northern Europe (see section 3.3). 
The  formulation  of  retrenchment  policies  mainly  were  affected  by  social  partners  through  the 
concertation mode. As explained by different scholars, this interaction mode take place in Italy only  
under two main conditions. The first is a contingent emergency, meaning an extraordinary external or 
internal challenge that  make urgent  and non-deferrable the retrenchment of pathways of exit.  The  
second is a  structural weakness of the Government lacking the political legitimacy to unilaterally 
impose  unpopular  measures.  In  exchange  of  political  legitimacy,  the  Governments  provide  social 
partners a disproportionate power of leading the negotiations. The first concertation processes took 
place two times along the 1970's and the 1980's, to legitimize the first austerity measures. Of these two 
processes  only  one  leaded  to  an  pact  in  1983.  In  exchange  of  social  partners'  support  of  wage  
moderation policies,  the  Government  had to  compensate the  sacrifices  of  workers and employers 
required by externalizing social security costs (Regalia and Regini 2004).    
The third concertation process is enacted by the Government in 1992 to legitimize the retrenchment 
of the most attractive and popular episodes of the pension pathway. The reform of the pension system 
was the main budgetary measure proposed by the Amato's Government to tackle the dramatic deficit  
threatening the public financing. Facing the exclusion from EMU and the further financial instability 
that  this  implied,  the  executive  was  empowered  (with  the  so-called  Legge  delega) to  adopt  the 
emergency measures  without the direct  Parliaments'  approval  (Schludi  2005;  Ferrera and Jessoula 
2007; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004).    
This unilateral approach was strongly attacked by the social partners, and especially the unions, 
37 As explained in Chapter 6 and 9 the DGB (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund) and the BDA Bundesvereinigung der 
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände) are the Confederations representing respectively unitarily German unions and 
employers in the social consultation with the Government. 
38 As explained in Chapter 5 and 8 StvdA  (Stichting van de Arbeid) is the bilateral foundation representing the interests of 
both employers and employees at national level. Besides taking part to the Consultative process with the Government and 
give a strategical address to their members (as BDA and DGB) they can steer directly the industry-level bargaining by 
signing agreements and common recommendations. 
39 The radical side of the social-democratic party for CGIL, the christian-democratic party for CISL, the moderate side of 
social-democratic party for UIL, and the liberal party for Confindustria (Baccaro and Pulignano 2009).
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who threatened to mobilize the public opinion against these measures, unless they got involved in the 
policy making. This threat concerned greatly the Government, who suffered from a lack of social  
support due to the institutional crisis following the scandal known as “Tangentopoli”  (Ferrera and 
Jessoula 2007).(Baccaro and Simoni 2008)  The public evidence of the rooted and generalized net of 
corruption  among  the  greatest  part  of  the  political  and  economic  elites  caused  in  1992  the 
establishment of a new technical government leaded by Giuliano Amato. Facing a fatal de-legitimation 
and the worsening of the institutional crisis, the Government could not spend his shadow of hierarchy  
and push its  plan unilaterally.  It  was instead forced to formulate the retrenchment of the pension 
pathway together with the social partners. The negotiations took place informally with the separate 
Confederal representatives of Confindustria, CGIL, CISL, UIL and only the parts of of the original  
draft gaining the consent were presented to the Parliament for the confidence vote (Schludi 2005). 
After this experience showed the risks of bargaining with social partners only in emergency, the  
Government  pushed for  counterbalancing  their  predominant  power  by  institutionalizing  modes  of 
social dialogues that promote shared instead of imposed solutions. The tripartite agreements of the 27  
of  July  1993  regulated  the  social  dialogue  as  a  regular  consultative  practices  and  required  the 
concertative practices for reforms requiring relevant impact on labour market. The only weak aspect of 
this agreements was its enforcement (Regalia and Regini 2004). 
In  fact  strong of  the  electoral  support  gained  at  the first  elections  of  the  second republic,  the 
Berlusconi's  government  in  1994 disregarded the agreements  and proceeded unilaterally  with  the 
retrenchment seniority episode40, formerly excluded by the unions from the Amato' s reform. Also this 
time however the Italian Government could not spend enough  shadow of hierarchy to prevent the 
social partners, and especially the unions, from hindering the the formulation of its draft. Excluded 
from the policy-making, social partners managed to de-legitimize the Government by organizing the a 
general strike and the largest social protest after the second world war. 
The fall of the Berlusconi's government boosted again the power of the social partners when they 
faced  1  year  later  the  proposal  of  the  next  cabinet  to  further  retrench the  pension  pathway.  The  
economic situation, after the first relief granted by the Amato's reform, required further emergency 
budgetary  policies  to  meet  the  Maastricht  parameters.  The  political  situation  was  still  highly  
precarious  and the Berlusconi's  government  was replaced  again  by  a  technical  cabinet  leaded by 
Lamberto  Dini.  Aware  of  the  failure  of  his  predecessor,  Dini  enforced  the  1993  agreement  and 
explicitly invited the social partners to bargain the pension pathway retrenchment. Nevertheless the  
balance of power was not the one promoted by the agreement. Social partners, and especially the  
unions, also in this case could use the pressure exerted by the EU to hinder the retrenchment of the  
pension pathway, at  least  for their core membership.  Due to the unduly mild retrenchment of the 
seniority episode, Confindustria refused to sign the agreements.     
A similar context framed the involvement of social partners in the formulation of the 1997 Prodi's  
reform. The economic pressure was now intensified by a tightening of the Maastricht criteria which 
then required a drastic restriction of public expenditure on the seniority benefit. The political weakness 
was now caused by the fragmented coalition backing the Prodi's Government, which included parties 
40 The Government draft planned to reduce the benefit by 3% for each year below the legal retirement age and to cut the 
benefit's accrual rate from 2 to 1.75% for older workers with at least 15 years of contribution (Ferrera and Jessoula 2007).
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from center to radical left. While the Government had already given generous concessions with regard  
to its original proposal (made by the so-called  Onofri Commission) and was near to an agreements 
with the social partners, the most extreme wing of both the unions and the party coalition withdrew 
their support and blocked the negotiations. The deadlock was solved and the negotiations resumed 
when the those intransigent wings were granted with the total exclusion of their core members, the 
blue-collar workers, from the seniority episode's retrenchment  (Schludi 2005;  Ferrera and Jessoula 
2007).     
Finally the reform on 2004 (the so-called Maroni-Tremonti) is the only following a rather different 
formulation. The Berlusconi's Government enacting this bill was supported by a more homogeneous 
center-right coalition and thus by Confindustria. Moreover it was less prone to give concessions to the 
unions.  In  spite  of  that,  unions managed again  to  block  the unilateral  attempts  of  the  cabinet  to  
retrench drastically the seniority benefits by mobilizing their members against it. Once again unions 
forced the Government into a concertation process, which finally brings to the enactment of a much 
milder retrenchment.  
All in all the concertation process that took place in Italy along the 1990's id often praised by the  
literature as the mechanisms that made the implementation of unpopular but necessary retrenchment of 
the pension's pathway . What is often neglected is that their involvement allowed social partners to  
preserve to a great extent their members' pathways from retrenchment.   
The  ad-hoc  inclusion  of  social  partners  in  the  policy-making is  counterbalanced by  a  regular 
involvement in the two main boards administrating the benefits financing all three pathways of exit 
(Regonini 1984). The  Istituto Nazionale per la Previdenza Sociale  (INPS- National institute for the 
social security management) and the  Istituto Nazionale per l' Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul  
Lavoro (INAIL- National institute for the social insurance against work accidents). Until 1994 these  
two boards were dominated by social partners, who nominated 2/3 of executive council' s members. 
The executive council had a key role in assessing the claims and thanks to their number social partners 
could ease the entry of older claimants into the disability pathway. Their power was reduced in 1984,  
when the disability criteria became less discretional. However thanks to their key position not only 
into  the  executive but  also  in  the  monitoring board,  social  partners  could compensate  the  tighter 
requirements  with  a  looser  assessment.  This  administrative  setting,  which  strongly  favour  the 
hindering of retrenchment policies, was reformed in 1994. Social partners were excluded from the  
boards of INPS and INAIL and their role was limited to the claims' support with the system of the so-
called  patronati (patronage).  Although still  involved in the management of claims, their exclusion 
from the board assessing them limit their capacity of hindering the implementation of further disability 
retrenchment (Jessoula 2013; Brugiavini and Peracchi 2014).  
More problematic is the involvement of social partners in the boards administrating the benefits of 
the unemployment pathway. Although eligibility criteria to access CIG and mobility funds are defined 
by law and the financing is delivered by INPS (Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale-  National 
Institute of Social Security) for CIGO and on the labour ministry for CIGS, unions contribute to the 
company restructuring plan. More specifically, unions have to agree on the companies' proposal on 
how to minimize the social costs of the re-structuring plan. In other words they can push companies, if  
they did not do so already, to steer the collective dismissals to older workers, who can undertake the  
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unemployment pathway until  statutory retirement.  This capacity of steering the costs of  industrial 
reconstruction on older workers is conserved after the Government decide to restrain the use of the 
CIG schemes at the end of the 1990's and in turn can considerably hinder the retrenchment of the 
unemployment pathway in the industrial and service sector (Mirabile 2004). 
In the sectors not covered by CIG (mainly construction and craft) the capacity of social partners to  
hinder the retrenchment of the unemployment pathway is consistent.  In fact they self-administrate  
bilateral unemployment funds (the so-called  enti bilaterali),  with which they can grant comparable 
unemployment pathways to older workers not covered by CIG. In this case however the funds are not 
public  and  social  partners  are  to  a  some  extent  more  accountable  for  the  costs  that  using  the  
unemployment pathway involve (Pancaldi 2012).  
In summary, the institutional channel by which social partners participate to the formulation and  
the implementation of retrenchment policies, enable them to hinder significantly both processes. In the 
next section the hypotheses are provided about the extent to which this hindering strategy has affected 
the effectiveness of retrenchment policies to extend working life.
7.4 Retrenchment policies' effectiveness: working hypotheses
Since the early 1990's onwards retrenchment policies reformed mainly the two main episodes provided 
by the public pension system: the old-age and the seniority. The retrenchment process was however 
severely hindered by social partners that, in the Concertative arena, succeeded to preserve the acquired 
rights of their “core” members. The major costs are shed on the future cohorts of recipients, on the 
self-employed and on the public sector (Ferrera 2006). 
In the same period the unemployment and the disability  pathways are only mildly retrenched. 
Important is to investigate to what extent social partners could use their role in the administrative 
boards to still foster their use. This was especially the case of the unemployment pathway, since social  
partners were in the position of concentrating the costs of industrial restructuring on older workers 
before the younger one's (Mirabile 2004).   
The effectiveness of retrenchment policies will be estimated by investigating whether the hazard of  
accessing those pathways of exit significantly vary between the cohort born before and after 1945.  
This cohorts' selection allow me to investigate to what extent retrenchment policies lower the risk of 
entering a pathway of exit in a cohort that newly enter their late career (or in other words get 50 years  
old) in the mid-1990's with respect to the cohort that enter their late career before the EWL target enter  
into the strategy of the social protection sphere. 
7.4.1 Unemployment pathway
After 1991 the unemployment pathway is subjected to no systematic retrenchment. Informal ad-hoc 
political interventions are undertaken by the Government in two opposite direction. On the one hand,  
in  1994  the  Government  tried  to  discourage  the  companies'  claims  and  abuses  by  reducing  the  
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economic events entitling to the CIG financing. On the other hand it extended the CIG financing to the  
sectors  (such  as  craft,  trade,  and  other  service  industries)  progressively  overwhelmed  by  the 
restructuring processes in the second half of the 1990's (Barbieri and Scherer 2011; Tursi and Varesi 
2013). Furthermore  social  partners  remain  in  the  position  of  concentrating  the  occupational 
redundancies on older workers. Because of that the hypothesis is that the cohort born in 1945 or after 
have a significantly higher hazard of entering the unemployment pathway than the cohort born earlier  
(HP 7.1). 
Since  the  financial  accountability  of  social  partners  in  the  implementation  of  unemployment 
pathways is lower in the sectors covered by the CIGS and mobility schemes than in sectors covered by 
bilateral funds, it is expected that among the cohort  born in 1945 or after older workers in in the  
sectors  covered by the CIGS and mobility schemes have a significant  higher hazard to enter  the  
unemployment pathway than older workers in other sectors (HP 7.2).
7.4.2 Disability pathway
After 1984 no further reforms retrenched the disability scheme. Formally this pathway can not be used 
anymore as a pathway of exit, since only objective psycho-physical impairments and not productivity 
losses are admitted as eligibility criteria (Brugiavini and Peracchi 2014). 
Nonetheless the health degeneration that  older workers experience with ageing can be used by 
social partners to facilitate the acceptance of their claims provided that they have an active role in their  
assessment. Disability pathway can be restored to substitute other pathways of exit (such as the old-
age and the seniority pathways) once they are retrenched. In Italy social partners are not in the position 
to do so since 1994. Assessments boards are composed only by medical doctors, who have the task to 
objectively evaluate the extent to which the claimants'  health impairment affect his work capacity  
(Jessoula  2013; Ales  2002) Social  partners  have  the  task  to  assist  the  claimants  during  the 
administrative  procedure,  but  they  have  no  power  to  manipulate  the  allocation  of  these  benefit. 
Because of that the hypothesis is that  the likelihood of undertaking the disability pathway of  exit  
significantly decreases between the two cohorts (HP 7.3).
  
7.4.3 Pension pathway
Four reforms in about a decade41 significantly changed the main features of the Italian pension system 
(Franco 2002).  From a monolithic  defined-benefit  pay-as-you-go system it  became a  multi-pillar, 
fully-funded system. In spite of these systematic changes, these reforms did not significantly modify  
the attractiveness of the pension pathways, at least in the short-term and in the private sector. This is  
due to the prominent role played by social partners in the concerted formulation of these policies,  
which enable them to postpone the retrenchment to the very long transitional rules (Schludi 2005b). 
The  first  reform was  enacted  by  the Amato's  Government  with the  Legge  503/1992.  This  act 
41  in 1992 (Amato reform), in 1995 (Dini reform), in 1997 (Prodi reform), in 2003-2004 (Maroni-Tremonti 
reform)  (Jessoula & Ferrera, 2008).
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introduced two sets of retrenchment measures. The first reduced the benefits' level, by extending the 
calculation of  the reference wage on the earnings obtained along the overall  working career.  The 
second tighten the requirements to access the old-age episode by 5 years for what concerned both the 
minimum age and contributions.     
Although informal, the concertation setting allowed social partners to force, in exchange of their  
support, the inclusion of a very gradual and long phase-in period that exempted to a greatest extent  
their members from the retrenchment. The benefit's old generosity was preserved for workers with  
more than 15 years of contribution, since for them the reference wage was extended only from 5 to 10 
years. Workers with less than 15 years of contribution had their reference period extended  pro-rata: to 
10 years for the contribution developed until 1993 and to the whole career for the subsequent period. 
The calculation of the reference wage was fully extended to the whole working career only for newly-
entrants. The minimum requirements to access old-age episode grew only by 6 months each year and 
thus increased by only one year when the phasing-in was interrupted by the enactment of a new 
pension reform (Morcaldo 2007).
Another concession that social partners obtained in 1992 was the total preservation of the seniority 
episode  in  the  private  sector.  Its  retrenchment,  which  was  supposed  to  increase  the  minimum 
contributory period from 35 to 36 years, was erased from the Government's proposal42. Coherently 
with the interests of CGIL, CISL, UIL, and Confindustria, the seniority episode is retrenched only in 
the public sector, where the minimum contribution (15 years) is progressively harmonized to 35 years,  
as in the private sector (Ferrera and Jessoula 2007). 
Similar concessions were made by the Government in 1995, when social partners are included in 
the formulation of the  Legge 335/1995, the act that is defined as the “Copernical revolution” of the 
Italian pension system. The main change was the shift of the benefit's calculation from an earnings-
related to a contribution-related formula. Contributions are notionally cumulated in personal accounts  
indexed to the mean GDP growth of the last 5 years  (Ferrera and Jessoula 2007). Contrarily to the 
previous attempts of  restricting the access  to  the  old-age episode,  the minimum requirements  are  
loosened in 1995. The contribution period is reduced from 20 to 5 years and the legal age is set  
between 57 and 65 years. Within this spell the individuals can retire under the condition that their 
account can be converted to a minimum pension benefit (equal to 1.2 the minimum allowance that 
individual in need receive after the age of 65 years) .  
The  definition  of  looser  and  more  flexible  minimum requirement  is  combined  with  a  benefit 
formula penalizing early access into the pension pathway. According to this formula, the benefit is not  
only directly proportional to the contribution history, but is also actuarially adjusted by a so-called  
transformation coefficient. This  coefficient  converts  the  account  into  a  benefit  according  to  the 
expected  period  of  recipiency,  which  in  turn  depends  on  the  effective  age  of  exit  and  the  life  
expectancy of each cohort. It is substituted every 10 years to take into control relevant changes of  
demographic and economic factors (Ferrera and Jessoula 2007; Jessoula and Ferrera 2006).   
Finally the Dini's reform included for the first  time a retrenchment for both the public and the 
private sector. The retrenchment consisted in a consistent rising of the minimum requirements. Despite 
42 According to Jessoula and Ferrera (2007), the employees and employers' confederation accepted the retrenchment of both 
the benefit formula and the old-age pathway only in exchange of the omission in the final bill of measures requiring a 
short-term retrenchment of the seniority pathway. 
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its outstanding potential, also the Dini's reform was hindered by the long transitional rules required by  
the unions to protect the acquired rights of their members. The new contribution-related formula is in 
fact  fully  implemented  only  for  the  new entrants  in  the  labour  market,  while,  according  to  the 
transitional rules set by the Amato's reform, workers with more than 18 years remain fully subjected to 
the  retributive  regime  with  a  reference  period  of  10  years.  Workers  with  less  than  18  years  of  
contribution are only partially subjected to the new contributive regime pro-rata. For each contributive 
year  before  1995  the  benefit  is  calculated  according  to  the  retributive  formula,  while  for  the 
subsequent years the new contributive formula is applied (Ferrera and Jessoula 2007).
As for the seniority pathway, two set of long transitional rules are introduced. The first set took into  
account  only the contribution  history.  As  shown in Graph 7.2,  the  minimum contribution history 
increases by 5 years in transitional period of 13 years. This transitional rules are fully phased-in in 
2008, when the minimum contribution history reaches 40 years (Morcaldo 2007). 
Graph 7.2: Progressive increase of the minimum contribution history for seniority pathway (eligibility 1).
Source: Morcaldo, 2007; OECD, 2004
The second set of transitional rules still granted the access seniority episode after 35 years of work,  
provided that a minimum age is reached. As shown in Graph 7.3, this minimum age is set at 52 years  
in 1996 and it is progressively increasing by one year each 2-years period. The minimum age at the 
end of the period of observation43 in 2008 reaches 57 years for both men and women44 (Morcaldo 
2007; OECD 2004).
43 Self-employment age limit is 1 year higher and they can retire at 61 years old and 35 years of contribution. Afterwards, 
the age limit is increased for both employees and self-employed. Since 2010 it will be respectively of 61 and 62 and since 
2014 it will be 62 and 63 (Morcaldo 2007).
44 For women the age-regime is fully phased-in in 2007 when they can retire after 35 years of work at a minimum age of 57, 
while for men the period of transition finishes in 2014, when they can withdraw a seniority pension benefit after 35 years 
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 Graph 7.3: Progressive increase of the eligibility age to access seniority pathway after 35 years of work (eligibility 2).
Source: Morcaldo, 2007, OECD, 2004
In spite of the long transitional rules, the unions' acceptance of the seniority episode's retrenchment  
required a further concession from the Government: the exemptions of workers engaged in “strenuous 
work”. Being this criteria defined by the unions themselves on behalf of the Government, unions were  
given the chance of exempting their core members even from the slight retrenchment of the seniority 
episode (Schludi 2005c) .   
The only measure undertaken in 1995 that retrench in the short-term the seniority pathway is the 
temporary block of their access during 1995. For the rest, the rise of the eligibility conditions impose  
only marginal retrenchments to current cohorts of older workers in the private sector (Morcaldo 2007).
A radical retrenchment of the seniority episode concerned self-employed and public employees, 
that is the workforce falling outside unions' memberships. The pathway reserved to public employees  
(the so-called baby seniority pension) was definitely harmonized and the eligibility conditions follows 
the same progression as in the private sector. The seniority pathway of self-employed, harmonized in  
1990 with  the  norms valid  for  employees  in  the  private  sectors,  was  drastically  retrenched.  The 
minimum contribution history rocketed to 40 years and the minimum age after 35 years of work is set 
to 58 years, without any transitional regime . 
Also hindered by social partners is the third reform of the pension pathway, the so-called Prodi's  
reform (Legge 449/1997) (Schludi 2005c). In fact, the Government's initial plan was to accelerate the 
retrenchment of  the seniority  episode enacted in 1995 and the phase-in of  the contribution-based 
system for workers with a contribution record longer than 18 years. Social partners, backed by the 
most radical part of the Government coalition (Rifondazione comunista), forced to enact this further 
retrenchment only to white-collar workers. Social partners' core constituency continued profiting from 
the pension pathway without experiencing major retrenchment  (Schludi 2005c;  Ferrera and Jessoula 
2007).  
Finally the Maroni-Tremonti reform succeeded in shortening the transitional rules of the seniority 
episode's retrenchment in all the private sector. The obstruction of the unions however postponed the  
enactment of this harsh measure after 2008, when the period of observation substantially stops.  Before 
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that  the unions imposed the Government  a  softer  approach to postpone the entry into a seniority 
episode (Schludi 2005c). Older workers eligible for a seniority pension were exempted from paying 
social security contributions if they kept working for other 2 years. Despite those monetary incentives,  
the soft approach proved to be ineffective and was not repeated (OECD 2004). 
Although financed by the public pension funds, the pre-retirement episode is not affected by a 
previous reforms. Social partners were formally not involved in their regulation and they were used ad 
hoc by the Government to externalize the costs of extraordinary restructuring processes, especially in  
companies controlled by the State (such as railways, energy etc.). A reform of this scheme introduced 
the partial retirement scheme, but no systematic retrenchment is implemented since its introduction in 
1981  (Mirabile 2004) . Because of that they might have compensated the retrenchment of pension 
pathway also in the public sector. 
All  in all,  the retrenchment of pension pathways was to a  great  extent  hindered by the social  
partners. Their involvement in the policy-making preserved the attractiveness of the pension pathway 
for  their  core  members:  older  workers  and  their  employers  in  the  private  sector.  The  major  
retrenchment are therefore concentrated on the public sector, the self-employed and younger workers.  
Because of that it is hypothesized that the cohort born in 1945 or after will have a significantly lower  
likelihood of entering a pension pathway  than the older cohort (HP 7.4). 
Since the retrenchment of the pension pathway is more significant for public employees than for 
private  employees,  it  is  hypothesized  that  among  cohort  born  in  1945 or  after  the  likelihood of  
entering a pension pathway is higher among private employees than among public employees (HP 
7.5).  
Among public employees the major retrenchment is experienced by women, who experience a 
greater extension of their minimum contribution history (from 15 to 35 years) than men (from 20 to 35 
years). Because of that it is hypothesized that among cohort born in 1945 or after in the public sector  
the likelihood of entering a pension pathway is lower for women than for men (HP 7.6).
Despite the pension pathway of self-employed was affected by a severe retrenchment, the fact that  
this  pathway was institutionalized only in 1990 reduces the likelihood of  noticing changes in the 
trajectories of the two cohorts. Because of that it is hypothesized that the likelihood of self-employed  
of entering a pension pathway does not significantly vary between the cohort born before and after  
1945 (HP 7.7).
Table 7.2 summarizes the extent to which retrenchment policies lower the financial attractiveness 
of pathways of exit and the hypotheses over their effectiveness in extending working life.
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Table 7.2: Summary of how retrenchment policies lower the financial attractiveness of the three pathways of exit in Italy and 
their hypothesized effectiveness in extending working life.
Pathways of exit Retrenchment policies Hypotheses
Unemployment 
pathway
CIGS and the mobility schemes are not formally 
retrenched  by  the  Government  after  1991. 
Interventions  are  used  ad  hoc  to  buffer  the 
redundancies created by the widespread process of 
restructuring in core “industries”
In the implementation of CIG and mobility scheme 
the  role  of  social  partners  allow  them  to 
concentrate  those  redundancies  on  older  rather 
than on younger workers. 
HP 7.1: The cohort born in 1945 or after have 
a  significantly higher  hazard of  entering the 
unemployment pathway than the cohort born 
earlier
HP 7.2: among the  cohort  born  in  1945  or 
after older workers in in the sectors covered 
by  the  CIGS  and  mobility  schemes  have  a 
significant  higher  hazard  to  enter  the 
unemployment pathway than older workers in 
other sectors
Disability pathway No further reform after 1984. 
Social partners are not involved in implementation 
organs where they can manipulate the allocation of 
the benefits only after 1994.
HP  7.3: the  likelihood  of  undertaking  the 
disability  pathway  of  exit  significantly 
decreases between the two cohorts . 
Pension pathway Social  partners  can  successfully  hinder  the 
formulation  of  retrenchment  policies  in  a 
concertation  arena  where  they  have  a 
disproportionally  high  bargaining  power  with 
respect to the Government.
Retrenchment  policies  involve  only  marginally 
their core constituency in the private sectors. 
Old-age  and  especially  seniority  pathways  are 
substantially  retrenched  only  for  civil  servants 
(especially women) and self-employed.
HP 7.4: the cohort born in 1945 or after will 
have a significantly lower likelihood  of 
entering  a  pension  pathway   than  the  older 
cohort 
HP 7. 5:  among cohort born in 1945 or after 
the likelihood of entering a pension pathway 
is higher among  private  employees  than 
among public employees
HP 7.6: among cohort born in 1945 or after in 
the public sector the likelihood of entering a 
pension pathway is lower for women than for 
men
HP 7.7:  the  likelihood  of  self-employed  of 
entering  a  pension  pathway  does  not 
significantly vary between  the  cohort  born 
before and after 1945 
7.5 Findings
The hypotheses outlined in the previous sections are tested using a Competing-Risk model (CRM). 
Estimations are expressed in hazard ratios in Table 7.4. The descriptive of the Sharelife sample are  
presented in Section 4.2 Sharelife is a retrospective survey, where the information over the lifecourse  
of representative sample of Italian individuals age 50 years or older are gathered between 2008 and  
2009 (for a more extensive description of Sharelife sample, see Section 4.2 ). 
In the CRM the work-retirement transitions of the cohort born in 1944 or earlier and the cohort 
born after 1944 will be compared45. Estimates are expressed in hazard rates.  Model 1.1, model 2.1 and 
model 3.1 include the cohort>1944 variable and the controls (see appendix C) for the three pathways 
of exit (unemployment, disability, and early retirement) and they respectively test HP 7.1, HP 7.3, and  
45 The dependent variable includes also a fourth other pathway. It represent the exit from employment without a 
income support, since an alternative support is found either in the household resources or in savings. Since 
this trajectory is not associated to any of the three pathways of exit investigated here, its estimations is not be 
interpreted. The full model is available in appendix ...  
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HP 7.4. The interaction between the cohort>1944 variable and industries are included in model 1.2 and 
3.2 to test respectively HP 7.2 and HP 7.5. The interaction between cohort, industry and gender are  
included in model 3.3 to test HP 7.6 . Finally model 3.4 includes the interaction between cohort and  
self-employment to test HP 7.7.  
Table 7.4: Competing risk models (CRM) estimating the effectiveness of retrenchment policies on the hazard of undertaking 
one of the four pathways of exit (1. unemployment; 2. disability; 3. early-retirement). Estimates are expressed in hazard rates.  
Full model is shown in Appendix C.
Source: Sharelife, release 3.1 November 2010. 
The estimations at first glance show that the effectiveness of retrenchment policies is quite limited 
in Italy. According to HP 7.1 model 1.1 shows that the cohort>1944 has higher likelihood of entering a 
unemployment pathway than the earlier cohort. This results can be explained as a consequence of the 
role that social partners play in the administration of CIG schemes. Thanks to this role, unions and  
employers can concentrate the growing redundancies of the economic restructuring on older workers 
with no additional private costs. 
 In order to refine this argument, model 1.2 tests whether the use of the unemployment pathway is 
significantly lower in companies not covered by CIG scheme, where the private costs are higher (HP 
7.2).  Unfortunately the main eligibility criteria of CIG, the firm' s size, is not provided. Thus the 
cohort effect is interacted with industry and the public sector, not covered by the CIG and mobility 
schemes, is compared with all the other industries. Workers in industries in the private sectors (with 
the exception of agriculture and real estate, renting and business activity) are more likely to enter the 
unemployment  pathway  than  workers  than  in  the  public  sectors.  However  against  HP 7.2,  this 
1,1 1,2 2 3,1 3,2 3,3 3,4
Unemployment Unemployment Disability Pension Pension Pension Pension
Cohort>=1945 2.448** 1.052 0.498 0.702*** 0.601*** 0.595*** 0.596***
Interaction: Industry*Cohort>=1945 
Cohort >1944* Agriculture forestry and fishing 2.95e-06*** 0.930 0.933 1.047
Cohort >1944* Manifacturing mining & quarrying 1.861 1.476 1.489 1.531*
Cohort >1944* Construction 3.712e+06*** 1.849* 1.868* 2.037**
Cohort >1944* Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 1.517 0.746 0.751 0.842
Cohort >1944*Financial intermediation 1.184 2.666 2.655 2.685
Cohort >1944*real estate, renting and business activity 0.918 3.51e-06*** 3.57e-06*** 4.14e-06***
Cohort >1944*Public administration and defense, education, health and social work Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Cohort >1944* other community 6.291 1.268 1.605* 1.695*
Interaction: *Public administration etc. *Cohort>=1945 *women 0.441* 0.430*
Interaction: Self-employed*Cohort>=1945 0.677
Number of events 33 33 18 685 685 685 685
Observations 2,199 2,199 2,199 2,199 2,199 2,199 2,199
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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likelihood is statistically significant only for workers in the construction industry. 
As for the disability pathway, in model 2.1 the cohort effect has the same direction hypothesized in 
HP 7.2. This can be explained by the fact that, although no further retrenchment takes place after 1984, 
the exclusion of social partners from the administration boards of INPS and INAIL in 1994 reduced 
the inappropriate use of  disability  as  an early exit  route.  In spite of that,  the lower likelihood of  
accessing the disability pathway does not reach a significant level.  
Looking finally at the cohort effect estimated for the pension pathway, a first consideration is that, 
according to HP 7.4, due the retrenchment of the pension pathway, the cohort >1944 significantly 
delay their entry in it. In order to test whether social partners managed to hinder the effectiveness of  
retrenchment policies in model 3.2 interactions between cohort and industry are included. They test  
whether social partners successfully preserved the pension pathway attractive in the private sector,  
while retrenching it in the public sector (HP 7.5).
HP 7.5 finds only partially empirical support. Only workers in the construction industry experience 
a significantly higher likelihood than public employees to enter a pension pathway, while in the real 
estate renting and business activity the likelihood turns up to be lower.  This may be interpreted as the 
result of the unions' “strenuous work” exemptions, which concentrated the retrenchment fully on white 
collar  workers.  Other  non-significant  effects  may  be,  as  mentioned  earlier  in  section  7.4.3,  the  
unintended effect of the extensive use of pre-retirement schemes, which compensated the retrenchment 
of the seniority pathway in the public sector.
Model 3.3 includes the triple interaction between cohort public sector and gender. As expected in  
HP 7.6, model 3.3 shows that due to the exposure to an harsher retrenchment, among public employees 
>1944 the entry of women is delayed significantly more than men. This specification provides a little 
more support to HP7.5, since also workers in the other community industry turn out significantly more 
likely to enter the pension pathway after public employees.  
Finally, according to HP 7.7, model 3.4 shows that among self employed the cohort>1944 does not 
reveal a significantly different pattern with respect to the earlier cohort. The interpretation of this result 
may be twofold. First the pension pathway was opened for self-employed for a very limited amount of  
time  (since  1991)  and  their  retrenchment  was  sharper.  Second,  self-employed  are  generally  less  
sensitive to early exit routes than employees. 
The inclusion of the interaction between self-employment and cohort effect refines the estimations  
concerning the interaction between industry and the cohort effect. Increasing the support to HP 7.4, the 
positive  effect  of  the  interaction  between  cohort>1944  and  manufacturing  mining  and  quarrying 
becomes significant. This is again the consequence of the “strenuous work” exemption and strongly 
reinforce the argument that the concerted formulation of the pension pathway's retrenchment let social  
partners hinder its effectiveness among their core membership. 
7.6 Conclusion
The main goal  of  this  chapter  was to investigate  the extent  to  which social  partners affected  the 
effectiveness of retrenchment policies in Italy. Due to their contentiousness, the overall hypothesis is 
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that social partners severely hindered the effectiveness of retrenchment policies. This is because they 
were  included  in  social  government  modes  that  let  them  obstruct  the  policies'  formulation  and 
implementation.  
The effectiveness of retrenchment policies was hindered when social partners needed to be actively 
involved in their formulation in the concertation setting. This is the case of the retrenchment of the  
most  important  exit  route:  the  pension  pathway.  The  context  of  great  economic  emergency  and 
political  weakness at  the back of the formulation of these policies  makes social  partners'  support 
unavoidable  and  prevent  the  Government  from  spending  its  shadow  of  hierarchy  during  the 
negotiations. Because of that social partners succeeded in forcing the Government to exempt their core  
members from the retrenchment. This was obtained with very long transitional rule for the phasing-in, 
which projected the policy effect on the future and with explicit clauses that concentrate the costs  
outside their membership, namely on the public sector, self-employed, and on white-collar workers.
The social partners' involvement in the formulation of retrenchment policies proved to effectively  
limit their effectiveness in the three main categories of workers placed under the “strenuous work”  
exemption in the construction, manufacturing mining and quarrying, and other community industries.  
The same hindering effect however is not clearly displayed in the rest of the private sector with respect 
to the public sector. Despite the harmonization of the pension rules concerning public and private  
employees retrenched abruptly the seniority pathway of the former, a significant effect is shown only 
for women working in the public sector. This counterintuitive result may be due to the pre-retirement 
schemes that, used ad-hoc to shed redundancies in the public sector, compensated the retrenchment of 
the pension pathway.
Despite  obtaining  no  exemption  from  the  social  partners,  self-employed  are  found  to  be  not  
significantly affected by the pension pathway's retrenchment. This result is less counterintuitive as it  
seems,  since  their  pension  pathway is  effectively  opened only  for  a  few years  and they  are  less  
sensitive to early retirement incentives.
All  in all,  this  investigation proved that,  the Concertation setting let  social  partners  hinder the 
effectiveness of retrenchment policies among the blue-collar workers.
The effectiveness of retrenchment policies were also hindered in Italy due to the inclusion of social 
partners in the administration of the CIG and mobility schemes. The use of unemployment as an early 
exit route is not found to decrease but to become even more likely after the mid-1990's. This is easily  
explained  by  the  combined effect  of  the  increasing  economic  restructuring and the possibility  of 
unions and employers to concentrate redundancies on older workers with no private additional costs.  
Also in this case the use of unemployment pathway is fostered only in industries dominated medium 
and large companies and thus with a strong unions presence. In industries where the size of companies 
is smaller the diffusion of the unemployment pathway is weakened by the higher private costs that it 
implied.  Although the direction of the estimates  are coherent  with this patterns,  their significance 
levels are affected by the very small sub-sample size of the transitions into unemployment.  
Finally, because of the exclusion of social partners from the administration of the disability scheme, 
since  1994 they  are  prevented  from compensating  the 1984 retrenchment  with a  accommodating 
evaluation of the  disability level of older workers. Although the direction of the effect support this  
argument, the significant  level  is again affected by the extremely small  size of the sub-sample of  
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disability trajectories. 
All in all, this chapter provided empirical evidence that, because of their contentiousness, social  
partnership have severely hindered the effectiveness of retrenchment policies in Italy. Social partners  
affected furthermore the policies' distributional effects, by concentrating the effectiveness outside their  
core membership and on future generations. The extent to which social partners have hindered rather 
than enhanced the effectiveness of retaining policies will be investigated in Chapter 10.
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8 The effectiveness of retaining policies in The 
Netherlands
8.1 Introduction
As  pointed out  in Chapter 3,  extending working life requires  not  only that  the protection system 
retrench pathways of exit, but also that companies retain older workers. The necessary condition for 
the implementation of retaining policies is that the EWL re-conversion became a strategical target of 
the companies' human resource management (HRM). Social partners play a key role in enhancing or 
hindering the top-down penetration. They can limit the strategical advantage of firms to shed older 
workers and enhance the implementation of retaining policies. The main research question of this  
chapter  is:  to  what  extent  has  the  strong  organizational  articulation  of  unions  and  employers'  
associations influenced the effectiveness of retaining policies implemented between the mid-1990's  
until 2008-2009 in the Netherlands?
According to the hypothesis (H 3.5), the highly coordinated collective bargaining system in the 
Netherlands successfully conveyed retaining policies into companies' HRM strategy and fostered their 
effectiveness. Retaining policies extend working life by improving some key work dimensions: time 
reconciliation, mental and physical health reconciliation, age equality, and employability. 
This top-down conveyance is successful because of two main institutional mechanisms. The first is  
the high vertical coordination between the confederal level and the industry organizations responsible 
for  the  collective  bargaining.  This  high  coordination  is  granted  by  the  STvdA (Stichting  van  de 
Arbeid), a bilateral body that conveys the EWL target with joint recommendations. Thanks to this joint 
recommendations the EWL target is mutually transferred into the strategy of both industry's unions 
and  employers'  associations,  which  translate  this  target  into  policies  that  are  then  included  into  
collective labour agreements (CLA's). The second mechanism is the high coordination between the 
industry and the company level, which makes CLAs legally compelling for companies. All in all, the 
coordination of the collective bargaining system constrained companies'  HRM to include retaining 
policies  as  long as  they  are  negotiated  in  central  CLAs.  According  to  my HP 3.4 the STvdA is  
encouraged to promote a retaining strategy because retrenchment policies internalized to a great extent 
the costs of pathways of exit. This strategy is pushed downward through the collective bargaining 
system, which is expected to coordinate the HRM practices to retain older workers. Because of that,  
retaining policies are highly effective (HP 3.5) across the economy (HP. 3.8).
The empirical expectations concerning the effectiveness of retaining policies are derived from data 
concerning  their  dissemination  in  CLA's.  The  higher  is  the  dissemination  in  CLA's  of  retaining 
policies  the  higher  is  their  effectiveness  supposed  to  be,  since  a  higher  share  of  companies  are 
compelled  to  implement  them  in  their  HRM.  Because  of  their  systematic  dissemination:  time 
reconciliation, physical and mental health reconciliation, and age equality are expected to be effective  
in EWL. Moreover their dissemination is quite consistent in all the industry, with the exception of the  
agriculture, fishery and forestry. Hypotheses are tested using a PCEM.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 describes the social protection system's attempts 
to convey retaining policies top-down by mainly endorsing the highly coordinated partnership system. 
Section 8.3 is devoted to a more detailed description of the aspects that makes the vertical organization 
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of social partners in Germany the collective bargaining system highly coordinated. In Section 8.4 the  
hypotheses concerning the effectiveness  of  retaining policies  are  derived from data that  show the  
dissemination of the different sets of retaining policies by CLAs between 1998 and 2006 in the overall  
economy and by industry.  The results  of  the piecewise constant  exponential  model  is  shown and 
interpreted in Section 8.5 and conclusions about the effectiveness of retaining policies are discussed at  
the end of this chapter.    
8.2 Protection's attempts to convey top-down retaining policies
The governments conveyed the EWL re-conversion into the HRM strategy mainly by endorsing social 
partners  to  disseminate  retaining  policies  throughout  the  collective  bargaining  system.  The social 
protection system provides a general legal framework that indirectly support the implementation of 
retaining policies, but without binding directly companies with financial incentives or legal constrains.  
The only exception is represented by the health reconciliation policies. Employers are made directly 
financially accountable for directly reducing the inflow of older workers into disability scheme by  
systematically improving the healthiness of their working conditions.       
The attempts of the social protection system to convey top-down the implementation of retaining 
policies are listed in Table  8.1.
Table 8.1: Social protections' attempts aimed at conveying top-down retaining policies in the Netherlands.
General-employability
2004- Tijdelijke subsidieregeling stimuleren leeftijdsbewust beleid, 2004- Temporary Subsidy stimulate age policy
2006-nu bonus voor  werknemers  and werkgevers:  o.a.  de  door-
werkbonus  –  de  arbeidskorting  voor  oudere  werknemers  –  de 
premiekorting  oudere  werknemers  plus  loonkostensubsidie  bij 
ziekte van oudere werknemers 
2006-now bonus  for  employees  and  employers:  including  the 
doorwerkbonus- the employed older workers the premium plus labor 
costs where disease of older workers
Time reconciliation
1996- Wet Verbod onderscheid arbeidsduur (VOA) 1996- Prohibition of Discrimination by working hours act
1996- Pension Covenant 1996- Pensioen convenant
2000- Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur (WAA) 2000- Adjustment of Working hours act
2004-  Sociale afspraken over vervroegde-uittredingsregelingen en  
spaarregelingen levensloop
2004- Social agreements on early-retirement schemes and life-course 
saving schemes
Health reconciliation
1993-  Wet  Terugdringing  Beroep  de  Arbeidsongeschiktsheids-
regelingen (TBA)
1993- Act on Reducing Disability Claims
1993- Wet Terugdringing Ziekteverzuim (TZ)  1993- Act on Reducing Sickness Absence
1993- Arbowet (ARBO)  1993- Act on Working Circumstances
1995-  Wet  Aschaffing  Malus  en  Bevordering  Reïntegratie,  
(AMBER)
1995 - Act Abolition of “Malus” and Improvement of Reintegration.
1996-  Wet  Uitbreiding  Loondoorbelingsverplichting  bij  Ziekte,  
(WULBZ)
1996- Continued Payment of Salary (Sickness) Act
1997-  Wet  Arbeidsongeschiktheidverzekering  Zelfstandigen,  
(WAZ),
 1997-   Act on Incapacity Insurance for the self-employed person
1997-  Wet  Overheidpersoneel  onder  de  Werknemerverzekeringen  1997- Act  on  Public  Servants  under  the  Employees  Insurance 
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(OOW) Scheme. 
1997- Wet op de Medische Keuringen (WMK), 1997- Act on medical examination
1997-  Wet Premiedifferentiatie en Marktwerking bij  Arbeidsonge-
schiktheidverzekeringen (PEMBA)
1997- Act on Premium Differentiation and Market Regulation.
1998- Wet op de (Re)Integratie Arbeidsgehandicapten (REA), 1998- Disability Reintegration Act
2001- Wet Verbetering Poortwachter (WVP)  2001- Act on Improving the Gatekeeper
2003-  Wet  Verlenging  Loondoorbetalingsverplichting  bij  Ziekte,  
(VVLZ)
 2003- Act extending the wage payment obligation 
Age equality 
1994- 2004 Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling- AWGB 1994-2004 Anti-discrimination law as emended in 2004, when age is 
officially  included  among the  criteria  for  which discrimination  in 
employment acts is illegitimate
A longer  retainment  of  older  workers  in  employment  is  first  enhanced  unilaterally  by  the 
Government, with both direct and indirect measures. Direct measures are relatively recent (between 
2006 and now) and offer employers financial incentives if they hire or retain workers between the age  
of 50 and 62 years, whereby subsidies and tax benefits (STvdA 2011). Other temporary subsidies are 
offered in 2004 in a program co-managed by social partners (Tijdelijke subsidieregeling stimuleren  
leeftijdsbewust beleid, 2004). For the first three years it focused on large enterprises, while in the two 
years on medium and small enterprises. The subsidies are used to develop employers' skills and know-
how that enable them to elaborate a successful strategy to both retain older workers and to keep them 
productive. On this purpose a new benchmark is diffused among the employers that takes part to the 
program: the WAI (Work Ability Index). It calculates the fitness of different dimensions of the work 
ability  of  the  personnel  (among  which  health,  training,  skills  etc.),  allowing  the  employers  to 
implement targeted actions to prevent productivity drops. Although innovative this programs involve 
companies  only  on  a  voluntaristic  bases,  which  makes  its  coverage  rather  limited  (European 
Commission 2010).
Indirect measures instead are not targeted specifically on retaining older workers, but indirectly 
improve some of the work dimensions that extend working life, namely health reconciliation, time 
reconciliation, and age equality. A first  set of unilateral measures made employers responsible for  
preventing long-term illnesses and impairments among their employees and indirectly improve health 
reconciliations, that is the healthiness of the working conditions that older workers experience. On the 
one  hand these  measures  makes  employers  financially  responsible  for  the  disability  and sickness 
claims that arise among their personnel. The TAV “act on reducing the disability volume” in 1992 
made the employers' social insurance contributions proportional to the past inflow of their employees 
into disability, whereby a bonus-malus system that is abolished in 1995 because ineffective (AMBER- 
“Act Abolition of “Malus” and Improvement of Reintegration”). The TZ “act on reducing sickness  
absence” (1993), the WULBZ “Continued Payment of Salary (Sickness) Act” (1996), the WVP “Act  
on Improving the Gatekeeper” and (2001) the VVLZ “Act extending the wage payment obligation” 
(2004) privatized the protection of sickness risk in the first two years in order to encourage employers  
to re-integrate recipients before they fall into disability (see Table  8.1) (van Oorschot and Boos 2000). 
On the other hand these measure made employers responsible for the prevention of long-term illnesses 
and impairments among their employees by improving the working conditions. The PEMBA act “on 
premium differentiation and market regulation” (1996) declare employers accountable not only to cut 
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disability claims but to prevent them and the “Arbo act on working circumstances” (1993) strengthen 
the role of “arbo-dienst” (companies that provide professional services on occupational health and 
safety), which have to be  mandatorily employed by companies to plan and monitor the improvement 
of working conditions (van Oorschot and Boos 2000; Sonnet and OECD 2005; Van Gerven 2008).
A second set of unilateral measures indirectly promoted time reconciliation, that is the shortening 
of  the  working  time,  because  they  fostered  the  diffusion  of  part-time  work  among  the  whole 
workforce. The VOA Prohibition of Discrimination by working hours act (“Wet Verbod onderscheid  
arbeidsduur”) in 1996 establish the right of equal treatment of part-time workers as full-time workers. 
Moreover  the  WAA Adjustment  of  Working  hours  act  (“Wet  Aanpassing  Arbeidsduur”)  in  2000 
introduces  the  right  of  workers  to  unilaterally  change  from  full-time  to  part-time  an  existing 
employment relationship (Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Visser et al. 2004).
A final set of unilateral measures indirectly boost age equality, that is the support of bosses and 
colleagues of younger age, by officially banning age discrimination in HRM (the so-called  ageism- 
OECE, 2005). First age discrimination is banned in the collective dismissals procedure in 1995, when 
the compulsory preference for older workers is abolished. Moreover the ban is extended to any other 
aspect  of  the  employment  relation  by  the  AWGB  Equal  Treatment  Act  (Algemene  Wet  Gelijke  
Behandeling- 1994, as amended in 2004)46 (Sonnet and OECD 2005). 
In all these three sets of unilateral measures does not have the express aim of extending working  
life, but as an indirect effect, they provide a broader legal framework that support social partners, once 
they start boosting the implementation of retaining policies. The choice of boosting retaining policies 
arises  in  the  Confederal  organizations  in  the  STvdA board  at  least  since  1993,  when  the  first 
retrenchment  policies  start  to  undermine  the  right  of  older  workers  to  use  the  pathways  of  exit  
(Wilthagen 2003). On the unions' side, the rationale of this choice consists of improving the working 
conditions  to  alleviate  the  additional  work  burden  of  older  workers,  once  pathways  of  exit  are 
retrenched. On the employers' associations' side, this choice is motivated by the aim of making the 
extension of working life an advantage for companies, by boosting older workers' productivity  (De 
Vroom 2004). Confederal institutions convey this message to the lower organizations, which in turn 
enhance the implementation of retaining policies  within companies thanks to the two institutional 
mechanisms that will be explained in the next section.
 
8.3 Institutional affinities between partnership and production
Social partners in the Netherlands can significantly steer companies' HRM policies thanks to its highly  
coordinated structure of the collective bargaining system. As described by Windmuller and Visser this  
system was legally regulated in response to the economic recession between the 1920's and the 1930's  
against the risk of unfettered wage competition. The two most important measures are in this respect 
46 The non-discrimination ban is applied unless the distinction is based on objective justifications, and a further protection is 
case of dismissals and victimization is the shifting of the proof burdenIt excludes situations where the distinction is based on 
labour policies aimed at encouraging the employment of other age-group, or is due to the termination of the employment 
relations for the achievement of the legal retirement age and the individual is eligible for AWO. In case an appealing is made  
an Equal  treatment  commission  is  appointed and  expresses  an  opinion,  which however  is  not  legally  binding,  and the 
applicant may bring the employer to court  (OECD, 2005) 
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After 1945 the role of the state increased, since it maintained until the outbreak of the oil shocks a 
statutory wage policies implemented in close cooperation with STvdA . After a decades where central  
corporative practices were interrupted under strong external market pressure, STvdA negotiated all the 
most  important  social  pacts  that  since  1982  (Wassenaar  agreements)  fostered  the  recovery  and 
competitiveness of the Dutch economy  (Visser 1998b; Rhodes 2001). Since then  STvdA interacted 
regularly with the governments to coordinate the policymaking and collective negotiations for what 
concerns wage and other terms of employment. The regular interactions institutionalized a cooperative 
setting that enabled the governments to commit STvdA first to retrench the pension pathway and then  
to promote the negotiations of retaining policies.    
This structure enabled to successfully convey the EWL re-conversion from the government to the 
companies'  strategy.  Two aspects  are  important  here.  At  central  level  the conveyance of retaining  
policies downwards to industry-level organizations is granted by STvdA (for more information see 
Section 5.3). 
This commitment led STvdA to deliver a series of joint recommendations where it encouraged their 
members to include retaining policies in their  negotiations. Despite non-legally bounding this soft  
dissemination provided a common platform that informed their members' strategies (Wilthagen 2003). 
Once the bargaining parts are informed over the necessity of retaining of older workers by promoting a 
set of work dimensions that extend working life, it is their task to translate this indications, according 
to their specific strategies, into concrete retaining policies, and to include them in CLAs.
The  second  mechanism  is  the  vertical  coordination  between  the  industry  and  the  company  
bargaining level,  which coveys the retaining policies from CLAs into HRM. In the Netherlands this 
high level of coordination is granted by the status of CLA's, which are legally binding for both the 
more decentralized negotiations and for personnel policies of companies. Therefore once retaining 
policies are included into an industry-level CLA, then social partners and the HRM at company-level 
can only acknowledge those policies and implement them. In all when a industry CLA requires the 
improvement of one of the work dimension that extend working life, the same or a better improvement 
have to be implemented  by companies that are covered by this CLA.
In short, the two mechanisms explained above enable the partnership system to successfully convey 
the EWL target from the protection to the production system in the Netherlands. The top-down process 
by which the strategical alignment between partnership, and production takes place will be explained 
in more detail below.  
8.4 Retaining policies: top-down alignment
Since the early 1990's social partners in the Netherlands proved to actively encourage the penetration 
of the EWL target into the HR management of companies (Tros 2005).
At  confederal  level  STvdA started  to  convey  the  EWL target into  the  strategy  of  the  lower 
structures of the social partners' organizations.  Since the beginning of the 1990's, a number of joint 
recommendations addresses not only to the general goal of extending working life but specifically  
endorse social partners to negotiate a reform plan which can foster the implementation of retaining 
policies within the companies.  Here are some examples that deal  with different  retaining policies' 
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dimensions:  growing  older  at  work (1993  –  StvdA,  1993)  working  on  your  job  (Werken  aan je  
werkkring,  1996);  lifelong learning at  work (Een leven lang lerend.  1998);  making employability 
policy work (werk maken van employabilitybeleid, 2001)  and more is needed (meer is nodig, 2001).  
Similar recommendations are then repeated in the subsequent years , but along time they assume a 
wider scope. In fact in “removing obstacles to working after the age of 65” (2006), what we can do 
together (StvdA,  2008);  and  “policy  agenda  2020:  Investing  in  participation  and  employability” 
(StvdA, 2010) the  extending working life becomes part of a more general process of fostering full 
employment in each phase of the life-cycle (Wilthagen 2002; Troos 2005; (STvdA 2011)). 
With these recommendations the StvdA attempted to persuade unions and employers' organizations 
that,  while  early  retirement's  gains  are  shrinking,  they  could  make  extending  working  life 
advantageous for older workers and for companies. Older workers can benefit from extending working 
life because, after the retrenchment of the pathways exit, it is their only way to accrue their retirement  
wealth. Thus it is the unions' primary interest to foster their members' welfare by negotiating working 
conditions that can relieve their strain of working longer. Companies can profit from extend working 
life  as  well,  because  they  can  retain  skills  that  are  becoming increasingly  scarce  because  of  the 
population ageing. Therefore it is a primary interests of employers and their representatives to bargain  
and implement measure that keep older workers competitive, by preventing skills to deteriorate with 
ageing.
As explained in the previous section, these recommendations were the common platforms from 
which industry negotiations formulate retaining policies. Once they become part of a CLA then they 
bind  lower  CLA's  and  companies  that  are  members  of  the  signatory  organizations  to  implement  
policies that improve working conditions at least until the level included in industry CLA's. 
Due to the specific characteristics of the workforce and of the economic system, retaining policies  
formulated by the industry negotiations in the Netherlands may improve some work dimensions rather 
than others . Moreover depending on the productive system and the economic performance, social  
partners in some industries can be more successful in disseminating retaining policies than others. 
The dissemination of retaining policies in central CLAs from the late 1990's onward is described in 
the next section both for the overall economy and by industry. The dissemination of retaining policies  
is expressed as either the % workers covered by CLA's that contains them or the % of the total number  
of CLA's that contain them, depending on data availability. According to the hypothesis (H 3.4), it is  
argued that the higher is the dissemination of retaining policies the stronger is the capacity of social  
partners to coordinate the implementation of retaining policies within companies, which in turn will 
make these latter more effective in extending working life. This is the main argument upon which the  
working hypotheses are formulated in the next section. 
8.5 Working hypotheses
8.5.1 Hypotheses by retaining policies
The  working  hypotheses  are  based  on  the  extent  to  which  industry-  CLAs  coordinate  the 
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implementation of retaining policies within companies. This coordination is more intense the more  
widespread is the coverage or the percentage of CLAs that include policies that improve the work  
capacity  of  older  workers  according to the  dimensions  defined  earlier:  time reconciliation,  health  
reconciliation, employability and age equality. Therefore the working hypothesis are split first on the 
different types of retaining policies and then by industry.
Information over the dissemination of different types of retaining policies over the whole economy 
between 1998 and 2009 are provided in Table 8.2. They express the way in which recommendations  
are translated into retaining policies and are conveyed into HRM strategy. Since recommendations  
represent the platform that inform the collective negotiations over the topics that needs to be regulated, 
then the dissemination of retaining policies will  progressively increase after  recommendations are 
made. According to the specific characteristics of each industry, social partners can prioritize some 
types of retaining policies  rather then others.  Data  over the dissemination of retaining policies in  
CLA's are available only for the private sector. However since in the public sector the Government  
itself  plays  as employer  in the collective negotiation,  I  assume that  in the public sector retaining  
policies are systematically disseminated. This is because the Government directly internalize in its 
negotiating strategy the target of retaining older workers. 
Table 8.2: Retaining policies' dissemination in CLAs' expressed as percentage of workers covered by these measures (with 
respect to the total number of older workers covered by CLAs) or as percentage of the total CLA's valid in 1998, 2001, 2008, 
and 2009.
 Source: Arbeidsinspectie 2001,  SZW 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 
The first row in Table 8.2 describe in general terms the dissemination of policies aimed at retaining 
older workers.  Between 1998 and 2001 about  40% of workers are  covered by a CLA containing  
retaining, policies. Their dissemination steadily increase, and support the general hypothesis that since 
the late 1990's onwards CLA's in the Netherlands have channelled the EWL policies into the HR 
management through the collective negotiation.  Therefore the general  hypothesis  is  that retaining 
policies effectively extend working life in the Netherlands (HP 3.6).
The other four sections of Table 8.2 give an overview of the dissemination of four different sorts of 
retaining policies: time reconciliation, health reconciliation, age equality, and employability. The most 
diffused way of retaining older workers appears to be with time reconciliation policies. In fact between 
Retaining policies  1998 2001 2006 2008 2009
Ge neral Retaining policies (% workers) 36 40 69 (% CLA) 79 (% CLA)
Time re concil iation
67 60 55 56 55
With wage reduction, of  which: 29 31 29 30 29
Less than proportional (% CLA) 21 21 18 22 18
Working time:  (% CLA) 76 76 77 74 77
He alth  reconci l iation
60 70 70 70 69/8
Lighter work burden (% CLA) 14
Relieve policies 67
Age  Equality Career policies 2 (% CLA) 42(% CLA) 35 44 38
Employabi li ty
Training leav e f or older workers 7(% CLA) 8(% CLA) 7 8 1
Skills dev elopment 5 (% CLA) 18 (% CLA) 13 13 9
Shorter work schedule** (seniors' measures) 
(% CLA)
Working time:  (% CLA)
(Overwork; Irregular working time Shift work)
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1998 and 2009 more than ¾ of CLAs include measures that regulate flexible working time and more  
than 50% of them include specific measures to enhance a shorter working schedules among seniors. 
Because of the compulsory status of industry CLAs that time reconciliation policies since the late  
1990's  onwards  will  undertake  a  comparable  dissemination  among  companies'  HRM.  Since  time 
reconciliation policies are systematically implemented by CLA's, it is hypothesized that older workers  
working part-time will have a significantly lower likelihood than full-time workers to experience a  
work-retirement trajectory (HP 8.1). 
As shown in Table 8.2, it is not the reduction of the working time itself that is implemented by 
CLAs to retain older workers. In fact the far majority of policies that are included in the CLA's to  
reduce the working time of older workers implies a reduction of less than proportional of the wage.  
This means that time reconciliation policies are especially conveyed by the partial retirement schemes, 
developed  within  the  pre-retirement  programs.  This  scheme  provides  older  workers  with  higher  
incentives to extend working life than part-time in terms of present and future streams of income, but  
require a relatively stable career to benefit from them. Since men have in average a more stable career  
than women, the hypothesis is that working part-time will lower the likelihood to undertake a work-
retirement trajectory, significantly more for the former than for the latter (HP 8.2).    
The dissemination of  health reconciliation policies among CLAs indicates that  a very diffused 
method to reduce the strain of work is to enhance the healthiness of older workers' schedule. In fact  
already in 1998 60% of CLAs contain measures restricting companies' freedom to organize seniors' 
work according to unhealthy schedules, such as overwork, shift work and irregular schedules. This  
percentage  increases  to  80%  in  2001  and  remain  rather  constant  afterwards.  Less  systematic 
information are available for the dissemination of other measures that improve health reconciliation. 
Only the 14% of CLAs in force in 2008 includes lighter work burden for older workers, which makes 
reasonable to attribute the 67% of relieve policies (general measures aimed at reducing the psycho-
physical  workload)  found in 1998 to measures  regulating  the working schedule  rather  than  other 
working conditions. Nevertheless the dissemination of health reconciliation policies by CLAs can be 
by-passed by a central dissemination steered by the Governments itself (De Vroom 2004; van Gerven 
2008; (Oorschot 2010). The policies that privatize the prevention of sickness and disability created a 
direct employers' duty to improve working conditions which does not need additional measures to bind 
the companies' strategy. As mentioned earlier, although these policies are not directly targeted on older 
workers, they can indirectly retain them, because older workers are the main recipients of disability 
scheme. Since health reconciliation policies are directly promoted by the social protection system, it is 
hypothesized that older workers that experience a low physical and mental strain at work will have a  
lower likelihood to enter a work-retirement trajectory than older workers that do not experience them  
(HP 8.3).
According  to the  definition,  age equality  policies  enhance the support  and the recognitions  of  
bosses and colleagues, the work atmosphere, and the fairness of work relations. The quality of the  
social interactions that older workers experience at work is indirectly improved by eliminating all the  
limitations  that  justify  age  discrimination  in  the  employment  relations  and  thus  in  the  social 
interactions. Since 2001 older workers are not directly exposed to discrimination in many aspects of 
their  working  conditions.  In  fact  no  CLAs  contains  age  limitation  for  recruitment  and  selection,  
promotions,  additional  bonus  and  incentives,  bond  premium  and  to  the  access  to  education  and 
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training in the framework of promoting lifelong education and sustainable employment (Spijkerman & 
Klassen 2002; Beeksma et al., 2007; 2008; 2009; Smits,  2010). Moreover the Table 8.5 shows an 
extensive diffusion between 1998 and 2001 of policies that grant also to older workers the opportunity 
of pursuing an upward career. Career policies are important to improve age equality, because they  
support  older  workers'  perception  to  be  fairly  treated  and their  social  status  among younger  co-
workers.  Since  age  equality  policies  are  indirectly  promoted  by  the social  protection  system and 
systematically  disseminated  by  CLA's,  it  is  hypothesized  that  older  workers  that  experience  a  
supportive atmosphere and a fair treatment at work will have a lower likelihood to enter a work-
retirement trajectory than older workers that do not experience them (HP 8.6).  
According to Table 8.2, employability policies undertake the least dissemination in CLAs in the 
Netherlands. In 1998 policies that enhance the development of older workers' skills are included only 
in 5% of CLAs. In 2001 this percentage increases till 18% but it still involve a limited portion of the 
production system.  Even lower is the diffusion of policies that prescribe training leave especially for 
older workers. Because employability policies are NOT systematically disseminated by the CLA's, it is 
hypothesized  that  older  workers  that  experience  skills'  development  at  work  will  NOT  have  a  
significantly lower likelihood to enter a work-retirement trajectory than older workers that do not  
experience them (HP 8.8).     
Since the CLAs under observation are negotiated at industry level, it is important to investigate 
whether retaining policies' dissemination significantly varies by industry. Industry unions, even within 
the same confederation, can differ in a variety of features: ideological, to structural and strategical.  
These differences derive from the intrinsic structure of each industry and its economic development,  
which in turn affect the extent  to which recommendations on EWL are adopted by the collective  
negotiations.  Since  the  dissemination  of  retaining  policies  in  the  CLA's  increases  the  share  of 
companies that are bound to implement them, it is argued that their effectiveness in extending working 
life is higher in industries where higher is their dissemination in the early 2000' onwards. Information 
over the dissemination of retaining policies by industry will be provided in the next section together  
with the hypotheses over their expected effectiveness.  
8.5.2 Hypotheses by industry
Information over the dissemination of retaining policies in CLAs by industry are available only for 
time reconciliation and employability. Because of that, only for these two retaining policies working 
hypotheses can be split by industry.  
Time  reconciliation  policies,  that  are  measures  which  shorten  the  working  schedules  of  older 
workers, are fairly disseminated in the CLAs of all industries, as shown in Table 8.3. Already in 2001 
the companies that employ the far majority of the workforce are bounded by CLA's to adopt measures  
that can grant a better time reconciliation for older workers. The only exception is agriculture and 
fishery,  where  the  coverage  is  only  40%.  The  service  sector  includes  the  industries  where  time 
reconciliation are diffused the most, since a range between 88% to the 71% of the workers are covered  
by  these  policies  in  the  2000's.  An  intermediate  diffusion  takes  place  into  the  manufacturing, 
construction, and the trade and catering industries. 
Given the dissemination of time reconciliation policies, it is hypothesized that  working part-time 
162 8  The effectiveness of retaining policies in The Netherlands
will lower the likelihood to undertake a work-retirement trajectory: the most in public administration,  
health, education and social work, real estate renting and business activity, financial intermediation,  
and other community.; less in manufacturing, mining & quarrying, construction,  wholesale and retail  
trade, transportation and storage & catering, and the least in the agriculture, forestry and fishery (HP 
8.3).  
Table 8.3: Dissemination of time reconciliation policies (reduction of the working time for older  workers) in CLA's by 
industry between 2001 and 2009, measured as the % of workers covered by CLA's that contain employability policies in each 
industry. 
Source: Arbeidsinspectie 2001,  SZW 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
Data concerming the coverage of CLA's containing employability policies across industries are  
available only since 2006 as shown in Table 8.4. The diffusion of policies that foster the training and 
education for older workers is consistent only in manufacturing and construction industry, where in 
2006 and 2008 it reaches respectively almost 50 and 40% of the total workforce. On the contrary  
almost no employability policies are disseminated in the agriculture and fishery, in other service, and  
in the transport and communication industries, since there the CLA's coverage range between 0 and 
3%. Finally an intermediate diffusion occurs in the trade and catering and the  corporate services 
industries, where CLA's containing employability policies covers about 10% of the workforce. Given 
the dissemination of time reconciliation policies, it is hypothesized that  skills' development at work  
will lower the likelihood to undertake a work-retirement trajectory: the most in public administration,  
health, education and social work; manufacturing, mining & quarrying; and construction, less in  
wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & catering; real estate renting and business  
activity,  and financial  intermediation,  and the least  in the agriculture,  forestry  and fishery,  other  
community (HP 8.8).   
Retaining policies Time Reconciliation 
Sector 2001 2006 2008 2009
Agriculture and fishery 40 40 25
Manufactoring 57 57 62 67
Construction 57 75 75 75
Trade and catering 64 55 39 41
Transport and communication 75 44 47 43
Corporate services 75 67 50 57
Other services 88 75 73 71
Total 67 60 55 56
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Table 8.4: Dissemination of employability policies (agreements on education and training for older workers) between 2006 
and 2009, measured as the percentage of workers covered by CLA's that contain employability policies in each industry.
Source: Arbeidsinspectie 2001,  SZW 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
Since incentives to implement health reconciliation policies are the same for the whole economy, it  
is hypothesized that NO significant industry pattern is expected in the likelihood of entering a work-
retirement trajectories among older workers experiencing a low physical and mental strain at work 
(HP 8.5). 
Finally, to information are available to derive hypothesis about industry pattern in age equality  
effectiveness. 
The  summary  of  the  top-down dissemination  of  retaining  policies  in  the  Netherlands  of  their 
expected effectiveness is provided in Table 8.5.
Table 8.5: Summary of the top-down dissemination of retaining policies and hypotheses.
Retaining policies Top-down dissemination Effectiveness retaining policies: HP
Time reconciliation Since 1996 the government provides legal framework 
regulate  part-time  work  and  indirectly  enhance  the 
dissemination  of  time  reconciliation  policies. 
However those measures are not specifically targeted 
at older workers.
Direct  measures  to  enhance  time  reconciliation 
policies have been included in the two social pacts: 
Pension Covenant in 1997 and the social agreements 
on  early-retirement  schemes  and  life-course  saving 
schemes in 2004. 
Enhancing  part-time  in  late  career  is  the  preferred 
measure  social  partners,  and  especially  unions, 
promote to relieve the strain of working longer. 
Their dissemination in CLAs is systematic: between 
½ and ¾ of CLAs between 1998-2006.
Dissemination BY INDUSTRY:
-High:  transport  and communication, corporate,  and 
other services and public sector.
-Medium:  manufacturing,  construction,  trade  and 
catering 
-Low: agriculture and fishery
HP  8.1:  Since  time  reconciliation  policies  are 
systematically implemented by CLA's, it is hypothesized 
that  older  workers  working  part-time  will   have  a  
significantly  lower  likelihood  than  full-time  workers  to  
experience a work-retirement trajectory. 
HP 8.2: Since men have in average a more stable career 
than women,  the hypothesis is that working part-time will  
lower  the  likelihood  to  undertake  a  work-retirement  
trajectory, significantly more for the former than for the  
latter 
BY INDUSTRY:
HP 8.3:  Given  the  dissemination  of  time  reconciliation 
policies,  it  is  hypothesized  that  working  part-time  will  
lower  the  likelihood  to  undertake  a  work-retirement  
trajectory: 
- the most in public administration, health, education and  
social  work,  real  estate  renting  and  business  activity,  
financial intermediation, and other community.
-less in manufacturing, mining & quarrying, construction,  
wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage &  
catering
-the least in the agriculture, forestry and fishery  
Physical and mental
Health reconciliation
Since  1993  the  government  indirectly  enhance  the 
dissemination of of both physical and mental health 
reconciliation  policies  by  privatizing  the  risk  of 
sickness and disability.
However  since  the  main  recipients  of  sickness  and 
disability  schemes  are  older  workers,  the  social 
protection system  introduces a direct responsibility 
of  employers'  to retain older workers  by improving 
HP 8.4:  Since  health  reconciliation  policies  are  directly 
promoted  by  the  social  protection  system,  it  is 
hypothesized  that  older  workers  that  experience  a  low 
physical  and  mental  strain  at  work  will  have  a  lower  
likelihood to enter a work-retirement trajectory than older  
workers that do not experience them.
BY INDUSTRY:
Employability agreements including policies  education & training % workers
Sector 2006 2008 2009
Agriculture and fishery 0 0 0
Manufacturing 48 43 18
Construction 37 37 0
Trade and catering 12 12 6
Transport and communication 1 1 20
Corporate services 8 7 9
Other services 3 3 7
Total 13 13 9
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working  conditions,  which  by-passes  the  role  of 
collective negotiation.
Because  of  that  the  dissemination  by  CLA appear 
more  limited  and  focused  on  providing  healthier 
working  schedule  (between  60  and  80%  between 
1998-2008) 
HP  8.5:  Since  incentives  to  implement  health 
reconciliation  policies  are  the  same  for  the  whole 
economy,  NO significant  industry pattern is expected in  
the  likelihood  of  entering  a  work-retirement  trajectory 
among  older  workers  experiencing  a  low  physical  and  
mental strain at work.
Age equality The social protection system bans age discrimination 
only in  2004 and since then indirectly  enhance the 
dissemination of age equality policies.
No CLA include age-limits in any phase of the HRM. 
The dissemination of career policies for older workers 
rockets from 2 to more than 40% in 2001 and remain 
relatively constant afterwards.  
HP  8.6:  Since  age  equality  policies  are  indirectly 
promoted  by  the  social  protection  system  and 
systematically disseminated by CLA's, it is hypothesized 
that  older  workers  that  experience  a  supportive  
atmosphere and a fair treatment at work will  have a lower  
likelihood to enter a work-retirement trajectory than older  
workers that do not experience them.
BY INDUSTRY:
 No data are available to derive hypothesis about industry 
pattern in age equality effectiveness.
Employability The dissemination of employability policies are quite 
limited. Less than 10% of CLA regulate training leave 
for  older  workers  between  1998-2008.  CLAs  that 
foster  the  skills'  development  of  older  workers  rise 
from 5% to only 18% in 2001 and decrease to 13% 
afterwards. Thus only a limited share of companies is 
bound to implement employability policies.   
Dissemination BY INDUSTRY:
-High:  manufacturing  and  construction,  and  public 
sector.
-Medium:   trade  and  catering  and  the  corporate 
services
-Low: agriculture and fishery, in other service, and in 
the transport and communication.
HP  8.7:  Because  employability  policies  are  NOT 
systematically  disseminated  by  the  CLA's,  it  is 
hypothesized  that  older  workers  that  experience  skills'  
development at work will NOT have a significantly lower  
likelihood to enter a work-retirement trajectory than older  
workers that do not experience them.
BY INDUSTRY:
HP 8.8: Given the dissemination of employability policies 
by industry, it is hypothesized that  skills' development at  
work  will  lower  the  likelihood  to  undertake  a  work-
retirement trajectory: 
- the most in public administration, health, education and  
social  work,  manufacturing  ,  mining  &  quarrying,  ,  
construction 
-less  in  wholesale  and  retail  trade,  transportation  and  
storage  &  catering;  real  estate  renting  and  business  
activity, and financial intermediation.
-the  least  in  the  agriculture,  forestry  and  fishery,  other  
community.  
8.6 Findings
The hypothesis outlined above are tested using a piecewise-constant exponential model (PCE). The 
sub-sample is restricted to the cohort born from 1944 onward, because the extent is investigated to 
which the entry in the work-retirement transition of the cohorts that reach the age of 50 years in the  
mid-1990's have been significantly affected by the implementation of retaining policies. 
The sample for Italy is obtained from Sharelife survey, that provides retrospective information over  
the  working  career  and  the  job  quality  gathered  between  2008  and  2009  (for  a  more  extensive 
description of Sharelife data, see Chapter 4). Estimations are expressed in hazard ratios in Table  8.6.  
The descriptive of the Sharelife sample that was used in this analysis is presented in Chapter 4.
Model 8.1 includes the controls (see the controls' estimations in Appendix D) the five job quality 
dimensions and the interaction between gender and time reconciliation. It tests HP 8.1 and HP 8.2, HP 
8.4,  HP 8.6 and HP 8.7. The subsequent  models  include the interaction between each job quality  
dimension and the industry: model 8.3 includes interaction between industry and time reconciliation 
policies  and  tests  HP 8.3;  model  8.4  includes  interaction  between  industry  and  physical  health  
reconciliation policies and test; model 8.5 includes interaction between industry and mental health 
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reconciliation policies and test. They both test HP 8.5. Finally model 8.6 includes interaction between 
industry  and  age  equality  policies,  and  model  8.7  includes  interaction  between  industry  and 
employability policies and test HP 8.8. 
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Table 8.6: Piecewise-constant exponential model (PCE) estimating the effectiveness of retaining policies in extending 
working life in the Netherlands.
Source: Sharelife 2008-2009 release 3.1, 2010.
8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6
Retaining policies:
Time Reconciliation 0.451* 4.442 0.380** 0.417** 0.463* 0.397**
Physical Health Reconciliation 0.774** 0.774** 0.525 0.776** 0.777** 0.759**
Mental Health Reconciliation 0.908 0.897 0.890 0.748 0.898 0.891
Age Equality 0.800* 0.818 0.802 0.809 0.580 0.784*
Employability 0.973 0.968 0.927 0.958 0.949 5.927***
2.654** 3.226** 3.154** 2.869** 2.620* 2.945**
Time Reconciliation* Industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery Ref.
Manufacturing, mining & quarrying 0.274
Construction 8.18e-07
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 0.0437***
Financial intermediation 0.142
Real estate renting and business activity 0.695
Public Administration and difence, education, health and social work 0.0803***
Other community 0.0969**
Physical Health Reconciliation* Industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery Ref.
Manufacturing, mining & quarrying 2.448
Construction 1.052
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 1.423
Financial intermediation 1.911
Real estate renting and business activity 2.845
Public Administration and difence, education, health and social work 1.569
Other community 0.716
Mental Health Reconciliation* Industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery Ref.
Manufacturing, mining & quarrying 1.743
Construction 1.705
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 1.263
Financial intermediation 1.222
Real estate renting and business activity 0.979
Public Administration and difence, education, health and social work 1.122
Other community 1.016
Age Equality* Industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery Ref.
Manufacturing, mining & quarrying 1.546
Construction 0.694
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 1.586
Financial intermediation 1.732
Real estate renting and business activity 2.168
Public Administration and difence, education, health and social work 1.367
Other community 1.554
Employability* Industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery Ref.
Manufacturing, mining & quarrying 0.275*
Construction 0.108***
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 0.178**
Financial intermediation 0.0853***
Real estate renting and business activity 0.0948
Public Administration and difence, education, health and social work 0.134***
Other community 0.176**
Failures 218 218 218 218 218 218
Subjects 809 809 809 809 809 809
Total observations 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Interaction: Time Reconciliation* women
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Note: Short variables' description:
Dependent variable:
Work-retirement trajectory: time-varying categorical variable equal to: 0 if the respondent is working at the end of the person-
period spell, 1 if the respondent left employment  at the end of the person-period spell
Independent variables:
Time reconciliation: : time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is working in a part-time job in the person-period spell
Physical health reconciliation:  time-constant interval scale obtained by Factor Analysis (see chap.4) equal from 1 to 4. It  
measure measuring the self-perceived quality of the material working conditions in the last/current job by looking at how the job 
is physically demanding and the workspace comfortable
Mental  health reconciliation:  time-constant interval  scale  obtained by Factor Analysis  (see  chap.4)  equal  from 1 to  4.  It  
measures the self-perceived  emotional burden of the last/current job looking at the time pressure, the emotional burden, and  
conflicts that the work Implies.
Age equality: time-constant interval scale obtained by Factor Analysis (see chap.4) equal from 1 to 4 measuring elf-perceived  
recognition and support  on the last job, the quality of the working atmosphere and the respondents' perception over how fairly 
they are treated by their bosses 
Employability:  time-constant interval scale equal from 1 to 4 measuring the extent  to which the skills of respondents are  
developed in the last/current.
Gender: time-constant dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a woman
Illness: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious illness (such as cancer, asthma etc.) in the person-
period spell
Stress: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious situation of high stress in the person-period spell
Poor health: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent perceive their health conditions as poor in the person-period spell
Family situation: time-varying set of dummy variable combining information over the cohabiting status of the respondent with 
and the career of the partner in the person-period spell.
Social class:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the social class the individual belong to in the person-period spell
Industry:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the industry where the respondent is working in the person-period spell.  
For a more detailed description see Chapter 4. 
 
Model 8.1 show the effectiveness of retaining policies in the Netherlands is quite high, because  
successful their conveyance into companies'  HRM practices. In fact  three out of the five working 
dimensions proved to have been systematically improved by companies to effectively EWL. Looking 
at  the  separate  sets  of  retaining  policies  it  can  be  seen  that,  according  to  the  hypothesis,  this  
conveyance is successfully carried out by social partners, thanks to their coordinate structure, and by 
the social protection system itself.  
As hypothesized in HP 8.1, working part-time in the late career reduces significantly the likelihood 
of exiting employment. This empirical result supports the argument that the widespread inclusion of  
time reconciliation policies between 1999 and 2009 in CLA's bound a large part of Dutch companies  
to  shorten  their  working  schedule  to  retain  older  workers.  This  systematic  dissemination  has  
significantly  extended  the  working  life  of  older  workers  that  are  affected  by  time  reconciliation 
policies, who show to be about 55% less likely to undertake a work-retirement transition than full-time 
workers. According to HP 8.2, this result hold only when the reduction of the working time occurs 
under the more favorable conditions offered by the partial retirement schemes. In fact when the part-
time is experienced outside these schemes, it does not extend working life. This is the case of women 
that, after childbearing, re-enter the labour market predominantly with part-time schedule to better 
reconcile work with their caring obligations (Jelle Visser et al. 2004). Because part-time is prevalently 
their ordinary working schedule, which is not chosen in late career to adapt their working conditions to 
their  ageing  and  moreover  is  not  accompanied  by  monetary  benefit  as  in  the  partial  retirement 
schemes, it  does not decrease women' s likelihood to enter a work-retirement trajectory. In fact if  
working part-time women are more than two times more likely than men to exit from employment. 
A  second  set  of  retaining  policies  whose  effectiveness  is  enhanced  by  their  systematic 
dissemination  in  CLA's  is  age  equality.  According  to  HP 8.6,  older  workers  that  experience  a 
supportive atmosphere and a fair treatment at work will  have a lower likelihood to enter a work-
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retirement trajectory that is 20% lower than older workers that do not experience them. 
This finding supports the argument that, even in absence of a legal age discrimination ban, social  
partners systematically convey policies that eliminate the age-based limitations in all aspects of the 
employment relation, comprised the possibility of pursuing an upward career, already in 2001. These 
policies penetrated the HRM of a significant part of Dutch companies and systematically improved the 
quality of the social relations that older workers experience on-the-job. The social protection system 
supports the dissemination of these policies in the rest of the economy only in 2004, when the age  
discrimination ban is introduced47 (OECD, 2005).    
The argument that the effectiveness of retaining is enhanced by their systematic diffusion in CLA's 
is also supported by the non-significant effect of employability policies. According to the HP 8.7 in  
fact older workers that experience skills'  development at work do NOT have a significantly lower 
likelihood  to  enter  a  work-retirement  trajectory  than  older  workers  that  do  not  experience  them. 
Although age limitations have been eliminated also for what concern the access to training programs,  
social  partners  fail  to  systematically  convey  policies  that  constrain  companies  to  develop  older  
workers's skills, that in fact are included only in a small minority of CLA's between 1998 and 2009.  
Since only a marginal portion of the productive system is constrained to implement employability 
policies, their effectiveness is shown to be low.
The findings concerning the last two sets of retaining physical and mental health reconciliation 
support only partially the hypothesis HP 8.4. According to HP 8.4, older workers that experience a low 
physical strain at work will be about 25% less likely to enter a work-retirement trajectory than older 
workers that do not experience them. Against the hypothesis HP 8.4, the same finding does not hold 
for older workers that experience a low mental strain at work, that show no significant difference in 
the timing they outflow from employment with respect to older workers that experience high mental  
strain.  These results support the argument that the effectiveness of health reconciliation policies is  
boosted by the incentives and sanctions set by the social protection system to companies to reduce the 
incidence of  occupational  disability  on  the workforce.  In  fact,  since older  workers are  the  major  
recipient of this scheme, companies, under the threat of financial sanctions, are constrained to retain 
them longer by improving the healthiness of their working condition. The results show that employers 
have mainly improved the physical healthiness and to a less systematic extent the mental healthiness 
of  the  working  conditions.  In  the  case  of  health  reconciliation  policies  the  conveyance  of  social  
partnership  is  not  necessary,  since  the  constrains  set  by  the social  protection  system by-pass  the 
collective bargaining system and affect companies directly.
The hypotheses concerning the industry industry patterns in the effectiveness of retaining policies 
are  tested  in  model  8.2-8.3-8.4-8.5.  According  to  the  hypothesis  HP 8.4,  no  significant  industry 
patterns are found in the effectiveness  of the only set  of  policies  conveyed directly by the social 
protection system: health reconciliation policies. The effect of a low physical and mental strain at work 
on the timing of the employment exit does not significantly vary across industry, because the social  
protection's constrains and sanctions are the same in the whole economy. Industry patterns are also not 
significant in the effectiveness of age equality policies (see model 8.5), for which no hypothesis made  
due to the lack of data showing their dissemination in industry CLAs.  
47 Although relevant this measure only indirectly conveys age equality because it increases the accountability of employers 
once the discriminatory act are brought to trials1, but does not affect the discriminatory attitudes towards older workers. 
As in the Germany and Italy this ban is the adoption of the directive 2000/78/EC (OECD, 2005) .  
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As  for  the  remaining  to  sets  of  retaining  policies,  time  reconciliation  and  employability,  the 
findings show to a significant extent the hypotheses HP 8.3 and HP 8.8, despite they do not display a 
gradient as depicted in both hypotheses. For both sets of retaining policies as a reference were chosen 
the industry where the most marginal their dissemination was: the agriculture, forestry and fishery.  
According to the  HP 8.3,  the  likelihood of entering a work-retirement trajectories of older workers 
experiencing  is  far  much  lower  in  where  the  time  reconciliation  policies  have  been  more  
systematically  disseminated  by  the  collective  negotiations,  namely:  public  administration,  health, 
education and social work, in wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & catering, than in 
the  agriculture,  forestry  and  fishery  industry.   Although  similar  results  hold  also  for  the  other 
industries indicated in  HP 8.3  (the hazard ratios are also for these industries lower than 0), namely 
manufacturing,  mining  &  quarrying,  construction,  real  estate  renting  and  business  activity,  and 
financial intermediation, their estimations unfortunately do not satisfy the significance level.    
Finally the results in model 8.6 support even more strongly the argument that the effectiveness of  
retaining policies is directly related with the extent to which they have been disseminated into the  
companies HRM strategy by the collective negotiations. Despite model 8.1 shows that employability 
policies have no significant effect on the overall workforce, model 8.6 shows that this result is due to 
the fact that their dissemination across industries is highly diversified. They are not disseminated in 
theagriculture,  forestry  and  fisher  industry  and  relatively  much  more  diffused  in  the  rest  of  the 
economy. Because of that, according to the HP 8.6 older workers experiencing skills' development are  
between  70%  and  90%  significantly  less  likely  to  undertake  a  work-retirement  transition  in  all 
industries with respect to agriculture, forestry and fishery. The only exception is here represented by 
the financial intermediation industry, where the hazard ratio score less than 0 but it is not significant.
All in all, the results of the CRM models show that the effectiveness of retaining policies to extend  
working life is high in the Netherlands. According to the hypotheses retaining policies are effective on  
the one hand when their implementation is successfully conveyed by the social protection system as in 
the case of physical health reconciliation policies. On the other hand they are effective only when they 
are disseminated by social partners through mechanisms, as the highly coordinated bargaining system,  
that constrain the strategy of companies to retaining older workers.
8.7 Conclusion
In  this  chapter  it  was  investigated  the  extent  to  which  the  coordinated  partnership  in  the 
Netherlands enhances  rather  than  hinder  the effectiveness  of  retaining policies  between 1995 and 
2009.  The  main  conclusion  from  the  analysis  is  that,  because  of  their  high  coordination,  the 
institutional channels by which social partners can affect the conveyance of the EWL target from the 
social  protection systems to the production system enhance the effectiveness of retaining policies, 
which result to be high.  Because of the high vertical coordination of the social partners' organizations,  
the EWL target is successfully conveyed into the collective bargaining system. Once retaining policies  
are included into CLA's, then companies are compelled to implement them. The collective bargaining  
system is therefore the structure that constrain companies to reverse the opportunistic strategy from 
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shedding older workers to effectively EWL. 
Secondly it can be concluded that the more systematic is the diffusion of retaining policies, the 
higher  is  the  share  of  companies  that  are  constrains  to  implement  them  and  the  higher  their  
effectiveness results to be. This is supported by data showing that the only retaining policies that is not 
effective is  employability  that,  because of  their  marginal  coordination,  do not  systematically  bind 
companies to offer older workers training to retain them. 
Thirdly,  because their  dissemination  is  not  voluntaristic,  but  systematically  coordinated  by the 
collective bargaining system, the effectiveness of retaining policies does not follow a marked industry 
patterns, but is quite uniform. 
The last conclusion is that, when the conveyance of retaining policies is carried out by the social  
protection system with appropriate demand and supply incentives or constrains, then the conveyance 
through the collective bargaining system is not necessary for retaining policies to be effective.
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9 The effectiveness of retaining policies in Germany
9.1 Introduction
As argued in HP 3.6, the intermediate outcome attained in Germany was due to the intermediate 
level of coordination of the  system. The research question that will be answered in this chapter is: The 
main research question of this chapter is: to what extent has the strong organizational articulation of  
unions and employers'  associations  influenced the effectiveness  of  retaining policies  implemented  
between  the  mid-1990's  until  2009  in  Germany? The  alignment  of  companies'  HRM  policies 
(extending  working  life),  is,  according  to  the  HP 3.3,  first  enhanced  by  the successful  to-down 
conveyance of retaining  policies  into the  coordinated Confederations  representing at  the  peak the 
interests of employees and employers. 
Because  of  their  coordinated  vertical  structure,  social  partners  can  aggregate  their  different 
branches  into  national  unitary  confederations:  the  BDA  (Bundesvereinigung  der  Deutschen  
Arbeitgeberverbände) and the DGB (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund), which organize respectively the 
employers 'associations and union. Like in the Netherlands, those confederations, by aggregating the 
interests they represent, offer the possibility to social partners to participate to a rather institutionalized 
Consultation process with the Government.  Nonetheless this adoption is more fragmented because it 
is not performed by a bilateral body, as in the Netherlands, but by two separate Confederations, which 
can not coordinate the collective bargaining with common recommendations. Two different strategical 
addresses are instead transferred to the decentralized organizations. While BDA attempts to encourage 
their members to retain older workers disseminating informations and resources, DGB has a more 
antagonistic positions.
Moreover, according to the HP 3.6, this alignment is limited because companies strategies can not 
be bounded , as the Netherlands, by a highly coordinated system of collective bargaining. In fact due 
to a recent process of erosion, industry CLAs have lost its capacity to uniform the working conditions 
across companies for two main reasons. At first the collective bargaining has reduced its coverage,  
significantly  cutting  the  percentage  of  companies  that  are  legally  bound  by  CLAs  that  contains 
retaining policies. Secondly the introduction of opening clauses allows companies to derogate from the 
minimum standards set by industry CLAs to retain older employees in case “hardship circumstances”  
occur.  In  other  words,  whenever  retaining  older  workers  attempts  on  the  companies'  economic 
viability, work councils can derogate from the implementation of industry CLA's aimed, in the parts  
aimed at achieving this outcome. 
All in all, because of its moderately coordinated structure, the capacity of social partnership to 
convey  retaining  policies  into  companies'  strategy  is  limited.  From a  central  level  it  is  strongly  
conveyed  top-down  by  the  state  together  with  the  two  Confederations,  especially  BDA.  The 
employers' Confederation engages their members in information campaigns that raises their awareness 
over the ongoing workforce's shrinking and over the best practices to minimize the decline of their  
seniors' productivity. However, since no common recommendations are conveyed to the organizations 
responsible  for  the  industry  bargaining,  for  long  time  the  social  partnership  structure  fails  from 
coordinating retaining policies throughout the collective bargaining structure.  
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This Chapter is organized as it follows. In Section 9.2 it is described how the social protection  
system attempts to convey directly retaining policies top-down taking advantage of the the vertical 
coordination of the partnership system. Section 9.3 is instead devoted to a more detailed description of 
the aspects that makes the vertical organization of social partners in Germany quite coordinated, but  
that compromise the coordination of the collective bargaining system. 
In Section 9.4 the hypotheses are formulated. The results of the piecewise constant exponential 
model are shown and interpreted in Section 9.5 and the conclusion over the intermediate effectiveness 
of retaining policies in extending working life are discussed at the end. 
9.2 Social protection's attempts to convey top-down retaining 
policies
The social protection system conveys the EWL target into the strategy of the production system by 
endorsing both social partners and other local agencies. Moreover it sets financial incentives that by-
pass social partners and directly affect companies' HRM. Although this conveyance started as early as 
in 1989, it suffers a great limitation in the aftermath of the German Reunification in 1990, when, due 
to the economic shock, it needs to be interrupted until the second half of the same decade. 
A lists  of  the laws that  the social  protection systems have introduced to convey top-down the 
implementation of  retaining  policies  to  the  partnership  and the production system is  provided  in  
Table 9.1.
Table 9.1: Social protections' law aimed at conveying top-down retaining policies in Germany.
General 
1994 Eingliederungszusschüsse, Artikel 88-92, 
131 SGB III
1994 Expansion of wage subsidies for companies that hire older workers (55+) for a 
maximum duration of 60 months
1960's  ABM SAM 
Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaβnahmen 630- DM 
gesetz
1960's 630- DM law- ABS SAM job creation measure- provide older unemployed with 
publicly subsidized job in fields of public interests for maximum 3 years. 
1998-2002 Bündnis für Arbeit 2001- Joint trilateral declaration: “Alliance for job, Training and Competitiveness”
2002 INQA- Job-Aqtivsgesets 2002 INQA- New quality of work – Expansion of wage subsidies for companies that 
hire older workers- the minimum age is lowered from 55 to 50 years and the maximum 
duration is extended to 60 months
2003- Telzeit- und Befristungsgesets – 
Eingliederungszuschüsse   
Eingliederungsgutschein 
2003- contribution exemptions for retain older workers – wage subsidies to hire older 
unemployed- more relaxed rules to employ older workers with fixed-term contracts
2003 Hartz I- Erstes Gesetz für moderne 
Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt
2003 Hartz I- First law for a modern service in the labour market. Introduces incentives 
to companies that hire older workers and to older workers that are in or at risk of 
unemployment (50+) that accept a lower paid job. 
2004 - Hartz III- Dritte Gesetz für moderne 
Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt
2004 Hartz III- Third law for a modern service in the labour market. The maximum 
duration of the wage subsidies for companies that hire older workers is reduced from 60 
to 36 months. Moreover the obligation of companies to retain older workers after the 
expiry of the subsidy is abolished.
2005- Perspektive 50plus- Beschäftigungspakte  
für ältere in den Regionen
2005- “Prospect 50-plus” regional employment pacts for older workers” by the Federal 
Ministry for labour and social affairs (BMAS)
2007 Reform der 58-Regel, nach §428 des SGB 
III
2007- Reform of 58-rule according to §428 of the Social Code III- The obligation for 
unemployed to search for a job as long as they withdraw the unemployment benefit is 
introduced also after the age of 58. 
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Time reconciliation
-1989 Altersteilzeit (1) 1989- Introduction of  old-age part-time work
1994- Altersteilzeit (2) 1994- Relaxed conditions for old-age part-time work 
1996 Gezets sur Förderung eines gleitended 
Übergangs in den Ruhestand (3)
1996- Reform of old-age part-time work to encourage progressive retirement 
1998- Altersteilzeit (4) 1998-Further prolongation of old-age part-time work
1999- Zweites Gesetz zur Fortentzwicklung 
der Altersteilzeit (5)
1999- Second Law for the further development of old-age part-time scheme. Part-
time scheme is made available also to part-time workers and the public subsidies to 
employers are terminated along a transitional period of 10 years (2009).
2009- Altersteilzeit Ablauf (6) 2009- Expiry of subsidized old-age part-time work
Health Reconciliation
1996 Gesetz über die Sicherheit von Geräten
2000 Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz
1996 Act on the security of the devices
2000 Occupational security act
They introduces the obligation to conduct a risk analysis and to employ a works 
physician in the company. They include in the definition of occupational safety and 
health the psychical as well as the physical well-being together with the social 
relationship. 
2001 Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB) Fünftes Buch 
(V) - Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung Artikel 
3-20, SGB V
2001 Statutory Health Insurance articles 3-20, Social law book 5. It contains 
incentives for companies that implement joint project that promote occupational health.
2002 INQA- Job-Aqtivsgesets 2002- New quality of work initiatives joint initiative between the Federal Government, 
the state Governments, trade union, employers' and business associations, social secuirty 
organizations, foundations and individual companies. 
2009 2009- Federal Ministry of the Interior- Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) and the 
German  Civil service association promote a campaign (DBB) promote a joint campaign 
on “Promoting health management in the federal administration”
Age Equality
2002 INQA 2002- New quality of work initiatives joint initiative between the Federal Government, 
the state Governments, trade union, employers' and business associations, social secuirty 
organizations, foundations and individual companies. 
2006 AGG Allgemeines 
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz.
2006- General Equal Treatment Act- introduce the ban of age discrimination in the 
employment relation. 
Employability
1998-2002 Bündnis für Arbeit 1998-2002 Alliance for job- promote the lifelong training
2002 INQA-  Job-Aqtivsgesets 2002- New quality of work initiatives. Joint initiative between the Federal Government, 
the state Governments, trade union, employers' and business associations, social security 
organizations, foundations and individual companies. Funding of vocational training for 
workers aged 50+ and SME's
2003 Hartz I- Erstes Gesetz für moderne 
Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt
2003 Hartz I- First law for a modern service in the labour market. Introduces incentives 
to companies that after recruiting older workers, include them in re-training programs.
2005- Perspektive 50plus- Beschäftigungspakte 
für ältere in den Regionen
2005- “Prospect 50-plus” regional employment pacts for older workers” by the Federal 
Ministry for labour and social affairs (BMAS)- mainly for older unemployed
2006  WeGebAU- Weiterbildung 
geringqualifizierter und beschäftigter älterer 
Arbeitnehmer im Unternehmen
2006 Continuous training of older and unskilled workers' program  in firms with less 
than 250 employees – established by the Federal Government and the Social Security 
Code III
(source: Eichhorst, 2011; Stette, 2011; Naegele & Bauknecht, 2011; Aleksandrowicz, 2014; Duell & Duell, 2002)
A first measure, introduced as early as in 1989, is aimed at enhancing part-time work in the late  
career (in the framework time reconciliation policies).  Its  aim is to delay the early entry into the 
unemployment  pathway granted  by  the  58er  and  59er rule48 by 5-years  with a partial  retirement 
48 As shown in Chapter 6, the unemployment scheme allowed older workers to withdraw a benefit up to a maximum 
duration equal first to 12 and then extended to 36 months in 1986. This provision, combined with the possibility for long-
term older unemployed to withdraw their full-pension benefit at the age of 60 years, allowed them to effectively exit 
employment at the age of 59 years until 1986 (59er rule) and at the age of 57 years and 4 month (58er rule) afterwards.    
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scheme  (Altersteilzeit-  old-age  part-time  scheme,  seen  in  Chapter  6),  which  provides  financial 
incentives  to  both  employees  and  companies (Teipen  and  Kohli,  2004;  (Eichhorst  2011). Older 
workers can benefit from the fact that the reduction of the working part-time implied a reduction less  
than proportional of their wage and do not affect the future pension income49. Companies instead can 
claim for subsidies to the unemployment insurance fund managed by the local public employment  
services (PES50)  (OECD 2005)51. 
This incentive promotes the companies' adoption of time reconciliation policies because it lower 
the labour cost of older workers if they work part-time with respect to full-time. However this scheme 
constrains companies to retain older employees for additional 5 years and the subsidies offered to  
companies did not overrule the opportunity cost of shedding older redundant workers full-time as soon 
as they become eligible to the unemployment pathway at the age of 57 years and 4 months. 
This first attempts of the social protection system to convey the EWL target into the strategy of 
companies is bluntly interrupt only in the years following the economic reunification between West 
and Eastern Germany in 1990. As we have seen in Chapter 6, the reunification posed a great challenge 
for the entire German productive system. In fact if companies in the Eastern regions were suddenly 
exposed to the international competition, companies in the Western regions had to support the former 
by massively increasing their non-wage labour cost, both in terms of tax and contributory rates. As a  
result of this, German economy had to incur a massive process of industrial restructuring in which a  
large mass of workers were expelled from the productive system (Teipen and Kohli 2004) 
Such a workforce' restructuring prevents the social protection system to pursue further the target of 
EWL. It requires instead the implementation of emergency measures that prioritize the least socially  
painful  expulsions, by facilitating the exit  of older workers nearly available to a pathway of exit.  
Because of that, the retrenchment of pathways of exit, as formulated in 1992, is diluted over time with  
a very long period of transitions, additional emergency pathway are opened for older workers expelled 
by Eastern companies and additional freedom is given to social partners to manage the old-age part-
time scheme according to the performance in each industry (see Chapter 6 for more information). 
At the same time, the social protection system manages to limit the resort to pathways of exit only  
to very few emergency years following the German reunification and continue their retrenchment, 
although progressive, afterwards. Social protections provides signals that redundant seniors will not 
provided with additional pathways but needs to be re-integrated. For that purpose financial incentives  
are offered to companies that recruit the increasing number of older unemployed who, because of their 
retrenchment, fail to fall into a pathway of exit. This is the case of hiring wage subsidies52, which 
49 In more detailed, as explained in Chapter 6, older workers' wage during partial retirement scheme amounted to 70% of 
the full-time wage and with almost no consequences for the future pension benefit scheme. Often these amounts were 
event topped-up till 80-90% by the collective agreements, especially if negotiated in large sectors or companies (OECD 
2005).
50 PES's are composed in equal number by representatives of both Government and social partners (Vogel 2012).
51 The PES reimbursed 20% of the wage provided to the older workers in partial retirement and 10% of the social 
contributions. 
52 This wage subsidy targeted to unemployed older than 50 years who were nevertheless too young (less than 58 years old)  
to be eligible to stop searching for a job. 
    It was included in a series of measures to enhance the recruitment of unemployed with serious severe employment  
impedment implemented between 1994 and 1998. Other measures were targeted to long-term unemployed (without a job 
for more than 1 year) and to unemployed that had to incur in special training curse to be re-employed (Wolff & Stephan,  
2013). 
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replaces up to 50% of the wage of a newly hired worker aged 55 years or more up to 12 months 53 
(Eichhorst, 2011; (Duell and Vogler-Ludwig 2012). The coexistence of public policies aimed at both 
excluding and reintegrate older workers that fell out the industrial restructuring process convey to the 
partnership  and the  production  system an  ambiguous  message  on  what  target  their  policies  shall 
pursue. 
As a result of that ambiguity, no resistance is opposed to the inappropriate use that social partners 
make of the incentives in the part-time old-age schemes, originally set to enhance the implementation 
of  time  reconciliation  policies. In  1996  the  social  protection  system agreed  to  allocate  the  same 
subsidies also to companies (covered by the unemployment insurance funds) that adopted the old-age 
part-time  scheme  vertically,  with  the  so-called  Blockmodell  (see  section  6.3  for  a  more  detailed 
description). With this measure companies face the same financial incentives to either retain their older 
employees in a part-time schedule for 5 years or to shed them after only 2.5 years of full-time work.  
Since the horizontal old-age scheme imposes higher reorganizational costs and hinder the generational 
turnover and skills' rejuvenation of their workforce, companies will favor the implementation of the  
Blockmodell. The social protection's decision of providing the same subsidy for  both the part-time and 
the  block  model  vanishes  the  incentives  originally  set  to  enhance  time  reconciliation  policies  
(Eichhorst 2011).   
In the late 1990's a second, more coherent attempts are made by the social protection system to 
convey the EWL target into the strategy of companies. The first message is conveyed in at the end of 
1998, when a permanent trilateral body was instituted, the so-called “alliance for job, training and 
competitiveness”  (Gemeinsame  Erklärung  des  Bündnisses  für  Arbeit,  Ausbildung  und  
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit),  to  elaborate  a  shared  strategy  to  promote  the  future  sustainability  and 
competitiveness of the German socio-economic system. In that occasion the social protection system 
manages to engage the Confederal peak in a common declaration where EWL is unanimously agreed 
to be one of the fundamental outcomes that need to be achieved to address the present and future skills' 
shortages induced by the population ageing. In 2001 this statement is converted in common guidelines 
wherewith the Government's and the Confederations'  representatives try to convey this message to 
their  members.  A first  set of  guidelines  encourage the organizations responsible for the collective 
bargaining to abolish the Blockmodell in the industry Altersteilzeit scheme,  in order to set incentives 
that truly enhance the dissemination of time reconciliation policies into the strategy of companies. The 
social  protection  system tries  to  foster  the  negotiation  of  these  reforms  by  abolishing  the  public 
support  that  allowed to  finance to  the  same extent  the  part-time  and the  block  model.  Although 
announced in 1999, this abolition de-facto is implemented in 2009, at the very end of the period of  
observation (Duell and Vogler-Ludwig, 2012; Wolff and Stephan 2013).
A second set of labour policies implemented monetary incentives to companies that retained older 
workers. The main target is to re-integrate the mass of seniors ejected out of productive system after  
the Reunification,  who remained increasingly shut  out  the pathways of  exit.  This  is  the rationale 
behind the financial incentives to the recruit of older workers expand after 2002. In that year the  Job-
Aqtivsgesets the extend the hiring wage subsidies also to companies that recruit unemployed aged 50 
53 While enhancing the re-integration of seniors this measure is not really meant to retain older employees. In fact the 
subsidy is not allocated to older workers that was regularly employed by the claiming companies in the last four years 
(Wolff & Stephan, 2013). 
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years  or  longer.  The  years  after  the  Teilzeit-  und  Befristungsgesetz  –  Eingliederungszuschüsse 
Eingliederungsgutschein  (Part-time  and  temporary  employment  law  -  wage  subsidies  inclusion 
voucher) increases the wage subsidies, whose maximum duration is set first to 60 months and then to  
36 months in 2004 (Hartz III  law54),  and provides  higher  flexibility  to companies  that  hire  older 
unemployed. Those companies can in fact recruit older workers using fixed-term contracts for a longer 
time span than the maximum allowed for the rest of the workforce. These incentives are expanded in 
the  same  year  by  the  so-called  Hartz  I  law  that  derogated  from  the  payment  of  unemployment 
contributions the employers that employ older workers that are currently unemployed or at risk of  
becoming. In case older workers faced insurmountable obstacles to be recruited then they were re-
integrated in the labour market with  job creation programs ( Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaβnahmen 630- 
DM law- ABS SAM) that offer publicly subsidized job in fields of public interests for maximum 3  
years (Wolff and Stephan 2013; Jacobi and Kluve 2006).
Despite this set of labour policies make the older workers cheaper to recruit than the rest of the  
workforce, they do not enhance companies to implement retaining policies, as I have defined them. 
This is carried out by a third set of measures which encourage them to retain older workers into  
employment  with  employability  policies.  These  measure  are  first  directly  recommended  in  the 
tripartite statements included in the alliance for job and then are enhanced with monetary incentives  
that are provided either directly to companies or indirectly on the bases of regional pact stipulated 
between the government agencies and social partners55. Direct incentives are financed by the Hartz I 
reform in  2003 only  to  companies  that  offer  training  courses  to  newly  hired  seniors  and by  the 
WeGebAU in 2006 to companies with less than 250 employees that re-train their older personnel 
(Weiterbildung geringqualifizierter und beschäftigter älterer Arbeitnehmer im Unternehmen- Training 
of low-skilled and older employees in the company). Indirect incentives are instead provided by two 
different targeted initiatives: INQA (the new quality of work) in 2002 and by the Perspektive 50+. 
While the first initiative provide funding to vocational training organized for older workers especially  
in  small  firms,  the  second  is  targeted  on  providing  specialized  training  to  older  unemployed  to 
maximize the re-employment perspective (OECD, 2005) (Duell and Vogler-Ludwig 2012).  
Other general measures introduced by the social protection system to convey the EWL target into 
the  strategy  of  companies  endorse  the  partnership  system  by  stipulating  agreements  with  the  
employers and unions' Confederations. The first goal of these attempts is to raise the awareness of  
employers and to spread good-practices (the so-called Leuchtturm-Projeckte- Lighthouse projects) that  
can help companies to modernize their HRM policies to both to the increased turbulence of the labour 
market and to the demographic challenges of the ageing population process. However no incentives or 
constrains are set to enhance or bind employers to implement them (OECD, 2005).
The remaining policies' sets (health reconciliation and age equality) have been also promoted, but 
more  indirectly,  because as in Italy (see Chapter 10), the improvement of those dimensions of job 
quality is promoted for the overall workforce and miss a specific target on older workers. In 1996 and 
54 This law in fact belong to the Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt- law for a modern service in the 
labour market formulated on the bases of the guidelines provided by the Hartz Commission  
55 Together with other organizations of the civil society that are important stakeholder in employment and demographic 
issues: churches, chambers of the commerce and craft, consultants and intermediaries, employment agencies, politicians,  
health insurance, scientific and university institutions etc (OECD, 2006).
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in 2000 the Gesetz  über  die Sicherheit  von Geräten and the Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz  give a more 
systematic approach to  the  improvement  of  the  occupational  safety in the companies by obliging 
companies to run a risk analysis and by adopting a wider concept of health that include the psychical 
as well as the physical well-being together with the social relationship. Moreover financial incentives  
are provided both directly to companies that implement joint project that promote occupational health 
(2001-  Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB) Fünftes Buch (V) - Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung Artikel 3-20,  
SGBV- Statutory Health Insurance articles 3-20, Social law book 5) and to companies that part of the 
joint initiatives organized in the INQA program (2002- New quality of work). Both these initiatives  
are aimed at improving the healthiness of the working conditions to reduce the occupational diseases 
and accidents, but miss the specific target of reconciling work with ageing (Eichhorst 2011).
In the same way, also age equality policies, here defined as measures that improve the support and  
the equal treatment on the workplace, are promoted also indirectly by the social protection system. The 
ban of discriminatory acts in employment practices is established quite late only in 2006. This ban 
increases the legal accountability of the employers, but has no effect on the atmosphere older workers 
experience at work. Moreover, despite the quality of the social relations in the workplace is promoted 
among  the  goals  of  the  initiatives  undertaken  by  the  INQA program (2002)  and  by  the  law on  
occupational safety discussed just above (1996-2000), no target is specifically hold on older workers.  
All in all, the social protection system to a great extent failed to directly promote companies to  
implement retaining policies. The main incentives are set to cut the labour costs of older unemployed 
and to promote their employability. On the contrary the main initiatives of the social protection system 
is to endorse social partners (either the peak or regional Confederations or the industry organization) in 
social pacts (with the various initiatives: Alliance for job; INQA;  Perspective 50+ etc.) in order to to  
convince them to disseminate retaining policies throughout the collective bargaining system. However, 
as we will see in the next section in this chapter, the success of these attempts are endangered by the  
moderated coordination of the partnership system in Germany, which will be described in the next  
section.
9.3 Institutional affinities
According  to  the  analytical  framework  described  in  Chapter  3,  the  moderate coordination  of 
partnership system in Germany limits the top-down diffusion of the retaining policies for two main 
reasons. The first concerns the vertical structure of the partnership organizations, which fails from 
conveying a strategical address able to univocally coordinate the collective bargaining. 
Similarly  to  the  Netherlands,  Germany  has  build  during  the  1950's  and  the  1960's  a  quite 
coordinated system of interests'  representations.  Unions and employers associations are articulated 
according to different dimensions: ideological, sectoral and territorial. As explained in Chapter 6, the  
different interests represented by the different organization are nevertheless integrated in a hierarchical  
confederal structure, where different  ideological  currents are conveyed into industry organizations, 
which  are  then  grouped  by  region.  At  the  peak  two  main  umbrella  organizations  integrate  and 
encompass the interests of employers associations and unions: BDA andDGB. 
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Because  of  their  moderate  and  cooperative  attitude,  BDA  and  DGB  are  involved  by  the  
Government in rather steady Consultation processes. Therefore when in the late-1990's social partners 
faced for the first time the EWL re-conversion, they could not preserve their members, as explained in  
Chapter 6. On the contrary, once retrenchment policies were enacted, the EWL target penetrate also 
BDA and DGB strategy since it is in their interest to make EWL sustainable also for their members  
(both companies and older workers). Unlike in the Netherlands, they cannot convey retaining policies 
into their members strategies because the constitutional principle of Tarifautonomie  prevented them 
from  interfering  with  collective  bargaining  (Lehmbruch  2003).Therefore  BDA and  DGB  do  not 
provide a common platform steering the more decentralized organizations responsible of the collective 
bargaining. Unlike in the Netherlands, the German Confederations do not participate in a bilateral 
setting that foster a common understanding and  common recommendations over EWL.  Instead they 
provide their member organizations with unilateral strategical addresses, which are hard to translate  
into retaining policies when collective negotiations take place (Pulignano 2010). All in all, the lack of 
common recommendations of BDA and DGB hinder the inclusion of retaining policies into industry 
CLAs and thus their top-down conveyance through the partnership structure. 
The second reason which hinder the conveyance of the EWL target in the companies' strategy is the 
moderate coordination of the collective bargaining system. Traditionally the collective bargaining in 
Germany are organized in a very coordinated structure, which mirrors the very coordinated structure  
of interests representations. The high coordination of the system was granted by two main aspects of 
its  regulation.  The first  is  the  strict  vertical  and functional  hierarchical  structure  of the collective 
negotiations  that  legally  bind the lower  negotiations  and HRM to the agreements  signed at  more 
central  levels.  The negotiations  takes  place  first  at  regional  and  industry level,  which  define  the 
minimum standards and the topics that have to be treated in the decentralized level(Streeck and Hassel 
2003b). 
This standard can be improved flexibly at company-level, where agreements can be made also on 
topic not explicitly treated (such as occupational health and safety or anti-discrimination) or explicitly 
demanded by the industry-CLAs (such as the flexible organization of the working time). All in all, if 
retaining  policies  or  targets  are  channelled  through  the  collective  bargaining  system in  Germany 
companies that are covered by the CLAs are legally bound to implement them in their HRM policies. 
The second aspect that granted the collective bargaining system a high capacity to coordinate HRM 
policies in Germany is the fact that CLAs are compulsory for the great majority of the productive  
system. CLAs bind in fact all the companies that are members of a employers' organization that fall  
within BDA. Since BDA represents about 80% of the companies in Germany, collective bargaining  
even  out  the  material  working  conditions  in  the  far  majority  of  the  productive system,  with  the  
manufactory (and especially) the metalworking industry as a “pace-setter” . The high coordination of 
the collective bargaining system is also granted by the high coverage of the collective negotiations at 
company level. In fact, unlike Italy, the elections of the union' bodies is not voluntaristic, but is a legal 
duties for companies. In short if retaining policies are included into the “pace setter” industry, the  
collective bargaining system will have a strong capacity to spread those standards and to make them 
compulsory to the greatest part of the production system (Streeck and Hassel 2003b).
Such highly  coordinated  collective  bargaining  system was  able  to  steadily  reproduce  itself  by 
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adapting first to the economic expansion of the 1960's and 1970's and to the globalization turmoil of 
the  1980's.  However  at  the  beginning  of  the  1990's  the  economic  re-unification  undermined  the 
adaptive capacity of the system, whose coordination started to progressively erode. The first aspect  
undermined was the coverage of collective bargaining,, which diminished from 80 to 65% because an 
increasing amount of companies dropped their membership from BDA. The second aspect undermined 
was the legal status of regional-industry CLAs, which can be derogated by the companies negotiations 
in case of “hardship circumstances” with the so-called  opening clauses. According to these clauses 
whenever the implementation of retaining policies established in a CLAs is expected to undermine the  
economic  performance  of  the  companies,  these  latter  are  legitimized  to  drop  them and  continue 
shedding older workers according to their economic convenience(Streeck and Hassel 2003b). 
All in all, since employers have an increasing opportunity to defect from the binding power of the 
CLA's,  by  either stepping out  from BDA's membership or by making use of opening clauses ,  the 
collective bargaining capacity to convey top-down retaining policies has become rather limited.    
This section was devoted to describe the two main aspects of the partnership's system in Germany 
that can hinder the conveyance of the EWL target from the social protection to the production system: 
the  moderate  coordination  of  the  vertical  structure  of  interests  organization  and  the  decreasing  
coordination of the collective bargaining system. 
The next  section discusses  the specific  mechanism by which the moderate  coordination of  the 
partnership structure has affected the conveyance of retaining policies in Germany from the social 
protection to the production system. Then working hypotheses are formulated over the effectiveness of 
retaining policies to extend working life for each set of the retaining policies and by industry. 
9.4 Retaining policies' effectiveness: working hypotheses
As explained in the previous section, the social protection system succeeds in conveying the EWL 
target into the peak level of the social partnership system in the second half of the 1990's when the  
emergency due to the German reunification was withdrawn. Employers' and unions' Confederation 
(BDA and DGB) officially share the target in 1998 when in the Alliance for Job they participate to the 
formulation of policies aimed at  improving the employment perspective of older workers. 
The exchange of views and information in the Alliance for job process raises the awareness of 
BDA over  the  current  and  future  demographic  challenges  and  makes  them particularly  active  in 
spreading the EWL target among its members. First it launches, together with the Bertelsmann stiftung 
(Bertelsmann  foundation),  so-called  “Pro-age  project-  facing  the  challenge  of  the  demographic  
change”  in  partnership  with  the  Dutch  (AWVN),  Irish  (IBEC)  and  Danish  (DA)  employers'  
confederations  in  2001.  They  share  knowledge  and  resources  to  develop  scientifically  based 
recommendations over the HRM practices that  are the most effective to preserve and foster older 
workers'  productivity  in  consultation  with  policy  makers,  business  representatives,  and  academic 
experts56. These practical recommendations are collected in  “Success with Older Workers. A Good  
56 The consortium of experts formed a consortium where they formulate proposals over the measure than can enhance the 
productivity of older workers. The Bertelsmann foundation has then carried out an first  an international exploratory  
investigation over the legislative and collective bargaining frameworks that have enhanced the employment of older 
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Practice Compendium” and conveys first the message that older workers are a competitive resources 
that companies can use to overcome the shortage of skills induced by the demographic change. The  
key to turn older workers from a burden to an opportunity is to implement HRM policies that support 
the work ability of older workers. The main focus of these recommendations is especially on spreading 
training techniques that maximize the learning of seniors (Don't leave them behind, and don't let them  
stand still!-  here employability policies). Moreover great importance is given to measures that can 
improve the work atmosphere by enhancing the quality of the relationship of older workers with their  
bosses and colleagues (in the framework age equality policies). This can be carried out by offering 
older workers  personal  development planning (Make the most  of  interests and abilities! )  and by 
including them in team-work where they can convey their knowledge to younger colleagues and at the 
same time being supported by these latter (Take advantage of seniors' experienceÐProfit from their  
know-how!).  Last  but  not  least,  recommendations  are  focused  on:  adapting  the  workplace  (Keep 
people able to work!- in the framework health reconciliation policies) and the time schedules (Design 
work hours that are age-appropriate!- in the framework time reconciliation policies) to older workers' 
needs. 
The compendium is finally spread to all  the Confederal members to enhance a process of  soft  
policy dissemination. BDA goes even further and invite the Unions' Confederation to bargain common 
platforms that could steer their lower organizations to collectively bargain retaining policies in the 
rounds that took place in 2002. Their aim is to strengthen the process of policies' dissemination by  
binding companies to retain older workers longer. 
This offer is however declined by the DGB, which as in the case of the Italian unions, hinders any 
limitation  of  older  workers'  freedom to enter  a  pathway of  exit,  which  is  already limited  by  the 
ongoing  retrenchment  of  the  pathways  of  exit.  Because  of  this  opposition  retaining  policies  are  
coordinated by the collective bargaining system with a considerable delay with respect to the period of  
observation. The first CLA that includes retaining policies is the Chemistry CLA's renewed in 2006 
and it is soon followed by the renewal of the CLA in the metal industry in 2008. Given the role of  
“pace-setter” of these two sectors in the collective bargaining, it is reasonable to expect that retaining 
policies will disseminate also into the remaining part of the productive system. This dissemination 
nevertheless overrules the period of observation.  
The only exception is the old-age part-time scheme, whose implementation start to be managed by 
the collective bargaining system in 1996, when, DGB and BDA did not endorsed yet the EWL target.  
Because of that the bargaining parts first cooperate to distort the function of these schemes from an 
instrument to EWL into a further early retirement pathway, as was explained in Chapter 6. After 1998 
the lack of common Confederal recommendations to include retaining policies into CLAs, provides no 
incentives to the collective bargaining to reconvert these schemes into time reconciliation policies until 
2009, when the public financing is withdrawn.  
All  in  all,  the  lack  of  bilateral  institutional  channels  where  the  employers  and  unions'  
Confederations can develop a common understanding toward EWL and convey them to the lower 
workers. On the bases of these findings the foundations have provided policy makers and social partners with guidelines 
on how to foster policies that can extend working life. Secondly they carried an international surveys on companies in  
order to examine which HRM measures are the most effective in fostering the productivity and the participation of older 
workers (Maguire, 2003). 
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organizational level limits greatly the inclusion of retaining policies into CLAs. If the conveyance of 
the retaining policies by means of the collective bargaining is hindered by the obstructing strategy of 
the union Confederation, more successful is the vertical conveyance of the policies carried out by the  
employers'  confederation  to  its  members.  Those  awareness  campaigns  convey  the  message  that 
retaining older workers is a competitive advantage, provided that the HRM implements personnel  
policies that maximize the productivity of older workers. The recommendations concern all sets of  
retaining policies here investigated, but especially  employability and  age equality.  This conveyance 
took  place  that  enhance  a  soft  dissemination without  setting  legally  binding  constrains.  The 
dissemination of the retaining policies in Germany is not as voluntaristic as in Italy, because it is  
coordinated by the BDA, which however can only enhance and not constrain companies to implement 
them. Because of that the success their soft dissemination critically depends on the membership' size 
of BDA and on whether this campaigns is favourably received by companies or not.
The extent to which the soft dissemination of retaining policies coordinated by the social protection 
and the employers' Confederation are expected to affect their effectiveness in EWL will be discussed 
in the next section.
 
9.4.1 Hypotheses by retaining policies
As  a  result  of  the  very  late  inclusion  of  retaining  policies  into  CLAs,  their  dissemination  into 
companies' HRM practices is limited. As shown by Graph 9.1 the percentage of German companies 
that implement at least one retaining policies remains between 2002 and 2008 just under 20%57. 
Nevertheless, the data can be easily misleading. In fact as shown in Graph 9.2 the implementation  
of retaining policies is strongly and positively correlated to the companies' size, meaning retaining 
policies,  although moderately disseminated, can affect a substantive portion of the workforce. As a  
matter of fact the companies that implement at least one retaining policies employs in total 51% of the 
workforce.   
57 This information are provided by the IAB-betriebspanel- IAB companies' panel- that from 2002 includes a section 
devoted to the implementation of specific measures for older workers (Bellmann et al., 2007)
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Graph 9.1:  Dissemination  of  the different  sets  of  retaining  policies  in  German companies  in  2002 and 2006.  It  is  
expressed as the percentage of companies that in 2002 and 2006  implement the following retaining policies.  
Source: IAB- Betriebspanel 2002 and 2006 –  in Bellmann, Leber & Gewise , 2006 & Leber, Stegmaier &Tisch, 2013 
Table 9.2: Dissemination of the different sets of retaining policies in German companies by firm size in 2002 and 2006. It is 
expressed as the percentage of companies that in 2002 and 2006 that by firm size implement the following retaining policies. 
A B C D E F G H
2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006 200258 2006
1-4 employees 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 0 1 1 14 7
5-19 employees 8 5 1 1 3 2 5 3 6 5 1 1 1 1 14 12
20-99 
employees
26 23 3 3 5 4 14 11 12 11 1 1 2 2 61 36
100-499 
employees
61 60 7 8 7 5 24 23 24 24 2 2 4 3 12 71
500 employees 
or more
86 85 13 19 13 12 33 34 35 42 4 7 6 7 12 92
Source: IAB-Betriebspanel 2002 and 2006 in Bellmann, Kistler, Wahse, 2003; 
Brussig, 2005; Bellmann, Kistler, Wahse, 2007
Legend of the retaining policies:
A= Altersteilzeit (old-age part-time scheme)
B=Workplace equipped to the need of the elderly
C= Lower job requirement for older workers
D= Generationally-mixed teams
E= Inclusion of older workers in further training
F=Special training measures for older workers
G= Other measures
H=At least one retaining policy
 
Looking at the different sets of retaining policies (Graph 9.1), the most disseminated is the only set 
conveyed by the collective bargaining system: the old-age part-time scheme, which are implemented 
by about 11% of companies between 2002 and 2006. As shown in Graph 9.2 this figure reveal a great 
58 Data provided for 2002 classifies companies according to the following size-class: small firm (extended in the Table to 1-
4 and 5-19 employees); mid-sized firms (in the Table 20-99 employees), and big firms (extended in the Table to 100-199 
and more than 500 employees) (Aleksandroviks, 2005; Bellmann et al. 2007) 
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disparity between the marginal dissemination in small companies (about 5% in average for the whole 
period) and the domination in big companies (between 60% and 80%), which brings about 40% 59 of 
the workforce to be covered by those schemes overall the period (Aleksandrowicz 2014). 
The  extent  to  which these  scheme promote time reconciliation  is  nevertheless  questionable.  It  
depends in fact on whether the scheme is applied with an horizontal part-time schedule rather than  
with  a  vertical  one  (Blockmodell).  Since  the  social  protection  system  fails  to  provide  a  higher 
incentives  to  the  first  than  to  the  second,  since  1996  social  partners  agreed  to  implement  the 
blockmodell to a major extent because it has lower organizational costs for companies and allow older 
workers to exit earlier. Furthermore the reform of these scheme is not successfully enhanced by the 
Confederations, which are unable to successfully steer the collective bargaining toward the negotiation 
of time reconciliation policies. 
Therefore the fact that about 12% of the companies implement old-age part-time scheme and 40% 
of the workforce are covered by them between 2002 and 2006 does not mean that time reconciliation  
policies are systematically implemented.  In fact  the majority of those scheme does not  require to 
shorten  the  working  schedule,  but  require  to  shorten  the  working  life.  Since  time  reconciliation 
policies are not systematically implemented in the old-age part-time scheme, it is hypothesized that  
older workers working part-time will NOT have a significantly lower likelihood than full-time workers  
to experience a work-retirement trajectory (HP 9.1). 
Time reconciliation have been  nevertheless  systematically  improved  whenever  part-time is  not 
diffused throughout part-time old-age schemes. This is for instance the case of part-time work that is  
promoted to reintegrate women into employment after childbearing. As much as in adult life, part-time 
work help them to reconcile better work with caring duties also in older life, when the duties toward  
the children are substituted by other duties, such as caring for grandchildren or other frail relatives.  
Since time reconciliation policies are more systematically disseminated for women than for men, it is 
hypothesized that then  working part-time will  lower the likelihood to undertake a work-retirement  
trajectory significantly more for women than for men (HP 9.2).  
The  second  most  disseminated  sets  of  retaining  policies  improves  the  employability  of  older 
workers, by including them in a training course. Despite the training measures specifically targeted on 
older workers are very marginal among either small and large-sized companies (less than 2% between 
2002 and 2006),  more diffused are measures that involve seniors in general training course. Despite  
the average dissemination of these measures is limited to the 6 % of companies, they affect in average  
more than 16% of the workforce thanks to the much higher diffusion that they have in the large rather  
(between 25% and 42%) than small-sized companies (less than 5%) between 2002 and 2006. 
The  dissemination  of  employability  policies  is  the  consequence  on  the  one  hand  of  the  soft  
conveyance carried out  by the BDA's  information campaign.  This soft  conveyance can especially  
explain the very systematic dissemination in the large companies, which are often more favourable 
than SMEs (small enterprises) to follow voluntary initiatives aimed at centrally coordinate working 
59 The information over the workforce coverage is available only for 2002. However since no major changes are shown in 
Graph 9.1 and 9.2 in the % of companies that implement retaining companies between 2002 and 2006, the choice is to 
assume, with all the limitation of the case, that also the % workforce covered by them remains comparable between 2002 
and 2006. This assumption hold also for the remaining discussion in this section.  
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conditions60.  This  conveyance  is  moreover  strengthened  by  the  social  protection  system  which 
provides financial incentives. These latter enhance the dissemination of these policies especially in 
medium companies, less receptive to the BDA's awareness campaign. Because employability policies 
are disseminated systematically by the social protection system and is softly disseminated by BDA, it  
is hypothesized that older workers that experience skills' development at work will have a significantly 
lower likelihood to enter a work-retirement trajectory than older workers that do not experience them 
(HP 9.3).
The remaining two set of retaining policies, health reconciliation and age equality, have been softly 
disseminated by the employers' Confederation, but only indirectly backed-up by the social protection 
system. As for health reconciliation policies, although the social protection system provides a legal 
framework and incentive to respectively improve the occupational safety at work, these legal acts are 
not  targeted at adapting the working conditions on older  workers'  specific needs.  Age equality  is  
endorsed very late only in 2006, with an anti-discriminatory ban that has no direct effect on the quality 
of  the  treatment  that  older  workers  experience  from  their  colleagues  and  bosses.  Despite  their 
dissemination remains voluntaristic, meaning that no legal constrains or financial incentives are set for 
their implementation, their diffusion was quite significant. As shown by Graph 9.1 and Table  9.2, 
between 2002 and 2006 the age-diverse  teams are  as  diffused as  the training measures  for older  
workers both in terms of the percentage of companies that implement them and their coverage (16% of 
the workforce) and are predominantly concentrated in large companies. The success of the BDA's soft  
dissemination  can  be  explained  by the high benefits  of  those  teams in terms of  intergenerational 
transmissions  of  knowledge  and  skills  easily  overrule  the  low  organizational  costs  that  their 
implementation involve. Because age equality policies are systematically diffused thanks to the BDA's 
soft dissemination, it is hypothesized that older workers that experience a supportive atmosphere and  
a fair treatment at work will  have a lower likelihood to enter a work-retirement trajectory than older  
workers that do not experience them (HP 9.4)
BDA's  soft  dissemination  has  instead  much  fewer  success  in  promoting  health  reconciliation 
policies. In fact as shown by Graph 9.1 and Table 9.2 between 2002 and 2006 only a marginal percent 
of companies of all size implement policies that lower the requirement for older workers and adapt the 
workplace to their need. The reason of this marginal diffusion is that health reconciliation policies 
involve higher implementation costs than age equality policies that are not easily overcome in the 
short-term by gains in productivity. As a result of this poor dissemination, a very limited portion of the  
workforce are exposed to health reconciliation policies (6%). Since health reconciliation policies are  
promoted only indirectly by the social protection system and and poorly disseminated by BDA, it is  
hypothesized that  older workers that experience a low physical and mental strain at work will NOT  
have  a  lower  likelihood  to  enter  a  work-retirement  trajectory  than  older  workers  that  do  not  
experience them (HP 9.5).
This section was devoted to formulating the hypotheses concerning the extent the effectiveness of 
retaining policies in EWL was moderated by the few incentives provided by the social protection 
60 This  higher  receptivity  of  large  companies  derives  from the  fact  that  they  in  general  benefit  more  from a  central 
coordination of working conditions than small-sized companies. While the former can obtain economies of scales when  
central initiatives coordinate HRM practices, the latter perceive these initiatives as a boundary that limit their flexibility  
and thus their competitiveness (Streeck and Hassel 2003b)
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system and by the  soft conveyance of social partners,  which can only inform but not constrain the 
strategy of companies. In the next section the extent to which these hypotheses vary by industry is 
treated.  
9.4.2 Hypotheses by industry
As  shown  earlier  in  this  chapter,  the  top-down  conveyance  of  the  EWL target  in  Germany, 
enhances the dissemination of retaining policies, but sets no legal constrains for companies. The main 
incentives  are  mainly provided  by the social  partnership sphere  and especially by the employers'  
Confederation, which engage a process of  soft dissemination of both information and best practices. 
This  soft  dissemination  is  backed  up  by  the  social  protection  system,  which  provides  a  legal 
framework and offers direct compensation to companies that implement employability policies. In any 
case the top-down conveyance in Germany leaves the implementation of retaining policies to a some 
extent  voluntaristic.  In  more  detail,  the  soft  top-down  conveyance  makes  the  implementation  of 
retaining policies appealing for companies only under certain conditions. The first set of conditions is 
economic and occur when the companies experience a  workforce shortage  that can be compensated 
via a longer retainment of their personnel. The second set of conditions is organizational and increases 
the companies'  advantages of conforming their HRM practices to centrally coordinated directives.  
Companies under those two sets of circumstances are more receptive to the social partnership's process 
of  soft  dissemination because they  obtain  from it  direct  benefits.  Because  of  that  two  competing 
hypotheses can be formulated with regards to the significance of industry patterns in the effectiveness  
of retaining policies. 
The  set  of  economic  circumstances  supports  the hypotheses  that  the  effectiveness  of  retaining 
policies is inversely related to the extent to which the Globalization manages to counteract the effect  
of the demographic ageing on the workforce. As seen in Graph 1.8 in the introduction, Germany have 
been  experiencing  a  rather  steep  ageing  of  the  population  since  the  late  1990's,  which  have 
progressively reduced the inflow of new generations in the workforce. Companies will experience this 
workforce's  shortage  as  a  skills'  shortage  only  if  their  labour  demands  is  not  endangered  by  the 
increased international competition induced by the globalization. Furthermore, once they experience 
this  skills'  shortage,  firms  profit  by  retaining  their  older  employees  only  if  in  their  industry  the 
technological change is moderate and does not make the skills' endowment of these latter unusable 
because  obsolete.  According  to  this  argument,  the  dissemination  of  retaining  policies  will  be 
systematic only in industries  less  exposed to  the globalization forces,  because they  only in  those 
industries companies have a strategical advantage from retaining older workers. 
This argument is partially supported by the descriptive in Table 9.2, that show the percentage of 
companies implementing a key range of retaining policies by industry in 2002 and 2006. Policies that 
improve the health reconciliation, the age equality, and the employability of older workers scores in 
both years higher in the industries that are the most protected by the globalization forces: non-profit  
organization, public administration and, to a some extent construction. The only exception is here  
represented by the old-age part-time schemes, whose diffusion, as was discussed earlier, do not foster  
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time reconciliation policies. Because of that, the first competing hypothesis is that  the likelihood of  
entering a work-retirement  trajectories  of  older  workers experiencing a low physical  and mental  
strain (HP 9.5a),  a supportive atmosphere and a fair treatment (HP 9.7a),  skills' development (HP 
9.9a) at work is significantly lower in the industries with low exposure to globalization: construction,  
public administration, health, education and social work. In addition, since old-age part-time scheme 
do not promote time reconciliation policies, it is hypothesized that the likelihood of entering a work-
retirement trajectories of older workers experiencing experiencing part-time in their last job NOT  
significantly  lower  in  the  industries  with  low  exposure  to  globalization:  construction,  public  
administration, health, education and social work (HP 9.3a).
Table 9.3: Dissemination of the different sets of retaining policies in German companies by industry in 2002 and 2006. It is  
expressed as the percentage of companies that in 2002 and 2006 that in each industry implement the following retaining 
policies. 
A B C D E F G
2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006
Agriculture and 
forestry
3.9 – 0.4 – 5.1 – 5.7 – 2.2 – 0 – 3.8 –
Manufactory 11.1 8 2.1 1 3 3 7.4 7 6.9 5 0.4 1 1.5 1




8.2 6 0.9 1 2.1 2 4.8 4 4.9 5 0.5 1 1.2 1
Private service
of which:
10.7 8 1.1 1 2.7 2 5.6 4 6.8 7 0.6 1 1.1 1
Business services 6 1 1 2 5 6 1 1





41.9 59 7.1 9 2.2 4 7.6 11 13.4 15 3 3 1.1 2
Source: IAB-Betriebspanel 2002 and 2006 in Bellmann, Leber & Gewise , 2006, 
Bellmann & Stegmeier, 2006, Leber, Stegmaier &Tisch, 2013
Legend of the retaining policies:
A= Altersteilzeit (old-age part-time scheme)
B=Workplace equipped to the need of the elderly
C= Lower job requirement for older workers
D= Generationally-mixed teams
E= Inclusion of older workers in further training
F=Special training measures for older workers
G= Other measures
H=At least one retaining policy
The set of organizational circumstances supports the hypotheses that the effectiveness of retaining 
policies is directly related to the extent to which the business size makes companies more receptive to 
a central coordination of their HRM. In fact with the higher is the dimension of the personnel, the  
higher  is  the  economy of  scales  that  companies  can  obtains  from a  central  coordination  of  their 
61 In 2006 the classification does not include news (Bellmann et al., 2006). 
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management. Instead the smaller the dimensions the more the competitiveness of the firm relies on a 
flexible adaptation of HRM to the market circumstances. Since this flexibility is undermined by a  
central coordination of HRM, small-sized enterprises (SME) usually opposed to collective bargaining 
when it takes place above the company level. 
At  the  bases  of  this  hypotheses  there  is  the argument  that,  since  the business  size  affects  the 
companies  receptivity  to  the  central  coordination  of  HRM, it  also  affects  their  receptivity  to  the 
partnership's soft dissemination.  In fact by comparing the percentage of companies that implement 
retaining policies between 2002 and 2006 by industry (Table 9.3) and by business size (Table 9.2), it is 
clear that the major gradient that discriminate over the dissemination of retaining policies is this latter 
and only to less extent the former. According to this argument the dissemination of retaining policies  
will  be  more  systematic  in  industries  that  are  dominated  by  large-size  rather  than  by  small-size 
companies after the  soft dissemination  takes place in 2001. According to OECD in 2003 large-size 
companies have dominated in mainly three industries in Germany: mainly manufacturing, mining & 
quarrying and to a lesser extent wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca and  
Real estate renting and business activity62.    
Because of that it is hypothesized that the likelihood of entering a work-retirement trajectories of  
older workers experiencing a low physical and mental strain (HP 9.5b), a supportive atmosphere and  
a fair treatment (HP 9.7b), skills' development (HP 9.9b) in the last job is significantly lower in the  
industries  where  large-size  companies  are  concentrated:  manufacturing,  mining  &  quarrying,  
wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca, and real estate renting and business  
activity.  Since  old-age  part-time  schemes  do  not  promote  time  reconciliation  policies,  it  is 
hypothesized  that  the  likelihood  of  entering  a  work-retirement  trajectories  of  older  workers  
experiencing part-time in their last job NOT significantly lower in the industries where large-size  
companies  are  concentrated:  manufacturing,  mining  &  quarrying,  wholesale  and  retail  trade,  
transportation and storage & horeca, and real estate renting and business activity (HP 9.3b).
Table 9.4 provides a summary of the hypotheses concerning the extent to which retaining policies 
are  expected to extend working life  in Italy,  depending on the more or  less  successful  top-down 
dissemination. 
62 In fact the proportion of the workforce that in each industry is employed in large company (+50 employees) is in these  
three industries higher than 50%. This proportion is above 1/3 if we consider larger companies (+250 employees). These  
proportions remain rather stable after 2003 (source: OECD- business demographic information). 
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The  dissemination  is  hindered  by  the 
collective  bargaining  after  1996  with  the 
implementation  of  vertical  part-time- 
blockmodell.
The social protection system fails to bind 
companies  to  retain  older  workers  by 
providing  higher  financial  incentives  if 
they  implement  the  based  on  the 
“continuous  working  time  model”  
(horizontal  part-time)  rather  than  on  the 
“block model”. 
The  employers'  association  (BDA)  softly 
convey time reconciliation policies to their 
members with information campaigns. 
Confederations  fails  to  convey 
recommendations  that  either  enhance  or 
constrain the  collective  bargaining  to 
include  in  CLA's  old-age  part-time 
schemes  based  on  “continuous  working 
time  model” rather  than  on  the“block  
model”.
Old-age  part-time  schemes  are  diffused 
mainly in the public sector, in the service 
sector and in the manufactory industry.
HP  9.1:  Since  time  reconciliation  policies  are  not  systematically 
implemented in the old-age part-time scheme, it is hypothesized that older 
workers working part-time will NOT have a significantly lower likelihood  
than full-time workers to experience a work-retirement trajectory.
HP  9.2:  Since  time  reconciliation  policies  are  more  systematically 
disseminated for women than for men, it is hypothesized that working part-
time  lowers  the  likelihood  to  undertake  a  work-retirement  trajectory,  
significantly more for women than for men.  
BY INDUSTRY: Two competing hypotheses
HP 9.3a: The likelihood of entering a work-retirement trajectories of older 
workers experiencing part-time in their last job NOT significantly lower in 
the  industries  with  low  exposure  to  globalization:  construction,  public 
administration, health, education and social work
HP 9.3b: The likelihood of entering a work-retirement trajectories of older 
workers experiencing part-time in their last job is NOT significantly lower 
in  the  industries  where  large-size  companies  are  concentrated: 
manufacturing,  mining  &  quarrying,  wholesale  and  retail  trade, 




Social  protection's  improves  the 
occupational  safety  at  work  are  not 
specifically  targeted  on  retaining  older 
workers. 
The  employers'  association  (BDA)  softly 
convey  health  reconciliation  policies  to 
their  members  with  information 
campaigns.
No  policies  aimed  at  improving  health 
reconciliation  are  included  in  industry 
CLAs. 
HP 9.4:  Since health reconciliation policies are promoted only indirectly by 
the social  protection system and and poorly disseminated by BDA, it  is 
hypothesized that older workers that experience a low physical and mental 
strain at work will NOT have a lower likelihood to enter a work-retirement 
trajectory than older workers that do not experience them.
BY INDUSTRY: Two competing hypotheses
HP 9.5a: The likelihood of entering a work-retirement trajectories of older 
workers  experiencing  a  low  physical  and  mental  strain  at  work  is 
significantly  lower  in  the  industries  with  low exposure  to  globalization: 
construction, public administration, health, education and social work
HP 9.5b: The likelihood of entering a work-retirement trajectories of older 
workers  experiencing   a  s  low  physical  and  mental  strain  at  work  is 
significantly  lower  in  the  industries  where  large-size  companies  are 
concentrated:   manufacturing,  mining & quarrying,  wholesale  and  retail 
trade,  transportation  and  storage  &  horeca,  and  real  estate  renting  and 
business activity.
Age Equality The social protection system attempts only 
indirectly  to  improve  age  equality  by 
abolishing  age  discrimination  in  2006  in 
all aspects of the employment relation.
The  employers'  association  (BDA)  softly 
convey age  equality  policies  to  their 
members with information campaigns. 
No  policies  aimed  at  improving  age 
equality are included in industry CLAs.
HP 9.6:  Because age equality policies  are systematically diffused by the 
BDA's  soft  dissemination,  it  is  hypothesized  that  older  workers  that 
experience a supportive atmosphere and a fair treatment at work will  have a 
lower likelihood to enter a work-retirement trajectory than older workers 
that do not experience them.
BY INDUSTRY: Two competing hypotheses
HP 9.7a: The likelihood of entering a work-retirement trajectories of older 
workers experiencing a supportive atmosphere and a fair treatment at work 
is significantly lower in the industries with low exposure to globalization: 
construction, public administration, health, education and social work
HP 9.7b: The likelihood of entering a work-retirement trajectories of older 
workers experiencing a supportive atmosphere and a fair treatment at work 
is  significantly  lower  in  the  industries  where  large-size  companies  are 
concentrated:   manufacturing,  mining & quarrying,  wholesale  and  retail 
trade,  transportation  and  storage  &  horeca,  and  real  estate  renting  and 
business activity.
Employability The social protection system  succeeds in HP 9.8: Because employability policies are disseminated systematically by 
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conveying employability  policies  to 
companies  by  providing  direct  financial 
incentives that  co-fund  job-related 
training. 
No  policies  aimed  at  improving  health 
reconciliation are  included  in  industry 
CLAs.
The  employers'  association  (BDA)  softly 
convey employability  policies  to  their 
members with information campaigns. 
the  social  protection  system  and  is  softly  disseminated  by  BDA,  it  is 
hypothesized that older workers that experience skills' development at work 
will  have  a  significantly  lower  likelihood  to  enter  a  work-retirement 
trajectory than older workers that do not experience them.
BY INDUSTRY: Two competing hypotheses
HP 9.9a: The likelihood of entering a work-retirement trajectories of older 
workers experiencing  skills' development  at work is significantly lower in 
the  industries  with  low  exposure  to  globalization:  construction,  public 
administration, health, education and social work
HP 9.9b: The likelihood of entering a work-retirement trajectories of older 
workers experiencing  skills' development at work is significantly lower in 
the industries where large-size companies are concentrated:  manufacturing, 
mining & quarrying, wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage 
& horeca, and real estate renting and business activity
9.5 Findings
The hypotheses HP 9.1-9 are tested using a piecewise-constant exponential model (PCE). The sub-
sample is restricted to the cohort born from 1945 onward, because it is investigated to which extend 
the entry in the work-retirement transition of the cohorts that reach the age of 50 years in the mid-
1990's have been significantly affected by the implementation of retaining policies. The descriptive of 
the Sharelife sample that was used in this analysis are presented in Chapter 4.
Model  9.1 includes  the controls (see the controls'  estimations  in appendix E) and the five job 
quality dimensions. Model 9.2 includes the interaction between gender and time reconciliation. The 
subsequent models include the interaction between each job quality dimension and the industry: model  
9.3  includes  interaction  between  industry  and  time  reconciliation  policies;  model  9.4  includes 
interaction between industry and physical health reconciliation policies; model 9.5 includes interaction 
between industry and mental health reconciliation policies, model 9.6 includes interaction between 
industry  and  age  equality  policies,  and  model  9.7  includes  interaction  between  industry  and 
employability policies. 
As it can be seen in model 9.1, the effectiveness of retaining policies in Germany is at first glance  
very poor. In fact none of the job quality dimension has any significant effect on the likelihood of 
undertaking  work-retirement  transition.  As  a  consequence  of  its  moderate  coordination,  social 
partnership fails to constrain companies to implement all sets of retaining policies and none of them is 
then systematically used by these latter to EWL.
According to the hypotheses HP 9.1 and HP 9.4 part-time and low physical and mental strain have  
no significant effect on the likelihood of undertaking work-retirement transition. This outcome is on  
the one hand due to the the fact that both the social protection and the partnership system failed to  
convey time reconciliation policies  into the old-age part-time scheme. On the other hand it is due to  
marginal implementation of health reconciliation policies that companies undertook after they have 
been softly disseminated by BDA. 
Against the hypotheses HP 9.8 and HP 9.6 a supportive atmosphere and a fair treatment  and  skills'  
development  at  work  do  not  significantly  lower  the  likelihood  of  undertaking  a  work-retirement 
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trajectory. Although age equality policies and employability policies appeared to be systematically 
implemented by companies, they turned out to have no effect on the timing of older workers' exit  
because companies are not constrained to retain their older employees. 
The estimations show in fact  that companies retain older workers only under  some conditions.  
According to the data these conditions are economics, since retaining some job quality dimensions 
(employability  and  age  equality)  proved  to  significantly  delay  older  workers  only  in  sheltered 
industries.       
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Table  9.5:  Piecewise-constant  exponential  model  (PCE)  estimating  the  effectiveness  of  retaining  policies  in  extending 
working life in Germany.
9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7
Time reconciliation 0.987 2.755 2.312 2.319 2.349 2.955* 2.940*
Physical health reconciliation 0.850 0.840 0.838 0.618** 0.855 0.818 0.832
Mental health reconciliation 0.888 0.886 0.881 0.891 1.030 0.911 0.897
Age equality 1.252 1.287* 1.317* 1.257 1.221 1.412 1.265
Employability 1.173 1.186 1.192 1.190 1.233* 1.190 1.308
Interaction 0.318* 0.339 0.375 0.353 0.257** 0.271*
Time reconciliation * woman
Time reconciliation* industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 1.23e-05




Real estate renting and business activity 4.205
Other community 0.288
Public Administration and defense 1.058
 Education, health and social work 3.041
Physical Health reconciliation* industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 1.435




Real estate renting and business activity 0.444
Other community 1.010
Public Administration and defense 1.081
 Education, health and social work 2.372*
Mental Health reconciliation* industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 1.374




Real estate renting and business activity 1.851
Other community 0.470
Public Administration and defense 0.734
 Education, health and social work 1.354
Age equality* industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 0.374*




Real estate renting and business activity 2.494
Other community 3.534*
Public Administration and defense 0.796
 Education, health and social work 0.315**
Employability* industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 1.054
Ref. 




Real estate renting and business activity 1.893
Other community 0.951
Public Administration and defense 0.567
 Education, health and social work
Observations 1518 1518 1518 1518 1518 1518 1518
Events 133 133 133 133 133 133 133
Subject 588 588 588 588 588 588 588
BIC 826.75 831.23 881.57 878.03 873.64 880.41 880.81
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Sharelife 2008-2009
Dependent variable:
Work-retirement trajectory: time-varying categorical variable equal to: 0 if the respondent is working at the end of the person-
period spell, 1 if the respondent left employment  at the end of the person-period spell
Independent variables:
Time reconciliation: : time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is working in a part-time job in the person-period spell
Physical health reconciliation:  time-constant interval scale obtained by Factor Analysis (see chap.4) equal from 1 to 4. It  
measure measuring the self-perceived quality of the material working conditions in the last/current job by looking at how the 
job is physically demanding and the workspace comfortable
Mental  health reconciliation:  time-constant interval  scale  obtained by Factor Analysis  (see  chap.4)  equal  from 1 to  4.  It  
measures the self-perceived  emotional burden of the last/current job looking at the time pressure, the emotional burden, and  
conflicts that the work implies.
Age equality: time-constant interval scale obtained by Factor Analysis (see chap.4) equal from 1 to 4 measuring elf-perceived  
recognition and support  on the last job, the quality of the working atmosphere and the respondents' perception over how fairly  
they are treated by their bosses 
Employability:  time-constant interval scale equal from 1 to 4 measuring the extent  to which the skills of respondents are  
developed in the last/current.
Industry:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the industry where the respondent is working in the person-period spell.  
For a more detailed description see Chapter 4. 
9.6 Conclusion
In this chapter it was investigated to which extend the moderate coordination of the partnership 
system in Germany affects the effectiveness of retaining policies between 1995 and 2009. The main 
conclusion from the analysis is that, because of their moderate coordination, the institutional channels 
by which social  partners can affect  the conveyance of the EWL target  from the social  protection  
systems to the production system do not enhance the effectiveness of retaining policies, which result to 
be moderate. This the moderate vertical coordination of the social partners'  organizations prevents 
from successfully conveying the EWL target into the collective bargaining system. 
Also it can be concluded that the soft dissemination of retaining policies carried out by the BDA 
does not  successfully boost  the effectiveness of retaining policies. In fact  companies make use of  
recommendations provided by BDA  only when their economic conditions make  the retaining of older 
workers profitable.  
Finally, because their dissemination is voluntaristic, the effectiveness of retaining policies follows a  
marked industry patterns. It is in average higher in industries protected from the globalization forces,  
because they start  experiencing the skill's  shortage induced by the ongoing process of population 
ageing. 
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10.1 Introduction
As shown in Chapter 7, the modest outcome of activation policies between the mid-1990's and 2009 
(Chapter 1) can be partially explained as the result of the poor effectiveness of retrenchment policies. 
Due  to  their  weak  organizational  articulation,  unions  and  employers  associations  took  part  to 
concertation and administrative settings that allow them to preserve the expectations of their  core  
members: male workers in the private industrial sector. 
The next  step is  to investigate the extent  to which the weak articulation prevented also to the  
collective bargaining system from conveying retaining policies into the HRM practices. The leading 
question of this chapter is:  to what extent has the weak organizational articulation of unions and  
employers'  associations influenced the effectiveness of  retaining policies implemented between the  
mid-1990's until 2008-2009?
Regulated only in 1993 by the Protocol of July, 27th, the collective bargaining is on paper rather 
coordinated.  Defining  the  minimum  standards,  the  content,  and  the  timing  of  the  negotiations, 
industry is the pivotal level of the system. CLAs have a legal value and thus are able to coordinate  
HRM practices to bargained strategical goals. The strategical goals bargained at industry-level can be  
finally  coordinated  at  central  level  by regular meetings  where the government  and Confederation 
bargain over the contents of the next CLAs' renewal (Regalia and Regini 2004). 
 However the effective institutionalization of this formal coordination is undermined by two main 
aspects. First  the  voluntaristic  diffusion  of  unions'  bargaining  structures  in  small  companies, 
undermine the enforcement of CLAs in a significant part of the Italian production system. Second the 
lack  of  procedures punishing  the  actors'  contentiousness  often  blocks  negotiations  and  delays 
agreements from central to company level, especially if controversial measures, as retaining policies,  
are concerned. This undermined the capacity of the Government to convey retaining policies in the 
strategies of bargaining organizations and therefore their downward implementation. This is because,  
being pathways of exit  to a great  extent  preserved for their  core members, unions and employers  
associations faced no incentives to implement retaining policies.   
Since retaining policies were systematically excluded from the collective negotiations, companies 
are not legally compelled to implement them. In short their implementations occurred in Italy only on 
voluntaristic bases. 
As phrased in HP 3.4, it is expected that the effectiveness of retaining policies to be low in Italy,  
unless they are conveyed by a different channels. This is the case for time reconciliation policies,  
whose  implementation  was  conveyed  by  the  government  directly  into  companies'  strategy  with 
monetary incentives encouraging the use of progressive retirement scheme. Reducing the labour costs 
of  older  workers  working part-time,  these  incentives  encourage companies  to  retain  them longer. 
Accordingly, I expect that the likelihood of older workers to undertake a work-retirement transition  to  
lower if they work part-time rather than full-time in their late career.  
As for the rest of retaining policies, the governments attempted to indirectly convey them with  
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labour  policies  that,  nevertheless,  often  lacked  a  specific  target  on  older  workers.  Since  the 
implementation of this policies remains voluntaristic, older workers that experienced either physical or 
mental health reconciliation or age equality of employability policies in their last job are expected to 
not have a significantly lower likelihood to enter a work-retirement transition than older workers that  
did not experience them. 
As for the distributional effects of retaining policies across industry two competing hypothesis are 
formulated. It can be expected that the companies always face no incentives to retain older workers  
and thus that policies effectiveness shows no significant industry pattern. Alternatively companies are 
expected to voluntarily  implement retaining policies  only if  some external  circumstances create  a 
skills'  shortages that can be compensated by older workers. If this is the case older workers, who 
experienced either physical or mental health reconciliation or age equality of employability policies in 
their last job, are expected to have a significantly lower likelihood to enter a work-retirement transition 
only in sheltered and expanding sectors.  As in Chapters 8 and 9, the hypotheses are tested using a 
piecewise-constant exponential model (PCEM). 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 10.2 describes the Government's direct attempts to 
convey retaining policies into companies' strategy, by-passing the collective bargaining system system. 
Section 10.3 is devoted to a detailed description of the aspects making interests' representation and the 
system  of  collective  bargaining  poorly  coordinated  in  Italy.  In  Section  10.4  the  hypotheses  are 
formulated. The results of the piecewise constant  exponential model  are shown and interpreted in 
Section 10.5 and the conclusion over the effectiveness of retaining policies in Italy is presented at the 
end of this chapter.
10.2 Government attempts to convey top-down retaining policies
As shown by  , the governments' attempts to convey top-down retaining policies between the mid-
1990's  and  the  late-2000's  was  limited  and  ineffective.  This  is  because  it failed  to  set  adequate 
incentives and sanctions to both social partners and companies. The only exception concerns the time 
reconciliation policies, which are successfully conveyed by incentives promoting the take up of partial 
retirement schemes (Mirabile 2004; Ciccarone, 2012)   A lists of the labour policies used to convey 
top-down the implementation of retaining policies is provided in Table 10.1.
Table 10.1: Social protections' law aimed at conveying top-down retaining policies in Italy.
Time reconciliation
Legge 335/1995 Riforma Dini  – Settore privato abolizione divieto  
di  cumualo  tra  pensione  e  lavoro-  introduzione  pensionamento  
progressivo.
Law 335/1995  Dini's  reform-  Private  sector:  Lift  of  the  ban of 
cumulating pension benefit  and wage-  introduction of progressive 
retirement 
Legge  331/1997 Riforma  del  lavoro  Treu-  estensione  del  
pensionamento progressivo al settore pubblico.
Law 331/1997 Labour  reform Treu-  extension  of  the progressive 
retirement scheme to the public sector.
Legge di Bilancio 1998-1999-2000 incentivi fiscali per i lavoratori  
anziani che optano per il pensionamento progressivo
Budgetary  laws  1998-1999-2000  fiscal  incentives  to  encourage 
older workers to undertake progressive retirement. 
Legge 53/2000 incentivi finanziari  sia  per  lavoratori  anziani  che  
per le  loro imprese per promuovere il  pensionamento progressivo  
and the turnover intergenerazionale; congedo per il diritto di cura
Law 53/2000 financial incentives for both older workers and their 
companies  to  promote  progressive  retirement  and  the 
intergenerational turnover; care leave 
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Legge 276/2003 Legge Biagi. Liberalizzazione di contratti di lavoro  
atipici, tra cui part-time
Law 276/2003 Biagi's law. Liberalization of flexible labour contract, 
among which part-time
Legge 243/2004 bonus per ritardare il pensionamento di anzianità  
per due anni a favore solo del lavoratore 
Law 243/2004 bonus to delay seniority pathway by 2 years valid 
only for older workers
Legge  Finanziaria  296/2006 accordo  sulla  solidarietà  fra  le  
generazioni: favorire il turnover generazionale
Budget  law  296/2006 agreement  on  the  solidarity  between  the 
generations: generational turnover
Health Reconciliation
 Legge 81/2008 Atto unico per la promozione della sicurezza e la  
salute occupazionale
Law 81/2008 Single act for the safety and the occupational health
Legge 106/2009 modificazione dell'  atto unico per la promozione  
della sicurezza e la salute occupazionale.
Law  106/2009 update  of  the  single  act  for  the  safety  and  the 
occupational health.
Age Equality
Legge  216/2003 Abolizione  dell'  età  come  legittimo  motivo  di  
discriminazione sul mercato del lavoro
Law 216/2003 Ban of age discrimination on the labour market.
Employability
Legge  236/1993 Promozione  di  programmi  di  lifelong  learning:  
riconoscimento ufficiale dei lavoratori anziani come target di questi  
programmi.
Law  236/1993 Promotion  of  lifelong  learning  programs:  older 
workers  are  officially  recognized  as  one  of  the  targets  of  this 
program.
Legge 53/2000 introduce e finanzia congedi per partecipare a corsi  
di lifelong learning. 
Law 53/2000 introduce and finance lifelong learning leaves
Legge  388/2000 crea  Enti  Bilaterali  Inter-professionali  per  il  
finanziamento del lifelong learning 
Legge  388/2000 establishes  Inter-professional  joint  funds  for 
lifelong learning.
Source: (Mirabile 2004; Ciccarone, 2012 ; Colombo 2013)   
The financial incentives used to promote time reconciliation policies benefited not only older workers 
in partial retirement, but more importantly, their employers. The first incentives are set in 1995, when 
the Dini's  reform introduced partial  retirement schemes in the private sector (Law 335/1995) (see 
Section 7.2). Two years before the entry in one the pension pathway, older workers were given the  
opportunity to shift their contract from full to part-time (not lower than 18 hours per week). Their  
wage gap with a partial retirement benefit with no loss in the future pension income stream. Since only 
the wage and not  the contribution gaps were covered by public funds,  partial  retirement  allowed 
employers to adjust more easily the personnel in time of recession, but no relevant saving on the non-
wage labour costs. A similar but slightly more limited partial retirement scheme was implemented by 
the Treu Labour Reform (Law 331/1997). Civil servants eligible for the seniority pathways could post-
pone  their  stay  by  reducing  their  working  time  by  maximum  50%,  unless  redundancies  were  
experienced in the same occupational category (OECD 2004). 
Further supply-incentives were introduced in the private sector by the financial laws implemented 
between 1998 and 2000.  They progressively raised the relieves  in  the tax  regime concerning the 
accumulation between work and pension income and improved the wage integration. 
Employers'  incentives  increased  only  in  2000 when the financial  law (law 388/2000)  partially 
subsidized  the  contributions  for  older  workers  in  partial  retirement.  Moreover  the  law 53/2000 
increased the subsidies if companies in collaboration with unions foster the intergenerational turnover 
by replacing the working hours given up by employees in partial retirement with newly hired63. 
63 Despite these measures are not included in the definition of time reconciliation, it is interesting to add that this law 
introduce additional vacation days to promote the right to care. This measure can be an way alternative to part-time to 
provide a better reconciliation between work and private life to older workers, especially women, that have caring 
obligations toward a frail members of their household. However the actual number of vacation days they can benefit from 
is rather small (maximum 3 days in 1 year) with respect to International standards (for instance the seniority days in the 
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In  short  the  Government  successfully  conveyed  time  reconciliation  policies  into  companies' 
strategies especially after the 2000. The last two measures discussed above are of a great importance 
not only because they cut the main disincentives to older workers' retainment: the labour costs, but 
because they involved for the first time social partners.  
Nonetheless  this  conveyance  stopped  in  2004,  when  the  law 243/2004 abolished  the  partial 
retirement schemes and moved the incentives entirely to supply-side (pension bonus). According to the 
new rules older workers postponing their entry in a seniority pathway by two years, can receive the 
social security contribution directly in their wage. As shown by  OECD (2004), the take up of the 
pension bonus was quite limited. This is because, while requiring the explicit consent of employers, 
the bonus provided no compensation for additional labour costs they had to incur. Due to the low take-
up the  pension bonus was substituted in 2006 by a  solidarity agreement between the generations  
(budget  law 296/2006) re-introducing incentives  for  intergenerational  turnover.  According to this 
measure, workers aged 55+ could shift their contract from to full to part-time to allow for newly hired 
under  the  age  of  25  years  (or  under  30  if  holding  a  university  degree)  (Mirabile,  Carrera,  and 
Montanari 2006)64 .   
The demand incentives set to foster the implementation of time reconciliation policies are the only 
governments' attempts to convey retaining policies, which hold a specific target on older workers. On 
the contrary,  the measures  aimed at  fostering other retaining policies  aimed at  improving the job  
quality of the whole workforce and not at retaining older workers. As a result  those measures are 
mainly regulatory and provide companies with no incentives or obligations constraining their HRM 
policies toward retaining older workers.
The almost complete lack of measures conveying health reconciliation policies is often justified as 
a  consequence  of  the  high  occupational  safety  granted  to  the  whole  workforce  by  the  Italian 
legislation, which is deemed to be one of the most advanced in Europe. A very recent update of the  
legislation, whose implementation overrun the period of observation, is introduced in 2008 and 2009 
(law  81/2008  and law  106/2009),  transposed  a  European  social  pact  on  occupational  safety  and 
especially the stress at work65 (Mirabile 2004; Colombo 2013). Also in this case these measures had no 
specific targets on older workers. 
The high standards in occupational safety do not provide relevant information about the standards 
in health reconciliation, because the two concepts overlap only partially. While the first concept deal  
with measures aimed at reducing accidents and professional diseases, the second specifically deal with 
measures that make working conditions not only safe but also suitable for older workers needs and 
preferences. 
In all, since no direct constrains or benefits are set for social partners and companies, the system 
failed  to  convey  top-down  the  health  reconciliation  policies.  Their  implementation  is  thus  for 
companies wholly voluntary. 
As in the Netherlands and in Germany, also in Italy  age equality, here defined as the perceived 
support  from bosses  and colleagues and the equal  treatment  in  the  working environment,  is  only 
Netherlands). 
64 At the moment of the writing data over the implementation of these incentives are not yet available. 
65  In short, this law introduces a single framework for a systematic prevention, reporting of occupational accidents in big 
medium and small companies in collaboration with social partners and bilateral bodies operating at the workplace level.
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indirectly promoted with ban of age discrimination in employment practices. Although the principle of 
equality and equal treatment is formally included in the art. 3 and art. 37 of the Italian Constitutional  
law, the ban of discriminatory acts in reason of age is introduced only in 2003 with the Law 216/2003. 
This  law  transposed  the  European  framework  directive  on  equal  treatment  and  employment  and 
occupation (2000/78/EC), and updated the Italian legislation to the EU standards (Ciccarone 2012). 
This conveyance is nonetheless indirect because it sanctions employers once the discriminatory act 
are brought to trials66, but does not affect the discriminatory attitudes towards older workers. Since the 
attitudes remains unchanged, HRM policies continued to discriminate senior employees (for instance 
excluding them from training and shedding them first in case of redundancy), and to promote the 
diffusion of discriminatory attitudes from bosses and colleagues. In short, the age discrimination ban 
did not convey effectively age equality in the companies. 
Finally also the conveyance of the employability of older workers was pursued only indirectly in 
the more general European framework of lifelong learning. The first legal framework was established 
by the law 236/1993 and further developed by the law 53/2000. A joint financing system of lifelong 
projects is established between the state and regions, which access to European Social Funds (ESF).  
Financing can be claimed by single companies or by group of companies within the same sector or 
with similar needs for skills' reconversion, and often requires the agreement of social partners. An 
alternative  financing  system  is  created  in  sectors  dominated  by  small-sized  companies,  hardly 
reachable  by  social  partners.  Here  lifelong training  is  promoted  by  inter-professional  joint  funds,  
managed by bilateral bodies (the so-called enti bilaterali67) in the small trade, craftsmanship, services 
to the people and to the enterprises. Despite those integrated attempts of promoting lifelong learning in 
all the sectors of the Italian productive system, those attempts remain rather vague, because they are 
not  targeted on older workers.  No requirement or incentives are in fact set to compel or enhance 
companies to include older workers in the financed training plan 68 (OECD 2004;  (Ciccarone 2012).
All in all, as I discussed above, with the exception of demand-side incentives promoting part-time 
in the late career, here called time reconciliation, no other measures were directly conveyed by the 
governments to convey retaining policies HRM strategies.  They improved the general  framework, 
which nevertheless kept the implementation of retaining policies voluntaristic for companies. 
The next section is devoted to discuss the reasons why the weak organizational articulation of both 
unions and employers associations hindered the top-down conveyance of retaining policies through the 
collective bargaining system.  In short  this  system, although able  to  strategically  coordinate  HRM 
policies, lack the central structures able to convey retaining policies from the governments'  to the 
confederation's strategy. The lack of this structure made the inclusion of retaining policies in CLAs 
voluntaristic.     
66 The law that ban age discrimination impose in fact to reverse the burden of the proof. Once the discriminatory act is 
reported to the public authorities, it is the duty of the employer to prove that the contrary is true. 
67 The enti bilaterali are private institutions composed in equal number by representatives of employers and employees in 
sectors where the coverage of the collective bargaining is marginal due to the predominance of small-sized companies 
(such as construction or craft). Generally their main finalities are to recruit social contributions and allocate social 
benefits in case of unemployment and occupational disability and to manage funds for lifelong learning (Leonardi, 2004).
68 A partial exception is represented by the training plans targeted by public employment agencies which give a preference 
to the inclusion of older unemployed as a category experiencing serious obstacles to their re-integration. However these 
measure lie outside the focus of this research for two reasons. First it does not enhance companies to retain but to recruit 
older workers. Secondly it is implemented in 2009, when the period of observation stops. 
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10.3 Institutional affinities
As  described  in  Chapters  1  and  3,  in  Italy  both  labour  and  capital  interests'  fragmentation  
undermined the development of a vertically organized structure. For employers this fragmentation is  
functional and reflects a productive system where few large companies in the industrial and service 
sectors are juxtaposed to a myriad or small and very small companies in craft, agriculture, and trade.  
Because of this functional differentiation, the vertical structures can not converge at the peak in a 
single  confederation.  The  confederations  themselves  remain  to  a  some  extent  industry-based: 
Confindustria,  for  industry,  Confcommercio for  trade  and  retail,  Confartigianato for  craft,  and 
Confindustriasi for innovative service. The lead is taken by the confederation representing the most 
resourceful interests:  Confindustria,  which then shape the strategy pursued in the social dialogue on 
the interests prevailing among large industrial companies. Nevertheless minority currents speaking for 
small and medium companies became increasingly powerful in the last  15/20 years  (Baccaro and 
Pulignano 2009). 
Also fragmented, but ideologically, is the organization of the trade unions. Two main boundaries,  
partially religious and partly political, gave birth in the second post-war to three main associations: the  
Condeferazione  Generale  del  Lavoro  (CGIL-  General  Labour  Confederation)  with  a  communist 
background, the  Confederazione Italiana Sindacati dei Lavoratori  (CISL- Italian Confederation of 
Trade Unions), with a cristian-democratic background, and the Unione Italiana dei Lavoratori (UIL- 
Italian Union of Workers), characterized by a social-democratic background. Also in this case, the 
ideological fragmentation led interests to converge vertically into three separated peak organizations. 
Unlike employers, the CGIL, CISL, and UIL take part to social dialogue separately. Not only they are  
separate in all the interactions they take part to: industry, territorial and company bargaining. This is  
because, unlike in Germany and in the Netherlands, in Italy none of the unions' currents can claim to  
be so encompassing as to be able to act on behalf of the whole workforce (Regalia and Regini 1998). 
The scarce unilateral coordination of the unions (as  apposed to the DBG in Germany or FVN in 
the Netherlands), preventing a fortiori a bilateral one (as opposed to the STvdA in the Netherlands69) is 
typical, as explained by Crouch (1993), of cases where in the early stage of the labour movement a 
culturally-dominant current (in this case catholic) excluded the participation of more radical one (in  
this case communist) . As a result of its early exclusion, CGIL developed a contentious attitude, which 
permeate the interactions with not only its opponents (employers' associations or the governments), 
but also with the CISL and UIL.   
All in all, the limited representativity of Confindustria and the contentiousness of the unions made 
it difficult for the government to commit the bargaining organizations to implement retaining policies. 
This prevented the conveyance of these policies in a system where on paper industry bargaining have  
the capacity of coordinating HRM strategies. 
69 As explained in Chapter 5 and 8 StvdA (Stichting van de Arbeid) is the bilateral foundation representing the interests of 
both employers and employees at national level. Besides taking part to the Consultative process with the Government and 
give a strategical address to their members (as BDA and DGB) they can steer directly the industry-level bargaining by 
signing agreements and common recommendations. 
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Likewise the social dialogue's practices (see Chapter 7), also collective bargaining was regulated 
only in 1993 with the July, 27th protocol. Before that the collective negotiations prioritized either the 
central  or  decentralized  level,  according  to  the  contingent  power  balance  between  unions  and 
employers associations. As explained by  (Regalia and Regini 1998), the “dualism” of the collective 
bargaining in Italy followed historically two phases. In the post-war reconstruction large companies,  
organized in the Confindustria organization, imposed the predominance of the central-industry level70. 
The power balance shifted to employees at the end of the 1960's, when, after a wave of generalized  
strikes (the Hot Automn), they obtained to adjust their wage to the companies' productivity. For this 
purpose a new unionised structures was created at the shop floor:  Consigli  di Fabbrica  (Factory's 
Councils)  and  since  1970 Rappresentanze  Sindacali  Aziendali (RSA-  Company's  Union 
Representative Bodies created by Law 300/1970). These bodies represented the “most representative” 
unions in  the  firm (typically  CGIL,  CISL,  and UIL)  and signed agreements  valid  for  the  whole  
personnel  (Baccaro and Pulignano 2009). The institutionalization of RSA made possible the second 
phase, where the rise of the international market competition pushed the bargaining to the shop floor.  
During this period, decentralized negotiation adapted the working conditions to the changing market 
demands and the industry negotiations extended minimum standards bargained at the company level 
for the whole workforce (Baccaro and Pulignano 2009; Regalia and Regini 2004).
This dualism is formally overcome in 1993, when the July protocol, gave a predominant role to the  
industry CLAs, which define  every two years the inflation-linked wage rises and every four years the  
general  rules  on  employment  conditions.  By  defining  both  the  competences  and  the  minimum 
standards of the decentralized bargaining taking place at territory for small companies and enterprise 
level  for  larger  companies,  this  system  is  formally  highly  coordinated.  If  retaining  policies  are 
included among the general employment conditions in industry CLAs, they have to be implemented 
by the decentralized negotiations according to the current circumstances in the territory or company 
and  in  turn  they  have  to  be  adopted  by  HRM. The  institutionalization  of  this  formal  organized 
decentralization is however undermined by two flaws in the implementation of the 1993 protocol  
(Regalia and Regini 2004;  Negrelli and Pulignano 2008). These two flaws prevent the employment 
conditions included in industry CLAs from coordinating the HRM practices by limiting the spread of 
the territory or company negotiations. 
First the voluntaristic diffusion of unions' bargaining structures in small companies, undermine the 
enforcement of industry CLAs in a significant part of the Italian production system. After 1993 those  
structure are called Rappresentanze sindacali unitarie (RSU- Unitary Representation Bodies). Unlike 
RSA, RSU includes representatives voted by both unionised and non-unionised personnel. Like RSA, 
their  institution  is  not  compulsory,  but  based  on  a voluntaristic  acceptation  of  the  companies' 
management. This limited the diffusion RSUs to companies, that for their large size, benefit from the 
coordination provided by the company bargaining. On the contrary, by excluding unions from the 
myriads of small companies, it reduced the facto the capacity of the bargaining system to coordinate 
HRM  strategies,  often  based  on  employer's  unilateral  actions71 (Pulignano  2010;  Bordogna  and 
70 This level was favoured by employers because it allow them to set wages below the effective productivity growth and 
thus to profit from the economic expansion relatively more than the employees.
71 According to one of the few studies based on a representative sample of the private-sector enterprises, the company 
bargaining involved between 1995-1996 only 10% of the enterprises and covered about 39% of the employees. This 
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Pedersini 2001; Bordogna 1997; Bordogna 1999; Rossi and Sestito 2000).     
Second until 200972 the poor enforcement procedures allowed the increasingly sharper divisions 
mounting after mid-1990's between employers' organizations and unions and among CGIL, CISL, and 
UIL to stalemate both industry and decentralized bargaining. The enforcement procedures, by omitting 
procedural deadlines and by fostering interpretative differences, discouraged bargaining institutions 
from cooperating, especially at lower levels where the bargaining was voluntary. Therefore also the 
territorial bargaining, originally thought as a most effective level to involve lukewarm employers in  
small companies, failed to coordinate employment conditions in a large part of the productive system 
(Regalia and Regini 2004; Negrelli and Pulignano 2008).
All in all the poor vertical coordination of the interests' intermediation system made the conveyance 
of  retaining policies  voluntaristic  first  for  unions and employers and then for  companies for two 
reasons. First the scarce unilateral and thus bilateral coordination that both unions and employers can 
express prevent them from constraining the strategy of their bargaining associations and from affecting 
their agreements. Second the poor coordination of the collective bargaining system fails to constrain 
HRM practices, especially but not only among the small companies. In the next section hypotheses are 
formulate  about  the  extent  to  which  this  voluntaristic  conveyance  affected  the  effectiveness  of 
retaining policies and their distributional effects. 
  
10.4 Working hypotheses
10.4.1 Hypotheses by retaining policies
As explained in the previous section,  the poor vertical coordination of the interests' intermediation 
system  prevented  the  governments  from  conveying  retaining  policies  through  the  collective 
negotiations. Although the 1993 protocol pushed for a more regular meetings between the government 
and the social partners, those meetings were not institutionalized enough to generate a cooperative 
partnership. This prevented the Government from achieving consensus among unions and employers' 
confederations about the necessity of promoting the diffusion of retaining policies among companies,  
as in the Netherlands. 
Unions'  main  concern  is  that  the  EWL re-conversion  could  not  be  sustained  by  the  Italian 
productive  system  which  would  continue  shedding  older  redundant  workers.  Their  choice  of 
preserving the generosity of pathways of exit has to be interpreted in this sense as a way of protecting 
those redundancies from more marginal spells of unemployment. 
More recent opinions favoured the implementation, also through the collective negotiations, of a  
wide variety of retaining policies: such as part-time, specialized training, and organizational change to 
improve the working conditions of older workers, mentoring and so on. However no concrete actions  
number show a decline a decline of the diffusion of company bargaining with respect to the mid-1980's (Rossi & Sestito, 
2000). 
72 In January  2009 a new tripartite agreements updating the 1993 protocols included some procedural rules to moderate the 
contentiousness in the CLA's renewals. For instance: clear deadlines are set for the starting of the negotiations before the 
CLA expiry (6 month for industry and 2 months for decentralized level), by that time the counterparts are compelled to 
present their proposals, during the negotiations until the CLA expiry no-strike obligation applies (Pedersini 2011). 
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were undertaken to include these issues into collective agreements until 2009. This is because unions 
feared that including companies' obligations to retain older workers limited also the freedom of older 
workers to exit early . Despite these common platform, ideological differences made CISL and UIL's 
positions  more  moderate  and  CGIL's  positions,  more  intransigent,  on  defending  early  exit  rights 
(Mirabile, Carrera, and Montanari 2006).
The strategy pursued by employers' associations was also fragmented, especially after the fracture  
between big and small companies became more evident from the second part of the 1990's onward. 
Since small-sized companies were averse to any constrains to their entrepreneurial autonomy, their  
growing  power  undermined  the  capacity  of  the  newly  adopted  bargaining  system  to  coordinate 
working conditions, especially if pertaining to a non-wage sphere (Negrelli and Pulignano 2008). 
All in all, the fragmented top-down diffusion of the EWL in both social partners' organizations 
hindered  the  inclusion  of  retainment  policies  in  collective  agreements.  Neither  employers  and 
employees' representative accepted to voluntarily constrain their members' autonomy. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the inclusion of retaining policies in industry 
CLAs was also hindered since no procedures facilitated a compromise among strongly antagonistic 
positions.  Moreover  requiring  the approval  of  all  the  bargaining  parties,  which  severely  prevents  
innovative  measures,  because  often  controversial,  and  make  the  system substantially  “immobile” 
(Ichino, 2006). Because of that even if industry employers' representatives included retaining policies 
in  the  bargaining  agenda,  an  agreement  would  be  hardly  reachable,  because  especially  the  most 
intransigent current of the union will not accept that the decision of EWL can be forced by employers  
and not voluntary chosen by older workers. 
Because of the poor coordination of the bargaining system in Italy, the top-down dissemination of 
retaining policies is severely limited, unless it is promoted directly by the Government. This is the case 
of time reconciliation policies. As described in Section 10.2 the social protection system enhances  
companies to retain older workers by reducing their labour costs if they enter progressive retirement  
schemes. Therefore it can be argued that time reconciliation policies are conveyed into companies' 
HRM because they aligned the labour costs of older workers closer to their productivity.  
Because of that  older workers working part-time are expected to be significantly less likely than  
full-time workers to enter a work-retirement trajectory (HP 10.1). Since men are more likely than 
women to become eligible for progressive retirement, working part-time will lower the likelihood to  
undertake a work-retirement trajectory, significantly more for men than for women (HP 10.2). 
On  the  contrary  physical  and  mental  health  reconciliation  age  equality,  and  employability  are 
conveyed only indirectly by the Government. Accordingly older workers experiencing a low physical  
and mental strain or a supportive atmosphere or a fair treatment, or skills' development in the last job  
are expected to NOT have a significantly lower likelihood to enter a work-retirement trajectory than  
older workers, who did not. (HP 10.4 - HP 10.6- HP 10.8).
The effectiveness of retaining policies is expected to be low because they were not conveyed by the 
bargaining system into HRM strategies. Since their implementation was not coordinated, policies may 
be expected to result non-significant across the whole economy. Alternatively other dynamics, both 
demographic and economics,  could encourage companies to implement retaining policies  in some 
industries more systematically than in others. In this case also the effectiveness of retaining policies is 
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expected to vary accordingly. 
10.4.2 Hypotheses by industry
As shown earlier, the systematic exclusion of retaining policies in CLAs made their implementation  
voluntaristic for companies in Italy. The governments succeeded in conveying only time reconciliation 
policies with  direct incentives that, although not legally binding, reduced the labour costs of older 
workers switching to part-time in their late career. Since part-time incentives are the same for the 
whole economy, NO significant industry pattern is expected in the likelihood of entering a work-
retirement trajectory among older workers working part-time (HP 10.3).  
As for the other sets of retaining policies two competing hypotheses can be formulated. The first 
hypothesis argue that  the  voluntaristic implementation of retaining policies does  not generate any 
industry  pattern  in  their  effectiveness,  because  the  aversion  of  companies  toward  retaining  older 
workers is generalized. Because of that a low physical and mental strain or a supportive atmosphere  
and a fair treatment, or training at work are expected to NOT significantly lower the likelihood to  
access a work-retirement transition across the economy. (HP 10.5a- HP 10.7a- HP 10.9a).
The second hypothesis is that, although no legally constrained, companies implemented retaining 
policies only if they experience circumstances that made profitable to retain older workers, such as a 
skills' supply shortage. As we have seen in Section 3.2, Italy experiences a progressive curtailment of  
young cohorts that inflow into the labour market since the end of the 1980's.  
 In the industries exposed to the international competition older workers were still be redundant and 
thus companies still profit from shedding rather than retaining them. On the one hand the increased 
competitiveness accentuated the economic turmoil, which depressed the job demands. On the other 
hand the continuous technological progress made older workers' skills obsolete. These segments fall  
into the private sectors  and include the core  Italian industries  based on low-skills  manufacturing,  
services,  and  craft  and  knowledge-based  industry  in  the  tertiary  sectors,  such  as  financial 
intermediations and business activity. On the contrary companies in sheltered industries are expected 
to implement retaining policies to compensate the workforce shortage they experience. 
Because of that the second competing hypothesis is: a low physical and mental strain at work or a  
supportive atmosphere or a fair treatment or skills' development at work are expected to significantly  
lower  the  likelihood  to  access  a  work-retirement  transition  only  in  the  following  industry:  
construction, public administration, health, education and social work. (HP 10.4b- HP 10.6b- HP 
10.8b). 
Table 10.2 provides a summary of the hypotheses concerning the extent to which retaining policies 
are  expected to extend working life  in Italy,  depending on the more or  less  successful  top-down 
dissemination. 
Table 10.2: Summary of the top-down dissemination of retaining policies in Italy and hypotheses.
Retaining policies Top-down dissemination Hypotheses
Time reconciliation Government  bound  company's 
strategy  to  retain older workers  by 
HP  10.1:  Because  of  the  direct  incentives  to  progressive  retirement, 
working  part-time  in  the  last  job  is  expected  to  lower  significantly  the  
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reducing  their  labour  costs  if  they 
work  part-time  in  a  progressive 
retirement  scheme  in  their  last 
career.
No policies aimed at improving time 
reconciliation  are  included  in 
industry CLAs. 
likelihood of older workers to enter a work-retirement trajectory. 
HP 10.2:  Since men are more likely than women to become eligible for 
progressive retirement,  working  part-time  in  the  last  job  is  expected  to  
lower  the  likelihood  to  undertake  a  work-retirement  trajectory,  
significantly more for men than for women. 
BY INDUSTRY:
HP 10.3: Since part-time incentives are the same for the whole economy, 
NO significant industry patters is expected in the likelihood of entering a  
work-retirement trajectory among older workers working part-time.
Physical and Mental  
Health  
reconciliation
Social protection's and partnership's 
attempts to improve the occupational 
safety  at  work  are  not  specifically 
targeted on retaining older workers. 
No  policies  aimed  at  improving 
health reconciliation are included in 
industry CLAs. 
HP 10.4: Because health reconciliation is enhanced only indirectly,  older 
workers experiencing a low physical and mental strain at in their last job  
are expected to NOT have a significantly lower likelihood to enter a work-
retirement trajectory than older workers, who did not.
BY INDUSTRY: Two competing hypotheses
HP 10.5a: A low physical and mental strain in the last job is expected to  
NOT  significantly  lower  the  likelihood  to  access  a  work-retirement  
transition across the economy.
HP 10.5b: A low physical and mental strain in the last job is expected to  
significantly  lower  the likelihood to access  a work-retirement  transition  
only in the following industry: construction, public administration, health,  
education and social work.
Age equality The state attempts only indirectly to 
improve age equality  by abolishing 
age  discrimination  in  2003  in  all 
aspects of the employment relation.
No  policies  directly  aimed  at 
improving age equality are included 
in industry CLAs. 
HP 10.6: Because age equality is enhanced only indirectly,  older workers 
that experiencing a supportive atmosphere and a fair  treatment at work  
will  NOT have a lower likelihood to enter  a work-retirement  trajectory  
than older workers that do not.
BY INDUSTRY: Two competing hypotheses
HP 10.7a:  A supportive atmosphere and a fair treatment at work in the  
last job is expected to NOT significantly lower the likelihood to access a  
work-retirement transition across the economy.
HP 10.7b:  A supportive atmosphere and a fair treatment at work in the  
last job is expected to NOT significantly lower the likelihood to access a  
work-retirement  transition  only  in  the  following  industry:  construction,  
public administration, health, education and social work.
Employability Regulation  of  lifelong  learning  but 
without any specific focus on older 
workers. 
No  policies  directly  aimed  at 
improving  employability  are 
included in industry CLAs.
HP  10.8:  Because  employability  is  enhanced  only  indirectly,  it  is 
hypothesized  that  older workers  that  experienced skills'  development  at  
work  will  NOT  have  a  lower  likelihood  to  enter  a  work-retirement  
trajectory than older workers that did not.
BY INDUSTRY: Two competing hypotheses
HP 10.9a:  Skills'  development  at  in  the  last  job  is  expected  to  NOT 
significantly  lower  the likelihood to access  a work-retirement  transition  
across the economy..
HP 10.9b:  Skills'  development  at  in  the  last  job  is  expected  to  NOT  
significantly  lower  the likelihood to access  a work-retirement  transition  
only in the following industry: construction, public administration, health,  
education and social work.
10.5 Findings
The hypotheses in Table 10.2 are tested by using a piecewise-constant exponential model (PCE). The 
sub-sample is restricted to the cohort born from 1945 onward, because it is investigated to which extnd 
the entry in the work-retirement transition of the cohorts that reach the age of 50 years in the mid-
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1990's  have been significantly affected by the implementation of retaining policies.  Since in Italy 
retaining policies,  with the  exception of time reconciliation policies  have not  been systematically  
implemented,  it  is  hypothesized  that  they  will  not  have  a  systematic  effect  on  work-retirement  
trajectories. Therefore it is expected that the timing of exit of older workers that experienced a good  
job quality in their last career will not be significantly higher of the exit timing of older workers who 
did not experience them.
Estimations are expressed in hazard ratios in Table 10.3. The descriptive of the Sharelife sample I  
have used in this analysis are presented in Section 4.2. 
Model 10.1 includes the controls (see the controls'  estimations in Appendix F) and the five job 
quality dimensions. Model 10.2 includes the interaction between gender and time reconciliation, and 
the subsequent models include the interaction between each job quality dimension and the industry. 
As it can be seen in model 10.1, the effectiveness of retaining policies is rather limited in Italy,  
because limited is the social partners' conveyance of retaining policies into companies' HRM. Only 
two of  the  five  job quality  dimensions lower  the  likelihood of  older  workers to  undertake work-
retirement trajectory. The first dimension is the  part-time in the late career (time reconciliation). As 
hypothesized in HP 10.1,  working part-time in the late career reduces significantly the likelihood of 
exiting employment. This is due to the monetary incentives that are directly offered by the social  
protection system to increase the companies' profitability to use time reconciliation policies within the 
scheme  of  progressive  retirement.  This  argument  is  also  supported  by  the  finding  that  part-time 
reduces the exit likelihood of men far more than the likelihood of women, because the former are more 
likely than the latter to be eligible to progressive retirement scheme (model 10.2). Since the entry into 
progressive retirement  requires a very long and stable career (about  35 years 73)  and men have in 
average a much more stable career than women, companies profit comparatively more from retaining  
men than women working part-time. Moreover, as hypothesized in HP 10.2, model 10.3 shows that the 
effect of part-time on the timing of the employment exit does not significantly vary across industry, 
because  the  social  protection's  incentives  is  the  same  in  the  whole  economy.  All  in  all,  time 
reconciliation policies are effective in extending working life because the social protection's system 
successfully enhance companies to implement them.
The second dimension that significantly delays the exit from employment is the low mental strain  
(or  mental  health  reconciliation  see  model  10.1).  This  effect  is  partially not coherent  with  the 
hypothesis HP 10.3, because differently from time reconciliation policies, it can not be explained by 
incentives set  either  by the social  protection or by the collective bargaining system. Although an  
increasingly higher concern is paid by the social protection system and the social partners toward the 
improvement of healthy working conditions, their attempts are very recent (2008-2009) and they do 
not directly bind or enhance companies to retain older workers74. 
73 The main eligibility condition to benefit from the progressive retirement scheme is to be entitled or almost entitled to the 
seniority pathway (35 years of contributions). 
74 Between 2008 and 2009 a single act concerning occupational health and safety is introduced by the laws 81/2008 and 
106/2009 update the previous legislation to the innovations introduced by the European Union and to the changes occurred in  
the labour market. It provides a unified framework that promote the prevention of occupational accidents and diseases by  
enhancing a more systematic information, and training of workers, a greater endorsement of social partners and a reinforced 
penalty system. Moreover social partners in 2008 sign  inter-confederal agreement  with which they adopt the indications 
included in a European framework agreement on work-related stress. They provide common guidelines to their associations 
responsible of the collective bargaining to introduces measures that at industry and company level can release the mental  
10.5  Findings 205
Alternatively we may think that companies are enhanced to retain older workers experiencing a low 
mental strain at work because they in average perform better than older workers that suffer from a high 
level of  stress.  By increasing the wellbeing at  work, a low mental strain increases not only older  
workers preference for work  but  also their  productivity  and indirectly  reduced their  labour  costs,  
similarly to as a monetary incentives. The lower likelihood of older workers with a low level of mental 
strains to exit employment does not derive in this case from an top-down conveyance of mental health 
reconciliation policies, but it is the result of companies' strategy of profit maximization.  
As  for  three  remain  job  quality  dimension,  physical  health  reconciliation,  age  equality  and 
employability, model 10.1 shows no significant effect on the likelihood of entering a work-retirement  
trajectory. As the hypotheses HP 10.3- HP 10.5- HP 10.7 predicted, since both the social protection and 
the partnership system fail to bind companies to retain older workers, HRM policies do not systematic 
improve their working conditions to extend working life. Because of that no significant difference in 
the timing of employment exit exists between older workers that experience better or worse working 
conditions. 
The competing hypotheses concerning the industry differences in the implementation of retaining 
policies are tested in model 10.4-10.5-10.6-10.7. The first set of the competing hypothesis (a) expect 
no industry patterns in the effect of working conditions on the exit timing. The second set instead (b) 
predicts that working conditions will lower the likelihood of exiting employment only in industries 
less affected by the globalization forces,  because only in these industries companies experience a 
shortage of the work supply that they have to compensate by retaining older workers. In the models I 
compare whether the effect of working conditions on timing of exit from employment significantly 
differ in each industry with respect to the effect they have in one of the industry challenged the most  
by the globalization: the manufactory.
Models 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, and 10.7 support to a greater extent the second set of hypotheses (b), than 
the first. As shown by the estimates of the interaction between the set of retaining policies and the  
industry, the likelihood of entering a work-retirement trajectories of older workers experiencing either 
a low mental strain at work (model 10.5) or a supportive atmosphere or a fair treatment (model 10.6) 
or skills' development at work (model 10.7) is significantly lower is industries protected from the high 
competitiveness and technological development induced by the globalization:  construction and the 
public sector. Companies within these two industries experience circumstances, in this case a shortage 
of  the  work  supply,  which  automatically  bind  them  to  substitute  their  shedding  strategy  with  a  
retaining strategy. Since they can not recruit the workforce they need in the labour market, they need 
to encourage their older employees to work longer by implementing retaining policies. Furthermore 
the results gives us an important insight over which strategy is pursued by the different sectors to 
retain older workers.  While the construction industry retained older workers implementing mental 
health reconciliation and age equality policies, the public sector implemented instead employability 
policies. None of them use physical health reconciliation policies, whose effectiveness remain non-
significant in all the industries. 
strains caused by work-related stress. 
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Table 10.3:  Piecewise-constant  exponential  model  (PCE) estimating the effectiveness  of  retaining policies  in  extending  
working life in Italy.
Source: Sharelife 2008-2009
10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7
Age 49-54 0.0948*** 0.0914*** 0.0965*** 0.102*** 0.0716*** 0.0514*** 0.0786***
Age 55-59 0.270*** 0.263*** 0.282*** 0.293*** 0.208*** 0.149*** 0.227***
Age 60-65 0.344** 0.345** 0.368** 0.386* 0.277** 0.200*** 0.300**
Time reconciliation 0.646* 0.215** 0.0798** 0.212** 0.215** 0.199** 0.204**
Physical health reconciliation 0.910 0.914 0.914 0.827 0.917 0.923 0.892
Mental health reconciliation 0.731*** 0.735*** 0.721*** 0.720*** 0.756* 0.738*** 0.721***
Age equality 1.123 1.132 1.144 1.118 1.176 1.483** 1.130
Employability 0.930 0.934 0.921 0.947 0.953 0.923 1.085
Interaction
Time reconciliation * woman 4.195* 4.801* 4.214* 4.185* 4.487* 4.411*
Time reconciliation* industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 3.084




Real estate renting and business activity (dropped)
3.127
Other community 1.690
Physical health reconciliation* industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 0.993




Real estate renting and business activity 1.311
1.126
Other community 1.129
Mental health reconciliation* industry
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 1.096








Agriculture, forestry and fishery 0.731








Agriculture, forestry and fishery 0.941










Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
Public Administration and difence, education, health and social work
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
Public Administration and difence, education, health and social work
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
Public Administration and difence, education, health and social work
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
Public Administration and difence, education, health and social work
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
Public Administration and difence, education, health and social work
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Dependent variable:
Work-retirement trajectory: time-varying categorical variable equal to: 0 if the respondent is working at the end of the person-
period spell, 1 if the respondent left employment at the end of the person-period spell.
Independent variables:
Time reconciliation: : time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is working in a part-time job in the person-period spell
Physical health reconciliation:  time-constant interval scale obtained by Factor Analysis (see chap.4) equal from 1 to 4. It  
measure measuring the self-perceived quality of the material working conditions in the last/current job by looking at how the job 
is physically demanding and the workspace comfortable
Mental  health reconciliation:  time-constant interval  scale  obtained by Factor Analysis  (see  chap.4)  equal  from 1 to  4.  It  
measures the self-perceived emotional burden of the last/current job looking at the time pressure,  the  emotional  burden,  and  
conflicts that the work implies.
Age equality: time-constant interval scale obtained by Factor Analysis (see chap.4) equal from 1 to 4 measuring elf-perceived 
recognition and support on the last job, the quality of the working atmosphere and the respondents' perception over how fairly  
they are treated by their bosses 
Employability:  time-constant interval scale equal from 1 to 4 measuring the extent  to  which the skills of respondents are  
developed in the last/current.
Industry: time-varying set of dummy variable over the industry where the respondent is working in the person-period spell. 
For a more detailed description see Chapter 4. 
All in all, the results show that the effectiveness of retaining policies showed to be poor in Italy.  
According  to  the  hypotheses  retaining  policies  are  effective  only  when  their  implementation  is 
successfully conveyed by the social protection system in the strategy of companies with financial  
incentives that reduce the labour cost of older workers, as in the case of time reconciliation policies. 
The  effectiveness  of  the  other  retaining  policies  is  compromised  because  their  implementation  is  
voluntaristic  for companies.  Since companies are  not  bind by the collective bargaining system to 
implement retaining policies,  they implement them only when some circumstances,  in this case a 
workforce  shortage,  require  them to  systematically  retain  older  workers.  Therefore  only  in  those  
industries (here construction and the public sector) retaining policies prove to significantly extend 
working life.
10.6 Conclusion
In this chapter it was investigated the extent to which the weak organizational articulation of unions 
and employers' associations influenced the effectiveness of retaining policies implemented between 
the mid-1990's  until  2008-2009.  The data  estimated by the CRM supported to a  great  extent  the 
empirical implication derived from the HP 3.5. It hypothesized that the low articulation of interests'  
coalition, hindering the effectiveness of retrenchment policies, prevented the conveyance of retaining 
policies into confederal strategy and in turn downward. Due to this failed conveyance between the 
mid-1990's and 2009 no CLAs included retaining policies and thus their implementation was wholly 
voluntaristic for companies. 
At aggregate level the weak articulation significantly proved to hinder the effectiveness of retaining 
policies. In fact only two out of five job quality dimensions were found to significantly delay the exit  
from work. The first is the time reconciliation. This is because policies promoting part-time in the late 
career were conveyed by direct incentives that by-passed the self-regulation mode allowing unions and 
employers' associations to hinder the effectiveness of these policies. Another empirical support to the 
success of this direct conveyance is the higher effectiveness of time reconciliation policies for men 
than for women. This is because men, having a more stable working career,  are more likely than 
women to become eligible to partial retirement schemes, where direct incentives are are allocated.
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The second is mental reconciliation. This was not predicted by the empirical expectation HP 10.6  
because  policies  lowering  the  stress  and  pressure  at  work  were  not  directly  conveyed  by  the 
governments. It may be explained as a result of the behavioural effect of low stress at work, which 
boosting the productivity of older workers, promoted companies to retain them even if no external  
incentives constrain their HRM.
Concerning  the  distributional  effect  of  retaining  policies,  data  support  more  the  empirical 
implications derived from HP10.9a than HP10.9b. The only exception concerned time reconciliation 
policies, because the direct incentives encouraged companies across the economy, and physical health  
reconciliation. For the rest retaining policies proved to be effective only in sheltered industries, where  
companies experienced a skills' shortage replaceable by older workers.
All in all, because of their weak articulation unions and employers' organizations proved to hinder 
the effectiveness of retaining policies. As a result they are effective only if they are directly conveyed  
by direct incentives of the governments or if they were part of the competitive strategies of companies. 
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11 Conclusions
This study was about the institutional conditions explaining the cross-national variation of activation 
policies'  outcomes in the Netherlands,  Germany, and Italy between the mid-1990's  and 2009.  The 
purpose of activation policies was to re-convert the existing retirement incentives at first in the welfare 
schemes that had institutionalized exit from work before statutory retirement age (pathways of exit). 
Although triggered by irresistible environmental pressures, activation policies could not be adopted 
unilaterally by governments. Facing strong opposition from both the workforce and their employers,  
these policies required the direct support of the organizations representing their interests. On the one  
hand their consensus was needed to avoid the blame raised by the retrenchment of pathways of exit to  
de-legitimize the process itself.  On the other hand their commitment was required to prevent also  
HRM strategies from compensating the effect of retrenchment policies.
The  institutional  conditions  that  explained  the  outcomes  of  the  EWL  reconversion  in  the 
Netherlands,  Germany,  and  Italy  are  found  in  the  institutional  affinities  between  protection 
productions and partnership. Since the protection regime here  fostered similar  expectations of the  
externalization coalition, the vertical coordination (here defined as organizational articulation) of the 
labour and capital interests assumed a particular relevance. This is because, defining the predominant  
traditions of the state-society partnership, the articulation of interests indicates the characteristics of  
the modes where the interactions for the adoption of activation policies take place.  
The partnership tradition is also relevant because it helped identifying the conditions under which  
the actors interact and in turn their strategical priorities. In contentious partnership the state tends to 
interact only when it lacks the necessary legitimacy to act unilaterally, and is thus dominated by the 
policy interests of the counterparts. On the contrary, the more cooperative partnership the more state-
society interactions are institutionalized and based on policy interests of the state. This is because the 
state can exclude in the shadow of its hierarchy the societal groups pursuing particular at the expenses  
of general interests.
The  typical modes  of  social  governance  are:  consultation,  concertation,  self-regulation,  self-
administration. Although they are not associated to any particular power balance between actors, in 
combination  with  the  partnership  tradition  allowed  to  predict  that  the  outcomes  of  the  EWL re-
conversion are directly associated to the organizational articulation of labour and capital' interests.
Since the first step of the EWL re-conversion is the retrenchment of pathways of exit, the focus moved 
at national level where social partners take part in the policymaking.   
11.1 Part 2: Effectiveness of  retrenchment policies
The conditions under which the effectiveness of retrenchment policies was promoted or hindered was 
investigated  in  Part  2.  The first  instance where the  externalization coalition shaped the EWL re-
conversion was the national level, in the social governance modes where retrenchment policies are  
formulated  and implemented. Using  a  Competing  Risk  Model, this  effectiveness  of  retrenchment 
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policies was estimated as cohort effects on the likelihood of accessing work-retirement trajectories 
based on three main pathways of exit: unemployment, disability, and early retirement. 
According to the empirical implications of HP 3.2, HP 3.3, and HP 3.4, estimations show that 
between the mid-1990's and 2009 retrenchment policies have been more effective in the Netherlands,  
less effective in Germany and the least effective in Italy. For the Netherlands (Chapter 5) the cohort  
effect showed that retrenchment policies are associated with a lower likelihood of entering two out of 
three  pathways:  the  disability  and  pension.  The  same  effect  is  not  found  for  the  unemployment  
pathway, which was retrenched only towards the end of the period of observation. At the same time,  
the fact that the cohort effect is not significantly positive was a hint that, most likely for its limited 
generosity, unemployment was not used as a functional alternative of the other two pathways. 
A lower effectiveness was estimated for the retrenchment policies in Germany (Chapter 6). Here 
the  cohort  effect  showed  a  significant  negative  association  only  with  the  likelihood  of  accessing 
pension pathway, which is moreover comparatively greater for women than for men. Cohorts effect is  
non-significant for the disability pathway. This is because its retrenchment dated back to 1984 and can 
not be detected in this model. Finally the most interesting case concerned the unemployment pathway.  
Here the cohort effect showed that overall the retrenchment, occurring in the second half of the 2000's, 
had no significant effect on the inflow across the whole economy. However the effect showed that  
unemployment access is significantly higher after the retrenchment of the pension pathway only for  
part-time workers. This meant that, differently from the Netherlands, unemployment was a functional  
alternative of pension, but only under the part-time retirement schemes.
In Italy (Chapter 7) the effectiveness was limited only in the pension pathway and only in some 
parts of the economy. With respect to the civil servants, the timing of entry grew significantly slower  
in the industries of the private sector under the protection of social partners. The negative cohort effect  
in disability pathway did not prove to be significant due to the very few transitions examined. At last  
the most  interest cohort effect is estimated in the unemployment pathway. Overall  it resulted that  
unemployment was increasingly used after the mid-1990's to shed redundancies before the eligibility 
to pension pathway. Nevertheless, due to the limited number of transitions, it could not be proven that 
this more frequent access was limited to the where CIG schemes were managed by social partners. 
With regard to the research question:
RQ2: Under  which  institutional  conditions  has  the  involvement  of  unions  and  employers'  
associations  in  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  retrenchment  policies  promoted  their  
effectiveness in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy between the mid-1990's and 2009?
Analysis has shown that the involvement of social partners in the policymaking of retrenchment 
policies implied always a political exchange that limited the effectiveness of retrenchment policies.  
Nevertheless, according to HP 3.2, this political exchange is rather limited in countries where the 
social partners are involved in modes approaching more the consultation than the concertation mode.  
This is because in consultation social partners pursue more power-maintaining over policy-oriented 
strategies and vice versa.
 Accordingly, the political exchange in the Netherlands limited only the effectiveness to the safety 
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pathway that, for its marginal generosity, was not used as a functional alternative for the other two. On  
the contrary, in Italy the exchange required the transitional rules that hindered the effectiveness of  
retrenchment policies in a significant part of the economy. 
In  short,  the  institutional  condition  that  prevented  social  partners  from  watering  down  the 
retrenchment  proposed  by  governments  is  a  organization  of  interests  articulated  enough  to 
institutionalize  a  regular  social  dialogue.  This  is  because  interactions'  iteration  reduce  for  social 
partners the payoff of hindering the formulation of retrenchment policies at the expenses of their future 
engagement in the policymaking. 
As  hypothesized  in  HP 3.3,  the  second  institutional  condition  supporting  the  effectiveness  of 
retrenchment  policies  is  a  system of  interests'  intermediation  so  articulated  as  to  be  involved  in 
implementation modes similar to self-regulation or self-administration. As shown in the Netherlands,  
the total internalization of VUT (early retirement schemes) costs discouraged social  partners from 
causing a further increase of pay-roll taxes by preserving those schemes. 
On the contrary, in Italy the effectiveness of retrenchment policies was apparently hindered by 
workplace representatives and the management of companies under CIG schemes. This is because 
they seemed to increasingly use those schemes to enhance the industrial re-structuring by shedding 
older workers with no additional costs. However the data limitation prevented to test this conjecture.  
Instead,  it  was  clearer  that  the  bargaining  organizations  could  hinder  the  effectiveness  of 
unemployment's  retrenchment,  despite  formally  self-regulating  the  old-age  part-time  retirement 
schemes. Because of the institutionalization of the  blokmodell  scheme, based on vertical part-time, 
they could shed recipients much earlier than it was intended to. 
The  results  also  supported  HP  3.4. Due  to  the  high  confederal-industry  articulation,  in  the 
Netherlands organizations  promote  the shift  toward  pre-retirement  schemes,  first  in  the  industries 
where their coordination capacity is higher and then elsewhere. In Germany the lower Confederal-
industry articulation allowed the industry organizations to foster unintended effects.
In  short,  social  partners  promoted  the  effectiveness  of  retrenchment  policies  under  interaction  
modes that limited either their power or the externalization of pathways' costs. This is because under 
these conditions opportunistic actions were either prevented or counterproductive for their members. 
Although  to  a  great  extent  findings  are  compatible  with  the  empirical  implications  of  the  
hypotheses formulated about the effectiveness of retrenchment policies, the research design does not  
allow to exclude alternative interpretations of the findings. If the role of social partners in affecting the  
retrenchment of the pension and disability pathway more straightforward, less clear is their role in the  
retrenchment of the unemployment pathway. Here the cohort effects are more likely to be explained by 
a unilateral action of the Government.  This is especially true in Italy where in the mid-1990's  an 
expansion of the unemployment pathway could be functional to prevent the economic restructuring to 
increase the already high youth unemployment and in turn widen the inders-outsiders cleavage.    
Furthermore the findings obtained for Germany can be easily understood as a consequence of the  
economic shock that followed the economic unification. As it pointed out in the conclusions below 
more refined analyses need to be done in order to exclude these alternative explanations. 
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11.2 Part 3: Effectiveness of  retaining policies
The organizational articulation of interests' associations did not only allow the social partners to affect 
the policymaking. Unions and employers associations coordinate top-down the incentives provided by 
the  HRM  policies  through  the  collective  bargaining  system.  Nevertheless  collective  agreements 
(CLAs) may convey two strategies, one opposite to the other. The first is to keep on shedding older  
workers with incentives able to compensate the retrenchment of the pathways of exit that the coalition  
could not hinder above. The second is to retain older employees with incentives able to support both 
their productivity and their work preferences. 
Using  a  Piecewise-Constant  Exponential  Model, this  effectiveness  of  retaining  policies  was 
estimated as the effect of five job quality dimensions in the last career on the timing of employment  
exit. The job quality dimensions were improved by five types of retaining policies: time reconciliation, 
physical and mental health reconciliation, age equality, and employability. The underlying assumption 
was here that only if the HRM strategies would aim at retaining older workers the effects of those 
dimension would significantly delay exit from work. The more HRM strategies tended to shed older 
workers the more the job quality's effect was assumed to be compensated by push incentives.     
According to the empirical implications of HP 3.5 and HP 3.6, estimations show only partially that 
between the mid-1990's  and  2009 retaining  policies  have  been  more  effective in  the Netherlands 
(Chapter 8), less effective in Italy (Chapter 10) and the least effective in Germany (Chapter 9). In the 
Netherlands improvements in job quality were to a greatest extent associated with a significant delay 
in  the  timing  of  exit  from  work.  The  only  exceptions  were  the  effect  of  the  mental  health 
reconciliation, shown not significant, and the time reconciliation for women, the only part associated 
to  a  lower  exit  age. The  effect  of  retaining  policies  was  stronger  in  industries  where  the  policy 
dissemination in CLAs was higher.  
In Germany improvements in job quality were generally associated to non significant effect on the 
timing of the exit from work. The only exception was time reconciliation, whose improvement only 
for women significantly delayed the timing of exit from work. The effect of retaining policies followed 
to some extent an industry pattern reflecting the dichotomy between sheltered and exposed industries.
Finally in Italy improvements in job quality were associated to a growing age of work exit only for  
time reconciliation and mental health reconciliation. As in Germany, job dimensions showed to some 
extent industry pattern reflecting the dichotomy between sheltered and exposed industries.
With regard to the research question:
RQ3:  Under  which  institutional  conditions  have  unions  and  employers'  associations  
promoted the effectiveness of retaining policies in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy between the  
mid-1990's and 2009?
Analysis  has  shown  that  unions  and  employers'  organizations  influenced  the  effectiveness  of 
retaining policies, in some cases promoting it in other cases hindering it. This is because, depending on 
the articulation of the collective bargaining system, social partners were included in three nested self-
regulation modes (national-sectoral-workplace collective bargaining) which promoted or hindered the 
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conveyance  of  retaining  policies  into  the  HRM  strategy.  Taken  for  granted  that  the  collective  
bargaining system in the three cases under analysis is able to generate sectoral coordination of HRM 
practices, the key condition was here the articulation between the central and the industry levels. This 
articulation defined the extent to which the output of national bipartite or tripartite negotiations affect 
the strategy of the industry bargaining organizations to include retaining bargaining in CLAs. 
  At first  according to HP 3.5 the effectiveness of retaining policies was promoted only if the 
retrenchment of pathways of exit internalized the costs of early exit. This is because the internalization 
compelled a shift in the Confederal strategy, which otherwise remained voluntaristic. Since in Italy 
social partners managed to preserve the pathways for their members, they faced no incentives to push 
retaining policies through HRM practices. This lack of obligations did not constrain companies to shift 
their shedding HRM practices unless environmental pressures made this shift part of their competitive 
strategy.  All  in  all,  the  poor  articulation  of  labour  and  capital  interests  made  the  conveyance  of  
retaining policies wholly voluntaristic for both social partners and companies and in turn hindered  
their effectiveness. 
The estimations supported also HP 3.6. Once the retrenchment of pathways of exit started to shift 
the  Confederal  strategy,  the  confederal-industry  articulation  affected  the  conveyance  of  retaining 
policies into the industry CLAs and thus into HRM practices. In the Netherlands the strong articulation 
of interests' organizations allowed the unions and employers' confederations to commit their members 
to include retaining policies in CLAs. This was thanks to the bipartite coordination granted by STvdA. 
By  delivering  common  recommendations  STvdA  provided  their  members  with  the  necessary 
incentives to discourage the opportunistic compensation of retrenchment policies and to improve the 
job aspects  boosting the work preference and productivity of older workers. Because of this mutual 
conveyance a large part of the productive system was compelled to implement retaining policies and 
thus to promote their effectiveness. This mutual conveyance was instead prevented in Germany by the 
constitutional  principle  of  Tarifautonomie (autonomy of collective  bargaining).  This  principle,  de-
legitimating  any   state  and  confederal  attempts  to  interfere  with  collective  bargaining,  made  the 
negotiation of retaining policies voluntary for industry organizations. The articulation of employers' 
interests is the only strong enough to unilaterally convey retaining policies into their members' HRM 
strategy with information campaigns. This is because BDA grew against the use of pathways of exit  
since the increasing cohorts of early retired would have raised the already consistent non-wage labour 
costs. This conveyance, despite raising awareness of the HRM practices able to boost the productivity  
in older age, did not promote the effectiveness of retaining policies for three reasons. First, BDA did 
not  set  any  rewards  or  sanctions  able  to  coordinate  their  members'  HRM practices.  Second,  the 
membership's  losses  experienced  by  BDA from  the  late  1990's  onward  limited  the  part  of  the 
production system, especially among small companies, it could affect. Third, the chance of expanding 
old-age part-time retirement schemes hindered the conveyance of retaining policies into the unions'  
strategy, less concerned by the increments of payroll taxes. 
To conclude, the institutional conditions under which unions and employers' associations promoted 
the effectiveness of retaining policies are two. First, the articulation of labour and capital interests had  
to be high enough to prevent them from hindering the effectiveness of retrenchment policies. Second, 
this articulation had to be institutionalized as a bipartitely coordinated collective bargaining system,  
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where retaining policies could be mutually conveyed by both union and employers' confederations.    
11.3 Social stratification
The vertical articulation of the interests' organizations did not only affect the outcomes of activation 
policies,  but  also  their  distributional  effect.  Depending  on  how  encompassing  the  interests  they  
represented,  unions  and  employers'  associations  were  expected  to  minimize  or  intensify  the 
distributional effects of activation policies across social groups, both intra and inter-generationally. 
The estimation  concerning both retrenchment  and retaining policies  in Germany, Italy,  and the 
Netherlands showed that  their  outcome diverged not only in the magnitude,  but  also in the social 
stratification of their  effect.  As shown in the part  of the empirical  analysis,  retrenchment policies  
displayed a significantly stratified effects only in countries where social partners hindered either their  
formulation or implementation, such as in Germany and Italy. 
Partially  against  HP  3.7,  data  did  not  always  depict  the  retrenchment's  effectiveness  to  be 
significantly lower only among the core members of the externalization coalition. Because of the high 
horizontal coordination of the bargaining system, in Germany the unintended effects of the old-age 
part-time retirement schemes displayed no significant industry pattern. On the contrary, in Germany 
and in Italy the retrenchment of the pension pathway displayed distributional effects reflecting more 
clearly cleavages  between core  member  and outsiders.  In  both  countries  the  retrenchment  of  the 
pension pathway was much less effective for men than for women. Although women were more at the 
margin of unions'  membership, this  was due to the European directives on gender equality.  Their 
reception required the governments to eliminate the more favourable eligibility conditions reserved for 
women, who then endured a sharper retrenchment than men. On the contrary, the significant industry 
pattern assumed in Italy by the cohort effect was a consequence of the generous transitional rules set  
for the coalition' core members. As a result of this exclusion, the age of the entry grew significantly 
slower in construction, manufacturing, and other community than in the rest of the economy. The 
effectiveness of the pension retirement followed the opposite pattern in the Netherlands. As explained 
earlier, they were significantly less effective only in the part of the economy where the unions and  
employers associations were too weak to coordinate the shift of VUT into pre-pension schemes.  
The distributional effects estimated for retaining policies to a great extent partially HP 3.8.  In the 
Netherlands among the retaining policies that  proved to be effective,  only time reconciliation and 
employability  showed  a  significant  industry  pattern.  The  main  pattern  reflected  a  different 
dissemination of these policies by CLAs between the mid-1990's and 2009. In industries where those  
policies were less disseminated, those job quality aspects showed a much lower effect than elsewhere. 
Finally, the distributional effect of a voluntaristic dissemination of retaining policies is, according 
to a HP 3.9b and HP 3.10b, to a some extent associated to a significant effect of job aspects only in  
parts of the economy sheltered from the international competition both in Italy and in Germany. In 
Italy this is not true for time and mental health reconciliation, which are associated to a significantly 
higher age of exit across the economy. In Germany this is not true for time reconciliation, whose effect  
is  not  significant  across  the economy,  and physical  reconciliation,  whose  pattern  contradicted  the 
implication of HP 3.9b.
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With regard to the research question:
RQ4:  Under which institutional conditions have unions and employers' associations affected the  
distributional effects of activation policies in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy between the mid-
1990's and 2009?
The analysis showed that the unions and employers' associations affected not only the magnitude 
but  also  the distribution  of  the  activation  policies  effects  in  the  Netherlands,  Germany,  and Italy 
between the mid-1990's and 2009. This was because depending on their organizational articulation 
they can distribute the effect of activation policies to the whole society or to some part of it.
Partially according to HP 3.7, an articulation allowing social partners to interfere the formulation or 
the implementation of retrenchment policies  produced two distributional inequities.  In Italy social  
partners created both intra and inter generational inequities, with transitional clauses concentrating the 
effect of retrenchment policies outside their core membership and on the future generations of older  
workers. In Germany social partners generated only inter-generational inequities since they delayed 
the formulation and the implementation of retrenchment policies with no significant pattern between  
insiders  and  outsiders.  Against  HP  3.7  the  distributional  effects  of  retrenchment  policies  were 
significant  also  in  the  Netherlands,  where  social  partners  are  prevented  from  hindering  their  
formulation and implementation. The distributional effect however showed that retrenchment policies 
is lower in industries where bargaining organizations are too weak to negotiate their implementation.
Against HP 3.8, even if mutually conveyed, unions and employers associations did not prove to 
promote the effectiveness  of  retaining policies  in the  whole  economies.  The distributional  effects  
however reflect the dissemination of retaining policies carried out by CLAs and are much lower than 
elsewhere. Even if the articulation of interests' organizations is higher in Germany than in Italy, their  
distributional effects were not significantly different. From that it may be concluded that, according to 
HP 3.9b and HP 3.10b, when conveyed on an unilateral or voluntaristic bases, retaining policies are  
implemented only if required by the external circumstances. 
11.4 Conclusion
This  research  investigated  the  institutional  conditions  explaining  the  cross-national  variation  of 
activation  policies'  outcomes in  the Netherlands,  Germany,  and Italy between the mid-1990's  and 
2009.  Although socially  relevant  and innovative (Section 2.7)  this  research  suffered  from various  
limitations. 
First, comparing three cases that according to the Ebbinghaus's classification of affinities (Section 
3.3) diverge mainly in the articulation of the labour and capital interests, it is implicitly assumed that  
the activation strategy is similar. Although the similar welfare regimes posed similar pressures to all 
three countries it is evident that even the governments followed three different strategies, more far-
sighted in the Netherlands, less far-sighted in Germany, and most short-sighted in Italy.   
Second, the data on the one hand provided the unique opportunity of comparing the effectiveness of 
activation policies in the three cases under analysis. On the other hand it showed both power, validity 
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and reliability  problems,  described in the conclusions of chapter  4,  which to  a  some extent  have 
affected the estimations. The cohort effect measures the extent to which the likelihood of inflowing 
into the three pathways of exit changed after their retrenchment. The measurement is to some extent  
arbitrary, because no certainty is given that within the younger cohort is fully exposed to retrenchment  
policies as if they exited from work before their implementation. If in the previous case the risk is to  
underestimate the effectiveness of the retrenchment, this measurement is instead likely to overestimate 
it if it is considered that insufficient attempts are made to control for additional secular trends that  
delayed the retirement patterns in the younger cohort. Trends which allowed a better preservation of 
health and productivity in older age concerns the life course exposure to better nourishment, working 
conditions, health care, education may have encouraged a longer working life. The underestimation of 
these trends are of concern here under two conditions. First those trends follow significantly different  
country-specific  process  and  undermine  the  comparison  of  the  activation  policies'  effectiveness.  
Second those trends affect not only the preferences of older workers but also the preferences of their 
employers.  In  this  sense  the  slower  educational  expansion  in  Italy  may  work  as  an  alternative 
explanation of the poor effectiveness of retaining measures. In other words the comparatively lower 
propensity of employers to retain older workers in Italy than in the Netherlands may be less due to the 
different coordination of the interests' system than to the fact that in average Dutch older workers are 
more educated and thus more productive than the Italian ones.  The plausibility of this alternative 
explanation  is  however  conditional  to  the  extent  to  which  productivity  in  older  life  can  still  be  
predicted  by  the  educational  endowment  or  experiences  during  the  life  course  (such  as  training, 
working conditions, unemployment spells) play a bigger role here. More interesting is to connect the 
educational  expansion  and  the  propensity  to  technological  innovation  to  a  different  occupational  
upgrade in the younger cohort which in turn led to significantly different retirement strategies for older 
workers and their employers in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. 
Third, even under the institutional conditions that are assumed to have prevented social partners 
from hindering activation policies, their influence was not null. This is because social partners could 
affect the policymaking in more indirect ways. They could affect the strategies of political parties that  
traditionally represent their interests in the cabinet or in the opposition.  Also in consultation modes 
their opposition, without blocking the Government proposal, could nevertheless delay it. 
Fourth concerning the German case, the failure to distinguish between Western and Eastern regions 
is one if not to say the main substantial limitation of this study. This flaw prevented the exclusion of 
simpler  and  more  obvious  alternative  arguments  explaining  the  ineffectiveness  of  retrenchment 
policies along the 1990's. This argument is connected to the economic restructuring that followed the 
German  unification  and  to  the  political  use  of  early  retirement  programs  to  reduce  the  tensions 
between  the  Western  and  the  Eastern  labour  markets.  This  external  force  altered  the  country  
comparison  since  it  exerted  a  huge  pressure  to  delay  retrenchment  even  independently  from the 
interferences of the externalization coalition that the Governments in Italy and the Netherlands do not 
experience. A better solution would have been to exclude Eastern Germany or at least control for this 
economic disparity.   
Further research attempts should be devoted to solve the methodological and substantial limitations 
issued above. In particular further investigations should include an analysis of the HRM have used  
working conditions differently before and after the mid-1990's. This would clarify the extent to which 
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the effect of job quality has significantly changed between the two cohorts and how this changed can 
be interpreted as a shift of HRM strategies. The assumption on which the empirical analysis of part 3 
rely on, that is shedding HRM policies mask the effect of job quality, although plausible, needs to be  
empirically tested to better interpret the findings. Since a triple interaction between cohort job quality 
and industry is of challenging interpretation and require higher power, other solutions splitting the 
analysis by cohort opens up new methodological issues related to the comparison of the estimations.
Further research would benefit greatly from further data collection combining information about 
the work-retirement patterns and the pull and push incentives regulated by the state, social partners 
and companies. A great benchmark would be the IAB panel in Germany, which should be extended in 
other European countries also retrospectively.   
With regard to the central research question:
    To what extent has the effectiveness of  activation policies been affected by the organizational
articulation of the externalizations coalition in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy between the mid-
1990's and 2009? 
This  research  showed that  the organizational  articulation of  the externalization coalitions  affected 
significantly the effectiveness of activation policies in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy between 
the mid-1990's  and 2009.  Depending on their  articulation,  the structure of  interests'  organizations 
represented a sort of institutional infrastructure that  enabled the governments to convey activation 
policies  top-down.  This  infrastructure  constrained  first  social  partners  and  in  turn  companies  to 
support their effectiveness. The articulation of this infrastructure, affecting the style of partnership and 
thus the strategies of relevant actors, explained to a great extent the divergent outcomes of the EWL  
re-conversion in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy.  
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Table A.1: Competing risk models (CRM) estimating the effectiveness of retrenchment policies on the hazard of undertaking 
one of the four pathways of exit – The Netherlands (estimates are expressed in hazard rates).
(1) (2) (3) (3.2) (4)
Unemployment Disability Early Retirement Early Retirement Other
Cohort >1944 1.486 0.596** 0.480*** 0.305*** 0.309***
Interaction: Cohort>1994*Industry ( Ref: Construction* Cohort >1944)
Cohort >1944* Agriculture forestry and fishing 2.650
1.263
1.006
Cohort >1944*Financial intermediation 3.021*
Cohort >1944*real estate, renting and business activity 2.330
Cohort >1944*Public administration and defense, education, health and social work 1.754
Cohort >1944* other community 2.550*
Controlling variable:
Socio-demographic
Gender (Ref: men) 1.315 1.971** 0.707*** 0.707*** 5.830***
Illness: (Ref: not ill) 0.550 5.074*** 0.864 0.862 1.152
Stress (Ref: not stress) 2.051** 2.141*** 1.108 1.115 1.374
Poor health (Ref: good health) 1.332 2.361*** 0.721* 0.711* 1.036
Part-time (Ref: full-time) 0.979 0.692 0.848 0.842 1.310
Not cohabiting 4.262*** 2.046** 1.026 1.037 0.550**
Cohabiting and partner never worked 1.67e-07*** 0.760 1.860** 1.901** 1.250
Cohabiting and partner stopped working 2.050 1.748* 1.425*** 1.450*** 1.345
missing info over the partner 2.327* 1.066 1.175 1.193 0.796
0.878 0.942 0.775* 0.761* 1.275
0.688 1.072 0.743 0.723* 1.866
Petit bourgeoisie or independents (+agriculture) 0.451 0.922 0.625* 0.601* 1.629
Lower grade service and manual workers 0.400* 3.245** 0.773* 0.767* 2.230**
Semi- and non-skilled workers 1.162 2.471* 0.758 0.752 1.635
Industry: (Ref: Construction)
Agriculture forestry and fishing 1.121 0.531 0.773 0.641 2.876*
4.292e+07*** 0.503 0.974 0.929 1.454
4.143e+07*** 0.494* 0.858 0.862 1.271
Financial intermediation 1.068e+07*** 0.340 0.942 0.736 1.797
real estate, renting and business activity 0.873 0.707 0.475 0.388 2.323
1.621e+07*** 0.496* 1.218 1.088 0.826
other community 1.143e+07*** 0.764 0.788 0.631* 1.680
Failures 45 106 463 463 121
Subjects 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408
Total Observations 2,399 2,399 2,399 2,399 2,399
Cohort >1944* Manifacturing mining & quarrying
Cohort >1944* Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
Family situation: (Ref: Cohabiting and partner working)
Social class: (Ref: Intermediate occupation)
Higher salariat
lower salariat
Manifacturing mining & quarrying
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
public administration and defence, education, health and social work
BIC 737.01 1491.39 6140.05 6186.02 1716.39
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Note: Short variables' description:
Dependent variable:
Work-retirement trajectory: time-varying categorical variable equal to: 0 if the respondent is working at the end of the person-
period spell or exit employment at the statutory retirement age of 65 years, 1 if the respondent entered a unemployment pathway  
at the end of the person-period spell, 2 if the respondent entered a disability pathway  at the end of the person-period spell, 3 if the 
respondent entered a early retirement  pathway  at the end of the person-period spell,  and 4 if the respondent entered other  
pathways  at the end of the person- period spell.
Independent variables:
Cohort>1944: time-constant dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is born after 1944  
Woman: time-constant dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a woman
Illness: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious illness (such as cancer, asthma etc.) in the person-
period spell
Stress: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious situation of high stress in the person-period spell
Poor health: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent perceive their health conditions as poor in the person-period spell
Part-time: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is working in a part-time job in the person-period spell
Family situation: time-varying set of dummy variable combining information over the cohabiting status of the respondent with 
and the career of the partner in the person-period spell.
Social class:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the social class the individual belong to in the person-period spell
Industry:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the industry where the respondent is working in the person-period spell.  
For a more detailed description see Chapter 4. 
Source: Sharelife 2008-2009 release 3.1, 2010. 
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Table B.1: Competing risk models (CRM) estimating the effectiveness of retrenchment policies on the hazard of undertaking 
one of the four pathways of exit – Germany (estimates are expressed in hazard rates).
1,1 1,2 1,3 2,1 3,1 3,2 4
unemployment unemployment unemployment disability pension pension other
Cohort>=1945 0.950 0.772 0.921 0.631 0.398*** 0.281** 0.703
Interaction: Industry*Cohort>=1945 3.520 2.000
Cohort >1944* Agriculture forestry and fishing 0.704 2.042
Cohort >1944* Manifacturing mining & quarrying ref ref
Cohort >1944* Construction 0.951 1.421
Cohort >1944* Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 1.758 0.857
Cohort >1944*Financial intermediation 0.371 3.408
Cohort >1944*real estate, renting and business activity 0.295 2.705
Cohort >1944*Public administration and defense, education, health and social work 1.872 0.314
Cohort >1944* other community 0.278 1.040




Woman (Ref: Man) 1.652*** 1.676*** 1.600** 0.960 1.012 1.002 3.315***
Illness (Ref: not ill) 0.840 0.826 0.884 4.706*** 1.134 1.112 1.823
Stress (Ref. Not-stress) 1.365 1.311 1.322 1.537 0.977 0.971 1.274
Poor health (Ref: good health) 1.329 1.354 1.375 3.952*** 1.225 1.223 0.670
Part-time (Ref: Full-time) 0.567** 0.304*** 0.324*** 1.593 0.803 0.791 2.385***
Family situation:
Cohabiting and partner is working 0.918 0.905 0.889 3.715*** 1.061 1.057 0.829
Not cohabited 0.616 0.574 0.554 0.494 1.771** 1.722** 1.71e-06***
Cohabiting and partner never worked ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Cohabiting and partner stopped working 1.565** 1.525** 1.500** 2.286** 1.311** 1.305** 0.861
Missing Information over the partners 1.395 1.389 1.379 0.654 0.892 0.896 1.403
Social class
Higher salariat ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
Lower salariat 1.704 1.686 1.778* 0.578 0.841 0.825 1.050
Intermediate Occupation 1.087 1.067 1.137 4.006* 1.165 1.153 1.093
Petit bourgeoisie or independents (+agriculture) 0.403 0.397 0.407 3.450 0.884 0.900 0.968
Lower grade service and manual workers 1.249 1.222 1.297 3.988* 1.211 1.199 1.184
Semi- and non-skilled workers 2.236** 2.196** 2.321** 7.106** 0.881 0.879 0.716
Industry
 Agriculture forestry and fishing 0.557 0.542 0.358 0.538 1.704** 1.566 0.520
 Manifacturing mining & quarrying 1.331 1.287 1.414 0.393* 1.276 1.183 0.828
 Construction ref ref ref ref ref ref ref
 Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 1.176 1.173 1.199 0.391** 1.203 1.155 0.834
Financial intermediation 0.536 0.518 0.449 0.159* 1.528* 1.512* 0.750
real estate, renting and business activity 1.133 1.144 1.972 0.717 0.585 0.394 1.466
Public administration and defense, 0.332** 0.325** 0.428 0.294** 1.238 1.127 0.618
other community 0.894 0.910 0.625 0.335** 1.134 1.239 0.502
Education, health and social work 0.562 0.539 0.858 0.608 1.339 1.343 0.400
BIC 2560,33 2560,79 2611,34 996,1 6406,59 6456,28 1345,55
177 177 177 66 331 331 88
Subjects 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380
Observations 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469 2,469
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Number of events
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Note: Short variables' description:
Dependent variable:
Work-retirement trajectory: time-varying categorical variable equal to: 0 if the respondent is working at the end of the person-
period spell or exit employment at the statutory retirement age of 65 years, 1 if the respondent entered a unemployment pathway  
at the end of the person-period spell, 2 if the respondent entered a disability pathway  at the end of the person-period spell, 3 if the 
respondent entered a early retirement  pathway  at the end of the person-period spell,  and 4 if the respondent entered other  
pathways  at the end of the person- period spell.
Independent variables:
Cohort>1944: time-constant dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is born after 1944  
Woman: time-constant dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a woman
Illness: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious illness (such as cancer, asthma etc.) in the person-
period spell
Stress: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious situation of high stress in the person-period spell
Poor health: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent perceive their health conditions as poor in the person-period spell
Part-time: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is working in a part-time job in the person-period spell
Family situation: time-varying set of dummy variable combining information over the cohabiting status of the respondent with 
and the career of the partner in the person-period spell.
Social class:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the social class the individual belong to in the person-period spell
Industry:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the industry where the respondent is working in the person-period spell.  
For a more detailed description see Chapter 4. 
Source: Sharelife 2008-2009 release 3.1, 2010. 
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Table C.1: Competing risk models (CRM) estimating the effectiveness of retrenchment policies on the hazard of undertaking 
one of the four pathways of exit – Italy (estimates are expressed in hazard rates).
1.1 1.2 2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4
UnemploymentUnemployment Disability Pension Pension Pension Pension Other
Cohort>=1945 2.448** 1.052 0.498 0.702*** 0.601*** 0.595*** 0.596*** 0.860
Interaction: Industry*Cohort>=1945 
Cohort >1944* Agriculture forestry and fishing 2.95e-06*** 0.930 0.933 1.047
1.861 1.476 1.489 1.531*
Cohort >1944* Construction 3.712e+06*** 1.849* 1.868* 2.037**
1.517 0.746 0.751 0.842
Cohort >1944*Financial intermediation 1.184 2.666 2.655 2.685
Cohort >1944*real estate, renting and business activity 0.918 3.51e-06*** 3.57e-06*** 4.14e-06***
Cohort >1944*Public administration and defense, education, health and social work Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Cohort >1944* other community 6.291 1.268 1.605* 1.695*




Woman (Ref: Man) 0.709 0.710 1.267 0.708*** 0.713*** 0.746*** 0.748*** 4.530***
Illness (Ref: not ill) 1.001 0.969 0.436 1.362* 1.340* 1.348* 1.353* 1.192
Stress (Ref. Not-stress) 1.022 1.038 0.645 1.283** 1.274* 1.270* 1.259* 1.004
Poor health (Ref: good health) 4.264*** 4.457*** 8.392*** 0.952 0.962 0.953 0.952 1.780**
Part-time (Ref: Full-time) 1.577 1.562 5.91e-08*** 0.320*** 0.322*** 0.327*** 0.328*** 1.373
Family situation:
Cohabiting and partner is working Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Not cohabited 3.071** 3.061** 2.282 1.077 1.066 1.063 1.063 0.932
Cohabiting and partner never worked 1.981 1.949 2.364 1.103 1.087 1.096 1.101 0.559*
Cohabiting and partner stopped working 1.105 1.069 0.570 1.453*** 1.428*** 1.438*** 1.435*** 0.908
Missing Information over the partners 0.307 0.307 0.544 1.364** 1.365** 1.377** 1.380** 0.825
Social class
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
1.116 1.089 1.299 1.045 1.065 1.062 1.064 1.569
Intermediate Occupation 0.964 1.029 1.009 1.210 1.232 1.241 1.236 0.678
Petit bourgeoisie or independents (+agriculture) 1.261 1.324 2.942e+07*** 2.313** 2.322** 2.357** 2.166** 2.094
Lower grade service and manual workers 1.021 1.175 2.417e+07*** 1.038 1.056 1.058 1.057 0.943
Semi- and non-skilled workers 0.882 0.917 1.184e+07*** 1.116 1.148 1.159 1.161 1.250
Industry
 Agriculture forestry and fishing 0.922 0.765 7.43e-08*** 1.007 0.980 0.979 0.953 1.826*
5.406* 3.687 1.315 1.269* 1.115 1.117 1.107 2.879***
 Construction 3.384 2.58e-06*** 4.337 0.714** 0.600*** 0.607*** 0.597*** 2.829**
7.714** 5.719 0.747 0.894 0.938 0.944 0.917 3.544***
Financial intermediation 4.20e-06*** 2.23e-06*** 1.869 1.306 0.889 0.903 0.896 6.472***
real estate, renting and business activity 2.06e-06*** 1.31e-06*** 0.868 1.454 1.627 1.648 1.599 1.49e-05***
Public administration and defense, education, health and social work Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
other community 3.112 0.929 4.029 0.907 0.833 0.835 0.823 3.614***
Employment relationship
Self-employed (Ref: employee) 0.761 0.274*** 0.277*** 0.273*** 0.320*** 0.567
Number of events
Observations 2,199 2,199 2,199 2,199 2,199 2,199 2,199 2,199
Cohort >1944* Manifacturing mining & quarrying
Cohort >1944* Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca
Higher salariat
Lower salariat
 Manifacturing mining & quarrying
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Note: Short variables' description:
Dependent variable:
Work-retirement trajectory: time-varying categorical variable equal to: 0 if the respondent is working at the end of the person-
period spell or exit employment at the statutory retirement age of 65 years, 1 if the respondent entered a unemployment pathway  
at the end of the person-period spell, 2 if the respondent entered a disability pathway  at the end of the person-period spell, 3 if the 
respondent entered a early retirement  pathway  at the end of the person-period spell,  and 4 if the respondent entered other  
pathways  at the end of the person- period spell.
Independent variables:
Cohort>1944: time-constant dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is born after 1944  
Woman: time-constant dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a woman
Illness: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious illness (such as cancer, asthma etc.) in the person-
period spell
Stress: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious situation of high stress in the person-period spell
Poor health: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent perceive their health conditions as poor in the person-period spell
Part-time: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is working in a part-time job in the person-period spell
Family situation: time-varying set of dummy variable combining information over the cohabiting status of the respondent with 
and the career of the partner in the person-period spell.
Social class:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the social class the individual belong to in the person-period spell
Industry:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the industry where the respondent is working in the person-period spell.  
For a more detailed description see Chapter 4. 
Source: Sharelife 2008-2009 release 3.1, 2010. 
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Table  D.1:  Piecewise-constant  exponential  model  (PCE)  estimating  the effectiveness  of  retaining  policies  in  extending 
working life in the Netherlands for controls.
Source: Sharelife 2008-2009 release 3.1, 2010
8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6
Age 49-54 0.0497*** 0.0173*** 0.147 0.0788 0.118 0.00211***
Age 55-59 0.116*** 0.0412*** 0.348 0.184 0.276 0.00508***
Age 60-65 0.510 0.183* 1.540 0.816 1.216 0.0230**
Socio-demographic characteristics:
Gender (Ref: man) 1.128 1.069 1.124 1.114 1.112 1.141
illness (Ref: not ill) 2.374*** 2.512*** 2.426*** 2.427*** 2.489*** 2.574***
stress (Ref: not stress) 1.868*** 1.812*** 1.872*** 1.863*** 1.877*** 1.827***
poor health (Ref: good health) 1.313 1.270 1.358 1.284 1.299 1.283
Cohabiting and partner working Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Not cohabiting 0.850 0.885 0.867 0.839 0.868 0.853
Cohabiting and the partner never worked 3.676** 3.788** 3.432** 3.531** 3.725** 3.376**
Cohabiting and the partner stopped working 1.588*** 1.625*** 1.544** 1.596*** 1.596*** 1.547**
missing info over the partner 0.896 0.865 0.891 0.900 0.881 0.931
Intermediate occupation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Higher salariat 0.711 0.658 0.550 0.670 0.723 0.589
Lower salariat 0.828 0.819 0.662 0.776 0.867 0.663
Petty bourgeoisie or self-employed (incl. Agriculture) 0.881 0.774 0.660 0.820 0.893 0.708
Lower grade service and manual workers 0.804 0.742 0.613 0.778 0.831 0.690
Semi- and non skilled workers 0.651 0.653 0.541 0.635 0.628 0.580
Agriculture, forestry and fishery Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Manufacturing, mining & quarrying 0.826 2.097 0.190 0.305 0.281 8.412
Construction 0.764 2.223 0.592 0.297 1.458 53.15**
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 0.703 2.505 0.358 0.427 0.225 17.99*
Financial intermediation 0.863 2.383 0.239 0.572 0.222 102.7**
Real estate renting and business activity 0.878 1.837 0.103 0.895 0.135 83.12
Public Administration and difence, education, health and social work 0.708 2.222 0.311 0.530 0.312 32.48**
Other community 0.875 2.456 1.504 0.768 0.294 23.29**
Failures 218 218 218 218 218 218
Subjects 809 809 809 809 809 809
Total observations 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239 2,239
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Family situation:  
Social class: 
Industry: 
BIC 1033.42 1068.58 1077.92 1084.40 1084.54 1073.04
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Note: Short variables' description:
Dependent variable:
Work-retirement trajectory: time-varying categorical variable equal to: 0 if the respondent is working at the end of the person-
period spell, 1 if the respondent left employment  at the end of the person-period spell
Independent variables:
Time reconciliation: : time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is working in a part-time job in the person-period spell
Physical health reconciliation:  time-constant interval scale obtained by Factor Analysis (see chap.4) equal from 1 to 4. It  
measure measuring the self-perceived quality of the material working conditions in the last/current job by looking at how the job 
is physically demanding and the workspace comfortable
Mental  health reconciliation:  time-constant interval  scale  obtained by Factor Analysis  (see  chap.4)  equal  from 1 to  4.  It  
measures the self-perceived  emotional burden of the last/current job looking at the time pressure, the emotional burden, and  
conflicts that the work implies.
Age equality: time-constant interval scale obtained by Factor Analysis (see chap.4) equal from 1 to 4 measuring elf-perceived  
recognition and support  on the last job, the quality of the working atmosphere and the respondents' perception over how fairly  
they are treated by their bosses 
Employability:  time-constant interval scale equal from 1 to 4 measuring the extent  to which the skills of respondents are  
developed in the last/current.
Gender: time-constant dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a woman
Illness: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious illness (such as cancer, asthma etc.) in the person-
period spell
Stress: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious situation of high stress in the person-period spell
Poor health: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent perceive their health conditions as poor in the person-period spell
Family situation: time-varying set of dummy variable combining information over the cohabiting status of the respondent with 
and the career of the partner in the person-period spell.
Social class:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the social class the individual belong to in the person-period spell
Industry:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the industry where the respondent is working in the person-period spell.  
For a more detailed description see Chapter 4. 
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Table  E.1:  Piecewise-constant  exponential  model  (PCE)  estimating  the  effectiveness  of  retaining  policies  in  extending 
working life in Germany for controls.
Source: Sharelife 2008-2009.
Note: Short variables' description:
Dependent variable:
Work-retirement trajectory: time-varying categorical variable equal to: 0 if the respondent is working at the end of the person-
period spell, 1 if the respondent left employment  at the end of the person-period spell
Independent variables:
Gender: time-constant dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a woman
Illness: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious illness (such as cancer, asthma etc.) in the person-
period spell
Stress: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious situation of high stress in the person-period spell
Poor health: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent perceive their health conditions as poor in the person-period spell
Family situation: time-varying set of dummy variable combining information over the cohabiting status of the respondent with 
and the career of the partner in the person-period spell.
Social class:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the social class the individual belong to in the person-period spell
Industry:  time-varying set of dummy variable over the industry where the respondent is working in the person-period spell.  
For a more detailed description see Chapter 4. 
9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7
Age 49-54 0.00317*** 0.00284*** 0.00266*** 0.00457*** 0.00172*** 0.00210*** 0.00212***
Age 55-59 0.00630*** 0.00562*** 0.00530*** 0.00913*** 0.00357*** 0.00425*** 0.00430***
Age 60-65 0.0202*** 0.0181*** 0.0178*** 0.0297*** 0.0125*** 0.0138*** 0.0145***
Family situation:
Not cohabiting 1.276 1.274 1.290 1.276 1.254 1.267 1.295
Cohabiting and partner never worked 5.446 5.900* 11.05** 5.322 8.304** 6.029* 6.151*
Cohabiting and partner working
Cohabiting and partner stopped working 1.189 1.199 1.178 1.222 1.222 1.224 1.231
missing information over partner 0.929 0.927 0.943 0.880 0.993 0.981 1.011
Social class:
Higher Salariat 2.190 2.127 2.244 2.312 2.602 2.484 2.288
Lower Salariat 2.410 2.428 2.493 2.506 2.831* 2.569 2.521
Petty bourgeoisie and self-employed (incl. Agriculture) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Intermediate occupations 2.560* 2.604* 2.642* 2.776* 2.966* 2.728* 2.798*
Lower grade service and manual workers 3.149** 3.197** 3.257** 3.271** 4.118** 3.393** 3.541**
Semi- and non skilled workers 5.089*** 5.113*** 5.292*** 4.769** 7.013*** 5.324*** 5.784***
Industry:
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 1.717 1.698 1.714 1.020 0.926 20.05** 1.510
Manufacturing, mining & quarrying Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Construction 1.172 1.186 1.196 0.654 7.159*** 0.988 15.92**
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 1.087 1.080 1.061 0.449 1.318 0.766 1.351
Financial intermediation 1.759 1.813 1.619 0.187 3.008 0.387 0.492
Real estate renting and business activity 0.863 0.882 0.640 1.781 0.396 0.0952 0.0264
Other community 1.642 1.712 2.733* 1.611 3.294* 0.111 0.438
Public Administration and defense 0.684 0.704 0.695 0.630 1.017 1.227 0.772
 Education, health and social work 0.407** 0.404** 0.263*** 0.0915** 0.335** 4.880 1.429
Personal characteristics:
Illness 2.622*** 2.730*** 2.596*** 2.664*** 3.083*** 2.673*** 2.724***
stress 2.095*** 2.092*** 2.081*** 2.171*** 2.029*** 1.980*** 1.944***
poor health 1.691** 1.653** 1.697** 1.845** 1.559* 1.763** 1.662**
Women 1.059 1.143 1.164 1.176 1.307 1.209 1.247


















825.64 830.08 881.57 876.77 872.96 879.52 879.65
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Appendix F – Piecewise-constant exponential model for 
Italy
Table  F.1:  Piecewise-constant  exponential  model  (PCE)  estimating  the  effectiveness  of  retaining  policies  in  extending 
working life in Italy for controls.
Source: Sharelife 2008-2009
Note: Short variables' description:
Dependent variable:
Work-retirement trajectory: time-varying categorical variable equal to: 0 if the respondent is working at the end of the person-
period spell, 1 if the respondent left employment at the end of the person-period spell
Independent variables:
Gender: time-constant dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a woman
Illness: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious illness (such as cancer, asthma etc.) in the person-
period spell
Stress: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent experience a serious situation of high stress in the person-period spell
Poor health: time-varying dummy equal to 1 if the respondent perceive their health conditions as poor in the person-period spell
Family situation: time-varying set of dummy variable combining information over the cohabiting status of the respondent with 
and the career of the partner in the person-period spell.
Social class: time-varying set of dummy variable over the social class the individual belong to in the person-period spell
Industry: time-varying set of dummy variable over the industry where the respondent is working in the person-period spell. 
For a more detailed description see Chapter 4. 
10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7
Controls:
Family situation
Not cohabiting 1.055 1.060 1.087 1.102 1.035 1.047 1.017
Cohabiting and partner never worked 0.750 0.773 0.771 0.798 0.754 0.755 0.742
Cohabiting and partner working Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Cohabiting and partner stopped working 1.141 1.146 1.160 1.170 1.145 1.124 1.140
missing information over partner 1.103 1.116 1.124 1.126 1.121 1.117 1.083
Social class
Higher Salariat 0.767 0.778 0.770 0.808 0.822 0.811 0.808
Lower Salariat 0.943 0.972 0.954 1.002 1.074 1.030 0.935
Petty bourgeoisie and self-employed (incl. Agriculture) 0.724 0.752 0.736 0.778 0.833 0.783 0.696
Intermediate occupations Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Lower grade service and manual workers 0.737 0.747 0.736 0.763 0.814 0.798 0.715
Semi- and non skilled workers 1.013 1.030 1.005 1.038 1.140 1.070 0.977
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 0.464** 0.461** 0.435** 0.509 0.384 0.875 0.534
Industry:
Manufacturing, mining & quarrying
Construction 0.619* 0.614* 0.589** 0.603 1.324 1.969 0.858
Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage & horeca 0.574*** 0.562*** 0.517*** 0.367*** 0.443** 0.700 0.555
Financial intermediation 1.664 1.629 1.589 0.711 1.447 3.452 4.523*
Real estate renting and business activity 6.02e-06 1.20e-05 3.91e-06 6.87e-06 7.56e-06 3.64e-06 5.57e-06
Public Administration and difence, education, health and social work 0.439*** 0.444*** 0.429*** 0.379** 0.454** 0.811 0.866
Other community 0.790 0.764 0.785 0.668 0.862 1.608 0.935
Personal characteristics:
Illness 1.249 1.209 1.181 1.234 1.252 1.237 1.210
stress 1.583*** 1.578*** 1.574*** 1.558** 1.591*** 1.619*** 1.531**
poor health 2.049*** 2.108*** 2.128*** 2.081*** 2.172*** 2.159*** 2.134***



















1156.75 1159.27 1191.35 1206.88 1202.87 1204.99 1204.23
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List of abbreviations
Abbreviations Original name English translation
AOW Algemene Ouderdomswet General Old-age Act 
BDA Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbände
Confederation of German Employers' 
Associations
CCME Centrally-Coordinated Market Economies
CGIL Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Lavoratori General Italian confederation of workers
CIF Cumulative Incidence Function
CIG Cassa Integrazione Guagagni Earning support funds
CISL Confederatione Italiana dei Sindacati dei Lavoratori Italian Confederation of the unions
CLA Collective Labour Agreements 
CNEL Consiglio Nazionale Economia Lavoro National council for economics and work
Confindustria Confederazione degli imprenditori dell'industria Confederation of employers in the 
manufactoring industry
Confartigianato Confederazione degli imprenditori dell' artigianato Confederation of employers in the craft 
industry
Confcommercio Confederazione degli imprenditori del commercio Confederation of employers in the trade 
industry
CR model Competing Risk model
DGB Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund Confederation of the German trade unions
EHA Event History Analysis
ESEC European Socia-Economic Classification
EWL Extending Working Life 
FA Factor Analysis
HP { } Hypothesis { }
HRM Human Resource Management
ILM Internal Labour Market
ILO International Labour Organization
IPF Iterative Principal Factor
KM-estimators Kaplan-Meier estimators
LHC Life History Calendars
LME Liberal Market Economies
MSSD Most similar systems designed
NA Non agreement
OMC Open Method of Coordination
OP Option Value
PCE model Piecewise-Constant exponential model
Piccola Industria Associazione degli imprenditori della piccola 
impresa
Association of employers of small companies
SCME Sector-Coordinated Market Economies
SER Sociaal Economische Raad Social and Economic Council
SMOE Specific Measures for Older Employees
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SQ Status quo
SSW Social Security Wealth
 STvdA Stichting van de Arbeid Labour Foundation
StCME State-Coordinated Market Economies
TAV Wet Terugdringing Arbeidsongeschiktheids Volume Act on reducing disability volume
TBA Wet Terugdringing Beroep op de 
Arbeidsongeschiktheidsregelingen
Act on reducing disability claims
TZ Wet Terugdringing Ziekteverzuim Act on reducing sickness absence
UIL Unione Italiana Lavoratori Italian union of workers
VoC Varieties of Capitalism
VUT Vervroegde Uittredingsregelingen Early retirement schemes
WHO World Health Organization
ZW Ziektewet Sickness Act
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